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BY THOMAS NELSON PAGE

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JOHN MARVEL, ASSISTANT
GORDON KEITH
RED ROCK
ON NEWFOUND RIVER
THE OLD GENTLEMAN OF THE BLACK STOCK
IN OLE VIRGINIA
UNDER THE CRUST
BRED IN THE BONE
THE BURIAL OF THE GUNS
PASTIME STORIES
ELSKET, AND OTHER STORIES

ITALY AND THE WORLD WAR
ROBERT E. LEE, MAN AND SOLDIER
THE OLD DOMINION: HER MAKING AND HER
MANNERS
THE OLD SOUTH
SOCIAL LIFE IN OLD VIRGINIA BEFORE THE
WAR
THE NEGRO: THE SOUTHERNER'S PROBLEM
THE COAST OF BOHEMIA
"BEFO' DE WAR"
MARSE CHAN
MEH LADY
POLLY
UNC' EDINBURG
THE STRANGER'S FEW

SANTA CLAUS'S PARTNER
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ITALY AND THE WORLD WAR


ITALY AND THE WORLD WAR

BY
↓
THOMAS NELSON PAGE, 1853
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO ITALY
FROM 1913 TO 1919

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK
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DEDICATED
WITH PROFOUND APPRECIATION
TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
WHO, UNDER THEIR NOBLE LEADER, VICTOR EMMANUEL III
BY THEIR HEROIC COURAGE AND YET MORE HEROIC SACRIFICES
CONTRIBUTED DURING THE GREAT WAR
SO MUCH TO SAVE THE CIVILIZATION
WHICH THEY HAD DONE SO MUCH TO CREATE

PREFACE

It is not my intention to attempt a formal history of Italy's part in the war, but only to narrate briefly the story of her historic and actual relation to this—the greatest Revolution of which the Annals of Humanity contain any record. A history would demand years of study and labor. But as one who was present during the entire period of the war and was a close and interested observer of all that went on in Italy and about Italy, I feel that, possibly, I may be able to throw some light on what has hitherto certainly not been completely appreciated by those outside of Italy.

One cannot live among a people during years of extreme tension and sacrifice and devotion to a great cause without coming to be in sympathy with them. No more does one have to go the full length of extremists among a people to testify such sympathy. Nor does Italy need any defense. With her ten months' preparation and her three years and a half of war; with her half-million dead and her million and a half wounded, with the deprivation, hardships, and sacrifices of her whole people unmeasured by anything similar among her western allies, she needs to have presented and made known only the simple truth.

In undertaking to speak with any completeness of any great historical movement, whether in a brief or broad compass, it is necessary, in order to secure a proper background, to go back a considerable distance, as no great movement can be comprehended without a knowledge of the economic and historical conditions which caused it or which, at least, gave to it its distinctive character. Without a proper background against which to project the picture, no perspective can be obtained, and no sound idea can be had of its relation to other contemporary movements. This is necessary in any case, but it is more imperative in the case of a country like Italy and a people like the Italian people,

whose life goes back almost to the dawn of history, and whose present is indissolubly connected with the past.

How can a reasonably just picture be given of a country whose capital is Rome and whose roads stretching north and south therefrom were built by and bear the names to-day of a decemvir and of a consul who was slain by Hannibal, without taking into account the continuity of its people and the causes which have contributed thereto? The following anecdote may serve to illustrate this idea.

One of the famous palaces of Rome to-day is the Palazzo Massimo, the home of Prince Massimo. The story goes that Napoleon asked the present occupant's grandfather if it were true that he was descended from Fabius Maximus. The reply was: "I do not know that it is true, but it has been a tradition in the family for some thirteen or fourteen hundred years."

It is not only Rome that is eternal, it is the Italian People that is eternal. It is Italy that is eternal, and that was eternal even when Metternich declared that Italy was only a Geographical Expression—as eternal as the seas which wash her shores: seas which Ulysses sailed and which Homer sang.

Based on this idea—that the key to Italy's relation to the War is to be found in her traditions; her history—especially during the last hundred years—and in her geographical and economic situation, this work is divided into three parts. The first is introductory and contains in outline the History of the Italian People in the long period when they were included in and bound under the Holy Roman Empire. The second contains the story of their evolution, from the conception of their National Consciousness on through the long and bitter struggle with the Austrian Empire for their Liberty, down to the time when, under a Constitutional Sovereign, they developed into a new and United Italy, to become, almost at a bound, one of the Great Powers of Europe; yet with one step before her: the complete rounding out of her People, and the possession of her ancient strategic frontiers.

The third part contains the story of the Diplomatic struggle to establish herself in a position to which Italy considered herself entitled as a Great Power and on which she had set what she believes her legitimate Aspirations, by virtue of her contribution to the World both in the Past and in this World War.

What she performed in the War is related briefly that the Reader may know what one who was present in Italy throughout the War was able to learn on the spot of the part played therein by the Italian People.

T. N. P.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY—THE CONCEPTION OF ITALIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS	1
II. NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE FIRST WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE	13
III. ITALY ATTAINS HER UNION	36
IV. ITALY BETWEEN FRANCE AND AUSTRIA	54
V. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	66
VI. ITALY AND THE BALKANS	72
VII. UNDER THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	85
VIII. ITALY AND THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	95
IX. THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	114
X. ITALY'S SITUATION AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR	142
XI. ITALY'S ATTITUDE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR	162
XII. ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AUTUMN OF 1914	179
XIII. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN INTRIGUES TO KEEP ITALY NEUTRAL	191
XIV. CONDITIONS WHEN ITALY ENTERED THE WAR	208
XV. ITALY'S FIRST YEAR OF WAR	222
XVI. ITALY AND THE ALLIED CAUSE IN 1916	245
XVII. ITALY IN THE DARK PERIOD OF THE WAR	277
XVIII. ITALY'S WORK IN THE OFFENSIVE OF 1917	296

CHAPTER		PAGE
XIX.	THE DISASTER OF CAPORETTO	303
XX.	THE PACT OF LONDON AND THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPLES	324
XXI.	ITALY AND THE LAST CAMPAIGN	353
XXII.	ITALY'S VICTORY AND THE COLLAPSE OF AUSTRIA .	372
XXIII.	ITALY'S DIFFICULTIES AFTER THE VICTORY . . .	387
	APPENDICES	405
	INDEX	413

MAPS

	FACING PAGE
The Unification of Italy	38
Istrian and Dalmatian Littoral with Ancient Venetian Boundary	56
Europe at the Time of Italy's Entry into the War	206
Theatre of the Italian War	224
The Trentino Offensive, May-June, 1916	254
The Austro-German Drive at Caporetto, October, 1917, Showing the Breaks in the Italian Lines	310

ITALY AND THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE CONCEPTION OF ITALIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

To understand fully Italy's relation to the great war, we must go back to the historic causes. To have a complete conception of the underlying principles and motives which controlled her action, one must have a reasonably complete knowledge of her relation to France and Austria during the period of the reconstruction of Europe—and especially during the last century. Where the problem is so complex, one must know the clew to find the true solution.

The relations of the European States to each other are, in fact, so complex, and the questions involved in those relations are so inextricably entangled, that without a knowledge of their history it is quite impossible to understand them. They extend back through the centuries, and include dynastic rivalries and territorial claims; they include and are intensified by religious antagonisms, and racial and traditional contentions. But under all lie economic and fundamental causes—the eternal law of supply and demand. And with these the prizes that men strive for through the ages, and will strive for more and more as population increases and civilization advances—the means of living more and more easily, and of displaying more and more the power of superior organization of human forces. And closely connected with this is the command of the highways of traffic. Nineveh, Babylon, Carthage, Rome, Bagdad, Constantinople, Venice, Paris, London—the story at bottom is the same—the aim to possess the fertile places of the earth, and to gain access thereto, whether in Spain, North Africa, the Valley of the Po, the Danube, or the Rhine. And the con-

trol of the highways by land or by sea lies at the base of their history in ancient as in modern times, whether it be of the Brenner or the Carnic Passes; of the Adriatic or Egean Seas, or of the eastern Mediterranean, most noted of all historic highways; of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; or of the Suez Canal and the Hamburg-Bagdad Railway.

The Punic wars were for the wheat-fields of Sicily and North Africa; for the coastwise and inland trade and the control of the Mediterranean; and for the supremacy of the conflicting civilizations engaged therein. The World War was fundamentally for the control of the great fields of enterprise in Asia and Africa, and of the highways leading thereto; and for the dominance of the conflicting ideas applied in the process. It was this aim which brought the Medes and Persians down into Mesopotamia; the Huns and Goths into Italy in ancient days; which brought the Cossacks to the Don; the Franks to France; the Slavs into the Balkan peninsula—to the shores of the Ionian and Adriatic Seas; which brought the Ottoman Turks to Constantinople and to the gates of Vienna. And it was this which set on foot the enterprise of reducing the world under German rule.

The history of Italy during the Middle Ages is so bound up with that of what is now known as Austria; but was then known sometimes as "the German Empire," sometimes as "the Holy Roman Empire," that to understand the one we must comprehend the other also, and the relations between them.

Without going back save to state that, although when the chief ruler of Europe and the source of future Emperors, Charlemagne, was crowned Emperor at Rome (A. D. 800) it resulted in what was termed later "the transference of the Empire from the Greeks to the Franks," it may be said that "the Holy Roman Empire," in the sense which it commonly bore in later centuries as "The Sovereignty of Germany and Italy under a Germanic prince," began with Otto the Great, descended from Charlemagne through a female line.

From this time the struggle for supremacy over Italy proceeded with fluctuating degrees of success down to our own time, and the history of Italy has never been wholly free from the effects of this struggle. Emperors succeeded each other and Imperial houses rose and fell, one after another, all exercising or claiming rights over Italy which affected, in greater or less degree, Italy and the Italian people. Popes rose and passed away, contesting or yielding to the Imperial claims; often conquered; sometimes victorious; but always Italy and dominion over the Italian people were the prizes for which they strove, and the Italian people were the victims of their strife. Emperor after Emperor invaded Italy and claimed sovereignty over her dismembered parts, accepted by the rulers or resisted by them; working with them or rejected by them. At times the claims were relinquished only to be reasserted later on.

The contest that went on so long was intensified by the rivalry between the head of the Empire and the head of the Church for supremacy. It began far back. It had its origin in the very foundation of the Empire on a Christian basis, and of Christianity on an Imperial basis. The "Donation of Constantine" was a long-subsequent invention to meet a certain political situation; but the contention for the supremacy between the Emperor and the Pope had long raged, each claiming that the other was his subordinate and vassal. With a relation at first accepted by both, one side from time to time encroached on the rights of Emperor or Pope, drawing their people into the quarrel. It had its apogee, after a long contest over investitures of ecclesiastics, when in 1077 at Canossa the Emperor Henry IV, excommunicated by the Pope and abandoned by many of his supporters, stood barefooted in the snow to do penance before Pope Gregory VII. Both Emperor and Pope died in exile; but both maintained their contention and handed it down to their successors to be the source of future quarrels as immortal as their respective titles. It has been said that the resentment felt by the German people, or their rulers, at the humiliation put on the German Em-

peror by the Roman Supreme Pontiff had its direct fruit in the Reformation and the support it found in Germany three centuries later. And all through the centuries, whatever their relations otherwise might be, the respective claims to supremacy kept them in an unending rivalry which colored and emphasized the division between their respective peoples and furnished ever fresh grounds for renewed conflict.

The long and fateful conflict (1160-90) between the Emperor Barbarossa and the Pope Alexander, in coalition with the Lombard League and Sicily, whatever prescriptive right there may have been on the Emperor's side, and whatever selfish political ambition may have been on the side of the others, was at bottom a contest as to whether Italy should be governed by Italian or by foreign rulers; and the latter won. Then came Innocent III, who asserted his claim to rule all Italy, and for a time appeared to have made it good against the Henrys of Germany. Then after a time the old fight was renewed and presently Italy was divided in the long contest between Guelfs and Ghibellines: representatives of, at least, the contest between domestic and foreign tyranny and later between degrees of the former.

After the interregnum which covered the period from the death of Frederick II, or of his son, Conrad IV, the conditions became so insupportable that a new German Emperor had to be chosen, and the choice fell on Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, who was chosen in 1273 and became the founder of the Austrian House and Empire.

It was a long road that stretched before them, but from the beginning to the end, however the tides of fortune ebbed and flowed, there was always Italy left, its people, however divided and antagonistic among themselves, still Italians, still proud, even arrogant, because of Rome, because of Italy with her memories of Rome. Sunk in misery, debased in some sections by conditions which would have debased any people and might have destroyed any other; engaged as they were in interminable internecine strifes, and subject to the rule of strangers, they yet retained something that

held them by a common bond united against the Stranger's subjugation, and this was the Italian spirit. Its great source was far back in the past, and like that river which courses under mountain and ocean to burst forth in the Garden of the Sun, its current was lost in the desert of the Dark Ages to issue forth with unabated force and ever-increasing volume in later days. In the past they—the people—had been conceded as their portion, at least, *panem et circenses*, and they still held that their right to food and recreation was inalienable. They were ever ready to rise for their rights; to close their gates and to ring their bells against all invasion thereof, as against even the victorious Charles VIII. Often they rose against their local tyrants; at times, indeed, against Emperors and Kings and Popes. And, although the cost was dear, they possessed inherent traits which made it possible to pay it and still survive with a potential endowment of racial and even national consciousness which to-day is found in the Italian word "Italianità."

It would lead too far afield to undertake to follow in any detail the tortuous and broken course of Austria's violation of and dealings with Italy.

Italy, from the death of Frederick II in 1250, had been sensibly emancipated from the Imperial power, although several Emperors entered Italy and many claimed Imperial power over her; and some, even of the great Italians, dreamed of an Emperor, suzerain of all powers and peoples under him, and an Italy recognizing his suzerainty, yet free within herself. This Utopian dream filled even great Dante's cosmic mind. But the reign of the last German Emperor who was crowned in Rome, Frederick III, ended the year after America was discovered and thenceforward, however divided and torn by internecine strife; however invaded by Imperial rulers; and bound and harried by ducal scions of the Imperial German-Austrian House, Italy's dreams were of herself. From Dante and Petrarch and Tasso to Mazzini and Carducci, the dreams were of Italy—the Italy of the Italians, free and rounded out.

Maximilian I, who has been said to be the true founder

of the House of Hapsburg, came to the throne the year after America was discovered, and, although he obtained from the Pope (Julius II) the right to the title of "Emperor Elect," he never reached Rome and he was essentially Emperor of the German Empire, rather than of the Roman Empire.¹

His grandson, Charles V, was crowned by the Pope, but at Bologna, and, however his power may have extended over northern Italy, it did not reach Rome.

Strengthened on the one hand by the acquisition of the Netherlands, the Austro-German Emperor had lost on the other by the repudiation of his suzerainty on the part of Poland, Bohemia, Switzerland, and Burgundy, as well as Italy. Thenceforth, however persistently the House of Hapsburg claimed and invaded and fought for it, conquered parts of it and established its provinces in its duchies, Italy was Italy, and the Italians were Italians.

Whatever the leaders may have thought, the people felt differently—and with them feeling was deeper than thought.

Meantime, a stronger power had grown up on the western side of Italy: the Kingdom of France.

In the last half of the fifteenth century, Burgundy and Provence fell to France, and Switzerland was breaking loose, to become practically independent of the German Empire in 1500, and be recognized by Europe a century and a half later (Treaty of Westphalia, 1648) as an independent state.

The great Duchy of Burgundy, falling to France, made the latter a formidable rival to the Austro-German Empire; and this rivalry, extending to the contest for dominion ostensibly over Burgundy and northern Italy, but really over central Europe from the North Sea to the Adriatic, was the true source of a struggle which has lasted intermittently and with varying fortunes down to our own time.

Although France was defeated by the Emperor of Austria-Germany in the great struggle for Italy, and lost at Pavia

¹ Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, chapter on the Renaissance.

all save honor, the genius of her people in time recouped her disaster, and eventually made her the mistress of central Europe. The French civilization almost eclipsed that of Italy, and the Grand Monarch, served by the most redoubtable armies of Europe, bade fair to restore once more the prestige of the Frankish Empire of Charlemagne. Then, following the law that appears to govern nations with almost rhythmic regularity, she sank under the combined forces without and within, until she lost to her foes her great colonies and her prestige, and fell into revolution only to rise again and acquire for a time, under an Italian by race, all and more than she had ever lost in Europe—including all that had ever belonged to the Holy Roman Empire.

The Holy Roman Empire which had survived until, as Voltaire said, it was "neither holy, Roman, nor an Empire," perished at length (in 1806) before the overwhelming power of an Italian in race, if French by citizenship. He conquered the western part of the continent of Europe as Charlemagne had done, and crowned himself King of Italy, and gave to his only son the title of "King of Rome." As the master of continental Europe, he drove out of Italy the tyrants great and small, who had ruled and misruled from one end of the peninsula to the other, and with a view to making Italy secure he laid off her northern boundary along the highest ridge of the Alps, including the Brenner Pass, a confine which Italy claimed in this war, and has just been accorded by the treaty of peace.

Napoleon was certainly not interested in giving to Italy entire Liberty in the sense in which we regard it to-day. He, however, intended to free Italy from the subjection of foreign rulers, and to become himself her sole ruler and, no doubt, his intentions were not inspired by any lofty ideas regarding Liberty, for he allied himself with the Austrian Emperor and, when it served his purpose, handed over Venice to Austria without compunction.

When, unsatiated with conquest and still aiming at new worlds to conquer, Napoleon failed before the aroused fear

and hostility of Europe, the Congress of Vienna, representing nations whose united fear and hatred had overthrown him, partitioned out his conquests, and handed Italy back to those whom Napoleon had driven out: mainly scions and wards of the Austrian Emperor, the head of the House of Hapsburg. Even so, however, Italy was less divided than she had been previously. There were fewer states and fewer tyrants. Previously there had been many more separate states in Italy, now there were but eight. These were all dependent directly or indirectly on the Austrian Empire.

In these transactions not the slightest attention was paid to the wishes of the Italian people, high or low. They were considered simply objects of barter and sale. When Talleyrand, who presided, declared the Congress open in the name of Public Right, the Prussian representative, Baron von Humboldt, rose in some indignation and demanded to know what right had the public with which that Congress was concerned. When the English representative referred to England as interested in the rights of Peoples, Metternich declared that whoever might consider themselves representatives of the People, Austria held herself as the champion of the Rights of Dynastic succession. Such was the temper in which the Congress undertook its labors, and the result of its labors was what the Congress promised. The resubjection of Italy to foreign rulers who, set up by external force, were maintained in their position by external force until their tyranny, their mismanagement and misrule, unexcelled if not unequalled during the whole course of human history, so roused the Italian people, even habituated as they were to misrule, that the spirit of Liberty in the Italian people, immortal under all conditions, burst forth and eventually brought about that great revolution known as the Risorgimento, or the Resurrection of Italy, which overthrew the governments of the tyrants, great and small, who had attempted to destroy Italy, and resulted in the union of the Italian states and of the Italian people in that great kingdom which is the Italy of to-day, great because founded on

the love of liberty of a great people united under a great constitutional sovereign: King Victor Emmanuel III.

The story of this Resurrection covers almost exactly one hundred years, one continuous whole, as it begins toward the end of the second decade of the last century and comes down through the misadventures and activities from Novara to Caporetto—from Caporetto to the final victory of the Piave and the Vittorio-Veneto to-day.

In the long contest between the Austro-German Empire and Italy, when to antagonisms of races and dynasties and rivalries of trade and commerce, were added immortal hostilities of religions, across the Alps and the Adriatic a new power arose where, toward the end of the first one thousand years A. D., Cisalpine Gauls and Latins, now become Italians, had sought refuge from barbarian invasion on the islands formed by the currents of the Piave and the Adige, and established as a seafaring people the great democratic commercial Italian city of Venice, destined to become one of the great promoters of commerce and civilization of the world. The form of government was republican, like that of its young rival across the peninsula: Genoa. The chief magistrate was the Doge—the Duke. The government became an oligarchy. It grew so marvellously as to become a proverb for wealth and magnificence and power. It took part in the Crusades. It extended its rule across the Adriatic, where it possessed itself of Istria and Dalmatia, and planted colonies and built cities along the coast, which carried the Italian name and tongue, and the Italian civilization, from Trieste to the Cattaro; cities which, through all vicissitudes and subjugations, exist down to the present.

Its Doge added to his titles that of Doge of Dalmatia. It fought the Greek Emperors of Constantinople and seized the Greek islands, and one of its Doges refused the Imperial crown. It penetrated the East. It fought the Turk and the Austrian. Like a second Rome, it conquered and annexed its rivals, and subjugated the cities and provinces between the Alps and the Po. The Republic, which had lasted longer than any Republic in history, in time lost its power

and its possessions at the hands of its traditional enemies, Turk and Austrian, and a century or more ago perished at the hands of the Conqueror of Europe, who remorselessly handed it over to its traditional enemy, Austria. But later on it revolted, to become, some fifty years ago, a part of United Italy.

During its more potent days the Holy Roman Empire, or that part of it which was Austria and under Austrian dominion, lay as a bulwark against the advance of the new and menacing power of the Ottoman Turk, a branch of the power which, having swept over southwestern Asia, Africa, and southeastern Europe, where its capital in the fourteenth century was Adrianople, had overthrown the Eastern Empire in 1453, and, establishing itself at Constantinople, proceeded to complete its conquests of southeastern Europe. Substantially the entire Balkan peninsula—Greek, Slav, and Venetian—fell into its hands, and its sway extended to the Adriatic and to the very gates of Vienna. Defeated by Charles of Lorraine and John Sobieski in 1683, its power gradually declined under its internal conditions of rottenness and the enmity of Christendom. Its strategic position, however, enabled it, owing to the jealousy of the European Powers, to maintain itself down to our own time, holding sway over a large part of the Balkans until the European Powers could agree among themselves as to the division of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire.

While the Holy Roman Empire, or Austria, and Italy were engaged during these later centuries with their own internal troubles and external conflicts, there had arisen in eastern Europe a new power so vast as to threaten, should it now become fully organized and awake to the realization of its strength, the very existence of the older States of Europe. The great Empire of Russia, about the beginning of the eighteenth century, under the commanding genius of its Tzar, Peter the Great, suddenly arose like some young giant from long and profound sleep, and made Europe aware of a power which, already weighty, might in no long time become perilous—the power of the Slav. The head of this gigantic power

established its capital at St. Petersburg, and proceeded to open the way to the North Sea by conquering the Baltic provinces; reconquered from Poland Little Russia, and then, defeating the Turk, wrested from him Azov and established himself on the Black Sea at the head of the waterway to the high seas. From this time Russia and Turkey were in necessary antagonism, for Russia, which had received her faith from the Eastern Empire, looked, by virtue of her power, to extend her sway over the fat regions which the Eastern Empire once held, and to become, by virtue of her race and religion, the head and guardian of the Slavic race which had swept down centuries before and now inhabited those regions. This brought her naturally into antagonism with Austria-Hungary, which viewed with jealousy any extension of the influence of her powerful neighbors over her weaker neighbors, all of whom she regarded as within her sphere of influence and destined in the not remote future to become subject to her control. Diversity in religion only accentuated her jealousy, for the two churches were even more antagonistic than the political States.

At times the antagonism between the Austrian and the Turk faded before the hostility and fear of the growing, and as yet unknown power of the Russians, as when Russia's advance southward aroused the apprehension of Europe, and Austria was able to rally to the aid of Turkey, but really to her own aid, the strong, if poorly handled, power of the Allies against Russia in the Crimean War, or as when yet later, in 1878, Russia, claiming the guardianship of the Slav race, once more pushed southward to the gates of Constantinople and was stopped by the Allies' warnings—and the treaties of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin followed. In all of these Austria and Italy were interested and took part. In all of these their interests, however they may temporarily have coincided for a certain occasion or to attain a certain object, were at bottom, when the occasion had passed or the temporary object had been gained, fundamentally in conflict. The rivalry was for

the fertile plains of Lombardy and Venetia and the control of the Adriatic with its island-guarded ports and its commerce both to the East and the West; and for the possession of the Alpine passes and valleys which were the gateways of traffic for half of Europe and a part of Asia and North Africa, as well. Such they were in times of peace. In time of war they were, as Italians feel, the very doors of their house.¹ It was through them that the Barbarians poured in who overthrew the Roman Empire; it was through them that the invaders of Italy have poured down ever since and have kept Italy divided and subjected through the centuries. With these doors in her possession Italy would feel safe; without them she believes she will be in peril.

¹ Sixty-six invasions, all successful save nine or ten, have been made during Italy's history.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE FIRST WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

THE Kingdom of Italy as it stands to-day is young enough for the birth of its union to be in the memory of men still in public life. And the glorious struggle of the Risorgimento (or Resurrection of Italy) was carried on by the fathers of those who to-day lead the thought of the nation. As an illustration—in the impressive and effective “demonstrations” of the week following the resignation of the Salandra ministry and preceding the declaration of war with Austria, old Garibaldians in red shirts were borne along on the shoulders of members of the crowd, and two of the three men who were invited to undertake the formation of a new ministry, Nogara and Carcano, were old Garibaldian veterans: “Camicie Rosse,” Red-Shirts. Further, the match which lit the fire which three weeks later burst into flame was the unveiling of a monument at Quarto—the point from which they set forth—to “the Thousand” who sailed under Garibaldi for the liberation of Sicily and the union of Italy.

It will be recalled that but two generations ago Italy was divided into a number of different kingdoms and dukedoms, principalities or states. They had numerous points of difference and even of conflict. But the people had certain things in common that are fundamental. They had an ancient Past of Glory; they had a common language and literature, a common religion, and they had—strongest of all ties: a common past of suffering.

Also they possessed one common point of light to show the way. Napoleon's genius in 1811 laid out partially the limits of a Kingdom of Italy, which he declared was according to natural boundaries. It was later divided and re-

partitioned, Austria holding a considerable share and exercising a dominating influence over much more—indeed, of nearly all the rest.

Napoleon is reported to have said at St. Helena that with that northern natural boundary Italy was substantially an island guarded by the Alps and the two seas, and that, "Isolated between her natural limits," she is "destined to form a great and powerful nation. Italy is one nation; unity of customs, language, and literature must in a period more or less distant unite her inhabitants under one sole government, and Rome will without the slightest doubt be chosen by the Italians as their capital." He did something to blaze the way to it; but his selfishness led him to forego what might have proved his greatest abiding monument, and to partition it among himself and his family. His gift of Venice to Austria was a blot on his fame which even taking it back could not erase and it furnished his conquerors later with a color of reason to turn it and much more besides over to a despotism hardly equalled in modern times. Still, a step had been taken which was never forgot by the Italians.

But if similar to an island, Italy's position partook at once of both the advantages and disadvantages of an island.

Modern invention has rendered her sea bulwarks rather a source of peril, unless she can safeguard herself otherwise; so her aspirations have been dictated by necessity no less than ambition. Her position has forced her to seek allies amid the growing menaces of vast coalitions, and out of the necessity she has felt of protecting her long Adriatic coast has grown her aspiration for the possession once more of the opposite shore with its commanding stations and internal waterway, an aspiration undoubtedly fostered by the fact that this shore was once Venetian and Italian, and is still peopled in parts by an Italian population.

Austria also had her history and traditions, not to mention her aspirations. Her Emperors had ruled in Italy and, after a long interval and many vicissitudes, Austrian rule had again in later times held absolute dominion over a con-

siderable part of Italy and an influence scarcely less absolute over all the rest. She had, in 1866—but yesterday, as it were—been compelled to give up Venetia, and but a few years before that had been forced to surrender Lombardy and her power over all the rest of Italy—but she still held the Trentino and Trieste, and controlled the upper Adriatic.

To these conflicting aspirations were added racial and traditional antagonisms, and to these the conflict of vast interests, commercial and political.

It is but a hundred years since Metternich said Italy was only a "geographical expression." The Kingdom of Italy, then, "United Italy," is, in its new formation, a young country; but it has before its eyes always the lines on which a Kingdom of Italy was founded in the distant past and re-founded again in the recent past. It is not therefore to be wondered at if the desire prevails to re-establish the kingdom on the well-known lines once occupied by it. Dante dreamed and wrote of a re-established Roman Empire with its capital once more in Rome; and Dante, though Florentine then, is Italian now, and has long been Italian, part and parcel of all Italy, as much all Italian as Homer was all Greek.

In this new-old kingdom traditions, customs, and racial traits count to an extent hardly dreamed of in more modern lands. The people cling to them, perhaps, unconsciously. The traits differ to some extent in different regions, the customs vary incredibly; but, with roots sunk deep in tradition, maintain themselves unchangeably where rooted. They extend from peculiarities of costume to peculiarities of forms of religious worship, if not of belief.

Even ignoring the Roman Empire—though Italians do not, for it speaks to-day in every province in Italy not only in heroic fragments; in its colosseums, its aqueducts, its tombs and temples, its roads, but above all in its history and its literature, common to all Italy—we should remember that Italy has existed for a thousand years. Empire and Kingdom, Duchies by the dozen; and Republics, have come in and passed across the scene from the fastnesses above the

Lombard plain to the points of Sicily overlooking the North African shore, where Carthage stood; but the Italians have survived—also has survived the imperishable idea of the Kingdom of Italy, or at least the idea of Italy.

Some rulers were content to hold their own provinces. Others strove to extend their sway. Some built on the sea, looked to the sea they wedded for their dowry; and one, altogether the most powerful, though a nominal Republic, took both sides of the Adriatic, and, having turned this sea into a Venetian lake, swept on to the Orient and, conquering its distant shores, planted there its colonies and established its power. However they may have fought each other and hated each other, the Italian States had a number of strong common bonds that bound them together. Dante sounded the note of National consciousness and laid the firm foundation of a national language and a yet stronger one for a quickened national spirit. His successors—Petrarch, Alfieri, and Goldoni, Manzoni, Foscolo, and many others—sounded the same note and therefore live to-day as does Italy herself.

As time wore on, the local hatreds died out into simple rivalries more or less acute. Pisa ceased to hate Genoa, however she may have envied her and claimed her share in Columbus. Florence and Siena and Pisa, Parma and Modena, Perugia and Ravenna, ceased to be fiercely Guelph or Ghibelline, as the case might be, and claimed common part in Dante, whose sacred dust is guarded by Ravenna; in Petrarch, in Donatello, in Angelo, and in Perugino, Raphael, and Leonardo, and in the countless masters of the various schools which enriched Italy and bound her into one beyond the power of Emperor or Duke, of Prince or Doge or King or Pope, to divide them.

And in religion all looked to Rome, as the Israelites of old looked to the city of David as their shrine.

The effect of this fact and the community of interest in their history and their literature cannot be too strongly emphasized.

The Papacy treated with or fought, now Emperors, now

Kings, as the occasion developed. But all the time it pursued a consistent policy of papal interests. Its success depended upon the skill with which it used the instruments at hand. But largely it was owing to the fact that it reached the people in a way that neither King nor Emperor nor Noble could do, and that it had a certain democratic foundation. And to a considerable extent here lay its power. It was only when greater knowledge developed in the people and they recognized that a better government and securer rights might be found elsewhere than under the Papacy that the Temporal Power of the latter dwindled. It added vastly to the prestige of Italy and ministered to the pride of the Italian people. But this is germane to our subject only in so far as it casts light on the present situation. It was, however, undoubtedly a unifying power.

Meantime, in the mall of Kings, Princes, Dukes, and Counts who rose and fought and ruled and fell from one end of Italy to the other, one House rose and maintained itself on the northwestern Alpine ridges above the passes that were the gateways of Italy. There were at times many richer and more powerful rulers in one part of Italy or another, but none possessed a stronger strategic position—and, perhaps, for this reason as well as for their lusty sons' breathing the robust air of their native mountains, the Heads of the warrior House of Savoy gradually enlarged their power until they developed from counts to dukes and from dukes to kings, governing both sides of their native mountains until Savoy, Piedmont, and Sardinia fell beneath their sway. For something like a thousand years their history runs, however misty the early part may have been. "We have carried our head high for eight hundred and fifty years and no one will make me lower mine," was the message sent by Victor Emmanuel to Napoleon III in 1858.

For over five hundred years they have been rulers living close to the people, whom they governed with discernment, if at times with rigor. On occasion they strove to maintain neutrality for their dominions, which included Savoy, Piedmont, and a part of Switzerland; sometimes with disastrous

effect, as when in the wars between Francis I and Charles V they strove to maintain neutrality and France annexed Savoy. It is mentioned to show a traditional instance of the House of Savoy trying to stand aloof from the wars raging about them.

In the third quarter of the sixteenth century the head of this powerful house, Duke Emmanuel, espoused the side of Spain and got his duchy restored. Whereupon he established his capital at Turin in the Piedmont, made the Italian tongue his official language, and made the House of Savoy integrally Italian. Not that he was yet in sight of the Treaty of Paris, much less of Sedan and of Venti Settembre; but an essential step had been taken and the House of Savoy, with its warrior blood, its wise, far-sighted counsel, its knowledge of and later its sympathy with the people, had become irrevocably Italian.

It is these traits in union which distinguished the House of Savoy from other brave and capable rulers in Italy, and which, with many lapses and after many vicissitudes, at the crucial final moment, backed by the might of the important strategic patrimony which was their dowry, and the effective army which it built up, made the House of Savoy the constitutional sovereigns of United Italy.

All this, however, was later on and after long stress and struggle during which the warrior qualities more than their liberalism distinguished the Dukes of Savoy and the Kings of Piedmont and Sardinia. In many other Italian states progressive ideas during the eighteenth century made more advance than in Piedmont, Venice, or Rome.

The French Revolution blew across the Alps with the young Bonaparte at the head of its armies, first as the head of the revolutionary armies, then as conqueror, and later as Dictator and Emperor. When the blast first came there was talk of a union of Italy for defense, but it could not be. Piedmont had made a league with Austria (1792) for defense, but the genius of Napoleon, finding a fit instrument in the spirit of freedom in his soldiers, swept everything before it.

Before he was through he took Nice and Savoy from Piedmont, he took Lombardy from Austria, overthrew Venice, and gave it temporarily to Austria to govern; bore off the Pope to Fontainebleau, took away his Temporal Power and changed Rome into a republic; formed the small states south of Piedmont into a republic, and did the same for Naples as an experiment. Much of this was temporary; and finally, before he was through and after he became Emperor in 1805, he formed the northern part of Italy into the "Kingdom of Italy," of which he crowned himself King. A year later, in 1806, he dissolved the Holy Roman Empire, took back Venice, and forced the Emperor of Austria, Francis II, to renounce the imperial crown. Napoleon's final downfall came in 1815; and the great Powers of Europe had already begun to provide for parcelling out his assets.

The Congress of Vienna (September, 1814, to June, 1815), which met pursuant to the decision of the Congress of Paris, May 30, 1814, to provide for the redistribution of Napoleon's conquests and, as was believed, to provide for the establishment of the European equilibrium which should forever prevent a repetition of what had threatened to be the conquest of the world, reparcelled arbitrarily the whole of Napoleon's conquests, including Italy.

The Congress of Vienna had in view several aims: to restore peace and to establish the rule of the Powers in Europe; to prevent the recurrence of the Napoleonic régime and to preserve forever the divine dynastic rights of the reigning rulers of the Great Powers participating therein. To accomplish the first it was deemed necessary to create what came to be known as the European equilibrium. To accomplish the second it was declared by the Agreement of Paris that the Napoleonic House should never again rule; and for the third, as well as the second purpose, it provided the obligations to watch and the right to intervene to prevent any change in the governments recognized by the signatory powers as established by divine right. Incidentally, each country strove to increase its own possessions and power and there was much intriguing among the representatives.

Austria, which gave up her distant provinces in Belgium and her provinces in southern Germany, got back her Polish possessions and was given the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom; the Tyrol and Salzburg, and the Illyrian provinces along the eastern Adriatic. The rest of Italy fell under Austrian influence.

It has been well said that the work done in Paris in completion of the Congress of Vienna was wise enough; but wise with that arid and narrow wisdom of diplomatists who understand the secret thoughts of Princes, but ignore the sentiments of Peoples.¹

The structure, solid enough otherwise, had basic weaknesses. One was that it left out of consideration the great waterway of the eastern Mediterranean, and the existence of the Ottoman rule, extended over the great Balkan peninsula and holding the entire north of Africa.

The other was of more immediate import. It took no account of the sentiment of the Peoples whom the powers in Congress undertook to assign as so many cattle. They were simply bartered away, as was said, as though it were a cattle fair.

The Congress did, indeed, discuss the means of meeting this last difficulty, and supposed they had provided for it. The Tzar brought forward his plan for a great alliance of Christian sovereigns in one grand European family of States, fortified by the authority of public opinion; and out of this sprang the "Holy Alliance." But, on the other hand, Austria, through Metternich, the champion of Dynastic Right, stood for the power of the rulers as against the people, and provided for the right of intervention and suppression of all that might endanger the principles of absolutism. And the Holy Alliance, conceived originally, perhaps, with no ignoble aim, became under Metternich's guiding hand as fit an instrument of tyranny as ever suppressed the liberties of states or peoples.

The Congress of Vienna (1814-15), which set to work to

¹ *From the Congress of Vienna to the War of 1814* (Ch. Signobos, Libr. A. Colin, Paris), p. 9.

redistribute Napoleon's conquests, reparcelled Italy arbitrarily, reserving only the principle of divine heredity among the petty rulers.¹

This redistribution left Austria potent, if not supreme, in Italy. North of the Bourbon confines she ruled with a heavy hand, and a system of spying and repression which was to bear cruel fruit. Parma and Modena were also under hand and lash.

In Tuscany her influence was dominant, though the Grand Duke, personally kind and paternal, gave his subjects more peace. In Rome her influence was paramount, as indeed it was in Naples, where the Bourbons returned, neither forgetting nor learning. "The will of Austria was supreme from Venice to Naples," and throughout her Italian provinces she established a despotism as sheer as ever trampled down a people.

The Italian National consciousness had, however, vivified, and it remained alive. To do so was a proof of its immortal vigor.

The downfall of Napoleon and the rise to power of Austria raised a force against not only freedom but all liberalism of ideas, which would have extinguished any spirit less than immortal. Germany had failed, partly because of her division and the intractable jealousy among her States. The loose German Confederation of thirty-eight States was impotent for united defense. Now, out of the welter of small States and Principalities, had emerged two strong States: Prussia, with her reorganized army, and stronger yet, Austria, which under her dominant Chancellor, Metternich, was determined to control Europe, and so did till Prussia, under an even greater Chancellor, de-

¹ Austria (which had lost its ancient provinces in Belgium now thrown in with Holland as part of the Low Countries, but took Salzburg) received again Venetia, with Parma as a gift for life to Napoleon's Austrian Empress, Maria Louisa; the Dukes of Parma taking over, in exchange, meanwhile, Lucca, which, after the death of the Empress, was to become a part of Tuscany. Genoa went to Piedmont, Savoy having been left to France; Naples went back to the Bourbons. The Papal States were, of course, left to the Papacy, and the old system was restored, with the Inquisition revived; Jesuits recalled, and civil service limited to priests.

spoiled her. In Germany Liberty made a brave fight; but Austria, under Metternich's guiding hand, crushed it inexorably. An effort was made toward union; but Metternich and the Austrian power mistrusted union as much as liberalism. Spain and Southern Italy, who had wrung from their restored tyrants constitutions granting their peoples some measure of Self-government, were crushed by the relentless forces of Absolutism, backed by the inexorable authority of the power Metternich had created. And their Kings, restored to their Absolutism by the Holy Alliance, proceeded to justify their patron's confidence by rooting out, so far as possible, the last vestige of free ideas within their confines. Greece revolted in 1820, and through the sympathy of Christendom secured a footing from which to make further progress as time passed.

But, though princes and ministers may propose and ordain, peoples often dispose. Liberty, pinned down by bayonets, was still alive. Though the revolutions which broke out in Naples and in Spain in 1820 and 1825, demanding constitutions, were sternly suppressed through the instruments of Austrian intervention provided for by Metternich's plan, the spirit was unsubdued.

The tides of Liberty and of Reaction ebb and flow with a singular periodicity, and apparently the high tide and the low tide cover, roughly speaking, from twenty to thirty years. Happily, in the history of civilization each flood-tide of progress rises in the main higher than the preceding one, and the ebb is not quite so low as that which went before. This gradual progress earns its name, and in the long run Liberty advances, and the World advances with it, however imperceptible may be the degree of each step.

The despotism and excesses of the rulers of Italy created in the hearts of the Italians an enmity so bitter and enduring that it became an inspiration, permeating, it may be said, the whole Italian people, to achieve their liberty and their union. Long afterward Gladstone, in a letter describing the rule of one of them, the King of the Sicilies, spoke of it as "the Negation of God created into a system of

government," a phrase which has become famous. This phrase might have been applied, with little modification, to the rule of all of them. The very despotism, however, in which they indulged was its own destruction, for it was so intolerable that it inspired a spirit of bitter resentment and antagonism which eventually led to their overthrow. The Italian people were, indeed, accustomed to revolt. It was their only recourse, and it saved them from extinction. Whenever they found the rule of their tyrants too oppressive, no matter what the cost to themselves, they had, through the centuries, broken out in revolt; for deep in their hearts was an incurable love of freedom, if not of independence. It was this tendency which made the long wars of the Guelfs and the Ghibellines possible. It spoke in its time through the "Carbonari" and "Young Italy." It continues to express itself to-day, even when liberty has been attained, in the Mafia and in the Umana, and it has, to some extent, become a trait of the Italian character. But it should be considered that without these traits and tendencies the Italian people might not have survived.

Yet whatever may have happened in the past, nothing could have appeared more unlikely, toward the end of the first quarter of the last century, than that Italy, trampled down and bound as she was beneath her foreign yokes, could have emancipated herself.

It befell, in the providence of God, that in the beginning of the last century there were raised up four Italians widely different in station, in training, and in method, but all inspired by one motive: the liberation of Italy from Foreign subjugation, and the union of all the Italian people under an Italian Government. They were—to name them in the order of their station: Victor Emmanuel II, the great "Victor Emmanuel," the hereditary Prince of the House of Savoy, the royal House of the King of Sardinia and Piedmont; Count Camillo Cavour, a cadet of a noble family in Piedmont; Giuseppe Mazzini, a member of a gentle family in Genoa; and Giuseppe Garibaldi, the son of an Italian boatman and fisherman of Nice. Taken together, Providence

has rarely formed a more fitting instrument for the achievement of liberty than this diverse and widely separated quartet of leaders, and, although it was long before they were brought together and their joint work was applied to the achievement of their joint aim, they must be taken together; for without all four it is possible that there would be no Kingdom of Italy to-day. It has been well said that Mazzini was the soul, Cavour was the brain, and Garibaldi was the sword of the Italian Risorgimento.¹ And it may be added that Victor Emmanuel partook of the endowment of all three, and was the crown which united them. Giuseppe Mazzini was born in 1805, Giuseppe Garibaldi was two years his junior, Camillo Cavour was born in 1810, and Victor Emmanuel was born in 1820.

At that time nearly all of the public rights which free-men prize were banned: newspapers were forbidden; the printing-press was shackled; freedom of speech was a crime whose infraction was met with instant punishment. Independence of views, even intelligence of a high order, were objects of suspicion. Young Mazzini was confined in the fortress of Savona, and young Cavour was banished to the mountain fortress of Bard. Silvio Pellico was in the Austrian prison of the Spielberg with other Italian patriots, and the "Piombi" and the dungeons of every Italian State were filled with political prisoners whose most probable escape in some States was by route of the gallows.

Silvio Pellico was the inmate of so many prisons that he wrote a famous book, now an Italian classic, entitled *My Prisons*.

Said the Governor of Genoa, when the father of Giuseppe Mazzini protested against his son's imprisonment until some charge against him should be proved: "Your son is a young man of some talent, and is too fond of walking alone at night deep in thought. What on earth has one to think of at his age? We do not like young people to think unless we know the subject of their thoughts."

The spirit of liberty in Italy, banned by the rulers, had

¹ *The Liberation of Italy*, Cisse Cesaresco-Martinengo.

resulted in the forming of a great secret society named "Carbonari," from the charcoal-burners who lived and performed their work in the forests. It was one of those secret organizations rendered necessary by the repressive vigilance of the rulers. It extended throughout Italy. One thing common to all the governments was tyranny and suppression, and it had the effect of creating a common cause in the hearts of the people of all the States.

In view of the determination of Austria to extend and perpetuate her sway over her subject peoples, at whatever cost, the differences were irreconcilable. Italy's dream was nationality and independence. Austria's fixed resolve was imperial domination and subjection.

Austria had bound the King of the Two Sicilies by a pledge never to grant any liberties to his people inconsistent with the principles on which the Austrian Emperor governed his Italian provinces. It was the type of her dealing with all Italy. She put her principles into practice in a way which would have created Revolution, even if the seeds of Revolution had not been already vivified. Her system was one which could only be maintained by the bayonet and the gallows. But her representatives in Italy, knowing only the rule of terror, made that system more odious through sheer brutality than it might otherwise have been. "Send me the hangman," wrote the Duke of Parma when he had been restored by Austrian bayonets to his dukedom after a revolution which had driven him out.

Women were whipped publicly; families were made to witness the execution of their loved ones, who had engaged actively in revolutions. The bill for the rope with which a young patriot was executed was sent by the authorities to his mother for payment.

It was such acts of folly and brutality as these, even more than the penalty inflicted, that permeated the Italian people and created in their hearts a universal and undying hatred of Austria and of those who obeyed her odious commands.

It was in Naples that the first explosion came. Liberty

was making strides elsewhere in Europe, and Spain, rising against mediævalism, had obtained a constitution which was deemed a model.

Next, Revolution made its appearance in Piedmont, and though abortive it bore rich fruit in the future. It must be mentioned as bearing on Italy's course down even to the present day.

In the early Napoleonic days (1802) Charles Emmanuel of Savoy abdicated the throne of Sardinia and, leaving his brother, Victor Emmanuel I, to succeed him, retired to Rome and entered the Society of Jesus. Victor Emmanuel's only son died, leaving Charles Felix, Duke of Genoa, the King's younger brother, heir apparent to the throne. Charles Felix, however, was childless, and the heir presumptive was Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, head of a younger branch of the House of Savoy—a youth who had imbibed some liberal principles, and who was spoken of by the Queen of Sardinia as "the little vagrant." After certain vicissitudes Charles Albert was married to Maria Teresa, daughter of the Archduke of Tuscany, and on the 14th of March, 1820, a son was born to them whom they named Victor Emmanuel, and who in time was to become the first King of Italy.

In the meantime, Austrian influences held Piedmont in their reactionary grip. In the spring of 1821 a Revolution broke out in Piedmont and the people demanded "the Spanish Constitution." King Victor Emmanuel I abdicated and Charles Albert was appointed Regent until the heir apparent, Charles Felix, who was at Modena, could arrive. Charles Albert permitted—possibly he was compelled to permit—the demanded constitution to be proclaimed, subject to the orders of the King when they should arrive. When the orders came they banished him from the capital—first to Novara, and then to Tuscany. When Charles Felix himself arrived, he came backed by an Austrian army, which defeated decisively the constitutionalist troops, who had followed Charles Albert to Novara, and soon afterwards he had driven all the liberals and constitutionalists into exile,

He, indeed, set about punishing the revolutionists with so ruthless a hand that the ex-Sovereign, Victor Emmanuel I, wrote from his retreat, begging him to be more merciful. The new King replied that he was ready to hand back the crown to his brother if he wished it, but so long as he was sovereign he would rule as such. "The King, as appointed by God," said he, "is the sole judge of what is best for the people, and the first duty of a loyal subject is not to complain." Such was the Austrian teaching.

Lombardy was expected to rise, but the leader of the patriots of Lombardy, Count Confalonieri, was arrested and sent to the Spielberg. Indeed, the spirit of Revolution stirred from one end of the peninsula to the other.

The next ten years were years of seething, of preparation, and of suppression throughout Italy. Austria ruled Italy, and Metternich ruled Austria. Four of the Italian States, Tuscany, Lucca, Parma, and Modena, were under Austrian rulers. The Papal States, under Pope Gregory XVI, and Naples, under Ferdinand I and Francis, were ruled with the aid of Austrian bayonets.

The rule in the Papal States was not unnaturally in accord with the Austrian principles, exercised in her conquered provinces. It was only better in that the ruler was an Italian and not a foreigner, and Italians were accustomed to recognize the Papal rule. However, it was so bad that, in the Papal States as elsewhere, liberty, crushed to earth, burst forth in revolution. It could not now be wholly suppressed. And Austria, had she known it, was contributing to it. "From her universal interference, sprang one of the strongest reasons for unity—and *Ciro Menotti*, *Beazio Nardi*, and others were now dreaming of this unity—of an Italy, one sole nation—from the Alps to the sea," free and independent.

It was in 1831 (April 27) that Charles Albert, of the younger branch of the House of Savoy, came to the throne of Sardinia, he having been previously required by Charles Felix to sign an agreement binding himself to preserve intact, during his reign, the laws and principles in force at his accession.

Also about the same time came into the leadership of the ideas of Progress Giuseppe Mazzini. As a boy in Genoa an appeal on the street for aid for the refugees of Italy—driven from their homes by Austrians, or by tyranny supported by Austria—gave him his career. Thus, Austria brought into being this leader of the forces of revolution and of Italian unity, as she was to bring into being that leader of revolutionary armies: Giuseppe Garibaldi. Mazzini started the organization, "Young Italy," to which he gave a sort of devout, religious spirit, and which was to prove one of the most efficient agencies for the diffusion of the principles of freedom and the idea of union. These were the guiding principles of his life—spent largely in exile, but always informed with a passion for Italian freedom and unity. A dreamer who dreamed of the return of the ancient Roman Republic; an idealist who held that the World was governed by principles, and that "great revolutions are the work of principles, not of bayonets," he was uncompromising in his views. Following his teaching came those who, like Garibaldi, were both ready and able to put his principles in practice with the bayonet.

A little later than when he started "Young Italy," Mazzini was released from prison, and he wrote a famous letter to the new King, calling upon him to declare himself the leader of the patriots throughout Italy; to recognize his destiny; to free Italy from the Austrians; to place himself at the head of the nation, and write on his flag, "Union, Liberty, and Independence." Mazzini was exiled, and settled at Marseilles, where, "in the bitterness of which only the exile knows," he matured his plans for a revolution and for the emancipation of Italy. He became a republican; for Genoa had been a Republic until Napoleon had changed it, and later the masters at the Congress of Vienna had assigned it to the Kingdom of Sardinia.

"Young Italy" spread like wild-fire throughout the peninsula. Among its new recruits was young Giuseppe Garibaldi, now a captain in the merchant-service, from which he soon resigned to join the Sardinian navy at Genoa as a

common sailor, with the view of bringing the sailors into the revolutionary movement. The revolution was planned and, indeed, broke out in Parma, Modena, and in Romagna, a part of the Papal dominion; but it was promptly suppressed by Austria.

The plans of "Young Italy" having failed, Garibaldi escaped and sailed to South America, where he served his well-known apprenticeship in the South American campaigns in the war between Argentina and Uruguay, and took part in the defense at the siege of Montevideo. Other patriots were arrested and hanged; still others were banished.

So the time passed, and Italy was once more sunk in the misery of suppressed revolution, and Austria ruled, directly or indirectly, the Italian people, and ground them down until along toward the end of the forties.

In 1845 the great powers had found their programme not so permanent as they had imagined, and Russia, trying to break through to the Mediterranean, found herself confronted not only by the Ottoman Empire, but by her former colleagues in the Congress of Vienna, by the French Empire, and by the King of Sardinia and Piedmont. The result was the failure of Russia's plan, and the admission of the Ottoman Empire into the circle of those protected by the European equilibrium.

From this misery Revolution once more gathered head, and the fires so long banked burst forth anew. It was the year '48 in which the tide of liberty once more rose throughout Europe. In France, in Italy, in Austria itself, in the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and in the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, the standard of revolution and of liberty was once more raised.¹

¹ In 1848 (March 12), even in Vienna, representatives from the Austrian Parliament rose against autocracy as represented by the Emperor Ferdinand and Metternich, who for thirty-five years had ruled with iron hand the destinies of central Europe. Metternich was driven out. A few months later Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his nephew, Francis Joseph, who became known in Italy later, from his ruthlessness, as the "Emperor of the Hangmen," and whose long reign saw the decline of the Austrian Empire and opened the way for its disappearance not only from the position of dictator of the destinies of subject peoples, but its disappearance from the map of Europe.

Mazzini, in what he termed his "long, lingering death-agony of exile," had kept the flame alive in Italy and among Italians everywhere, and in the winter of 1847-48 and the spring of 1848, the news reached Montevideo of the patriot movement in Lombardy and its aim to wrest Lombardy from Austrian rule; and Garibaldi, gathering his Italian friends about him, set sail for Nice, where they arrived June 23 of that year. He was, indeed, as his friend Anzani said when dying, "a man of destiny, on whom depended, to a great extent, the future of Italy."

Meantime, Charles Albert, wavering between two opinions, had turned once more toward Liberty, and some liberty having been granted the press, young Camillo Cavour, who had long resigned from the army and applied himself to agriculture and to political study, building up his father's property on the Leri, and incidentally building up ideas for a United and Independent Italy, started, with the help of Massimo d'Azeglio and other liberals, a journal which they termed, *Il Risorgimento* (*The Resurrection*), which was devoted to the demand for a Constitution and a Parliament for the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont.

The House of Hapsburg still controlled Italy and ruled in Lombardy as ruthlessly as ever. In March, 1848, Milan, which was held by Marshal Radetsky, with some 20,000 Austrian troops, rose in revolt and, after five days of fighting, with no weapons save those which a population held down by military force is permitted to have, the Austrian troops were driven from Milan, and all Lombardy flamed into revolt. Now, Radetsky was a Jugo-Slav. He was a capital general and a stern governor, and had put a finish on his long career of cruel repression of the Italians by the threat to turn his soldiers loose upon the town. It was this which caused the barricades of Milan to spring up in a night.

The Milanese, in the midst of their furious fighting, sent an appeal to Turin for help from one who was an Italian—the only Italian ruler in Italy save the Pope—the King of Sardinia and Piedmont. It was in response to this appeal

that Cavour wrote his famous article in the *Risorgimento*. Cavour was a liberal, but not a revolutionist. He was also a monarchist, and on March 23 he declared in his paper: "The supreme hour for the monarchy of Savoy has struck, the hour for firm decision, the hour on which the fate of empires and peoples depends." He called for "War, instant war." And within twenty-four hours the War of Independence was declared.

On March 25 the Piedmontese crossed the river Ticino into Lombardy at Pavia.

It looked for the time as though Italy might be freed.

In June, 1846, a new Pope had been elected to succeed Gregory XVI—Pius IX; and it had seemed almost as though Rome might once more become the leader of Italy.¹

Jealousy of the King of Sardinia as leader of a great Italian movement which might lead to the union of the Italian states, led the Pope, Pius IX, and even the King of Naples, to despatch forces to help drive out the Austrians. And the Venetians, under Daniel Manin, were preparing to go to place themselves under the standard of Charles Albert. From Parma, Modena, and Tuscany came volunteers, and, in the beginning, brilliant victories were gained at Goito

¹ The Bishop of Imola's elevation to the Holy See was possibly hurried forward to prevent Austria's pronouncing on the subject. It is certain that he was at the time the most advanced and liberal man who in modern times has become Pope. His change later was a proof that possibly circumstances, possibly the Constitution of the Roman Church and hierarchy, were too strong for him; possibly that a liberal Pope, as Metternich said, was a "contradiction in terms," at least so long as the claim of papal Temporal sovereignty is asserted. The Roman Church is possibly the most conservative organization on earth. When, through its head, it asserts Temporal power it finds itself in opposition to the forces of progress moving steadily forward. The result could hardly have been more disastrous. Beginning his pontificate amid the acclaims of the entire people of Rome and doubtless with every desire to serve his people to the best of his ability, he found himself, as time passed, confronted by conditions beyond his control, and was forced by his people to grant a constitution, liberal beyond any dream that he had ever had. So opposed was it to all that his advisers and chief supporters held, that after a fruitless effort to stem the tide he fled from Rome in disguise, and in the sequel returned supported by foreign power that had made war on his people, and thenceforth he maintained himself only with foreign bayonets.

Madame Waddington tells of one of the Roman princes saying to her that Pius IX was the most liberal ruler he ever knew.

(April 8), at Pastrengo (April 30), and at Santa Lucia (May 6). The fortress of Peschiera fell into the hands of the Italians; the Austrians were driven out of Como, Brescia, and Bergamo, and the government of Vienna even showed signs of offering terms to Charles Albert. But the triumph was of short duration. Marshal Radetsky was an able general. The papal troops were recalled before crossing the papal borders; the Neapolitans never arrived and were never intended to arrive, and toward the end of April Pope Pius published an encyclical declaring himself neutral, and regretting that, with affection for peoples, races, and nations, he could not continue, and the papal troops were withdrawn.

On March 17 the Venetians hoisted the tricolor standard and, electing Daniel Manin as their leader, wrung from the Austrians the permission to form a national guard. They had no arms, so the Austrian civil governor, Count Palfy, felt perfectly safe; but the Italian workmen in the arsenal killed the Austrian commander, overpowered the guard, and opened the gate to Daniel Manin, whereupon the Austrians evacuated the town, the ancient standard of St. Mark was unfurled before the Duomo, and the Venetian Republic was once more proclaimed.

Radetsky received all the reinforcements he needed, and on July 24 the decisive battle of Custozza was fought, in which the Italians, wretchedly handled, were completely defeated, and from then on—in the pursuit to Milan, to which Charles Albert had retreated, and on through Milan—it was only a question of enlarging the Austrian gains. Finally, on the night of August 5, Charles Albert set out on foot, a fugitive from Milan, to escape possible death at the hands of the Milanese.

Thus ended the first campaign of the War of Liberation, but nearly all Italy had been united in this war, that is, nearly the whole people of Italy. But, notwithstanding the defeat of Custozza, the idea of fusion and even of union had made headway. The people of Lombardy and of Venetia, of Parma and Modena had voted in favor of Union, and

these states had offered to acknowledge Charles Albert as their sovereign.

Italians had shown themselves able to meet and beat Austrian troops who had hitherto been considered invincible by them. The Italian defeats were set down, and properly, to their generals. Moreover, Italians from every state and from every rank of life had fought in the same ranks against the common foe, and the feeling of what Italians term "Italianità," a feeling of racial and of national unity, had been enlarged and deepened. The Sicilies, the Papal Dominions, and Tuscany were not in the movement for fusion, but many of their people turned with a quickened sense to the idea.

Sicily was still aflame with revolt, and the Neapolitan troops were driven out of Sicily except from the citadel of Messina. The parliament set up in Palermo demanded a King, and asked for Charles Albert's second son, the Duke of Genoa; but the defeat of Custoza decided the fate of this movement, and King Ferdinand bombarded the town of Messina, and reduced it to ruins, acquiring for himself the sobriquet of King "Bomba."

After this, Sicily was once more overpowered and subjugated; but not for long; for the spirit of liberty was now awake throughout Italy. For a while it appeared to have the cordial support of the Pope himself, and patriotic friars preached in Rome and Bologna the doctrine of liberty. But the time was not ripe for this, and with startling suddenness Pope Pius, alarmed at the progress that Liberty was making, and possibly falling under the influence of reactionaries stronger than himself, withdrew himself from the National cause, and orders were sent forth to silence the friars and the clericals. To show that his liberal views still remained, the Pope appointed as his prime minister a liberal Italian, Count Rossi; but Rossi was murdered on the steps of the Parliament House by, it is said, a son of the popular leader, Rignetti; the papal palace itself was attacked by a mob, and the Pope, a few nights later, fled in disguise to Gaëta, where he put himself under the protection of the King of Naples.

Here he was later joined by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who had taken umbrage at the movement within his dominions to unite the Tuscan and Roman provinces in one republic.

In March, 1849, the armistice that had been declared between Charles Albert and Austria expired, and eight days later the Piedmont army again took the field, commanded this time by a Pole, General Chrzanowsky, whose second in command was General Ramorino. Radetsky also promptly took the field and on March 23, 1849, at Novara, a decisive engagement took place in which the Austrians, having been given time to bring up their reserves, defeated the Italians, and Charles Albert was forced once more to beg for an armistice. The terms proposed were such that the King felt that the only way to save his country was to follow the example of his uncle; and that night he abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel, the Duke of Savoy, and, passing in disguise through the Austrian lines, he turned the kingdom over to one who, though a youth, proved one of the great leaders and statesmen of his time—Victor Emmanuel II.

The next morning the young King met Radetsky, who received him with courtesy, offering to make peace and cement a friendship with him on two conditions: first, that he would recall the Constitution granted by his father; secondly, that he would not fly the Tricolor flag, but only the standard of the House of Savoy. Victor Emmanuel's reply was: "I shall preserve intact the Institutions granted by my father; and I will uphold the symbol of Italian nationality, the Tricolor flag. Vanquished to-day, it will yet triumph."

The other conditions he was forced to accept, and Lombardy and Venice were once more surrendered to Austria. But as he rode away from the field of the lost battle, it is said that he exclaimed: "*Italia serà*"—"Italy shall be."

That Charles Albert was a waverer seems to have been due to the conflict of his sympathies with his people and his ambition to extend the Kingdom of Sardinia by clearing

out the Austrians, and on the other hand to his apprehension of Austria's power—and almost equally, of Revolution.

He gave Italy her charter in giving it to Piedmont, and he never took it back, however urged by Austria to do so—as Ferdinand of Naples did that which he gave his people. And furthermore, at the last he fought her battles, however blunderingly and unsuccessfully, and when he lost he relinquished his crown and gave it to his son, the great Victor Emmanuel II, first King of Italy.

His last public utterance as he left the borders of Savoy was to the Governor of Nice: "In whatever time, in whatever place a regular government raises the flag of war with Austria, the Austrians will find me among their enemies as a simple soldier." It was the sentiment of Italy from one end to the other, at least outside of Rome, and of every class from the King to the plainest peasant. Austria was too powerful for them at the time, and the exiled or threatened rulers were by her aid restored to power. But Austria had consolidated against her all the intellectual forces of Italy, save those whom she sustained against Italy. Her prisons were full of Italian patriots; other countries were refuges for Italian exiles; and her records were red with the blood of Italian victims, martyrs for Liberty. Nor was it wholly Italy's loss that in these years she stood alone. Time had been when she had to look to others for support needed to sustain herself. The props had proved worse than feeble—they had fallen away. Now she looked to herself. *Farà da sè* was the new principle.

CHAPTER III

ITALY ATTAINS HER UNION

AFTER Novara (March 23, 1849) there was little hope for the revolted states. Ferdinand, who had moved his court to Gaëta, was able to suppress the revolt in Sicily, and the Pope, after having refused to receive a mission from Rome, asking him to return as the spiritual head of the church, called on France, Austria, Spain, and Naples to restore him to his supreme authority.

The Pope returned to Rome from Gaëta the following April, maintained in his restored temporal power by the troops of France in Rome, and those of Austria elsewhere.

The old ideas of liberalism had been irreparably shaken, and thenceforth he who had in the beginning been looked on as the rising star of the liberals was sustained in his sovereignty only by the arms of foreign invaders, whom he had called on to restore him to his temporal power—arms stained with the blood of those who had acclaimed him in his accession as the deliverer from Austrian dominion.

The progress of liberalism among the people, however, was not stopped. Over 30,000 Romans had signed an address asking the withdrawal of the French corps of occupation. And the Italian Chamber (March 27) declared Rome to be the capital of Italy, asserting that the Pope could exercise his sublime office in a freer and more independent way guarded by the affection of 22,000,000 Italians than guarded by 25,000 foreign bayonets.

After his father's abdication the first labors of King Victor Emmanuel on coming to the throne were to make terms with conquering Austria and to suppress a revolt in Genoa, which on learning of the armistice had declared for a Republic. He performed both labors, not acceptably at the time, perhaps, but wisely; and when he had done so he

had established his position as a King who kept his word. Against the warnings of Austria he stood by liberal government; swore to observe the Statute (or Constitution) given by his father, and became later, in consequence of his observance of his oath, first King of Italy. The government fell; the Parliament was dissolved; the King appealed to the people with success; and a liberal ministry came in, who stood for the people against both Austria and Rome.

The Prime Minister, D'Azeglio, proceeded to put through ecclesiastical and corporate reforms, which brought him into conflict with the Vatican. But he won.

Into this new Ministry came a man who was to prove Italy's greatest statesman, and probably the first statesman of his time: Count Camillo Cavour.

His public career, brief in time—for he died early—but most brilliant in its accomplishment, placed him in the first rank of statesmen. Representative of an old and noble Genoese house, he was representative also of Italian aspiration for Liberty, which is as much as to say hostility to Austria.

Like many others, he had undergone exile or imprisonment at Bard for his liberal views, and, with far-sighted wisdom, he struck at the root of the trouble, irrespective of whether his acts were popular or not.

He reorganized the finances of the Kingdom of Sardinia, impaired by two unsuccessful campaigns; and in the face of Excommunication he passed laws regulating clerical corporations, which asserted the supremacy of the State. Determined to place Italy among the Great Powers he, with far-sighted sagacity, joined England and France, and sent a contingent of 15,000 troops to the Crimea. It was a bold and apparently groundless "play to the galleries." In fact, however, it placed the Kingdom of Piedmont, as representative of Italy, before Europe as an integer in European politics. He secured her a place in the Congress that settled the questions of the war, and got the affairs of Italy discussed before the congress—though only informally.

In all this, though he moved but a step at a time, and often but slowly, he was moving against Austria. To this end he worked up an alliance with France, and to secure it he made sacrifices which cost him his popularity; but eventually led to Italy's freedom and union. The conference which he had with Napoleon at Plombières, at the latter's instance in 1858, disclosed to him Napoleon's aims, including his desire to ally his house to the House of Savoy through marriage between his cousin and the Princess Clotilde of Savoy with an eye to future Italian interests—certainly including the throne of Tuscany. But he did not flinch nor did King Emmanuel. On the eve of the outbreak of war against Austria, in which France—or Napoleon III—had agreed to join—for a compensation—Cavour played a bold game and assented to the suggestion of a European congress to settle Italian affairs. Austria refused, as, of course, he was satisfied she would, and poured troops into Italy, which was arming eagerly.


On April 23, 1859, the Austrian Commissioner, Baron von Kellersberg, handed Cavour Austria's ultimatum: "Unarm in three days, or War." Cavour looked at his watch. At the same hour three days later he handed the Austrian Commissioner his reply: "Sardinia had no further explanations to make."

On the 29th the Emperor Francis Joseph declared war, and Austrian troops invaded Piedmont. Garibaldi had been offered a command by Victor Emmanuel, and to him rallied the forces of freedom. "Badly armed and worse equipped," they yet represented Italy, fighting under the banner of Italy borne by the House of Savoy, and led by the most popular patriot in Italy.

Napoleon, with his eye on both Tuscany and, as is now known, the Sicilies, brought his armies into Italy—one of them landing at Leghorn in Tuscany. And on the 31st of May the allies won the battle of Palestro, and on the 4th of June the battle of Magenta, forcing the evacuation by the Austrians of Lombardy. Modena and Parma rose in revolt and joined Piedmont.



THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY.



On the 24th of June the French won the battle of Solferino and the Sardinian-Italian army won the battle of San Martino above Lake Garda.

Then on the 6th of July Napoleon, to the amazement of the Italians, secretly sent a messenger to the Austrian Emperor, asking for an armistice. Prussia, with six army corps, it is said, was about to move to Austria's aid.

Napoleon leaned to a Confederation of Italian states under the nominal Presidency of the Pope. He was far from desiring a United Italy. Cavour, in desperation, resigned office, declaring that Napoleon had dishonored him by getting him to allow his King to go to war to release Italy and then leaving him in the lurch.

The revolutionary spirit of Italy, however, was not to be appeased by such an experiment as a Confederation. Modena, Reggio, Parma, Piacenza, having driven out their Austrian scions, voted in August for union with Piedmont. Tuscany and Romagna, through their Constituent Assemblies, soon followed the example. Notice of their choice was given to the great powers by Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and Romagna, and delegates went to Turin to offer the crown to Victor Emmanuel. His government, in view of the dangers incurred by such action, with three armies arrayed against them—for the Austrians were backing the Duke of Modena; the papal troops were in the field; and, above all, Napoleon's army was ready to march—deferred acceptance of the tempting offer. Garibaldi headed a popular army that was raised in Tuscany; but, Napoleon threatening to occupy Piacenza should he advance, Count Ricasoli, the patriot Dictator of Tuscany, opposed him, and finally Victor Emmanuel satisfied him that the cause of Italy would best be subserved by prudence, and he reluctantly yielded. The Peace of Zurich was signed November 10, 1859.

Cavour had resigned in rage when Napoleon asked an armistice after Solferino. King Victor Emmanuel could not resign. He had, as he wrote the French Emperor, joined his fate to that of the Italian people, and therefore he de-

clined to second the French Emperor's plan for an Austro-Italian federation. He wrote as follows to Napoleon in answer to a letter from him:

If Your Majesty is bound by treaties and cannot revoke your engagements in the [proposed] congress, I, Sire, am bound on my side by honor in the face of Europe; by right and duty, by the interests of my house, of my people and of Italy. My fate is joined to that of the Italian people. We can succumb; but never betray. Solferino and San Martino may sometime redeem Novara and Waterloo; but the apostacies of princes are always irreparable. I am moved to the bottom of my soul by the faith which this noble and unfortunate people has reposed in me, and rather than be unworthy of it, I will break my sword and throw my crown away, as did my august father. Personal interest does not guide me in defending the annexations. The sword and time have borne my house from the summit of the Alps to the banks of the Mincio, and those two guardian angels of the Savoy race will bear it farther still, when it pleases God.

The idea of a Congress to settle the affairs of Italy, which Napoleon III promoted with a view to securing a sort of Confederacy of Italian states, with the Pope as honorary head and the Temporal power limited to a small territory about Rome, fell through. The scheme might have been impracticable in any event, and certainly the Pope opposed it.

In January Rattazzi's ministry fell, and Cavour was recalled to power just as Napoleon announced his demand for Savoy and Nice as the price of his acquiescence in the annexation of the central states that had offered Victor Emmanuel their thrones. It was bitter; but it was necessary, and Cavour and Victor Emmanuel accepted it. Garibaldi never forgave Cavour for it. Victor Emmanuel also lost the birthplace of his family. It was Napoleon's aggression here which contributed to arouse Prussia, and later bore such grievous fruit.

Garibaldi was soon after elected by the Niçois as their representative in a popular plebiscite, held before the one arranged by France, and he was on the eve of going to Nice and starting a revolution to counteract the French

Government's moves in relation to the formal plebiscite set for the 15th of April, 1860, when a larger and more far-reaching enterprise presented itself to him: the liberation of Sicily and the uniting of southern Italy with northern Italy. Mazzini, who had sent Francisco Crispi to Sicily, among other agents, had long been at work with this end in view. On the 24th of March Count Rosalino Pilo, a Sicilian patriot, had gone as an advance courier to Sicily with a small cargo of arms, which he landed near Messina on the 19th of April, a few days after the government had sacked a monastery at Palermo, which was a secret arsenal for the revolutionists. Pilo wrote letters back to Genoa which decided Garibaldi to turn from Nice to Sicily. He was farsighted enough to know that a republican uprising could not secure the great prize, and his cry was, Italy and Victor Emmanuel.

On the night of May 5 Garibaldi embarked from Quarto, near Genoa, with 1,072 men—known as the "Thousand"—on two boats, the *Piemonte* and the *Lombardo*, for Marsala, Sicily, where he landed safely. Cavour gave orders that he was not to be meddled with on the high seas, but should not, in view of the ministry's orders, be allowed to land in a Sardinian port.¹

The result of the enterprise is one of the most astonishing chapters in history. By sheer audacity and courage, united to skill, in union with the sentiments of the people of Sicily, Palermo, though defended by 18,000 regular troops, was captured by Garibaldi's little force, swelled now by local volunteers to perhaps some 5,000 men. He became Dictator, and, sweeping on, soon conquered the island. Having expelled the Neapolitan forces therefrom, he turned his attention to Naples.

His progress in Sicily was such as to excite apprehensions in various quarters and of various kinds. Cavour and Victor Emmanuel had possibly some question as to how

¹ An English ship present, commanded by Captain Marriat, it is said, rendered incidental aid to the work of disembarkation by lying too close to the ships of the expedition for the latter to be fired on.

far this all-conquering knight-errant could be controlled—and certainly as to whether he might not by an unsuccessful throw lose the great stake he had won. It was even suggested that should the King of Naples consent to give up Sicily, he should be let alone by Garibaldi. Mazzini and the extremists thought he should address himself next to the conquest of Rome, and a force of 8,000 volunteers was gathered to undertake this step from Sardinia.

The King of Naples, to escape the impending convulsion, yielded too late to persuasion, granted an amnesty, promised a Constitution, hoisted the Tricolor with the Bourbon arms in it, and offered 50,000,000 francs and the Neapolitan navy to help secure Venice for Piedmont—all to no purpose. Garibaldi induced the volunteers in Sardinia to join him, and, crossing the straits into Calabria, which was breaking forth into revolution, captured Reggio; passed on victoriously till he frightened the king and court out of Naples and, entering the city almost alone, assumed the title of Dictator, and as a first step handed over the Neapolitan navy to the Sardinian Government.

The statesmen of the Sardinian, or, as it was now called, the Italian Kingdom—the King and Cavour—had, meantime, recognized the fact that they must not longer remain at the window as mere spectators, but must take an active part in the movements going on in southern Italy or else the fruits of it might be gathered by others or lost altogether. They decided to invade the Papal States, and, in the face of threats from nearly every European continental Power, the step was taken. Austria, France, Spain, Prussia, and Russia broke off diplomatic relations with them. France threatened to intervene. And from France, Belgium, and Ireland flocked, at the call of the Pope, volunteers to defend the Temporal power. But Cavour and Victor Emmanuel kept on; for the stake was Italy. An offer made to the Pope to leave him Rome and the nominal Sovereignty of the Papal States, which were, however, to be administered by the King of Italy, was declined or ignored, and on the 11th of September the forces of King Victor Emmanuel

crossed the frontier. They captured quickly Perugia and Spoleto, and after a victory over the papal forces at Castelfidardo, attacked Ancona, which was taken on the 29th of September, opening the road to Naples, where Garibaldi lay on the Volturno, facing the still large army of King Ferdinand, which was burning to wipe out the disasters of Southern Italy; and where Garibaldi had fought and won a battle on October 1, a few days before Victor Emmanuel crossed the Neapolitan frontier.

On the 11th of October the Piedmontese Parliament authorized the King's government to accept the annexation of those States or Provinces which desired to become a part of the Kingdom.

On the 26th of October the King of Sardinia and Piedmont, at the head of his army, reached Teano, where Garibaldi awaited him. The Dictator dismounted and advanced to meet the King, and, taking off his cap, hailed him as "King of Italy." On the 7th of November, 1860, the plebiscites of the two Sicilies were handed him.

The seizure and capture of Gaëta in January (15), 1861, completed the conquest of Southern Italy. For years, however, under the fostering influence of the Roman Government, whose guest, Francis Joseph (son of Ferdinand II), expelled from Naples, now was, Revolution, degenerated into sheer Brigandage, was kept alive until finally put down with a strong hand.

Only Rome and Venice still remained outside united Italy; the former supported by France, the latter possessed by Austria.

The initial act of the first Italian Parliament, which met in Turin on February 18, 1861, was to confer on Victor Emmanuel and his heirs the title of "King of Italy." The new kingdom was recognized by England in a fortnight, by France in three months, by Prussia in a year, by Spain in four years, but never by the Pope.

Among the difficulties of the new situation was that relating to Garibaldi and his volunteers. The great patriot had rendered immeasurable service to the country—such

immeasurable services that they could not be estimated. He declined the Dukedom and Honors offered by Victor Emmanuel, and retired, like Cincinnatus, to his little farm, to Caprera. Naples elected him a representative and he took his seat in the Chamber, where he was soon in conflict with Cavour, whom he erroneously held responsible for the ingratitude shown the Garibaldians. In fact, Cavour had done his best for them.

Cavour's course was almost run. A little later he passed away, completely exhausted by his vast labors for Italy. Happily the King had already brought him and Garibaldi together. Garibaldi, however, was not always easy to lead. He had one aim only, and he pursued his course steadfastly—to free Italy and make her one. He knew one means only—by arms. With Venice still under Austrian dominion, and Rome excluded from Freedom, he could not rest. No protests nor warnings availed. Venice first drew his attention; but in view of the vast difficulties and enormous dangers to be encountered in that enterprise, it was deferred for the time being, and after a visit to Sicily, where he preached a crusade against Napoleon III, he, on August 22, crossed the straits into Calabria at the head of some 1,000 volunteers, with the war-cry, "Rome or Death." For the King of Italy to permit him to pass meant war with Napoleon, and probably the undoing of all that had been done. Garibaldi was proclaimed a rebel; his expedition was presented as "an appeal to rebellion and civil war" (August 3, 1862), and his way was barred at Aspromonte (August 28, 1862) by the troops of Victor Emmanuel, who fired on the Garibaldians, wounding Garibaldi as he was walking down his lines endeavoring to hold his volunteers in check and prevent their firing on the royal troops. He seated himself and awaited capture by the royal commander, who approached bareheaded, and he was borne off in a litter to Verignano, where later he was released under a general amnesty.

Garibaldi's arrest created a situation impossible to sustain and the Ministry fell promptly.

In 1864 the situation was somewhat improved by a Con-

vention under which France agreed to withdraw her troops in two years. Italy was to protect the papal confines from invasion, not to protest against the papal army, and to move her capital to Florence within six months. From this last Napoleon expected certain results to ensue. One was to embitter Piedmont. Another was to fix Florence as the permanent capital in central Italy and eliminate glances at Rome. Mazzini characterized the Convention as "Aspromonte in permanence."

Meantime, a new factor had entered into the European problem. Bismarck, who was the dominant statesman of his time, controlled the destinies of Europe from his rise to power in 1862 until long after his downfall at the hands of the young Emperor, William II in 1890. It, indeed, might be said that he has controlled those destinies down to the present time. He had conceived and he now nourished the idea of a great German Empire, headed by Prussia, with the King of Prussia to rule over it as Emperor. Having in the reorganization of the Prussian army a fine instrument and one which he deemed adequate to his purpose, he, in 1864, drew in Austria to act with Prussia and take from Denmark the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. To carry out his plans it was necessary to curb France. At one time he coolly considered helping Austria seize Piedmont and beat France, should the latter intervene. Another method of obtaining his aim, however, attracted him more and he saw in Italy's hatred of Austria and fear of France an important aid to the first steps in his ambitious and far-reaching scheme. He accordingly felt out the Italian Government, where he found its head, La Marmora, favorable to Prussia as against Austria. A commercial treaty was negotiated in 1865, and General Govone, whose influence was very potent in Italy, was invited to Berlin, where a treaty was arranged in March, 1866, and signed in April.

Then, having quarrelled with Austria over the division of what may be termed the booty of the war with Denmark, and having secured from Napoleon III the guaranties of

benevolent neutrality in exchange for vague promises of permission for French expansion along the Rhine, and bringing Italy to his aid with the lure of the unredeemed provinces of Venetia and Trentino, Bismarck made war on Austria. The treaty of April 8 provided that both parties should make war on Austria simultaneously, and that neither should make peace without the other. Italy observed her agreement and refused Austria's offer of the Veneto if she would remain neutral; thus placing herself in peril of having to fight Austria alone; as Bismarck notified La Marmora that he would not consider the treaty operative should Austria attack either party before both made war on her. Italy had proposed the year before to Austria the cession of Venetia in consideration of 50,000,000 francs, an offer which Austria had promptly rejected.

Austria soon after proposed to cede Venetia to Napoleon III, for Italy, in consideration of a guaranty of Italy's benevolent neutrality. It was too late. Italy had made her alliance and stood to it. A little later Austria agreed secretly with Napoleon to give him Venetia—bordered, indeed, by certain lines destined to play an important part half a century later—to be handed over to Italy. She retained Trent, Eastern Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia—all Venetian or Italian territory and Italian at heart.

On June 20 Italy declared war on Austria. Prussia, whose armies had on the 16th invaded Hannover and Saxony, declared war on the 21st. Garibaldi was, of course, in the field, but at Lake Garda with a badly equipped force of volunteers.

On the 24th of June, 1866, a battle was fought at Custozza in which, though their losses were heaviest, the Austrians at the close of the day held the battle-field, and at most it would be considered a drawn battle. The stars, however, were with Italy.

On the 3d of July, at Sadowa, near Königgratz in Bohemia, Prussia won a battle over Austria which eventually made her the head of the German states and led to changes which but yesterday were being fought out by half the

world. Two days after this defeat Austria ceded Venetia, or a part of it, to Napoleon III for Italy. It was a manoeuvre which had in view two things: to diminish the value of the territory ceded by rendering permanent a confine which favored Austria; and to secure a benefit from France by enabling her to place Italy under obligation to her. Italy well understood the grounds of the concession, and it looked for a time as though she would stand on her original claim and fight her way through. Austria, however, won successive victories, both by diplomacy and by arms, and Italy, abandoned by Prussia, was forced to make peace.

Napoleon, after the armistice, demanded of Prussia, as recompense for his part, German territory on the left bank of the Rhine; but abandoned the claim on Bismarck's firm refusal. Later, however, his representative, Benedetti, treated with Bismarck for an extension of German power over the South German states, and the extension of French territory to take in Luxemburg and Belgium. Bismarck did not sign this, but kept a copy of the proposal in the handwriting of Benedetti, and in 1870 published it, with great effect both on the German states and on England and Russia.

After the battle of Custozza, Garibaldi was recalled from the Trentino, where he was successful, to help "cover the capital" from an apprehended Austrian invasion, and when this danger passed he went back to fight his way through to the position he had left. A stiff battle on the 21st of July left him master of the field, though it was a Pyrrhic victory. On the 20th the Italian fleet, which had been ordered to attack and capture, if possible, Trieste, an order which was disregarded, was, owing to incompetent handling, completely defeated near Lissa, off the Dalmatian coast, which it was trying to seize. On the 26th Prussia made peace with Austria, leaving Italy to fight on alone, and an armistice was the result. Garibaldi, ordered to retire when but a few miles from Trent, replied laconically: "Ubbedisco"—"I obey."

"And now to Rome," said his disgruntled followers.

"Yes, to Rome," he said. But the way was yet long and rough.

Thus ended Italy's third War of Independence.

In December, 1866, the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome was concluded under the September convention of 1864.

Ricasoli, who had succeeded La Marmora, endeavored to come to an understanding with the Vatican as to a *modus vivendi*; but found himself balked by the intractableness of the Pope, even on such questions as a customs union, a postal agreement, and common action against brigandage. The Pope refused to treat. The hopes of those who had trusted to see Rome the capital at that time were revived.

The rumors that the Romans were ready to rise had started a movement for an invasion of papal territory which had been quickly suppressed (June, 1867) by the royal troops. But to prevent a more serious movement, France mobilized 40,000 men at Toulon to prevent the realization of Italian aspiration. Garibaldi, however, was not to be daunted.

Garibaldi made ready to move on Rome, but was arrested September 23 at Sinalunga by the Italian Government and sent to Caprera, whence he escaped in an open boat and eventually made his way to the Tuscan coast to join the volunteer bands which were raised by the Republicans to capture Rome. But it was too late. French intervention was decided on, and on October 17, 20,000 French troops landed at Civita Vecchia, the Italian minister's decision to send troops to Rome was half-hearted—and, in any event, was too late, as Victor Emmanuel recognized. An attack on Rome by a small force under the Cairoli brothers, with a view to starting a Revolution, failed; but Garibaldi, having joined the volunteers, changed the situation. On the 25th of October he stormed and captured Monte Rotondo, above the Tiber, a dozen or so miles east of Rome. It was too late. On the 25th the French arrived—and Garibaldi was compelled to retire from the gates of Rome to Mentana, ten or a dozen miles away. Here he was attacked by the

Papal forces on the morning of the 3d of November. These he was driving back when the French arrived on the scene and defeated him. He was later arrested by the Italian troops and once more was confined in Varignano.

France, with "chassepots that performed wonders" at Mentana, was to reap a bitter harvest from that sowing. She had for some time viewed with natural anxiety the growing power of her warlike neighbor beyond the Rhine, strengthened as Prussia was by her victory over Austria in 1866. In 1867 the dispute over Luxemburg brought her to the brink of war with Prussia, and the next year she would not have been averse to entering into treaty relations with Italy and Austria could she have arranged acceptable terms.

The King, indeed, never forgot what Italy owed to France for assistance rendered in earlier days; but the Italian public was still suffering deeply from resentment over France's action regarding Rome, and her victory at Mentana still rankled. Moreover, Rome, as the capital, was a *sine qua non*, and this Napoleon was not ready to concede.

France had not only returned to Italy and defeated her aspiration for Rome as her capital, but in the debate in the French Chamber, Rouher, the premier, declared that "Never should Italy have Rome," and he was sustained by an overwhelming vote. This "never" had sunk deep in the Italian heart.

The battle of Sadowa had further-reaching consequences—as the German chancellor intended it to have—than the mere primacy of Prussia among the Germanic states. He looked forward now to a great German Empire. But the powerful South-German states—Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg—were jealous of Prussia, and it was necessary to bring them around. To effect this there must be a National cause which should appeal to a National spirit. France furnished this in the affair of the Spanish marriage. In Prussia the long-headed chancellor, with his eye fixed on the future, was casting about to circumvent France, whose

growing power might frustrate his far-reaching designs. He went to work on Italy. He took up Mazzini, with whom he had one thing in common: to prevent Italy's entangling herself with France. It was clear enough to him that Italy must have, if not then, in the course of events, aspirations along the Mediterranean. He dangled hopes of Tunis before him. The Mediterranean should become an Italian lake. France and Italy must always be rivals, often foes, he declared. He even referred to Trieste. So it went on.

Meantime, Napoleon was trying to get Italy and Austria into an alliance with him. The obstacle was Rome. Rome was the natural capital of Italy. As for Napoleon, with his troops garrisoning the Eternal City and himself supported in France by the Clericals against the Progressives of every stripe, it was impossible for him to yield to the claim of Italy.

Napoleon's policy was beginning to make itself extensively felt. The annexation of Nice and Savoy by France had aroused the suspicion and the apprehension of more than one of her neighbors. Napoleon's attitude to some extent kept up the apprehension. Bismarck, looking about to strengthen the Hohenzollern House, put forward a member of that house, Prince Leopold, as a candidate for the throne of Spain. France opposed and, indeed, resented this idea.

Napoleon, who had been intriguing as to the matter with both Austria and Italy, felt strong enough to demand of Prussia an official confession of the failure of the German plan. Events hastened. Bismarck presently felt ready. The story of Napoleon's despatch is known. Bismarck, in transmitting the despatch to the public, altered it sufficiently to make its positive tone appear yet more peremptory, and published both the Emperor's despatch and the King of Prussia's refusal. The situation was one which rallied the German states to the side of Prussia. Napoleon on the 15th of July declared war on Germany, and the result of the war united the German states under the King of Prussia, defeated France, took from her Alsace

and Lorraine, created the German Empire, strengthened the primacy among the Germanic states already taken from Austria, and changed the course of European history. The immediate consequence, besides those mentioned, was the increased prestige of the Imperialistic Powers.

Two days after the fall of Napoleon III the dogma of Papal Infallibility was declared by the Ecumenical Council in Rome—and Pius IX was declared infallible. Napoleon had done his best to get Italy to come to his aid, withdrawing his garrison from Rome in early August, and Austria was sounded, but the latter deemed the time for intervention passed.

Sedan occurred on the 2d of September, 1870, and two days later the French Empire fell.

Italy's opportunity had come. It was the hour for which she had waited so long.

The way to Rome was now open, and the aspiration of the Italian people who had suffered and undergone so much, was too ardent to be withstood. Lanza, the Prime Minister, conservative as he was, moved with deliberation, it is true; but, though Mazzini was arrested, he knew what the will of the people was. And on August 29 Visconti Venosta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced to the European powers that Italy would take possession of Rome immediately. The King wrote a letter to the Pope begging him to accept the love and protection of the Italians rather than insist on a sovereignty which existed only by the support of foreign arms. The Pope declined; he wrote to William of Prussia, but the letter reached him when Victor Emmanuel was in Rome.

On the 11th of September, 1870, the Italian forces crossed the papal frontier, where they had been concentrated awaiting developments. On the morning of the 20th of September negotiations for the pacific surrender of the city having failed, an attack was made at several points; and about eight o'clock a breach having been battered in the wall a few hundred feet from the Porta Pia, the Italians, under General Cadorna, rushed in. A sharp fight took place be-

tween the Italian assailants and the defending Swiss Guards and French Zouaves in the Papal service, who defended the Porta Pia, but the issue could not be doubted, though the Zouaves did not lay down their arms until late in the day. The Diplomatic Corps urged upon the occupying forces the immediate restoration of order; for the situation appeared critical. The Leonine city beyond the Tiber, however, was not taken possession of until a request for protection had come three times from the Vatican.

A plebiscite was set for October 2 and the Leonine city was not included; but the people there set up an urn of their own, and delivered it first of all the urns at the capitol that evening. The total vote stood 133,681 for, and 1,507 against, the new government. So Rome became the capital of a once more United Italy, and Victor Emmanuel could say: "Here we are, and here we shall stay."

Italy's position, following the last step by which her union had become established "from the Alps to the sea," was a peculiar one and, quite apart from military conditions, not free from perils. To gauge it accurately and get a clear idea of her condition then, and her progressive action since, a brief glance must be given to the European powers about her at the time when she entered on her new career, and to their situation and aspirations, and another glance must be directed to the internal situation within Italy herself, and especially within Rome.

The keys of St. Peter are not the only keys held by the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church. Holding these, he has also the keys of the solution of many a far-reaching problem.

It is difficult for one exempted by heredity, birth, and training from the teachings of the Church of Rome to realize the power that it exercises over the minds of those subjected from birth to its profound influences. And the Head of this power is the Pope. The power exists in all lands, extends to the uttermost parts of the earth; and the centre of it all is the Pope, encircled and surrounded by Curia and Hierarchy—the most completely organized, cohesive body

on Earth to-day, or that has ever been on Earth. It is not an individual question of an individual. The Pope is doubtless himself as much bound by the traditions of the Holy See as, and possibly even more than, any one else. This is why the situation of the new government in Rome found its first, most difficult and perplexing if not perilous problem in Rome itself—the problem which is known there as the “Roman question.”

It had been so from the beginning of the struggle for Italian unity.

Even before the claim to Rome as the capital of Italy had been advanced, and while the devoted Catholic, Charles Albert, was King, the Pope, Pius IX, then in the first flush of his early liberalism, had found himself shackled by his bonds. He wrote the Austrian Emperor exhorting him with fatherly affection to withdraw voluntarily from Italy. The letter has a curiously familiar sound to those familiar with the encyclicals of the present occupant of St. Peter's chair. He exhorted the Austrian Emperor “to desist from a war which, powerless to reconquer the hearts of the Lombards and Venetians, only leads to a dark series of calamities.” “Nor let the generous Germanic nation,” he proceeds, “take offense if We write it to abandon old hatreds and convert into useful relations of friendly neighborliness a dominion which can be neither noble nor happy if it depend only on the sword. Thus, We trust in the nation itself, justly proud of its own nationality, to make no longer a point of honor of sanguinary attempts against the Italian nation; but rather to feel that its true honor lies in recognizing Italy as a sister.”

It was to this letter that the reply was given that the same treaties which gave the Pope his Temporal power gave to Austria Lombardy and Venetia.

CHAPTER IV

ITALY BETWEEN FRANCE AND AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA, having so long been the premier power on the continent of Europe—a premiership broken only for a short period by the all-conquering Napoleon—found it difficult and, indeed, impossible, so far as her own views and policy were concerned, to face the challenge which modern Progress presented to her in the rise of new states bent on Independence and Liberty. The diminution of her conquered possessions by the events of 1859–60 and 1866, and the usurpation of the primacy among the Germanic states by Prussia in the latter year, followed later by the signal triumph of Germany over France, left her reduced in extent and power; but not a whit in spirit or aim. The House of Hapsburg had been too long intrenched in unlimited power to relinquish any part of what it regarded as a Dynastic possession.

The Franco-Italian victories of Magenta and Solferino (1859), which cost Austria Lombardy and gave it to Italy, served also to open the way a few years later to the establishment of the dual system with Hungarian equality after Sadowa in 1866, when Austria found it necessary to cultivate Hungary's good-will in her plan for revenge on Germany and for the recapture of Austrian primacy among the Germanic states. This plan was disposed of later by Germany's victorious war with France, and Austria promptly turned her aspirations southward and southeastward, where a few years later the Balkan states, between the Adriatic and the Ægean Seas, became the Naboth's Vineyard of her desire.

The gibe of the abdicated Emperor, Ferdinand, after Sadowa, that his abdication seemed unnecessary, as he also could have lost battles and provinces, may have spurred on

his successor and nephew, Francis Joseph; for the latter's policy was steadily set to obtain compensation in other directions for the territory he had lost, and as early as 1876 he secured the consent of the Russian Emperor to the acquirement of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Austria's cession of Venice to France to be passed on to Italy left Italy with a northern boundary-line which Austria laid along the slopes of the Alps, which left in Austria's hands not merely the Trentino and the Isonzo region, but left her in possession of confines, possessing which she could not only easily defend herself, but could readily march down on Italy. The Trentino extended like a wedge far down into Italy which could be readily invaded on her long flank through the passes and valleys which Austria had retained. Thus, holding at once the northern heights above Italy and the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts across the Adriatic, with their long internal waterway, ports and harbors, Austria was strategically in a position to command Italy's border from the Swiss line half-way to the southern outlet of the Adriatic.


The conformation of Italy obliged her, in the view of the Italians, to control the Adriatic, at least, to the extent of maintaining therein a power superior to that of any other state or combination of states. The eastern coast of the peninsula is low and sandy. It has no harbors of any importance from Venice down to Bari or Brindisi; whereas, on the other side of the Adriatic are a long series of protective islands beyond which are numerous ports and harbors on the Dalmatian coast and long internal waterways. The fleets of the country in possession of these control that coast in security and threaten the opposite Italian shore, either from the north or from the south. The Italians recognized the necessity of holding and controlling that coast and Venice had established cities and factories along the coast and settled it with Italians hundreds of years before, and it was not until the treaty of Campo Formio, when Napoleon Bonaparte, for his own reasons, turned Venice and


Dalmatia over to Austria, that the Dalmatian coast had been less Italian than the western shore of the Adriatic. He had, after his victory over Austria, taken back the gift he had bestowed on her, but in the partition of his dominions after his fall, Austria, as we have seen, had promptly availed herself of the title, which he had temporarily assumed, to assert her right to permanent possession of a part and control of the rest.

Throughout the period of Austrian possession there had been a large element in the cities of the regions expropriated by Austria who claimed Italy as their mother country and aspired to become once more united with her. They had, against all discouragement and repression, preserved their Italian spirit and kept alive, even when at times abandoned by the mother country, the hope of being rescued from their servitude to the Hapsburg House and becoming once more free Italians. They preserved the Italian tongue and cherished Italian traditions—and they kept alive and poignant in Italy herself the memory of the wrong that had ravished them from her embracing arms.

Italy, then, was united from the Swiss border to the southern end of Sicily, but her position was difficult. Misgovernment, Revolution, and War had exhausted her resources and impoverished her. The Government itself was overburdened with debt. The public debt had increased in ten years from £120,000,000 to £328,000,000 sterling and the taxes were enormous. She began her new life steeped in poverty, overburdened with debt, with the deep hostility of her nearest neighbors on one side and the envy of her neighbors on the other side, and with internal difficulties to surmount rarely equalled in the history of a state. That out of these difficulties she was able to emerge triumphant is the proof either of remarkable ability on the part of her statesmen or of the unspeakable evils of the rule to which she had previously been subjected.

During the decade following the final union of Italy the great actors whose names were a seal of union passed from the scene, one by one. One only remained till 1882, Gari-





baldi; but his name was a symbol of liberty, and as such it still survives.

The necessity to meet the expenses of the government, together with the enforcement of order and the substitution of law for the exercise of private action, brought so much hostility to the Government that the Conservative Ministry fell and the Conservative Party was driven from power after its long tenure of office covering a generation. In its room came by a great majority the Liberal Party under Depretis. Its programme was a transformation, its leaders were men who had followed Garibaldi and looked to the utmost freedom. In this change the South of Italy came into power, supplanting to some extent the old Piedmontese and Lombards who had formulated Italy's policy for over a generation.

Naturally the people who had been fed on promises looked for an amelioration of conditions, especially of Taxation, and for an era of prosperity and freedom. But the conditions did not admit of it and, once in power, the new party found it impossible or at least impracticable to make any radical changes. The result was dissatisfaction and danger to the new system, to which all Italy had looked as a sort of specific for all evils from which it had suffered so long. Besides this, certain apparent and very real dangers from without stared the new kingdom in the face. Italy was at daggers-draw with Austria; France had been by turns her friend and her foe as occasion arose, and England, however more friendly to her than the others, had a record not wholly beyond question in her relations to her.

The Depretis policy, which began March, 1876, was a marked change from that of the Right, which had been guided by the older conservative element represented by the North. It was necessarily based on concessions to those whose votes were needed in the Chamber, and this led to the formation of numerous groups, all of whom had special or local interests to subserve, and it led to government by Blocks. This process, which was termed Transformation when, about 1882, abandoning the Republican

element, he called in the old Right to adjust the balance of his former support, changed Italy's political methods essentially. Depretis abolished certain taxes on grain, and enlarged the suffrage from about 600,000 to about 2,000,000 votes. He also (in 1877) made elementary education compulsory for children between the ages of six and nine. The internal conditions in Italy came in for more attention, and her foreign policy was relegated to the second place. This led to matters of local concern supplanting often those of more general concern, and to an increase of rivalries and recriminations among the representatives whose expression was at times of incredible bitterness. On the other hand, there resulted a system of secret combinations, which had a tendency toward debasing the political system into one of secret intrigue and "log-rolling."

Depretis went down for a time in 1878 before the new situation, which had developed and culminated in the Congress of Berlin. He was succeeded by Cairoli, who reversed his preference for Germany and sought friendlier relations with France, while a fresh spirit of irredentism, directed against Austria, sprang up in Italy which was never afterward quite laid.

The issue of the Berlin Congress, in which Italy got nothing, shocked and enraged the Italians, and brought down Cairoli, sweeping Depretis back into power; which he retained until 1887, when events forced him to yield the reins to Francisco Crispi, whose career is generally considered to give him rank next to Cavour in the list of Italian statesmen.

For a time Italy attempted to carry out her high-sounding but not wholly practical doctrine of "*Farà da sè.*" The result was not wholly satisfactory. One after another of her Ministers tried the method of aloofness, with the result that she found herself isolated and cut off, not only from practical support, but from the friendship of those who had formerly shown friendship—and it is necessary for even States to have friends.

Poverty and possibly the spirit of enterprise had turned

the eyes of the Italians toward both the eastern shore of the Adriatic and the southern shore of the Mediterranean. To Tunisia, which is almost in sight of the Sicilian coast, the tide of emigration had set in so steadily that there were something like 50,000 Italians settled in this ancient province of Rome. Libya had once been called "the soul of Rome," and the arrival of the Grain-fleets from North Africa was in ancient times celebrated as a great national festival. Seeing the success of France in Algeria, Italy was looking forward to the occupation of Tunis at no distant date. At the Berlin Congress she had a chance to carry out her aspiration in this direction, but missed it.

France was also recuperating from the blow which she had received in 1870 and was meditating her "revanche," looking to extend her colonial possessions in North Africa.

Four wars had been required to bring about German Unity and German Imperialism. The first was internal—the revolution of 1848, when the King of Prussia refused to acknowledge any right in the people to bestow the crown, or any theory save that of the grace of God and the Princes. The second was the war of 1864, when, with the aid of Austria, the Schleswig-Holstein Duchies were wrested from Denmark. Then came that of 1866, when, with the aid of Italy and France, Austria was defeated in the contest for the primacy among the Germanic states; and a half-dozen states, including Hannover, were seized and absorbed in Prussia, *nolens volens*.

And finally, the war of 1870–71 with France, when Bismarck, having manœuvred successfully to get an issue formulated that would arouse German racial and national sentiment, though to do so he garbled the despatch of the French Emperor, united all the Germanic states outside of Austria in a common cause and, having beaten France completely, wrested from her the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and crowned the King of Prussia Emperor of Germany in a way that he believed would appeal to the sentiment of the entire German race and make him the undisputed suc-

cessor of Charlemagne and thus the successor of the Roman Emperors themselves.

It was not long, however, before Germany awoke to the consciousness that she had crushed her enemy only temporarily, and that before the scars of war were half healed France was on her feet again and was steadying herself for whatever the future might hold. Thus it was that the question presented itself to Germany: should she spring upon her and crush her decisively and finally before France had recovered completely, or should she wait? The question was answered by the other powers of Europe. Russia and England lined up with France and the peril was averted.

In this state of the case Bismarck sought to isolate France. The Three Emperors' League was already failing and he cast his eye southward, where Austria, beaten by Prussia, Italy, and France ten years before, lay gnashing her teeth over her lost opportunity for revenge, and where Italy was isolated. The way to relieve the situation was to turn Austria's thoughts southward to the Balkans as a field for exploitation and bring Italy to consent to it.

Meantime, new questions were arising in Europe—new-old questions destined to play an important part in the future struggle for supremacy among the Great powers. The importance of the East, the possibilities of colonial expansion began to excite them. England's colonial possessions not only kept her Mistress of the seas, but incidentally also Mistress of the marts of Commerce and the centres of finance. She held the gateways of traffic to the East; and above one of these gateways, the Balkans were a strategic point which substantially commanded it.

The Balkan question was now becoming one of the important questions of Europe. Mainly Slav in their populations, though having large sections of other peoples, the Balkans were historically and ethnically related to Russia more closely than to any other country. At the same time they stretched across southeastern Europe, bordering the Mediterranean from the Adriatic to the Ægean, and thence across to the Black Sea, a position which potentially fur-

nished the key to the control of the highways to the Orient.

As a result of the Franco-Prussian War, Russia, which had shown a benevolent neutrality toward Prussia, was drawn into closer relations with the new Empire; and later Austria, to whom Bismarck suggested compensatory expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was brought also into friendly relations.

The three Emperors had exchanged visits and formed the *Drei Kaiser Bund*, or Three Emperors' League, in the summer (August) of 1872, which it was thought would enable them to control Europe. Their conflicting ambitions, however, were too great, and Russia and Austria formed, in 1876, a secret agreement known as the Treaty of Reichstadt, looking to an expansion in the direction of the Ottoman dominions, which still included sovereignty over the Balkan states extending to the Adriatic. A Bulgarian revolt, which Turkey crushed ruthlessly, brought Russia into the field against Turkey in the War of 1877. She had arranged with Germany and Austria in advance; but on the eve of the completion of a victorious campaign Great Britain, who, in 1875, had bought a controlling interest in the Suez Canal, the gateway to her possessions in the Orient, intervened and Russia was stopped almost at the gates of Constantinople, and was forced to content herself with the advantages already gained by the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878. Russia's aim was a great Bulgaria under her suzerainty and an independent Roumania and Servia bound to her by ties of Nationality.

Austria, looking to the possession of the Balkan provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and England, apprehending Russia's advance across her line of communication with her eastern provinces, united in a secret Agreement (May 30, 1878), which would balk Russia's aim, and the Congress of Berlin, promoted by them, assembled (June 13, 1878), and negotiated the Treaty of Berlin, July 30, 1878, with a view to establishing an equilibrium in Europe.

Meantime, England had negotiated a Secret Treaty with the Porte on the 4th of June, 1878, by which England was

to have Cyprus and the Porte was to grant needed reforms in his European and adjacent possessions. The Agreement, knowledge of which was not known, at least to Italy, until it came out through the press, aroused so much excitement in France and Italy that Lord Salisbury suggested to Italy expanding in the direction of Tunis or Tripoli—which Bismarck later also suggested to Italy.

By the Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria was divided—like all Gaul—into three parts; Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro became independent; Russia got back Bessarabia, lost by her through the Crimean War; Greece got Thessaly, without Epirus, however, which she coveted; and Austria got authority to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, though they were still under Turkish sovereignty.

The Congress of Berlin, which undertook to re-establish the Equilibrium of Europe—or its consequences—has been considered by European statesmen to have deferred the outbreak of any general European war for nearly a generation; and, although there were wars fought elsewhere in which the Powers signatory in that congress participated, and on several occasions a General war seemed imminent, the great conflagration was postponed until the great World conflict burst forth in August, 1914. But the fires were always there—simply banked, never extinguished.

The period which followed the Berlin Congress was an era of Diplomacy, in which the statesmen, like jockeys before the dropping of the flag in a great race, spent their time in “jockeying for position.”

Bismarck, who had quarrelled personally with his Russian rival, Prince Gorchakov, presently saw that Germany's true policy was to cultivate good relations with Russia, and steps were taken to draw the three Emperors once more closely together.

The Powers, having laid down the confines in Europe of the several countries, were obliged to look elsewhere for their future expansion.

The great Ottoman Empire, left stagnant and undeveloped—became the nearest and most alluring field for

future exploitation. And to it turned the eyes of all the expanding Powers of Europe. Turkey would have been possibly a dangerous fraction of the Ottoman dominions to assail directly. All Islam might be aroused by such an attack. Moreover, she subserved the double purpose of a buffer state and of an almost inexhaustible field for financial exploitation. That portion of it known now as the Balkan peninsula had been practically disposed of by the Treaty of Berlin and its consequences, and the rest of it that lay most convenient to Europe was the North African littoral, which immediately became the object of European covetousness, and from this time was the field of European rivalry and intrigue.

Austria had secured the mandate to occupy and administer the coveted provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russian consent was obtained at Reichstadt in 1876. England's consent was assured in a convention, signed June 6, 1878.

The desire of the Austrian Emperor was for immediate annexation, as it gave Austria a new outlet on the Adriatic, and the possession of the islands and the inner waterways along the eastern Adriatic coast, which would enable her to control both shores of that sea—Italy's as well as Montenegro's and Albania's. The expression of this intention, however, met with such manifestations of opposition in various directions that, for the time being, Austria was forced to content herself with mere Occupation and Administration. Even this was quite sufficient to arouse intense opposition in the provinces themselves, where the situation became little short of war. Italy immediately manifested her expectation of receiving "compensation" in the direction of the Trentino—a claim which, however, Austria had no mind to admit. But a more potent obstacle than these was the opposition of the Hungarian Magyars and of the Austrian Germans, who for different reasons opposed the infusion of so large a body of Slavs into the Austrian body-politic. An equally earnest opposition was interposed by Turkey and likewise by the Slavs, not

only of those provinces, but of Servia and Montenegro, who—especially the former—had begun to dream of some sort of confederated union which would have a racial basis more consonant with their future liberty than they could hope to obtain under the Austrian yoke. In face of this general and far-reaching opposition, Austria was fain to content herself with an Occupation and an Administration which she made sufficiently vigorous to give a foretaste of what her rule would be when she should be ready to annex the provinces permanently.

With a view to guarding herself on the other side and to relieving herself from Russian interference in her expansion policy, Austria entered into a secret convention with Russia in 1878 (July 13) which assured her against the latter's intervention should she occupy the Sanjak of Novi Bazar (Old Serbia), she, on her part, engaging to support Russia diplomatically in realizing the provisions of the Berlin Congress. These restored to the latter what she had lost in the Crimean War. Russia, however, was not reconciled to the translation of administrative occupation into annexation, which would open the way for Austrian supremacy in the Balkans and German supremacy far beyond them. This attitude remained an abiding factor throughout the ensuing years, down to the time when the final move was made which opened the titanic struggle in the World War. The evidence tends to show that Bismarck, in his boasted character of "honest broker," fomented if he did not suggest the plan for Austrian occupation of the Turkish Slav provinces, having in view the absorption of both Austria and Russia in questions which would keep them embroiled and therefore diverted from matters which Germany was conducting.¹

The following year (1879) saw the "Dual Alliance" between Germany and Austria-Hungary concluded, based probably on very different motives on the part of the two signatories; for Germany had her eye on France; but one motive was common to both—the apprehension of Russia

¹ *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (Steed), p. 216.

and of Russian intervention in matters which the two Empires felt might mature before very long. The Dual Alliance, however, did not prevent Germany's negotiating in 1884 a secret treaty with Russia, which has been well termed a Reinsurance treaty, designed to insure Germany against any interference on the other's part should trouble arise with France, and conversely to insure Russia should trouble arise between her and Austria-Hungary.¹ This treaty remained in force until 1890, after Bismarck's fall; but was not known to the world until disclosed by Bismarck's former organ in 1896, October 24.

The following year an agreement was reached between the Austrian and Russian Emperors in regard to the Balkans, and on April 29, 1897, the two governments issued a statement that the Emperors were determined to maintain the General peace, the Principle of Order and the Status quo. This was further confirmed by a despatch issued by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, containing the information that "the two powers principally interested in the Balkans" had arrived at an agreement to repudiate all Conquests and maintain the Status quo.

Peace and Order, however, were not so easily maintained as the Status quo, and the next years were filled with wars and rumors of wars.

¹ *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 217, note 2.

CHAPTER V

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

At the Congress of Berlin Italy had got nothing. During the session of the congress Bismarck, with an eye to the future, and desiring doubtless to raise serious questions between Italy and France, suggested to Count Corti, the Italian representative, that Italy might occupy Tunisia. This Italy undoubtedly looked forward to doing some day; but at the time there were several reasons why it appeared too inconvenient, if not too hazardous, to take the step. She was burdened with debt, and to attempt this at the time was almost certain to bring a clash with France as well as with Turkey; and even England, notwithstanding that Lord Salisbury's taking over Cyprus became known, would not have looked with favor on this step by the aspiring young kingdom, which would have made her a bar across the Mediterranean. Italy, therefore, was fain to content herself with the assurance of France that she contemplated no step toward occupying Tunis, and of England that she would not consent to any change in the Ottoman Empire beyond that provided for by the Berlin Congress.

Thereupon Bismarck, who was now ready for a period of peace in which the new Empire which he had created might build itself up internally, declared that Germany was "satiated" and turned the attention of France to Tunis, probably thinking that with this outlet for her ambition and energies she might forget the rape of her provinces on the Rhine, and that this would estrange, if not embroil her and Italy.

The story of the movement is not without obscurities. Certainly Bismarck foresaw that France's occupation would disturb, if not destroy the good relations with Italy. In any event Italy, if not outwitted, was overreached.

England also, or her statesmen who represented her, played a secret part not reconcilable with the replies they gave to Italy. France and Italy both had been much disturbed by the discovery that Beaconsfield had secretly got Cyprus from Turkey, and to appease France's resentment, her representative, M. Waddington, was quietly given to understand that England would not object to her moving on to occupy Tunis, which she greatly coveted. Lord Salisbury had also given one of the Italian representatives to infer from his "veiled utterances that Italy might dream of expansion in the direction of Tripoli or Tunis."¹

In 1881, on a change of her ministry, notwithstanding a promise made to Italy that she would do nothing in this direction without consulting her, France took advantage of disturbances between the Kroumirs—tribesmen in western Tunisia—and some of her Algerian tribes, to cross the border and march on Tunis.

The Dual Alliance and the Reinsurance Secret Treaty with Russia were followed three years later by the renewal of the Three Emperors' League. Bismarck, however, was far from contenting himself with this. He had no illusions as to France, whose recuperation after the Franco-Prussian War had astonished the world. He knew what France would do should she become strong enough. Accordingly, he turned to Italy, which just then was discovering many difficulties in her new position as a Great Power, and was herself looking around to secure her position. And from this conjunction came the Triple Alliance.

The sudden move of France into Tunisia and her occupation of the Regency under the Treaty of the Bardo, notwithstanding the assurances given by France that beyond defending her interests she had no intention of changing the political status of the Regency, together with the disclosure of the way in which the Italian statesmen had been overreached, aroused great excitement in Italy, and the Cairoli ministry fell.

Italy suddenly found herself stared in the face by com-

¹ *Memoirs of Francis Crispi*, II, p. 117.

plete isolation. France, who had been on occasion friendly to her, had now dealt her, as she deemed, a deadly blow; England, on whose friendliness she had ever counted, had failed her. She not only saw her natural aspirations frustrated by the act of France; but foresaw the possibility of losing Sicily, which had not so long before been under the rule of those who claimed France as their mother country: viz. the Bourbons. Riots growing out of the situation took place, and the tension between her and France was strained well-nigh to the breaking-point. Moreover, there was danger that France and even Germany might step in and once more reopen the Roman Question.

Bismarck's evident intention was to keep Italy in just the condition in which she should be most dependent on Germany and most useful to her. Just so much leash would he give her and no more.

England, on the revolt of Arabi Pasha with the design of expelling her from Egypt, seized the Suez Canal August 25, 1882; landed troops at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, who won the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, September 11, and pushing forward seized Cairo and captured the garrison there, September, 1882; and has since extended her power to the southern point of the continent.

From this time England has occupied and virtually been the mistress of Egypt. Her occupation of Egypt, with France's occupation of Tunisia, closed Italy in almost completely—and the latter's position was undoubtedly one to excite what is termed in Italy "preoccupation."

Thus, altogether, Italy's position was far from as happy as it had appeared to be prior to the Berlin Congress, when, building up her fleet, she apparently stood a chance of holding the balance of power in southern Europe. France now held Tunis, and England and France together were administering Egypt under a dual control, and she found herself, as she said, "closed in by a ring of iron." There was danger of the Roman Question being reopened not only by France, where the Clerical party was strong and aggressive, but even by Germany, who had sent a Minister to the Holy

See, made overtures to the Catholic Centre, and began to testify a new interest in Roman matters. It appeared necessary for Italy to look about her if she did not wish to remain isolated and run the risk of being pared down by her powerful neighbors. Accordingly, she turned toward the one state in Europe where she could hope for sympathy and assistance: Germany. Whatever the first steps were, Bismarck, it is said, informed her that the road to Berlin lay through Vienna, and that Italy and her King should come by way of Austria. As the necessity was obvious, proposals were made for the exchange of visits between the King of Italy and the Emperor of Austria, the first suggestions coming—it is said, at the instance of the Italian ambassador to Vienna—from the Vienna press.

Accordingly, in October (27), 1881, the King and Queen of Italy visited the Emperor Francis Joseph, it having been arranged that the latter should in due time return their visit. As transpired, however, the Italian ambassador, in arranging for this exchange of visits, had omitted to stipulate the place where the return visit of the Austrian Emperor should be paid, and as the Pope objected to its being paid in Rome, which would have been an acknowledgment of the Royal authority in the Eternal City, it was never repaid at all. This, it appears, came near preventing the object of the visit of King Humbert to Vienna being carried through. Eventually, however, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who desired to get rid of the perpetual menace of Italy's aspiration to get possession of the irredentist provinces, opened with the Italian Government a discussion as to the advantages which each would derive could they forget old dissensions and unite in defense of their common interests.

Out of this, with many hitches and lapses, came, fostered by Bismarck's sedulous care, the Triple Alliance, signed May 20, 1882, though not acknowledged by Italy until March, 1883, when the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs alluded to it in a debate in the Chamber.

The terms of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance have never

been completely known. It was not until after the outbreak of the World War that certain of its important specific provisions were published.¹ It was only known that it provided a defensive alliance against attacks by enemies on the parties signatory, and that Italy stipulated that she should not be called on to fight England.

The chief object of the Alliance was protection against France on the one side and Russia on the other. Another object undoubtedly was, so far as the Empires were concerned, the abandonment by Italy of her Irredentist policy, so that their aspirations looking toward the Balkans might have an opportunity for development.

¹ The published articles read as follows:

Article I.—The High Contracting Parties mutually promise to remain on terms of peace and friendship, and that they will not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against one of their States.

They pledge themselves to undertake an exchange of views regarding all general and political questions which may present themselves, and promise furthermore their mutual assistance, commensurate with their individual interests.

Article III.—In case one or two of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty and should become involved in a war with them, the *causa fœderis* would arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

Article IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the High Contracting Parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Party, the two other Contracting Parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality toward their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its ally.

Article VII.—Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the territorial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all territorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signatory of this Treaty. To that end they shall communicate to one another all such information as may be suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well as those of other Powers.

Should, however, the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Egean Seas, in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both Parties.

One of the principal reasons for this secrecy was the apprehension of the attitude of the Italian people toward a treaty, even one limited to measures of defense, between Italy and her overbearing foe, Austria. The rumor that floated about of such step caused great opposition and some excitement in Italy. This opposition found a concrete expression of reflection of this feeling in the act of a young irredentist student named Guglielmo Oberdan, who, inspired in part, perhaps, by the many antique examples in Roman history of self-immolation to a patriotic instinct, took occasion to avail himself of a contemplated and much-heralded visit of the Austrian Emperor to Trieste, to make an attempt on his life. Having provided himself with explosives, with this intent he left Rome, only to be arrested immediately on his arrival in Trieste territory, where the explosives, being found in his possession, he was immediately tried and convicted. Great efforts were made to save him, and petitions asking clemency were signed by thousands of women. Victor Hugo appealed personally to the Emperor. But the House of Hapsburg's long régime had not been established on clemency, and Oberdan was promptly hanged. The legend grew up in Italy that he was convicted on manufactured evidence, and that the bombs attributed to him were placed in his valises by Austrian agents. He became immediately a popular hero, and during all the days in which Italy's decision hung in the balance Oberdan's name was to be found scribbled on walls and gates and even on the pavements of the streets throughout Italy.

Notwithstanding this strong, if unsystematized opposition to an alliance with the nation ruled over by him whom the Italians stigmatized as the "Emperor of the Hangmen," the advantages to Italy of such an alliance, in face of France's attitude toward her, were sufficiently apparent to enable the Italian Government to maintain the treaty in force for thirty years, and to extend it by successive renewals which, indeed, were agreed on before the period already provided for had expired.

CHAPTER VI

ITALY AND THE BALKANS

NONE can appreciate the situation of Italy in connection with the Triple Alliance who does not endeavor to unravel the complexities of European relations and get hold of their original causes.

An attempt has already been made to present the age-long relations between Italy and Austria, resulting in the bitter antagonism which culminated in the Italian revolutions and wars of independence of 1848-49, 1860 and 1866, that left Italy, overreached by the diplomacy of France and defeated (at Lissa) by Austria; baffled of her aspirations to redeem her regions of the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria; obliged to sit in humiliation and see herself dominated along half of her border—from the Swiss line to the southern point on the Adriatic coast by her potent and prepotent enemy.

To give some appreciation of what this meant to Italy an effort has been made to show how the Italian spirit, with whatever it contains of good or bad, of admirable or the reverse, has grown up through ages of stress and struggle—and also to show the internal conditions of Italy, and their relation to the external conditions in which she has found herself placed since 1866, when her new geographic boundaries were fixed; and especially since 1878, when the Congress of Berlin apportioned the continent of Europe by metes and bounds as the final partition among the powers; and, while Austria was given regions like Bosnia and Herzegovina, which brought her the control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic, Italy found herself the Cinderella of the sisterhood, left to lament at home—alone.

To understand the "Aspirations of Italy," which became almost a catchword of the period preceding her entry

into the war, it is necessary to have some knowledge of that which is vaguely known as the Balkan Question. And to have any proper idea of this, at best, mysterious subject, one must know, at least in outline, the history of the Balkans. The term, as generally used, includes all that region that extends from the eastern shore of the Adriatic to the shores of the *Ægean* and around to the Black Sea. On the north, they may be said to have included Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking in the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, and stretching eastward, they reached well into what is now Russia. Originally, in the term might also have been included Slavonia, Banat, and Transylvania to the west of the present Moldavian province of Roumania; and to the eastward of Moldavia they included Bessarabia and Crimea.

All of these Balkan provinces, originally settled by Slavs who had pushed southwestward and dispossessed the Avars and others, were, on the stopping of the great tidal wave of the Ottoman Turk's sweep into Europe, left in his possession as a part of the Ottoman Empire. Apparently hopelessly abandoned to the Ottoman Power, with its tyranny and incompetence, the elements of racial and religious differences served to preserve the national, or at least racial, spirit. This spirit found a champion and a refuge in Austria to the northward; and then along the Adriatic, in Venice, and to the northeast, in Russia. It has been well said that Austria, under the House of Hapsburg, with all its tyranny and intolerance, stood for two centuries as the chief champion of Christendom against the Ottoman Turk and Mohammedanism: Poland aided her, and presently Russia, under the great Rulers: Peter and Catherine, entered the lists, and soon the Balkans were become subject to "spheres of influence." Russia's power was based on racial and religious unity, which gave her a vast advantage.

Then came the Napoleonic idea of Nationality, which, with the Illyrian State formed by him as an example, began to change the Balkans, in however small a degree, from what they were before to what they are now. It may not appear that they have yet attained a condition to boast of;

but, whatever they may be to-day, this much may be said: that it is an advance beyond what they were in the past.

Servia attained her own independence. She is called the Peasant Kingdom, because her upper class was extirpated by the Turks and the peasants fought themselves free. Then came the Greek independence, sung by poets, with Byron at their head, and aided by the sympathy of the Great Powers. And in this movement, at least among the Greeks, was a dream of a new Greek Empire, the successor of the old Greek Empire, with Constantinople as its capital—a dream which has possibly been floating vaguely in some minds even in these latter days. Then came the Roumanian nationality, working out its independence with France as a sort of godmother to the Latins of that region, and later on came Bulgaria's opportunity to free herself from the heavy Turkish yoke.

It has been said that "Servian Liberation was achieved without the great powers, Greek independence through the great powers, and Roumanian unity in their despite."

Finally came the liberation of Bulgaria, which is said to have been the only Balkan state which virtually had no share in its emancipation. This emancipation was accomplished by Russia.

A discussion of the Balkan question in any detail would require far too much space and lead the reader away from the main theme.

Having become the field of exploitation of the Great powers, the Balkan peninsula was, in a sense, a Naboth's Vineyard for them, while, on the other hand, it was—to use a different simile—a brand, ever in danger of setting a fire which might flame into a conflagration. And the Balkan states have played an important part in the present crisis, and it was from one of them that the spark came which set off the loaded magazine and resulted in the explosion of Europe. Surrounded on three sides by the seas, and blocking the outlet of Germany and Austria to the southward and eastward and of Russia to the westward, they constitute a vastly important strategic position on the east-

ern Mediterranean and, consequently, affect the vast questions of colonial expansion and power which lie at the basis of the World War. In their age-long struggle, both racial and religious questions had become intensified by perpetual antagonisms among themselves until these had become, in a sense, almost fundamental.

These in turn were crossed by geographical conditions which became grave factors in the rivalries and conflicts which existed among them. Separated and weakened by these, the Balkan states became mere pawns in the long game fought by the powers for their own interest—especially in the game between Austria and Russia. And it was only in latter times that the rise of national feeling enabled the Balkan peninsula to stand forth with the assertion of a claim to be something more than a congeries of mere pawns in a game played by intruders, even though the game they substituted for it was to end in a bitter war among themselves and intensify their inter-Balkan rivalries and hatreds.

The diffusion of Knowledge was such that in time it extended even to the Balkans; and the movement of modern life reached and permeated them also. They had had in the past an heroic history and an heroic literature, and their peoples were of warrior blood, even though they had not been able to fling off the yoke of foreign subjugation. They had more recently accepted the rule of Kings, partly or wholly foreign, at the hands of the Great Powers, because it appeared the best way of loosening the yoke of Turkey; but they were not deceived as to their own powers—and they knew the value of their own growth. The chief obstacle in the way of their development was their rivalry and hostility among themselves.

The Congress of Berlin (1878) left the Balkan states mainly in the hands of Turkey; but, as has been related, took the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Serb and Croatian as they were—and by giving Austria the permission to occupy and administer them, practically gave them to her, in despite of the sympathies and aspirations of the

Serb states of Serbia and Montenegro. In 1908, after a period of internal preparation, Austria simply took them and added them to her Empire—*nolens volens*—and against the wishes of all other parties in interest, save Germany. Backed by Germany she braved the danger of lighting a fire which should set all Europe aflame; and although she was able, with Germany at her back, to take the step without starting up the conflagration, she only deferred it and she aroused the other Balkan states to a step which in turn was a stride toward the World War. By annexing permanently the Serb-Croatian provinces, whose aspiration had been toward Serbia, she cut Serbia off from the Adriatic and extinguished the aspirations of the Serb-Croatians and kindred branches of the race for a Serbian kingdom, far-stretching as of old. This turned of necessity Serbia's ambitions toward the *Ægean* Sea; brought her in conflict with the Bulgarians over Macedonia, and placed her as a bar across the way to the East. And the East and the roads to the East were now become the prizes of the nations to which all eyes were turning. Thus the Balkans had become a live factor in the great International game for supremacy.

To the other factors which made the Balkan states the centre of political strife was added the ever-efficient cause of discord: religious and racial affinities and antagonisms. The greater part of the populations were Slavic or of Slavic origin; but there was a sufficient infusion of other races to keep alive a certain antagonism, though it was not dominant. Added to this were the antagonisms between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, with, in some parts, sufficient Mohammedanism to hold a sort of Balance—if not of Power, of Unrest.

It suffices to say that all played their part in the seething that has gone on so long and all have been useful to one party or another among the greater powers in the intrigues and the struggle for the supreme control in this strategic Keep of Southeastern Europe.

This occupancy of the Jugo-Slav provinces bordering the

Adriatic gave Austria a position of power in the Adriatic to which Italy could not be indifferent, as it placed her at a disadvantage greater than ever regarding Austria, which thenceforth held the commanding position, not only along the Italian Alpine border, but along Italy's whole undefended seacoast.

It had been aptly said by Bismarck that, "Italy and Austria must be enemies or allies," and this situation emphasized this fact.

Italy's greatness had, as already stated, been acquired as a Sea power, whether in Ancient times or in the Middle Ages, and had ever been associated therewith; and her command of the Adriatic was an essential for her independence and, indeed, for her existence. Unable to maintain her growing population at home, she was obliged to see them cross the seas in great numbers to distant lands, where, owing to easier conditions, many of them remained permanently. Thus, she looked with favoring eyes to their emigration to the Balkans as well as to the North African coast where, hardly a day's sail from the southern point of Sicily, Tunisia furnished an outlet for her Labor, not subject to the danger mentioned of her losing it permanently.

France's unexpected occupation of Tunis in 1881 caused profound feeling against her throughout Italy, and would have precipitated war had Italy been strong enough at the time. Her act left Italy closed in on the west and south by France, which held the former Italian territory of Savoy, Nice, Corsica, and now Tunisia, where Italians outnumbered many times the French. At the same time Austria held the Trentino and Trieste; was occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was extending her influence southward in a manner which threatened substantially to close Italy in. England had already substantially occupied Egypt.

Thus, Italy was driven to turn to the only European Power that apparently had interests similar to hers, and in any event would not be able to assert any political interests inimical to her.

The Triple Alliance, signed in May, 1882, and renewed by

successive governments in 1887, 1891, 1902, and 1912, lasted in name until it was formally renounced May 3, 1915. But it had meantime become definitely restricted, first by amendments, the last of which, known as Article VII, provided expressly against any advantage being gained by either Austria or Italy in the Balkans which would tend to change the status quo, without prearrangement with the other as to compensation therefor, or, as Signor Tittoni termed it, "a balancing of interests."

This treaty led to a tariff war between France and Italy which lasted until 1898, when, Italy having recognized the French Protectorate over Tunisia in 1896, it was terminated and more friendly relations began, and a secret treaty was negotiated in 1902 between the two powers, providing that Italy would not join in an attack on France should the latter be attacked or herself be provoked to attack.

Meantime, Italy had, with a view to opening a field for the utilization of the overplus of her laboring element, embarked on a colonial policy in East Africa, which in the outset proved disastrous, but eventually, though far from remunerative, contained other compensations for her. It gratified the pride of her people; gave to her interests outside of her borders, which distracted them from internal troubles; and furnished a field for the exercise of Italian ambition to become once more a Sea power. New elements had also entered into her relation to the Adriatic question. In 1896 the Hereditary Prince, the present King of Italy, contracted a marriage with the Princess Helena, daughter of the King of Montenegro, which gave Italy a point d'appui on the eastern side of the Adriatic; added greatly to her force as an Adriatic power; and tended to oppose a barrier against the steady extension of Austrian interests and influence to the southward along the Adriatic, which had threatened to draw both Montenegro and Albania within its engulfing sweep.

This, however, by no means prevented Austria from pressing southward to eclipse Italian influence in Albania, and Italy and France began to cultivate more friendly re-

lations, which led to Italy's recognition of French interests in Tunisia and later to the Secret Treaty of 1902. Italy, indeed, was in a situation of much difficulty. France had established an entente with Russia, and Russia was tending to take greater interest in a Pan-Slav movement which would extend her influence across to the Adriatic, and might traverse Italy's interests in that direction as much as Austria. The Southern Slavs of Serbia and the Turkish provinces were as unamenable to Italian influences as the Magyars themselves or the Austrian Germans, and in their relations with the Albanians had shown themselves as hostile to Italian interests as the former. Italy found herself obliged to preserve the equilibrium which had come about in the Balkans, and to do this—to lend her influence toward maintaining the status quo. Any great expansion of the Pan-Slav idea was as likely to shut her out from great influence beyond the Adriatic as was the undue expansion of Austria-Hungary. Albania became of more and more importance to her as extending along the eastern shore of the southern Adriatic and including Valona, which was almost the key to the Adriatic. A great competition sprang up between Italy and Austria for commercial advantages in Albania, and eventually, in 1907, an arrangement was arrived at by which it was agreed that Albania should be converted into an Independent principality. This, however, by no means signified that the rivalry between Austria and Italy for the control of Albania was at an end. Austria, as lying closer to Turkey, was able to come to an arrangement with her more readily than Italy, and in 1908 Austria secured from Turkey a railway concession under which she was able to join her Bosnian railway to the Turkish railway to the port of Salonika, which gave her an outlet to the sea to the east of Albania. The accession to power of the Young Turks opened to Austria yet greater opportunities for extending her influence in the Balkan dominions formerly belonging to Turkey, which she promptly availed herself of to Italy's great concern, as every step toward Austria's greater aggrandizement decreased the chances of

Italy's ever redeeming her irredentist provinces, and increased those of her losing yet more.

The Triple Alliance which began with the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria in 1879, and was expanded into the Triple Alliance by the adhesion of Italy in 1882 (May 20), when Italy was suddenly aroused to her isolation by the unexpected act of France in occupying Tunis and assuming a protectorate over Tunisia, was the chief factor which influenced the Diplomacy of Europe for the next twenty years. However it may have been regarded by others, the Italian statesmen charged with the responsibility of Italy's security and progress have ever taken pride in its achievement.

It appears a fact that Bismarck had no great regard for Italy, but he accepted her, believing that she would be likely to side with Germany rather than with Austria should any questions arise between the two, and Italy's antagonism against France would be a support of Germany should the latter be attacked.

Bismarck had written to Mazzini in 1866, when he was endeavoring to array Italy against France: "Italy and France cannot associate to their mutual advantage in the Mediterranean. This sea is an inheritance that cannot be divided between two kindred nations. The empire of the Mediterranean belongs indisputably to Italy, who possesses in this sea coasts twice as extensive as those of France. The empire of the Mediterranean must be Italy's constant thought, the aim of her ministers; the fundamental policy of the Florence Cabinet."

This had long been a tenet in Italy. Mazzini himself had declared that "Northern Africa is Italy's inheritance," and thus, when France moved into Tunisia and took possession of it Italy was alarmed and incensed into turning to Germany and even accepting an alliance with Austria.

This alliance, however, was, as has been seen, simply defensive, and after a period of hard feeling and unhappy incidents, both the French and Italian Governments, in

recognition of the mutual disadvantages accruing from their continued estrangement, and of the advantages to be derived from their instituting more useful rapports, suppressed their bitterness and drew closer together for their mutual benefit. Each government, after the Franco-Italian agreement, vied with the other in expressions of satisfaction over their changed relations, and, although there were periods when each appeared ready to question the perfect faith of the other, the relation that had existed stood the test when the time came; and when Austria and Germany plunged into the war, which Italy had vainly tried to prevent, Italy maintained her neutrality. If she did so without taking the trouble to publish to the world the incontestable proof of the correctness of her position, only she herself has suffered therefrom.

The effects of the treaty between Italy and the Central Empires on Europe were enormous and, indeed, fundamental. It resulted in eventually dividing Europe into two camps, which it pleased its advocates to call the Equilibrium, and to eulogize as the guaranty of European Peace.

A direct result of the alliance was the consequent counterbalancing Entente between England, France, and Russia.

A further result was the earnest and quickened contest between the two balanced sides of the Equilibrium for the acquisition of the important fraction of Europe left out of the Equilibrium: the Turkish Empire and the Balkan states, with the preponderant control of the two great routes to the vast regions of the Orient: the Mediterranean and the parallel land-route to the southeast. One further unknown quantity was Russia, whose power was yet unutilized and, indeed, was unknown in its unorganized state; but if organized was easily foreseen to be immeasurable. To the acquisition of these as yet unexploited and unexplored factors, the two sides of the by no means stable Equilibrium addressed themselves in the manner of the Old Diplomacy. Italy's field was in the Near East, where ancient Italian traditions still lingered to some extent, and which was

nearer to Italy by the open sea route than to any other country.

The marriage of the Prince hereditary of Italy, the present King, to a Balkan Princess naturally reinforced Italy's influence in the Adriatic, and the problems into which the Balkans entered became a greater concern of Italy's than previously.

Not only Montenegro, but Albania became a field for the exercise of Italy's interest. She was shut off by France from the regions of the North African littoral immediately to the south of her; but a long strip still remained unexploited between Tunisia and Egypt, which England had occupied, and Italy kept her eye on it, with equal apprehension directed toward her western neighbor and her own allies.

Austria's part in the future disposition of the Turkish dominions in the Balkans lay in the same direction with Italy's so far as the Balkans were concerned; but extended further to the southeastward where she encountered a power as all-absorbing as herself and which had interests directly contrary to hers. Thus, in the western Balkans she ran counter to the interests of her ally, and to the eastward to those of a powerful member of the Entente. It was to meet this situation that Article VII was inserted in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance by Italy. Germany for her part took a wider range and shaped her policies so as to stretch beyond her ally's sphere of aspiration and extend her influence and power over regions formerly wholly under Turkey, but more recently under the influence of England and Russia, and which, could she supplant the latter, would open to her a vast field for the development of her power. It was this prodigious and far-reaching scheme of Germany which caused the creation of the counterbalancing plan of the Triple Entente. It was not, however, only toward the southeastward that she extended her interests. By different, but not less effective methods she extended her influence through other channels, commercial and financial, into Italy, where it became in time strongly established.

The Triple Alliance, however, though established by a treaty, was not based on any unquestionable community of interest save that of mutual defense against those outside of the Alliance, and this was so frankly recognized that the principle of "reciprocal compensation" was specifically embodied in it to meet the probable event that one party or the other might endeavor to secure some further advantage in regions in which the other had interests. And, in fact, it was the violation of this counterbalancing arrangement which eventually brought about the destruction of the Triple Alliance, to which Italy, as a whole, only reconciled herself because she confided sufficiently in the leaders to believe that they would never negotiate a treaty not greatly to Italy's advantage, and also because Italy was somewhat flattered at being recognized as an equal to Germany and Austria. Yet, notwithstanding these reasons, it was only a grudging acquiescence that Italy as a whole gave to the treaty with her prepotent neighbor, and whenever any difficulty arose the Opposition press was wont to taunt the government with its slavishness to the "Emperor of the Hangmen." Nor was this bitterness wholly without excuse. For Austria conducted herself with scarcely, if any, less overbearingness toward her ally after the treaty than before it was signed. This attitude, emphasized by Austria's frank assertion of her power through formal and firm expression of her objection, on occasions such as have been mentioned, of the selection of an irredentist Italian for a portfolio in the Cabinet, was signalized at times by more far-reaching acts. Such was Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose inclusion as an integral part of the Austrian Empire changed essentially the "Adriatic Equilibrium," and eventually had a strong influence in causing the World War. There seems little doubt that Italy would have gone to war at that time to recover her irredentist provinces from Austria-Hungary had she felt equal to the contest.

Germany, having secured by the Triple Alliance the assurance of assistance from Austria and Italy should she be

attacked, applied her diplomacy to the task of allaying the ill-will of Russia and France, while she sedulously kept both at odds with her allies.

Thus, for a time France was encouraged to gratify her colonial aspirations in Africa, as though Germany were more friendly to her than was England or Italy. Russia was given to understand that she would maintain a sympathetic attitude toward her policy regarding Manchuria. Austria-Hungary was encouraged to look forward to absorbing the Turkish provinces at the head of the Adriatic. Italy was reassured by German financial and commercial penetration if not assistance in the development of great enterprises in North Italy; and even England was spoken fair and for a time was drawn into relations of more convenience than formerly; and all the while these Powers, which had so many things in common, were kept in a state of suspicion toward each other; and all the while Germany thrived and built herself up economically.

CHAPTER VII

UNDER THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

ITALY now found herself constrained for cogent reasons to look beyond her borders to support her growing population and maintain her position as a Great Power. Thus, in 1885 she embarked on her ill-starred African colonial enterprise, which came to grief in Abyssinia, armed as the latter was with German guns and supported by French sympathy. She, however, laid the foundation of a Colonial System in the following years down to 1905, when she assumed the protectorate of Somaliland.

The war between the United States and Spain in 1898 threatened to set a spark in Europe, and Austria was strongly anti-American. The Emperor Francis Joseph was not unmindful either of the Monroe Doctrine, or of the fate of that other Austrian Emperor, his brother Maximilian, as a consequence of that doctrine; and Austria was for joint European action against the United States. Had she been able to bring Europe to the succor of Spain, the World War might have been hastened by sixteen years.

France and England clashed in Africa in 1898, and the Fashoda incident, when Major Marchand mounted the French flag on the White Nile, might also have precipitated the World War, had France not feared her continental neighbors and under this apprehension settled with Great Britain the question of conflicting African interests (March 21, 1899).

The leading Italian statesman of the period covering the earlier years of the Triple Alliance, Francisco Crispi, had had experience of the Bourbon rule in his native region of Sicily, and France's occupation of Tunisia in the light of her relation to the Vatican had incensed him. The Ministry of Francisco Crispi came into power in 1887, and he continued

to guide for nearly a decade. Following the example of Cavour, he had visited ten years before the principal Capitals of Europe to inform himself personally of the attitude there regarding Italy, and had made the personal acquaintance of the leading public men of those countries. He appears to have returned satisfied that Italy's best chance lay with Germany, and he adopted a policy which would strengthen the bonds between Italy and the other members of the Triple Alliance, even should it create a wider division between Italy and France. One of his first steps was a visit paid to Bismarck within two months after he had assumed the reins of leadership. It placed him immediately, and on his return to Italy he declared the Triple Alliance one of the strongest safeguards of the peace of Europe. He believed France was ever ready to plot the restoration of the Temporal Power of the Papacy, and do everything else that would weaken Italy. He believed in the Triple Alliance and confided in Bismarck's friendship or, at least, in the sanction of a common enmity to France to prove of permanent service to Italy. French hostility to Italy's ambitious Colonial Policy in Africa furnished palpable grounds for his enmity, and the riots in which Italians were injured in Marseilles, and rumors of the French designs against the Italian Coast (1888) served to keep Italy in a state of tense exasperation, the more acute because Italy was not in a position to go to war. Italy, on her part, however, was far from supine under the aggravation. She repudiated the Commercial treaty with France, and a tariff war began which lasted some ten years. Its consequences were disastrous, but this only served to increase the bitterness. French archives in the consulate at Florence were seized with a view to ascertaining the ramifications of French intrigues. One of the consequences was the increased German commercial penetration into Italy, which took the place vacated by France, who withdrew some 700,000,000 francs from investment in Italian industries.

Crispi secured the visit of the new German Emperor to Italy only a few months after his accession and a great re-

ception was accorded him, and in May, 1889, the King of Italy, attended by Crispi, returned the Emperor's visit. Bismarck was dismissed from power by his Royal Master, March 8, 1890, but his successor, Count Caprivi, visited Italy at the earliest possible moment, and soon afterward Crispi took occasion to declare that the irredentist agitation was detrimental to Italy's interests. Furthermore, he took steps to bring it to an end. Also he set to work definitely to increase Italy's armament, as the budget for this purpose clearly showed.

Under these circumstances the feeling between France and Italy began to show tension. A number of "incidents" occurred. Stories calculated to increase the tension were widely circulated, and the feeling of the Italian people began to be turned from Austria toward their Western neighbor. This was possibly not undirected, but nothing availed to change Austria. She remained as ever, obdurate and truculent.

The trouble with France was happily averted, and eventually more friendly relations were renewed. But meantime Crispi turned the aspiration of the Italians for expansion toward Africa, where, after a period of success, a great disaster was to befall, which pulled him down and left the fruit of his labors in this direction to be reaped by others.

With the fall of Bismarck (March, 1890), the immediate peril of the Triple Alliance appeared to France somewhat diminished, and when a few years later the collapse of the Italian Protectorate in Abyssinia followed consequent on the crushing Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896 (March 1), France felt the opportuneness of reducing the growing antagonism between her and Italy and of arriving at an adjustment which would remove a bitterness that might contain the seeds of future disaster. Crispi's government fell immediately on the failure of the Abyssinian enterprise, and Italy was ready to meet France in a more conciliatory spirit.

In September (1896) negotiations between the two governments were concluded by a Convention by which Italy

accepted a revision of the Tunisian Treaties, and thereby implied a recognition of the French Protectorate over Tunisia. The accession of Delcassé to power in France marked a new departure in French foreign policy and the substitution of a colonial policy nearer home, and better relations with Italy as a Mediterranean power than had existed since France had driven Italy into Germany's net. In November, 1898, a new commercial treaty was negotiated between Italy and France. This was followed, under Delcassé's influence, by negotiations which were concluded by a treaty between the two governments, according to which France would abstain from interference with Tripoli, where it was provided that Italy should be left free to pursue her policy, and Italy would refrain from interfering with the French policy in Morocco. Italy gave assurances that so far as France was concerned the Triple Alliance on Italy's part was wholly defensive, and that she would not be "either the auxiliary or the instrument of aggression against France." She bound herself not to unite with the other signatories to the Triple Alliance should France be attacked or be provoked herself to attack by the necessity to defend her honor or her vital interests.

Thus, in 1902, fell one of the pillars on which Germany had so carefully counted to carry through her policy of acting as the Clearing-house of European Diplomacy. Within two years followed the entente between France and England, and so within four years of the perilous incident of Fashoda fell another of the props. The convention between Great Britain and Russia, regarding their zones of influence and a *modus vivendi* in Western Asia was negotiated in 1907, and the Triple Entente thus established was further reinforced by the understanding arrived at with Japan by France and by Russia in July of the same year. So fell the last of Germany's schemes for divisions among the Powers.

Germany, meantime, had been far from yielding meekly to a trend of events which crossed so directly her own policy, and she made more than one bold move to counter them.

She had, however, disclosed too plainly her aims, and each move that she made only resulted in cementing the relations between the powers threatened.

Germany viewed—and not unnaturally—with profound distrust the changes in the relations of the European nations, especially those in which France was concerned. That Italy and France should lay aside their bitterness was tolerable, provided it did not go too far, and the German Chancellor expressed, however hollowly, his view that Germany had no interests in the Mediterranean and was pleased to see that France and Italy had come to an understanding on the question. Germany, he declared, had “no gable-front on the Mediterranean.”¹

That France and England, however, should bury their age-long and apparently immortal enmity was intolerable. At first, it was apparently not taken too seriously, but a little later, the authoritative German mouthpiece, the Kaiser, sounded the note when at the dedication of a bridge he declared that the bridge “designed to develop more peaceful relations might have to serve for more serious purposes.” He had just declared in another speech that “Present events invite us to forget our present discords. Let us be united in our preparations for the occasion when we may be constrained to intervene in the policy of the world.”

The time appeared auspicious for Germany to move. Russia was deeply involved in her war with Japan, which was going worse and worse for her; England was not bound by her Understanding to fight—certainly if France began; Italy had too important ties with Germany and had too recently burdened herself with the expenses of a war to enter willingly into another, and France had immersed herself so deeply in her colonial expansion that she had not kept pace with Germany in military preparation. So the stars appeared in conjunction. Moreover, M. Delcassé was proving himself a man who might have to be reckoned with if he remained in control of French foreign policy long

¹ Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 167.

enough. He might even counter successfully the Bismarckian policy of preventing a European equilibrium and keeping Germany the guardian of European interests. He had already come to an accommodation with Italy, and now he had followed it by arranging an entente with England and an accommodation with Spain. The danger was that instead of France being isolated, Germany would be.

On the other shore of the Mediterranean was the side where France was weak, yet might in time acquire potent strength. So on this point Germany struck. She had great interests beyond Morocco and Algeria and Tunisia—why not supplant France in those countries and thus become dominant on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean? Germany would take a step that would show that she was the mistress of Europe. She would put France in her place and would lay the foundation of a world policy. Only the year before, she had acquiesced in the arrangements and ententes negotiated between France and England, and France and Spain, and had admitted that her only interests in Morocco were commercial, which were safeguarded in the arrangements mentioned. The instant, however, that Russia was rendered powerless by the decisive defeats in Manchuria, Germany struck her blow. The defeat of Mukden occurred the last of February, 1905; on the 12th of March announcement was made that the German Emperor would visit Tangier during his Mediterranean cruise, where a welcome was prepared for him by the denunciation a week before by the German Consul at Fez of the "aggressive colonial tendencies of France."

On the 31st of March, 1905, the Kaiser's yacht anchored at Tangier, and the Kaiser made the declaration to the representative of Sultan Aziz that he visited "the Sultan in the character of independent sovereign"; that he hoped that "under the Sultan's sovereignty a Free Morocco would remain open to the pacific competition of all nations without monopoly and without annexation"; that he intended to make known that he was resolved to do all in his power properly to safeguard the interests of Germany, since he

considered the Sultan an absolutely Free sovereign, and that it was with him that he intended to come to an understanding.

The step was a public offer of German protection to the Sultan, and this was promptly accepted, as it would dispose of France. It was much more than this. It was directly in line with the Kaiser's policy disclosed in his visit to Constantinople some years before when he had made a bid for the Friendship of Islam. To avoid a coalition, however, of the Powers against Germany, it was necessary for Germany to secure the preponderant acquiescence of European Powers to so far-reaching a change. Accordingly, a conference of the Powers was requested on the 12th of April to pass on and settle the questions involved. France consented to it, though grudgingly (July 8), and the conference assembled at Algeciras on January 15, 1906, and was participated in by the Powers signatory to the Convention of Madrid of 1880, which had settled the jurisdiction of the Foreign Legations. In the call Morocco united. The summoning of an International Conference was in itself a blow at France, who claimed rights independent of such jurisdiction; yet France yielded. But a more humiliating step lay before her. Through the mouth of a special representative,¹ Germany demanded the dismissal of M. Delcassé from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claiming that the object of France was the isolation of Germany, and that the disposition of the empire of Morocco without warning or consulting Germany had wounded her and the Emperor to the quick. France was called on to dispense with the services of her Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to give her conduct of Foreign Affairs a new direction, under the threat that Germany would not wait to have Delcassé's policy realized, and that should she prove the victor the peace would only be signed in Paris.²

Under this threat the French Government was forced to yield and M. Delcassé resigned. It was a humiliation whose

¹ Prince Henckel of Donnersmarck.

² Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, pp. 183-4.

bitterness France could not forget, and which apparent concessions by Germany could not ameliorate.

The conference at Algeciras assembled the middle of the following January, but the result was far from that which Germany strove to attain. In addition to the European Powers the United States was also represented. The Powers were conscious of their danger and the German proposals were rejected by them, including Italy, and, as to some, even by Austria. The German manoeuvre had failed.

The Algeciras Conference was of far more importance than its immediate results indicated, and caused far more extended consequences. The immediate results were the rejection of Germany's insolent contention at the hands of the Great Powers assembled in conference, and the rebuff of her attempt to assert her uncontrolled will wherever she desired. The less immediate, but not less direct, consequences were the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the strengthening of the Triple Entente in the European equilibrium. The hegemonic aim of Germany was so manifest that even her allies were appreciably repelled from her, rather than drawn toward her, by her domineering act. During the progress of the Conference Germany's action tended to increase this diffidence on the part of her allies. To say the least, her course was extremely tortuous. Both the French and Italian Ministries fell during the Conference. The Fortis Ministry in Rome fell February 1 (1906), and with it went its Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis di San Giuliano, who tended to be very friendly, if not toward Germany, toward the Triple Alliance. They were succeeded by Baron Sonnino as Premier with Count Guicciardini at the head of the Consulta, the former of whom was considered as very friendly toward England, and the latter of whom had helped negotiate the French-Italian Convention of 1902, whereby Italy bound herself not to unite in any attack on France, and France and Italy arrived at an agreement regarding their respective rights in Morocco and Tripoli.

Fortunately for the Entente Powers, the new Ministry

retained, as Italy's chief representative at Algeciras, the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, who had been sent there by San Giuliano, but had consented to go only on condition that he should have a free hand. And when on the change of Ministry, the German Ambassador at Rome applied himself with fresh energy to the attempt to align Italy on Germany's side, with the assertion that Germany was championing the common cause of Europe against France, and that all the other countries were standing by Germany, he was referred to the Italian Plenipotentiary at Algeciras as the person having the whole matter in his hands. France was kept also informed of the work that was going on, and naturally Italy was able to gauge precisely the value of Germany's policy. England and France were equally desirous to prevent a fortunate issue of this policy, and kept the Consulta fully informed of their attitude. Thus France and England were brought closer together at Algeciras, and Italy, "who acted as a conciliator and intermediary,"¹ also was drawn closer toward them. At the same time Russia, who had been approached along the same lines by Germany, was like Italy drawn into closer relations with both France and England by Germany's unconscionable manœuvring to interpose in a sphere which manifestly appertained to France and, after France, to the other Mediterranean Powers.

Another important consequence of the Algeciras Conference was that through the participation of the United States therein they broke the tradition of a century which had kept them from participation in any International affairs beyond the Atlantic.

A hundred years previously the United States, finding their interests seriously affected and their honor deeply touched by the insolence of the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, had declared war against them and had sent a Naval Squadron to the Mediterranean, where it had rendered efficient service in clearing that important International highway of the pest of Piracy that infested it.

¹Speech, in Italian Senate.

Their boldness had long been a menace to the commerce of all Christian nations, and their truculence had reached a point when even England had been fain to sign a Convention estopping her from demanding the liberation of Christian slaves. The part played by the United States had contributed largely to the emancipation of the Mediterranean and the eventual opening of the Barbary States to European penetration and control.

Mr. Roosevelt, fresh from his important International act of helping to bring about the peace between Russia and Japan, just signed at Portsmouth, and filled with the idea that the United States had now enlarged International responsibilities which her people must recognize, determined to take part in the International Conference which assembled to deal with the same regions thus once before dealt with. He accordingly sent the American Ambassador to Italy, the Honorable Henry White, as the American Plenipotentiary to Algeciras, where he took an active and by no means unimportant part in the Conference. And the President himself took the important step of proposing to the Emperor of Germany a plan for the settlement of one of the most serious differences between the two countries chiefly involved. Moreover, when his proposal was promptly rejected by the Emperor, the President stood firm, and eventually his determined stand had an important bearing on the final settlement of the controversy, which had threatened to plunge Europe into war.

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY AND THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

THE Status quo in the Balkans was considered one of the pillars of the European Equilibrium, and every Power watched it with care and, at times, with anxiety. Whatever tended to disturb it was frowned on save by the Power that believed it saw an opportunity to better its own position. The danger zone was recognized as that where Austrian and Serb interests clashed.

Austria had undoubtedly long looked forward to bringing the southern Slav regions within her Sphere of influence. The accession of the Karageorgevitch House in Serbia after the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga of the Obrevitch Dynasty (June 10, 1903) swung the balance over to the side of Russia, though it was apparently considered that the Karageorgevitch held as a principle not to quarrel with Austria or Turkey. The relations between Serbia and Austria, however, which had at one time been excellent, remained tolerably good until the end of 1905, when a Customs union was arranged between Serbia and Bulgaria.

The Austrian Government thereupon declared a tariff war against Serbia, which excluded from Austrian markets Serbian cattle, pigs, and other agricultural products. This punitive measure, which resulted in what was known as "the Pig war," stirred up much resentment among the Serbs, who turned from Austria: their nearest market and neighbor, to seek markets elsewhere and find elsewhere also the stores and supplies that they needed. Thus, they turned to France for their military supplies and opened the way to their future financing at the hands of that provident country. Austria, not to be beaten in the conflict, took steps to break up the coalition between the Serbs and the

Croatians in the Croatian Diet, by enforcing what was known as the Agram Treason Act to extirpate, in her old way, the pro-Serbia tendencies among her southern Slavs.¹

Then came the Young Turk Revolution in July, 1908, and Austria acted decisively and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The way in which this Annexation was effected was eminently characteristic.² Austria had obtained at the Congress of Berlin the right to occupy the two provinces and administer them. Her desire to annex them immediately had aroused such universal opposition that she had been forced to desist at the time, and content herself with their administration. This Administration was, however, shaped with a view to their complete Annexation when she should feel herself sufficiently strong to accomplish it. The situation was one in which many vices inhered. The population was not Austrian nor Magyar, but predominantly Slav, and both historically and racially it tended to affiliate with those who possessed the same traditions and blood, rather than with Austria. It fought them, for this was their nature; but it recognized the conflicts as family quarrels. The title to the provinces still remained in the Porte, whose suzerainty, since Austria had taken charge, began to be regarded with more complacency than when Turkey was actually collecting taxes. Among a certain element these differences were accentuated by differences in religion. But the principal reason was that these provinces lay in a commanding position. If they remained as they were, they offered a great field of exploitation to others than Austria. Turkey and Serbia both had claims to them, or at least nourished certain aspirations.

The Croat and Serb parties had in 1905 drawn closer together and formed a political alliance with the Hungarian opposition to the Crown, which had served to forward the liberation of Croatia and Slavonia from the vassalage to which they had been reduced since 1868.³

¹ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 243. Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Alger*, pp. 64, 65; 103, note 2; 173, 235, 249-251, 334-5, 387-8, 404, 446.

² Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 243-263.

³ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 256.

Russia regarded herself and was regarded by them as having a relation to them nearer than Austria. And Italy maintained a relation to a certain part which might not always be merely academic.

All of these various counter-currents Austria found most inconvenient.

Moreover, Turkey appeared to be beginning to awaken. The spirit of Progress was beginning to breathe even on the face of that chaos. Serbia was arousing and the other Balkan states were showing signs of increased restlessness. Italy's gaze was becoming more and more directed to this quarter. Austria was the protagonist of Reaction. Her method of Occupation was the only one she knew. It was the one she had tried in Italy and Hungary. She had lost Italy; but she had saved Hungary, and she would save the Slav provinces, which she now considered her own, by the same means. But to accomplish this it was necessary to be in full possession of them, and she awaited only an opportunity to annex them.

A step was taken in this direction when a suggestion was made in 1908 to the Young Turkish Committee at Salonika that the Emperor was proposing to grant a Constitution to the provinces. The suggestion was received with the reply that "the right which the Austro-Hungarian monarch proposed to exercise belonged exclusively to the suzerain of the provinces: the Sultan."¹

The Turkish Constitution, however, had been restored, and some step was necessary to pacify these provinces in this regard.

Moreover, steps were being taken to internationalize the question of Macedonian Reform for which Austria and Russia, as the two "most interested Powers," had under the compulsion of the situation taken upon themselves to provide a scheme in 1903, to which Austria had looked as a means of creating a zone of influence which might help open the way to her to Salonika with a decisive increase of her power in the Balkans. This internationalization, desired

¹ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 245.

by both Russia and England, would have prevented this aim, and have tended to strengthen both Turkey and Serbia to the extent that it countered Austria's designs. Accordingly, Austria decided to mollify Turkey and to abandon or, at least, modify her attitude toward Macedonian reforms, and a little later on she obtained from Turkey the railway concession to run a railway through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to connect her Bosnian railway with the Turkish line, which it was announced later would constitute a new and important route from Central Europe to Egypt and India.

A proposal was also made by Austria to Russia (1907) to take Germany and France into the Russian-Austrian Entente on a basis of mutual compensation, which included for Austria the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proposal probably included the Dardanelles as Russia's reward, and the support of the German Bagdad railway plan by France. Italy seems not to have been considered in the matter. Russia, however, declined it, possibly seeing in it more peril than profit, and soon afterward the Russian-English Entente of August 31, 1907, was entered into.

Another cause was the break between Austria and Russia which followed a few months later, and widened from then on.

Italy, whose interests were deeply involved in the Austrian movement to enlarge her influence in the Balkans, began to bestir herself to prevent what would have been a perpetual menace to those interests, and eleven months later, in the midst of the excitement caused by her next step: the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria abandoned to Turkey the Novi Bazar concession and applied herself to the work of consolidating securely her newly annexed territories.

None of the Great Powers appear to have been informed of Austria's intention to take this step, though with some of them certain informal and vague conversations had been held containing references thereto, such as Germany and

Russia. Some had been actually deceived. Bulgaria appears to have been informed of it and brought into the scheme by Baron von Aehrenthal, the Austrian Premier, by an arrangement under which she declared herself Independent the day preceding that on which Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 6, 1908. The representative of the Russian Government received notice only two days before, through a private letter addressed to him in Paris by Baron von Aehrenthal, who had pledged himself that "Russia should receive considerable previous notice of the intended date of annexation."¹ England, France, and Italy were kept in the dark as to the contemplated step until it was a *fait accompli*.

It was known that Austria looked forward to this annexation. The matter had been discussed between the Austrian and Russian Emperors as far back as 1897, but had been deferred. It had been taken up later between their Ministers; but the time set for its accomplishment was not known, and the Powers all expected that some compensation would be provided for those Powers concerned, which would prevent the disturbance of the Equilibrium contained in the Status quo. Russia and England, indeed, were ready to support a claim prepared by Serbia for compensation with this intent, and Italy looked forward to a compensation which should maintain at once the Equilibrium that was menaced, and restore to her, at least, a part of her irredentist provinces.

The Austrian Premier, however, had no intention to take a road which might prove so inconvenient. He preferred to take a short cut and arrive at his objective before it was known that he had really started, thus avoiding obstacles on the way. Such difficulties as he might encounter after arrival would be met duly.

The effect of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was far-reaching in Europe, and nowhere more so than in Italy, which, in a way, was more affected by it than any of the Countries, unless it were Serbia. The Annexation had

¹ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*.

brought Austria down to the Adriatic along a long stretch of coast filled with fine harbors, connected by inner waterways and guarded by islands and a coast as defensible as the rest of Austria's Italian frontier. The Annexation changed completely the Italian and Austrian relation in the Adriatic and gave Austria, at least, a potential preponderance there, which placed the entire Italian coast, from Venice to the mouth of the Adriatic, under an immediate menace. Even Germany professed indignation at the step Baron von Aehrenthal had taken which threatened such a change in the Status quo. She, however, in action sided with Austria. The other Powers were seriously angry. Russia felt that she had been overreached, and her interests were so seriously affected that her representative, who had been duped by Aehrenthal into complete inaction, demanded a European Conference to readjust the threatened overthrow of the Equilibrium. This Austria rejected unless the action of the Conference should be limited, so far as the annexed provinces were concerned, to a simple acceptance of the *fait accompli*. In this, Germany united with Austria. England and France, the other Powers in the Entente, began with backing Russia in the demand for a European Conference, but when Germany appeared, as the Kaiser phrased it, "in shining armor," to back her ally, Great Britain and France yielded, and Germany and Austria had scored a victory for the Triplice over the Triple Entente which bore far-reaching consequences. Serbia was thrown into a condition of mingled anxiety and rage, from which she never recovered, and Italy was aroused to a state of watchfulness which was to bear much fruit in the next few years. All the long-bound suspicion and animosity was suddenly unbound and broke loose, and the rivalries of the two nations were stirred to pristine force. Turkey boycotted Austro-Hungarian merchandise and practically suspended Austro-Hungarian trade with Turkey. Turkey and Serbia, under the spur of a common wrong and a common peril, drew closer together. Russia and Austria both began to mobilize their armies. Austria,

to forestall the serious uprising threatened in the annexed provinces themselves, filled them with troops and concentrated large forces in the Croatian and Slavonian provinces and in Southern Hungary, in anticipation of the bursting of the storm. Germany prepared to stand by her ally should Russia attack her, as appeared more than possible.¹

In view of the threatening situation and of the drawing together of Serbia and Turkey, Austria decided to divide the two and to conciliate Turkey. Accordingly in 1909 (February 10) Austria-Hungary concluded a Convention with Turkey, under which she yielded to Turkey and renounced all rights acquired or claimed by her in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar under the Treaty of Berlin, and by previous agreement in 1899 (April 21) touching the Occupation of the Sanjak. She consented to various other contentions on Turkey's part relating to the Moslems and the free exercise of their religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to sundry provisions which aided Turkey financially, such as an increase of Turkish customs and the creation of Turkish monopolies. And, finally, she agreed to a Treaty of commerce with Turkey; to suppress the Austrian Post-Offices in Turkey as soon as the other powers should do the same, and last, but not least, to support Turkey before any European Conference or otherwise in her demand that she should be released from the Capitulations.

By this Convention Turkey, at least, was eliminated from the list of those who were ready to make common cause against Austria, and was drawn closer toward the two chief members of the Triple Alliance, if somewhat estranged from the third. Before Austria, however, could settle down to the consolidation of her newly seized provinces, she was obliged to make further concessions to meet the general feeling that had been aroused against her. She had to yield to the pressure of Italy and Russia, and consent to the modification of the Article (XXIX) in the Treaty of Berlin, giving Austria the right to police the Montenegrin waters, which was a strong limitation on Montenegrin sovereignty over her own

¹ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 254.

littoral and a standing menace to Italy. Montenegro was thus released from such Austrian dominance. Her waters were, by an understanding with her, opened, and her port, Antivari, became a free port to the war-ships of all nations; and soon afterward, on New Year's day, 1910, by virtue of an agreement on the part of France, Italy, and Russia, a French squadron attended the celebration of the opening of Montenegrin waters and of the fiftieth year of the reign of King Nicholas. A little later, August, 1910, an Italian squadron escorted the King and Queen of Italy to Antivari to attend the Diamond Jubilee of King Nicholas and the proclamation of Montenegro as a Kingdom.

Under these conditions, while not in any sense satisfied with the action of Austria in the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other powers were brought to a condition of more or less acquiescence in the new situation. Only Serbia was left out completely. The interests of Serbia and Austria might have conflicted in any case; under the policy of Austria they must have conflicted.

Serbia had, at times, dreamed of a pan-Serb movement which should reach the seas, both the Adriatic and the *Ægean*, and in which Serbia proper should be the controlling factor. Austria had not only her own dream, but her own very practical plan. And this led her to the open sea, both to the Adriatic and the *Ægean*, and if Serbia lay across the way, so much the worse for her. Serbia was the lamb in the stream below the wolf. Let her not trouble the water. She would do well if she herself were not gobbled up. Her relationship to the Serbs already under Austrian Rule was in itself a peril for her. It impeded Austria's absorptive process.

Austria, who had not found the process of assimilation easy in her dealing with the Southern Slav provinces and was jealous even of Hungarian influences there, had a profound suspicion of Serbia and Serbian intrigues, which she feared might counter her own plans. And doubtless there were elements on both sides of the border that ardently desired whatever might strengthen the pan-Serb sentiment.

At least, Austria apprehended that there were such, and her long-tested Spy system was in full force and vigor to detect and root out anything tending thereto.

There were produced, in justification of Austria's annexation, documents revealing an alleged Serbian plot in connection with a similar Croatian-Serb plot to establish a Greater Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary; and a prosecution for High Treason was instituted in Agram by the latter against some threescore Serbs. "The proofs," which were published in the official organ of Baron Aehrenthal by his friend, Doctor Friedjung, in the spring of 1909, were proved in a trial, which was caused by the publication, to be forgeries executed by a certain Vasich, who was employed for the purpose by a member of the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. and were eventually repudiated by Baron Aehrenthal.¹

The situation, however, was at one time so critical that the World War appeared to be within twenty-four hours of breaking out five years earlier than it actually did, and only Germany's notification to Russia that she would, in case of war, take the field on the side of her ally, prevented Russia from attacking Austria in support of the Southern Slavs.

Such was Austria's attitude toward Serbia and all Jugoslavia in the crisis of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Annexation, which was presented as a present to her Emperor, Francis Joseph, on an anniversary occasion. But after Serbia the effect on Italy came next.

Austria, however linked with Germany by the necessities of her surroundings, where Russia and Turkey or countries within their influence bounded her to the Italian line, had never ceased to chafe under the prepotency of the country which had supplanted her among the Germanic states, and Germany's attitude during the Bosnian and Herzegovinian affair had not tended to reassure her in her new step. Her leading statesmen, with Aehrenthal at their head, were simply desirous to gain a greater independence of Germany

¹ Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 259-260.

than had existed for some time under the Triple Alliance, and the means of accomplishing this were only through bettering relations with other powers. The Three Emperors' League had come to naught; the proposal for an Austro-Russo-Franco-German Entente had fallen through, and Austria was left with only Germany and Italy as her allies, and between the two her position was far from satisfactory. She recognized that Italy was nearer to Germany than she was to her, and that it was necessary to improve this situation. This was undoubtedly one of the motives that induced her to enter into the arrangement with Italy, first for the abstention of both Governments from an attempt to obtain territorial acquisitions in Albania, and then for the mutual compensation provided for in Article VII of the Triplice relating to the Balkan and Adriatic Equilibrium.

The advent of Tommaso Tittoni to power in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward the end of 1903 had opened the way for a relation of less poignant bitterness between the two Countries, and of more friendly relations between the two Governments. Signor Tittoni was a cool, clear-headed, capable man, sincerely desirous to raise Italy to a more important position in the category of nations, and convinced that it would be done better by promoting peace and good-will with her neighbors than by rash attempts to force her way by a policy of persistent Irredentism. A clear and cogent speaker, he was moderate in statement and tactful in expression, and inclined to temporize where great difficulties existed. He believed firmly in the Triple Alliance as the sheet-anchor of Italy's foreign policy; but desired at the same time to keep fair with England and France. He began his career as Minister for Foreign Affairs by a statement in the Italian Chamber (December 15, 1903) on the relations of Italy and Austria, with reference to the recent riots which had occurred in Innsbruck between Austrian and Italian students, with a repercussion in certain Italian universities. In this speech he defended, against the attacks of the champions of Irredentism, the Austrian Government, which he declared had acted in ac-

cordance with the principles of International Law, and he stated that he looked to Peace as the supreme end of his policy. He defended warmly the Triple Alliance, which he declared "an efficient instrument for Peace," and announced that the fundamental policy of the Governments was "to uphold firmly the Triple Alliance; to uphold and consolidate our sincere friendship with England and France."¹

This programme of peace was reaffirmed some months later when the Minister for Foreign Affairs, again meeting the criticism of the Irredentist element that his policy was inherently vicious in that it undertook to combine irreconcilable relations, amplified the statement of the Government policy. He referred with pride to the visits exchanged by the Royal and Imperial chiefs of State of Italy and England as a reaffirmation of their traditional close friendship—of England and Germany, and of the visit to Sicily of the German Emperor, who was declared to have been "greeted unanimously everywhere as the friend and faithful ally of Italy." His own visit to the Austrian Premier, Count Goluchowski, had, it was declared, given occasion for the exchange of opinions as to the policy of Italy and Austria in the Balkans; and finally the visit of the President of the French Republic, with his enthusiastic reception, had shown how greatly Italy valued the friendship of France.

The German Chancellor, Count von Bülow—not yet a Prince—was referred to as having "always shown affection for Italy."

For himself, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that the relations between Italy and France were friendly and would always remain so, as far as depended on him. As to England and Germany, he declared that it was necessary to conform Italy's action to the greatest sincerity and loyalty and he asseverated that there were in the Italian policy "no reservations, no hidden meaning, no ambiguity."

Dealing with the Italo-Austrian situation, the spokesman of the Government referred with apparent assurance to the

¹ Tittoni, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, pp. 9-10.

improved relations between the two rivals for Balkan favors, and reprobated the efforts made to arouse the doubts, the suspicions, the diffidence, the passions of the people of Italy, and declared that his visit to Goluchowski had resulted in entire mutual confidence. Italy, he declared, had the position in the Balkans which was due to her, and her "disinterested action in the East was viewed with confidence by Turkey, and at the same time with sympathy by the Balkan states." Austria, in her relation to Macedonia, the Minister stated, was controlled by the convention between her and Italy, as she was in her relation to Albania, whose ports were "all-important, as they would assure to Austria or Italy, if either of the two powers possessed them, the incontestable military supremacy of the Adriatic."¹

"Now, neither can Italy allow to Austria such a supremacy," pursued the Minister, "nor could Austria to Italy, and if either of them should claim it, the other would have to use every means to oppose it."

It is impossible not to concede to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs entire good faith in these declarations of confidence in the friendship between the several powers alluded to, including Austria. During the entire period of his tenure of office, whether dealing with Italy's policy in the Balkans, in Tripolitania, or in Eastern Africa, he dwelt on the same theme of established friendly relations with the same high intention. Aehrenthal succeeded Goluchowski, and Austria kept on with her policy of absorption down to the end; but the Italian Minister held firmly to the "precious guaranty of Peace: the Triple Alliance Treaty," and to the declaration of "mutual confidence and friendship." Was it only meant for home consumption to keep the people quiet? It could not have been consciously this, for he often took the unpopular position and defended it boldly. Yet Baron Aehrenthal took occasion, in 1909, to send him a biting message to the effect that he would appreciate more Italian declarations of friendship in the Chamber if

¹ Tittoni, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, pp. 16-18.

Italian Diplomacy at Belgrade were more in conformity with them. Tittoni was equal to the occasion. He satisfied the emissary who conveyed the message as to his sincerity, and sent Aehrenthal the message that if he really wished to promote friendliness between the two countries, he had better return at Rome the visit he had paid him, and that sooner or later the question of returning the visit of the King of Italy to the Emperor would have to be settled. The Austrian Minister, however, met the suggestion with a challenge of Italy's relation to Greece, and with a complaint that the visit of the King of Italy and of Signor Tittoni to the King of Greece had complicated the situation so far as concerned Austria, and though he returned the visit, he returned it at Desio and not at Rome, and neither did the Emperor return King Umberto's visit at Rome, which gave the opponents of the Triplice ammunition for their irredentist campaign, which it took all the address of the Ministry to meet.¹

Notwithstanding the discouragement of Austria's persistent intransigence in the Balkans, and even in face of her avid cupidity for enlarging her power, the head of the Consulta kept on with unflagging courage, maintaining that only friendliness inspired the relations of the two powers. It required a certain intrepidity to withstand the bitter resentment caused among the advanced Italian elements by Austria's treatment, which varied between indifference to and contempt of Italian sentiment and, in certain respects, Italian rights. But Signor Tittoni, like most of those who have presided in the Consulta, held that the Triplice was the foundation-stone of Italy's foreign policy, and he defended it against all assaults as an "austere duty." The waters in which they fished were generally muddy and sometimes turbid, but the Italian Statesmen appeared reasonably satisfied so long as they could feel the Triplice under them. Tripoli, the Balkans, Turkey, Albania, Asia Minor were all bound up with Italy's future development, and the Triple Alliance related to all of them directly or indirectly.

¹ Steed, *Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 268; Tittoni, *Italy's Foreign Policy*.

The announcement of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria (October, 1908) aroused in Italy a feeling of mingled anxiety and resentment, which expressed itself in a press polemic so violent as to demand all the address of the Government to neutralize it. The Italian Foreign Affairs Minister in diplomatic phrase referred to it as having "so deeply perturbed the Italian political atmosphere." It was generally demanded that Austria should meet the requirements in the Triple Alliance Treaty for compensation to Italy under such circumstances by ceding to her at least the Trentino, and it was declared later by some that certain statesmen, like Prinetti, stood for insisting on this cession, but were overruled by the Consulta when Austria refused firmly to admit that the *casus fœderis* had arisen. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, while reprobating earnestly the action of Austria in "creating a difficult situation in Europe," having "a considerable repercussion on the internal condition in some states" and deeply perturbing the Italian political atmosphere, yet opposed a protest on Italy's part. He justified his position by giving the very sound reason that "the protest to be serious and efficient should have been accompanied by the determination to enforce it by coercive means should it have passed unheeded."

The speech of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was, in fact, a strong presentation of the history of the Austrian movement which resulted in the Annexation of the Jugo-Slav provinces. With firm hand he traced the steps by which Austria-Hungary, having secured the mandate from the Congress of Berlin, had proceeded inexorably to her goal with the assent of the other great powers and the acquiescence of his predecessors in the Consulta. He pointed out the difficulties and dangers that any other course on Italy's part than that pursued by her would have brought on her, standing, as she would have done, alone, and he reiterated his conviction that Italy's true policy lay in adhering to the Triple Alliance and at the same time cultivating the friendship of England and France.

No reiteration of friendly sentiments, however, nor ex-

pressions of confidence in Austrian good faith availed to stay the on-sweep of Austria's policy of dominance and absorption. She knew too well the deep-seated antagonism of the Italians to her policy and the profound causes of the Irredentism that made Governmental conventions a feeble palliative. The Emperor, Head of the House of Hapsburg, had been despoiled of something of his power; a portion of his patrimony had been ravished from him by a stronger power. He should be compensated from those that were weaker, and as to what remained, it should be bound to Austria by stronger chains than ever. So Austria set herself to the task, on the one side, of rooting out the spirit of Irredentism and rendering her Italian provinces permanently Austrian, in fact, and, on the other, of pushing southward and extending her power into the Balkans, where she proposed to herself to become the heir of their former Suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, and reaching the seas from which new acquisitions would await her.

To achieve the first she proposed to Austrianize the Schools. She would cut up Italianism at the root. The Italian tongue was discouraged, and eventually, where it was necessary to accomplish her end, the Schools were suppressed, as in the case of the Italian University of Trieste.

That there would be great and bitter hostility on the part of the Italian element to this policy was foreseen, and arrangements were made to meet it with inexorable resolution, as was done on the other side in her Jugo-Slav provinces. With some, the unworthy cajolery of local office was attempted, or a concession of office was made, though usually only as the last resort. Thus, for example, when the Emperor was informed that he would be received in silence at Agram on a proclaimed imperial visit unless he restored two Croatian-Serb officials who had been supplanted, he abandoned his visit rather than yield; but finally yielded and sent his nephew, the Archduke Ferdinand.

Those who were obdurate were made to feel the crushing weight of the Government's hand; those who were too recalcitrant were chased away to swell the list of irredentist

Italians harbored in Italy, and gradually Austria felt that she was able to see the desired effect of her imperial policy.

But however Italian Ministers might labor to prevent Irredentism, or at least any public expression thereof, the feeling had become too deep-rooted in the Italian mind to be eradicated, and the spirit too widely diffused throughout Italy to be suppressed. The Trentino and Trieste especially were deemed integral parts of Italy, separated from her by violence and bound in foreign servitude by force. Istria and the Dalmatian coast were likewise considered so by some; but the feeling about Trent and Trieste was universal. Even could it have been suppressed in one age, it contained the elements of an immortal Spring, ever ready to burst forth anew. There was no more chance of their ever being forgot, or left permanently in peace as a part of Austria, than there was of Rome's being forgot or abandoned. The lapse of time had, according to the Italian mind, nothing to do with it. It was simply a question of power. What were Alsace and Lorraine to France as compared with Trent and Trieste to Italy? Had they been long in Austria's hands, it was simply a longer servitude. Had the Italian population dwindled, it was merely a proof of Austria's suppressive and ruthless rule. They had been long under Austria's dominion and the Italian elements had dwindled; but Italy knew the reason therefor, and of late Austria, aroused to the situation, had taken steps to make her policy thorough. The direction of the policy was placed in charge of the Grand Duke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Imperial throne and to the traditional Austro-Hungarian Policy of Imperial subjection.

Seditious societies were dissolved; their members were prosecuted or chased away. Public meetings were forbidden, and the conditions resembled those in Lombardy in the old days of Austrian Occupation.

No amount of discouragement on either side of the line, Austrian or Italian; no amount of repression, and no amount of concession availed to discourage or suppress, much less to cajole the irredentists on either side. The fact was,

that they were Free in spirit and Italian, and wanted, on the one side, to be a part of Free Italy and not of Imperial Austria, and, on the other, they wanted to help them to be free. Thus, nothing could extinguish their aspiration. As the blood of the Martyrs is the seed of the Church, so the blood of Patriots is the seed of Liberty. Irredentism had its birth the moment after Garibaldi, on July 25, 1866, sent his laconic reply: "Ubbidisco" to King Victor Emmanuel's announcement to him that the armistice was signed and he must evacuate the Trentino. Immediately, municipal councils had begun to send memorials declaring their right to become a part of Italy, and secret organizations were formed to effect this end. An abortive Revolutionary movement was attempted in the Trentino immediately to bring, at least, that part which Garibaldi had won within the new confines of Italy. It was followed in August by appeals from Trieste and Istria to be brought within the Ægis of Italian protection, and urging their Rights on historic and ethnic grounds which have found an echo throughout Italy. The Treaty of Prague (August 24, 1866), however it may have settled the boundaries, failed to settle the question involved, and in every movement, military or civil, since against Austria the Irredentist Provinces have been represented.¹ They were volunteers under three generations of Garibaldis, and fought as exiles fight to rescue their country. Italy was not able to continue the war for their deliverance, but "all Italians of the Provinces which do not yet form a part of the Kingdom of Italy" were admitted to the rights of Italian citizens on duly registering as such in any Italian town they might select. Many of them have held high positions and some of them have been Ministers. On the first occasion when one became a Minister, Austria protested formally, and the Ministry resigned rather than submit to the domineering demand of Austria.

Against the Irredentists of the Italian Provinces Austria pitted the Tyrolese to the westward and, to the eastward, around the Adriatic, the Croats and other Jugo-Slavs, who,

¹ Carnovale, *Why Italy Entered Into the Great War*, 2d Part.

however they may have disliked Austria, were always ready to oppose the Italians. They were, indeed, ever among the fiercest soldiery of Austria, and under their leader, Marshal Radetsky, himself a Jugo-Slav, they were noted as being especially brutal in the revenge taken on Milan at the time of the Revolution of 1848.

There were many conflicts between the Italian Irredentists and the Jugo-Slavs in the long struggle for the redemption of the Irredentist Provinces.¹

Austria pursued a policy of firm repression without avail. No policy would have availed. After the Triple Alliance was entered into, the Italian authorities endeavored to distract the attention of Italy from the Irredentist regions; but this, too, was without permanent results. The numerous Associations on both sides of the line represented a profound and fundamental conflict of sentiment. The Irredentists went into mourning for the death of great Italian leaders, and celebrated great Italian events as though they were not outside the Italian confines. Thus, for example, they commemorated the death of Victor Emmanuel, of Garibaldi, and of Humbert.

In the year 1896 the Italians of the Irredentist Provinces erected a great monument to Dante: "The Father." They participated as sons of Italy in the ceremony of placing a perpetual taper at Dante's tomb in Ravenna, and Trieste claimed the honor of presenting the lamp and the fire. In every way imaginable they strove to keep alive in their hearts the unquenchable flame of Italian patriotism. They labored to establish schools for their children where the language and teaching were both Italian. And though it was done under great difficulties, the result was sufficient to keep the movement in full vigor. The question of Higher Seminaries was yet more productive of trouble. Austria, finding the Italian Universities Seminaries of Sedition, as she deemed them, undertook gradually to change their

¹ The noted Italian Director of Antiquities, Giacomo Boni, who is a Venetian, told the writer that in his youth Venetian mothers frightened their children with threats of the Croats.

character, and when this did not succeed, she did what was tantamount to abolishing them. The consequences were such a recrudescence of Irredentist feeling, both in the Irredentist Provinces and in Italy herself, that she agreed to make certain concessions to this aroused sentiment, and promised to substitute an Italian Faculty of Law at Trent, Rovereto, or Trieste. It was on the occasion of this new explosion of Irredentism that Signor Tittoni, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, made his memorable speech reaffirming that Italy's policy was to stand by the Triple Alliance Treaty as one of the greatest safeguards of peace in Europe.

But whatever the Government might proclaim, the People were not appeased. Societies sprang up, or those existing received new impulse to free Trent and Trieste, and "incidents" were of frequent occurrence. The old Mazzini spirit seemed to have revived. Appeals and proclamations were circulated secretly calling for the rescuing of the Irredentist Provinces from Austrian rule.¹

¹ One such was sent to the Italian Chamber in February, 1914. Another was circulated in Gorizia, Trieste, and Istria in April, 1914. (Carnovale, *Why Italy Entered Into the Great War*, pp. 190-1.)

CHAPTER IX

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

GERMANY, however repulsed at Tangier and Algieras in her first essay, was far from ready to accept the decision, and she soon made another attempt to block France in Morocco and "obtain her place in the sun" in Africa, with whatever further advantages such a position might import. In August, 1907, French marines were landed at Casablanca to preserve order and protect the Europeans in Morocco, who appeared in considerable peril at the time. The German Consul undertook to give an asylum to a number of German deserters from the French Foreign Legion, and the tension once more tightened. The trouble, however, was settled by referring the matter to the Hague Tribunal, and a special Convention was entered into by France and Germany, under which Germany declared her recognition of the fact that her interests in Morocco were only Economic, and France, on her part, engaged to recognize the equality of all Economic interests in that Country. This relieved the tension, and for a time it looked once more as though the peril from that quarter had been tided over, especially as Germany appeared now immersed in more easterly affairs. The appearance, however, was fallacious.

The results of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis appeared to have been all in favor of Austria and Germany. Austria, backed up by Germany, had taken a long step toward the goal at which she aimed. She had, it was true, felt it prudent to make the Basi Bazar concessions to Turkey, and otherwise to mollify the new and supposedly progressive Party of Young Turks; but this brought to her counterbalancing advantages toward the South, and she had, on the other hand, with Germany's aid, stood off both Russia and

Italy, and was now both territorially and politically stronger than ever; so that she might now proceed calmly on her course of absorption. Germany, on her part, had shown Europe that the Dual Alliance, if not the Triple Alliance, was an actuality and that when she spoke, Europe knew that it must hearken. Russia had been faced down, and the Triple Entente had proved a broken reed before the German Alliance. For a time, however, it looked as though Europe had settled back into a period of simple commercial and industrial rivalry, and the idea of War had been, at least temporarily, relegated to the background. Germany particularly interested herself in her commercial enterprises toward Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Russia, which had lost through the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis more prestige than any other country, was gradually brought into better relations with Germany, and the Tzar visited the Emperor of Germany at Potsdam in November, 1910, with the result that the latter was reassured regarding his Berlin-Bagdad Railroad enterprise, and Russia was reassured as to her Interests in Persia. England and France, Austria and Italy, alike appeared to have been overlooked in this cousinly arrangement, and the Triple Entente would certainly have been fundamentally weakened had the arrangement been founded on the realities of mutual interest and good faith. As it was, the cross-currents that existed after as before the Potsdam Agreement prevented the current which it was attempted to set in a new direction from attaining any great force. Its chief practical effect appeared to have been the renewing in the mind of the Kaiser of his old idea of German Hegemony.

In the spring of 1911 Delcassé was once more brought into the French Ministry, this time to exercise his powers in building up the French Marine. His presence in the Ministry was in itself in some sort a challenge to Germany.

A revolt having occurred in Morocco in April in which the French were attacked by the Indigenes, a French column was despatched to Fez, which was taken possession of in May (21), and the protection of the Sultan proclaimed.

This was a blow to Germany, who had manifestly cherished hopes of recouping her rebuff regarding Morocco in 1905-6. The French Ministry fell and M. Monis was succeeded by M. Caillaux. France had just passed through a great strike and her internal difficulties had formed the subject of universal comment in the press of Europe. She had, however, prospered greatly financially and had loaned large sums abroad—indeed, had loaned large money in Germany—but her political position was considered insecure. She had fallen out with the Pope some time before, and between the Clericals and the Socialists the Government was the general subject of baiting. The Royalists were beginning to look up. England also was going through a period of transition and new men were coming to the front, whose measure had not yet been fully taken. They were less imperialistic than their predecessors, and the new leader, Mr. Lloyd George, had been an open pacifist and had boldly opposed the Boer war. Moreover, the perennial Irish Question was still acute. Russia had shown, as was believed, her readiness to refrain from interfering with Germany. Austria could be counted on.

As to Italy, she was already occupied sufficiently with Turkey, which knew of and resented her designs touching Libya and Asia Minor and had, for some time, shown herself inclined to grant, for due compensation, concessions to Germany which might enable her to act more independently toward the Entente powers.

Thus, the time for a new move appeared auspicious, and in the beginning of July the German gunboat, *Panther*, appeared at Agadir, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. de Selves) was informed that it had been despatched there to protect the interests and lives of German citizens. It was the move of Tangier and Casablanca over again, with an added defiance to the Entente Powers.

For a time it looked like war. The world held its breath. France, perhaps to the surprise of Germany, withstood her insolence firmly. Germany mobilized her army on the French frontier. England despatched a flying squadron

under sealed orders, and in Parliament all parties got together and served notice on Germany that the British Empire was still intact and had no intention of abdicating her international position. At the same time the French Bankers, creditors of Germany, called in their German loans, with the result that Germany found herself facing at once the possibility of a war the limits of which were unknown, and of a panic equally vast and unmeasured. It was said that the German bankers sought and obtained an audience with the Emperor and satisfied him of the perilous position in which Germany stood.

Certainly there was such an audience, and the following day the German Ambassador called on the French Minister and with a quite new demeanor announced that he was the bearer of good news. Germany had, on study and reflection, arrived at the conclusion that the French position was unassailable.

Germany's action, however, had brought Italy up standing on her feet. Where would the *Panther* appear next?

It was now apparent to all but the Blind that Germany was not likely to give up her dream of German Hegemony without a final contest for it, and those Powers on which the brunt of this was likely to fall began to draw closer together.

The next point where Germany was due to make an effort was the Tripoli Coast, the only remaining strip of the North African Littoral which was not yet in possession of a European State. This, however, had long been considered as designed for Italy's occupation. And Italy knew that the way to occupy it was to occupy it. She had had experience of the other method, and even with all the assurances that had been given her, France had taken over the region promised her. Germany, through her Kaiser, was manifestly deeming herself on the way to becoming the protector not only of the Sultan of Morocco, but of the Sultan of Turkey, as well. And her past actions had shown that she was not serving him for naught. The concessions that she had obtained were an irrefutable proof of this. Another evidence of it

was the growing insolence of the Turkish Government in its attitude toward Italian interests and Italian citizens in the regions under its dominion. On top of this came the rumor that Germany had obtained from the Porte certain concessions in the regions on the North African Coast where Italian interests were paramount. And Italy moved.

The relations between Italy and Turkey had for some time been becoming more and more strained, as those between Turkey and the other Members of the Triplice had grown more intimate, if not more friendly. Italy's interests in Tripoli, which had been recognized by the Powers at the Algeciras Conference, and in the Adalia regions where she had secured railway and incident concessions, were becoming more and more established, and Turkey began to pursue, whether under the instigation of her new friends or of her own motion, a policy more and more hampering. Whatever might appear on the smooth outer surface, Italy's part in the Algeciras Conference had been distinctly opposed to Germany, and none too consonant with that of the other member of the Triplice, who Germany declared had "played the part of a brilliant second on the field." Italy had proceeded busily with the design of carrying through in Tripoli a successful commercial penetration, which would, she hoped, meet the just wishes of the Indigenes, and spare her the labors and expenditures of a military conquest. She had many emigrants there and she had established there not only trading-posts, but had set to work to develop the resources of the country in a way which she anticipated would reconcile the Indigenes to her Occupation by satisfying them that it was to their material interest to yield to her. She started Banks, established an Italian S. S. line, projected a Railway, and endeavored to open up the back country by connecting the oases with the settlements on the coast.

The advent to power of the Young Turks in the Autumn of 1908 had, however, changed this whole situation. They proposed, if not to modernize Turkey, as was claimed, at least, to establish a new régime under which the Turkish

Empire would no longer permit its dominions to be exploited by the Great Powers of Europe, but would be exploited for itself. They had lost Bosnia; but they had got back (Basi) ^{Novi} Bazar, and they had no intention of losing Libya. Accordingly, they stepped in and, sending new officials into Tripoli, instituted a policy of systematic opposition to Italy's work throughout the country. It was not difficult to accomplish where, to the natural opposition of bold native races like the Arabs and Berbers, were added a traditional enmity to the White and the bitterness of Religious antagonism.

Italy soon found her enterprises obstructed, her citizens subjected to what she considered deliberate persecution, obstacles thrown in her way in all directions, and her progress systematically impeded. Moreover, Turkey was engaged in taking certain military measures which indicated plainly that she purposed to hold Libya herself and not permit herself to be dispossessed of it.

How far Germany and Austria were implicated in this action was a matter rather of conjecture; but subsequent events would appear to justify the charge that they were not strangers to Turkey's plans, and certainly not averse to her policy. A strong press campaign followed the recognition by the Italian People of the obstructive programme pursued by Turkey and, after a period of apparent hesitation, natural in face of so grave a move which might disrupt the Triplice and topple over the whole structure of the European Equilibrium, Italy declared War on Turkey. To do this, however, without bringing the whole nest of adverse and hostile interests about her ears, it was necessary to reassure her allies in the Triplice that such a move was not a preliminary to further steps that might and, indeed, would almost certainly change the Status quo in the Near East. Germany, with her now recognized intentions regarding Mesopotamia and the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, was constituting herself in a way the guardian of the Sublime Porte, and Austria was eagerly watchful of anything that might tend to affect adversely her aspiration for the extension of her power over the Balkans. Accordingly, Italy was in the

very beginning obliged to yield to their demand that no step should be taken which would affect the Status quo.

Every step taken by Italy had been jealously watched by her allies and, indeed, by the other Powers also; for none of them was over-eager to see Italy occupy a position which would strengthen her greatly in the Mediterranean, and give her a decidedly more potent voice in the Concert of the Nations of Europe.

The decision to declare War on Turkey was arrived at suddenly. It was believed that Germany was on the way. Another Agadir was apparently in sight. The People responded with eagerness to the plain lesson of the exigency, and the Government took the requisite step.

Italy's final decision was made in a few hours, and War was Declared September 27, 1911. Her Government, through her Minister for Foreign Affairs, issued on September 30 to the World the grounds of her momentous step, and on the same day, her hope having been dashed that Turkey might yield on her Declaration of War, she bombarded Tripoli, and within a week it capitulated and she landed troops sufficient to hold it securely.¹

Italy proceeded promptly to consolidate what she had gained by her first dash. On November 5 she annexed her North African acquisitions—which included Tripoli and Cirenaica—and thus, after nearly fifteen centuries, became once more the possessor of a part of what had once been, possibly, Rome's most cherished possession.

She hoped and may have intended to keep her war—to employ a technical term—localized and thus avoid the dangers of complications with her nearest ally across the Adriatic. But events proved stronger than forecast intentions, and Italy soon found herself facing a more extended Field of operations than had at first appeared necessary for her chief object. Although Turkey had no navy, her situation in the eastern Mediterranean, if supported by outside aid, would menace Italy in her new position.

¹ Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War*, p. 113; McClure, *Italy in North Africa*, pp. 35-38.

On October 1, the day after Italy announced to the other Powers the reasons for her move against Turkey, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Aehrenthal, said to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna that Italy's "military operations had impressed him most painfully and that they could not be permitted to continue; it was most necessary that they should cease and that they (the Italian ships under the Duke of the Abruzzi, who were threatening the Turkish torpedo-boats) were given orders to remain no longer in the waters of the Adriatic or of the Ionian Sea."

The following day the Italian Ambassador at Vienna was informed by the German Ambassador that Aehrenthal had begged him to telegraph his Government to say to the Italian Government that "if it had continued in its naval operations in the Adriatic and the Ionian seas, the Italian Government would have had to deal directly with Austria."¹

Indeed, Austria had already taken steps to mobilize her fleet for eventualities. Truly it might have been said: "See how these brethren love one another."

A month later, Count Aehrenthal, having effectively stopped Italy's action against the Turkish torpedo-boats at Prevesa, extended his obstruction to any action she might contemplate toward the *Ægean* Sea. On November 5 he informed the Italian Ambassador that he understood that several Italian battleships had been sighted in the vicinity of Salonika, where they made electric-light projections, and he notified him that "not one single action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey, or even on the islands of the *Ægean* Sea, would be permitted by either Austria-Hungary, or Germany, because it was contrary to the Triple Alliance."

Aehrenthal's dealing with Balkan and all other mundane matters came to an end soon afterward. He was succeeded by Count Berchtold in the early part of 1912. But Austria's policy continued the same. In March, 1912, Berchtold,

¹ Speech of Premier Salandra delivered at the Campidoglio, Rome, June 2, 1915.

the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, following Aehrenthal's example, notified Italy that if she attempted to pursue her policy of attacking the coast, the consequences might be very grave, for she would have Austria to deal with.

The political situation precipitated by the war was, at best, one of peril, and every new step might shake down the already tottering edifice of the European Equilibrium. Turkey's strength was in sitting still. However incapable of expelling Italy from North Africa, she knew that the other Powers were too intent on securing their portion of the coveted booty to permit her substantial dismemberment at the hands of one Power. She accordingly applied her efforts to keeping up such a defiance as she might in Africa, while she stirred up as much commotion as possible elsewhere. In both of these aims she was measurably successful. In the latter she was so successful that Italy, finding that the war in Africa was not a definitive success and might drag on indefinitely, took the step, however fraught with complications, of attacking Turkey directly, and thus compelling her submission to the North African situation. She accordingly in the Winter transferred her operations to the *Ægean* Sea, and as a first step she took possession of the dozen or more islands which Turkey had taken from the Greeks and still held, and she proceeded to threaten Constantinople itself.

The bombardment of the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles began on the 18th of April, 1912, and the Dardanelles were at once closed. A couple of small Italian war-vessels, however, under command of Captain—afterward Admiral—Millo, penetrated the Dardanelles and returned without serious injury, and the important island of Rhodes and the rest of the dozen *Ægean* islands were seized.

It was clear that Italy was now seriously bent on reducing Turkey to a position where she must accept her terms, and all the conflicting Interests were aroused. Should Italy's success prove too great, much if not all that they had counted on, and waited for, and striven and intrigued for so earnestly

through the years, might be lost irretrievably. The very Equilibrium of Europe, the palladium of European peace and power and—opportunity for plunder, was imperilled.

The absorption of Turkey in her war with Italy had offered the Balkan States an opportunity which might not occur again in this generation, or possibly in many generations, and which the latter were prompt to take advantage of. It even induced them to lay aside temporarily their historic enmities and unite in a Balkan League to overthrow their age-long oppressor, and not only emancipate themselves, but take from her certain regions, such as Macedonia and Crete, which, while beyond their actual confines, were populated by people of their races, and had in the past been an integral part of one or another of them. They might have been content to wait under the old régime until it rotted to its fall, but the accession to Power of the Young Turks had changed the situation radically. These exhibited much more energy and determination, but were not a whit more modern or liberal than their predecessors. If anything, they were more repressive. Instead of putting through the long-expected Reforms in Macedonia, they had definitely abandoned the promised policy, and the persecution of the Christian subjects had been so atrocious as to inflame the people of Greece and Bulgaria, of whom the population for the most part had originally formed elements. They had taken away the Autonomy of both Macedonia and Crete, and were proceeding to rule both in the old Turkish way, only informed with and carried out with a new vigor. Moreover, instructed by their recent lesson, they were reorganizing their military establishment and apparently proposed to render it an efficient weapon.

It happened that the Prime Minister of Greece at this juncture was a Cretan, and was, moreover, a man of extraordinary ability and a statesman of the highest order, Eleutherios Venizelos. More than to any other one man Crete owed to him such progress as she had made toward Liberty, and Greece such as she had made toward a position of strength among the Balkan States. He had fought

Turkey from his youth, and, like Themistocles, he could "make a small city a great one." No man since Cavour had manifested such vision and grasp, and he exemplified in himself the power of racial feeling. Also he was happy in his time. The oppressor of Hellenism was tottering.

To Venizelos' determination to extort from Turkey the restoration of Cretan Autonomy was due in large part the beginning of the Balkan League. For the moment the enmities were laid aside to fuse all forces in a common weapon against the common enemy. Without Greece it could not have had a chance of success, for the participation of the Greek fleet was essential to prevent Turkey from transferring her troops from Asia Minor. Among his motives was doubtless also the ultimate obtaining of the Dodecanese Islands for Greece, as should Greece and her allies go to war with Turkey, Italy would hardly return the islands with their Greek population to their common enemy.

The Balkan League once formed, War was inevitable, for the Turkish Government was blind to the new power constituted and, as usual, refused any concessions until too late. The Balkan peoples were already inflamed by the massacres of the summer (1912), and were ready to fight to avenge their age-long grievances. Even Italy, exasperated beyond measure by Turkish delay and equivocations, might join in. Montenegro moved first.

On October 8, 1912, Montenegro Declared War. A week later Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia issued an ultimatum, demanding the Autonomy of the Turkish European provinces. Turkey, which at the last minute had offered to the League the Reforms demanded in Macedonia, and to Greece the Autonomy of Crete, rejected their ultimatum and Declared War (October 18) on Bulgaria and Serbia, and Greece Declared War on her.

In the beginning, the general opinion was that Turkey, relieved from her war with Italy, which was at the moment closing, would win. In some quarters "the wish was father to the thought," and the European Powers placed little faith in Balkan co-operation. Yet the war lasted only six

weeks and Turkey was decisively beaten. The Young Turks were turned out and Kemel Pasha, representative of the older elements, once more resumed the reins of power, and requested an armistice, which was signed December 3.

The Allies' demands were tantamount to the surrender by Turkey of all her European possessions save Constantinople, the Gallipoli peninsula, and a strip of territory sufficient to protect Constantinople and its approaches.

The Peace Treaty between Italy and Turkey was signed at Ouchy, October 15, 1912, and immediately afterward Count Berchtold visited Italy, where he held an important Conference with the Marquis Di San Giuliano (the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), who a little later in early November visited Berlin, and the Triple Alliance was renewed (two years before the date set for its expiration) for the fourth time (November 5).

The first Balkan War broke out on October 12, and Turkey was defeated by the middle of December, before Austria-Hungary could intervene. The London Conference opened December 16.

The German Chancellor, Doctor von Bethmann-Hollweg, declared in an address on December 2 (1912) that "Germany will stand by the side of her Ally, Austria; and if need be, will fight." In fact, when all the evidence is taken into consideration, it is manifest that Austria-Hungary was at this time earnestly engaged not only in preparing for the eventuality of a war on Serbia and a move on the Balkans; but in seeking for a *casus belli* against Serbia.¹

Serbia was bent on securing an outlet on the Adriatic, and this Austria was equally bent on preventing. Montenegro had need for expansion, and while Serbia was heading for Durazzo, Montenegro was addressing her plans toward the acquirement of that portion of Albanian territory which contained her ancient Capital.

Italy was felt out and was invited to occupy Valona—an invitation which she entertained with a pleasure doubtless

¹ Cf. Goričar and Stowe: *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue*, chapters III, IV, V.

mitigated by the reflection that Austria might interpret somewhat broadly the term "Compensation" in Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. Austria, in fact, was bent on one aim: to compensate herself for previous losses.

The Balkan Entente was subjected to every assault that intrigue could suggest. An Albanian Convention was assembled in Austrian territory to take measures for the creation of "a Greater Albania"—all under Austrian auspices. And, finally, an arrangement was entered into by which Albania was to become an Autonomous Kingdom under a German Prince, who should be offered the Crown by both Austria and Italy. These were to have respective spheres of influence, the former in northern, the latter in southern, Albania.

While Germany was thus earnestly engaged in extending her power, whether to the Southeastward and to the Eastward, or toward regions which she coveted beyond the Mediterranean, Austria was preparing to reinstate and extend her power in the regions she coveted. She had a common ground with Germany of antagonism against Russia, though for a somewhat more immediate reason. She coveted dominion over the Balkan States, as yet largely unexploited by the other Powers—and especially she coveted possession of Montenegro and Albania and control of Serbia. These would give her control of the Adriatic and indirectly over Italy. Thus, she would solve the Balkan question and restore the prestige of the Empire, which had been shaken at Sadowa and had lost in Venetia a part of what the Emperor considered his patrimonial estate.

Her policy, as has been stated, had ever been to keep the Balkan States divided and in a condition of antagonism with each other, and thus prevent any consolidation of them.

Russia's aim was just the opposite. Her solution of the Balkan question was a Confederation of the Balkan States, which she would protect as being of the same Race and Religion—thus, she would have a great Pan-Slavic region which should stretch to the Adriatic. A Serbian-Bulgarian agreement was arrived at and the Convention was already

signed (March 13, 1913). It provided that each State should support the other, were either attacked, and by a secret agreement, a division of Macedonia was provided for with the Tzar as Referee, in case of dispute as to such division. Later a Military Convention was entered into to which Greece and Montenegro subsequently adhered.

The Victory of Italy over Turkey was a shock to the Austrian plan and also to the German plan of a great Middle Europe. Both had, to use the Kaiser's reported statement, "Placed their money on the wrong horse."

The Balkan Alliance was the next step toward the furthering of the Russian idea and the shattering of Austria's hopes. The next shock to Austria was the victory of the Balkan League over Turkey, and the final shock was the victory of the other Balkan Allies over Bulgaria. The entire German-Austrian plan was in danger of tumbling about their ears. The situation was such that Austria-Hungary began to prepare in earnest for eventualities and the increase of her armaments, both Military and Naval, to what she termed a "reinforced peace footing."¹

It was declared by Count Berchtold that Austria had "vital interest in the Balkans which she was determined to guard under all circumstances."

All this time the War party of both Germany and Austria-Hungary were zealously working up the feeling of their respective Peoples to prepare for the great step that should let the World know the power of the Germanic Empires.

Maximilien Harden, esteemed among the most independent thinkers of Germany, delivered an Address in Austria in which he pointed out that both Russia and France were unprepared for war, and declared that "all the difficulties that Austria-Hungary had had of late years and which it has to-day spring from the fact that it is the companion of the German Empire, both together forming the Greater Germany, which knows no frontiers. Should we not succeed this time in opening the way into the Ægean and the

¹ Doctor J. Goričar and Lyman Beecher Stowe, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue*, pp. 81-83.

Black Sea for German Hegemony, then have we reached the beginning of the end." ¹

The whole drift of the military authorities of the "Greater Germany that knows no frontier" was toward preparation for a step which would further their ambition for the Hegemony of the Germanic Empires.

At this juncture the aim was principally directed against Serbia and consequently against her would-be protector: Russia. At the head of the Austrian-Hungarian war party was the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

Austria had determined, at least, that Serbia should not under any circumstances have the Sanjak of Novi Bazar (Old Serbia) or get out to the Adriatic, a step which would add immensely to her strength and prestige with the other Balkan States and, moreover, would render her completely independent of Austria. To the political policy touching this was added a Religious policy which was voiced by the Clerical Austrian and German press and fitted in too well with the Secular policy to have been wholly a pious crusade. A great element of the population of the Balkan regions coveted by Austria were of the Orthodox Church, and another great element were Mohammedans. Especially in Albania were the latter preponderant, and Albania was eagerly coveted by Austria as the key to the Adriatic situation, whose possession would control not only Serbia and Montenegro, but Italy as well. The first step toward the accomplishment of the plans was the Declaration of Autonomy for Albania. As a preliminary to carrying through her plans, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, who had fallen into some disfavor years before, but was reckoned the greatest of the Austrian Generals, was recalled to the command of the General Staff (December 10, 1912). He was hated in Italy, where it was understood that he had counselled Austria to attack her in 1908, when she was almost prostrated by the Messina and Calabria Earthquakes and the distress and disorganization consequent thereon, and again in 1911, when she was in the midst of her war with Turkey. He was very close to the Archduke

¹ *Id.*, p. 85.

Francis Ferdinand, and was an advocate of War as ever Austria's best policy. When Serbia and Montenegro invaded Albania and began to establish themselves, the former at Durazzo, the latter at Cettinge, it looked for a time, in view of Austria's actions both in increasing her military forces and in an inspired Press campaign against Serbia, in which she was manifestly seeking "a cause of quarrel," as though she were arranging for immediate war. The Conference in London, however, arrived at a solution of the threatening situation, and by procuring the withdrawal from Albania of Serbia and Montenegro—which again shut Serbia off from the sea—staved off the war for a year and a half.

The Young Turks in January fomented a Revolution and, with Enver Bey at their head, assassinated the military head of the restored Administration, Nazim Pasha, and caused the reinstatement of an Administration pledged to the prosecution of the war. The negotiations were broken off and the war began again. This time also, however, Fortune was with the Allies, and after the capture of Adrianople, the sacred city; of Janina, the ancient capital of Hellenism, and of Scutari, and the threatened fall of Salonika, the situation of Turkey became so hopeless that Shefket Pasha, who had been brought into power by the Revolution of January, made a secret appeal to the Powers for their mediation. This they were quick to respond to, and negotiations began which resulted in proposals that Turkey accepted at once, and the allies also a little later (April 20, 1913).

From this, after negotiations not unnaturally somewhat protracted in view of the immense conflicting interests involved, came the Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913. By this Treaty it was supposed that Turkey in Europe had been substantially eliminated as a power and left only occupying the Dardanelles as a sort of International porter, in the interest of all the Powers. She was permitted to retain Constantinople and to the westward only the region between the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and a line extend-

ing from Enos on the *Ægean* Sea to Midia on the Black Sea; but this, as was proved in the sequel, was enough.

Albania was taken over by the Powers for their future disposition, as was the question of the *Ægean* Islands. The rest of the former Turkish dominions were turned over to the Allies for partition among themselves. The division proved a costly one for all concerned.

Unfortunately for the plans of all, the war had not been sufficiently long or costly to the Balkan allies to give them a profound feeling of mutual interdependence and loyalty to a common cause—if, indeed, this last ever existed at all.

While the general strategic plan of the campaign had been carried out with the utmost success, each ally had fought in a separate field, and apparently what had been accomplished in any one direction had been the work of only one army. Thus, when the armistice came and finally the peace, each of the allies felt entitled to hold as its separate prize what it had taken, and each coveted also a portion of what the others had taken.

The Bulgarians, whose army was the best in the field, had marched boldly against the main Turkish army in Thrace where they, having invested Adrianople at the end of October, in a series of attacks made with intrepidity and pushed with resolution, defeated the latter first at Kirk Kilissi and then on November 1 at Luleh Burgas, forcing their precipitate retreat to the Tchatalja defenses of Constantinople. The Serbians attacked the Turks in Novi Bazar, and having forced their evacuation of this important territory, pushed on toward Monastir, which they captured, together with the large military force opposed to them.

The Greeks performed equally well their part of the general plan. They guarded by sea the approaches to the Turkish coast to prevent the arrival of reinforcements and military supplies, and by land, the Greek forces, under the titular command of the Crown Prince, later King Constantine, marched into Thessaly and, defeating the Turkish forces opposing them, pushed on to Salonika, which was captured on November 9. The following day the Bulgarian force,

operating with the Greeks, also entered the city and took possession of the quarter of St. Sophia, on which they mounted the Bulgarian flag. Later on Adrianople fell.

Thus, when hostilities ended, the situation was sufficiently complicated to have disturbed relations even much more cordial than existed among the new allies. Adrianople, Monastir, and Salonika were all coveted by each ally, and Bulgaria, which had undoubtedly done the heaviest fighting and suffered the heaviest losses, claimed as her prize Monastir and the Bulgar section of Macedonia, which had been captured by Serbia; while Greece and Serbia asserted equal claims, and had the advantage of being in possession, with no intention of moving out.

Then there was Albania, on which, or parts of which, both Serbia and Montenegro had their eyes set, as it offered an outlet to the Adriatic.

In March, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria had, as stated, signed a convention by which the latter was to have a large part of Macedonia, and the former was to meet her aspirations in Albania. Meantime, in the war Montenegro had marched in and captured Scutari, which constituted the coveted approach to the Adriatic.

When, however, the Treaty of London was made, through the instrumentality of the great Powers the settlement effected was completely satisfactory to none of the Allies. In fact, it was not made to satisfy them, but was made in the interests, in considerable part, of the great Powers. Albania was taken from both Serbia and Montenegro, and was constituted a Separate State, to be later by agreement of Austria and Italy placed under a German prince, Prince William of Wied. Bulgaria found herself in possession of Thracian territory which Greece desired and she did not care for, while Serbia and Greece were in possession of Macedonia, including both Monastir and Salonika, which Bulgaria ardently coveted.

With the renunciation of Albania, Serbia was thrown back for compensation out of Macedonia, and it soon became manifest that she proposed to hold on to what she

had taken. Bulgaria attempted to secure the co-operation of Greece through yielding to her any claim she might have to Salonika. Greece's feeling, however, whether of apprehension or of enmity, was stronger against Bulgaria than against Serbia, and Venizelos declined Bulgaria's overtures. Whereupon Bulgaria, incensed at what she deemed intolerable ill usage on the part of her allies, and instigated to right herself by Germany and Austria, turned on the former, and without warning, on June 29, marched against Serbia and Greece, possibly thinking that a show of force would bring them to terms. Far from yielding, however, Serbia and Greece, who knew their danger and had prepared for this contingency, united in a counter-attack, and in a week had forced back the already exhausted and dejected Bulgarian armies.

Taking advantage of conditions which might not occur again, the Allies, especially the Greeks, pushed on until they were in some danger of finding themselves led by their ardor into serious difficulty. New factors, however, had come into the situation. The Bulgarian retreat began on July 6. Roumania declared war on Bulgaria, July 19. Her action settled the issue. Bulgaria, surrounded by enemies, was forced to ask terms of peace and they were severe. A wounded wolf might as hopefully have asked terms of his brothers of the pack whom he had just attacked.

Bulgaria, supported as she was by Austria, had too long been a menace to her sister Balkan States to be let off when so fair an opportunity was offered them.

Roumania stood somewhat apart from her Balkan neighbors, to whom she stood rather in the relation of a stepsister than a sister by consanguinity. She was measurably different in Race, claiming Latin descent through the colony that Hadrian settled beyond the Danube to guard the eastern borders of the Empire from its barbarian neighbors. This difference in Race she had been ready to exploit on occasion. As she had grown stronger and more independent, she had been drawn into the Triple Alliance, since when her royal House had been made much of in Austria.

Her history likewise had been measurably different from theirs. Like them, she had fallen under the Turkish yoke, but she had not fallen under it as completely as they. The Turks had overrun the principalities of Transylvania and Wallachia as they had done those south of the Danube, but had not subjugated them so completely. They had extinguished the aristocracy of Serbia and had almost destroyed that of Greece. But the Roumanian upper class had been more fortunate, and Roumanians had been assisted through their leadership in their resistance to foreign subjugation. Also, Roumania's geographic position, if it made her the coveted prize among her three powerful neighbors, tended to give her a position where she could on occasion play off one against the other of her jealous and truculent suitors. While to the south of the Danube a Christian Rayah ran the risk of his life if on meeting a Turk he failed to dismount from his horse, no such shameful condition existed in Roumania, and in the towns of Wallachia a Turkish mosque was not permitted.¹

The French influence strongly affected Roumania, and from this came a consciousness of their Latin descent which increased their national consciousness.

The Greek colonies had likewise an effect on the spirit of the Roumanians, and the Greek struggle for freedom, which appealed so strongly in the West, found a repercussion in Roumania which eventually bore rich fruit.

The result of the Balkan war against Turkey had awakened in Roumania a fresh sense of danger from the quickened ambitions of the victorious Bulgarians. Her southern boundaries were ill adapted for defense should Bulgaria undertake to put into practical operation the apprehended idea of extending her borders and her power. Under this apprehension Roumania requested of Bulgaria a readjustment of their frontiers, basing her proposal on the efficient aid she had rendered Bulgaria back in 1877, when she had saved the situation before Plevna, and also her benevolent neutrality in the preceding year. Bulgaria, still in the pride

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Balkans, Italy, and the Adriatic*, p. 13.

of her recent victory over Turkey, rejected the proposal, though a little later (April) she made a partial concession.

This, however, in Roumania's view did not meet the situation, and four days after Bulgaria began to retreat, Roumania declared war and, invading Bulgaria, advanced on its capital. The Bulgarian situation was manifestly hopeless, and on the 17th she sued for peace, and the Peace Treaty was signed on August 10 at Bucharest. Greece and Serbia formed an alliance for defense, which Greece subsequently claimed was limited to defense against the Balkan States only, and on September 25, 1913, Bulgaria and Turkey entered into an alliance. Turkey had meantime, under Austrian instigation, while her recent adversaries were fighting ferociously among themselves, marched back and quietly taken possession of Adrianople and fortified that region more strongly.

By the Treaty of Peace Greece, of course, got Crete. She also extended her lines so as to take in Kavalla, the port of the small portion of Macedonia which Bulgaria possessed. Serbia extended her line to take in Monastir; Roumania secured what she wished. Bulgaria lost all she had just fought for, and also Adrianople and Kalessi, which she had captured before. Such a situation was hopeless so far as concerned any promise of permanent peace, especially as the war had been one of the most ferocious in history.¹

If the Bulgarian extension and attitude alarmed Roumania and Roumania's allies and brought them into an accord based on the need of united defense, the unexpected result of the ferocious campaign alarmed, on the other hand, Austria, who had shared with her other German Ally the view that Bulgaria would prove as victorious in her second war as in her former one. It was a shock to her when she found that she had missed it in her calculations, and that Serbia, instead of being diminished and weakened, as she had expected her to be, had come out of the conflict

¹ A commission appointed to examine the charges of atrocious barbarities in this war, which had shocked Christendom, found the charges true and distributed the blame between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria about equally.

strengthened and inspirited. Her own preparations to meet the situation had been too late. Serbia and Greece had drawn together, and Roumania also had been drawn closer to them by the necessities of the case, while Bulgaria had been decisively beaten and her power reduced.

The aim of Russia had been to emancipate the Balkan Powers from Turkey and get them united in some sort of confederation which, in virtue of their Slavic origin and history, would make them a useful auxiliary for Russia should trouble arise between her and Turkey or Austria. In this France also had become interested.

The aim of Austria, on the other hand, had, as has been stated, steadily been to prevent the Balkan Powers from forming a League which would act unitedly. Her policy was to keep them divided in two rival groups. To this she had addressed herself with such success that the result was a cleavage of the Balkan States into two almost equally strong opposing groups comprising, on the one hand, Turkey and Bulgaria and, on the other, the two Serbian States: Greece and Roumania.¹

Russia, both before the second Balkan war and immediately after it, proposed to Bulgaria to come into an arrangement for a Balkan Confederation; but Bulgaria declined the overtures and proposed to Austria to be admitted within the Triple Alliance, an offer which was not accepted, apparently because the conditions would have jeopardized the good-will of Roumania, which, at the time, appeared of more value than Bulgaria. Notwithstanding this refusal the proposal was renewed oftener than once, but Bulgaria was at the moment not strong enough to command consideration.

From the time of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation between Austria and Serbia had never been free from peril. Serbia was not only cut off from the sea, but had found her aspirations for the union of the Serb race extinguished by this act of Annexation, which was

¹ Memorandum enclosed in letter of Emperor Francis Joseph to Emperor William II, July 2, 1914. *Austrian Republic's Red Book*, June 28 to July 23.

effected by Austria's one means—force; against which no national sentiment nor traditional solidarity availed.

Serbia's aspiration for a Pan-Serb Confederation ran sharply counter to Italy's interest, as it would embrace not only the Austrian-Serb provinces, but also Montenegro and, perhaps, even Albania. Serbia might, if successful, have turned toward Italy and have countered her interests. Moreover, Italy was tied up with Austria, and, as has been described, the Italian Government felt constrained to accept the annexation, even though Austria refused her any compensation to balance the unexpected change in the Adriatic Equilibrium. Russia had yielded and Serbia was powerless. Serbia, accordingly, was obliged in March (31), 1909, to recognize formally the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a *fait accompli* and to declare that it had not affected her rights; also to accept in advance the decision of the Powers with regard to Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. Further, she was to renounce thenceforth the attitude of protest and opposition to the annexation which she had held since it occurred the preceding autumn, and to change definitely her policy toward Austria-Hungary. This was to be cited later by Austria to Serbia as proof of her confession of wickedness, in the most tragic crisis of her history.¹

Meantime, as stated, Austria-Hungary, even with the active backing of her Imperial Ally, had fruitlessly exerted her efforts to keep the Balkans divided into two rival groups, of which the stronger should be their friends.

The issue of the two Balkan wars was a rude shock to the Central Empires. They had miscalculated in both instances. First, Turkey had been defeated and partitioned; then Bulgaria had been defeated and despoiled. The result had favored the Entente and enfeebled the Triple Alliance. The Serb-Greek combination was decidedly strengthened, and Roumania was leaning toward them. They had barred Austria from the *Ægean* and held the islands guarding the outlet of the Dardanelles. Moreover, they were in a posi-

¹ Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, dated June 20, 1914.

tion to threaten the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, on which Germany counted to parallel the Mediterranean sea-route to the Orient, and control both the outlet to the Bosphorus and the fertile regions of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

In this situation Austria moved to sweep away by a sudden stroke this new peril. She prepared to attack Serbia, and to do it without much notice. Immediately before the outbreak of the Balkan War she had arranged for a great increase of her armament budget. She could count on her Northern Ally, but she was not sure as to her Southern Ally. Her interests and Italy's were far from identical in the Balkans, and certain actions of her own in Italy's recent war with Turkey were still fresh in her mind. Accordingly, she felt out Italy. She did it boldly, but it did not avail.

On the 9th of August, 1913, the Italian Government received from the Austrian Government a communication of her "intention to take action against Serbia," which it defined as "defensive," hoping to bring "into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance."

To this Italy replied that if Austria intervened against Serbia it was clear that a *casus fœderis* could not be established, inasmuch as no one was thinking of attacking her, and it could not be a question of defense. This declaration was also made to Germany, with the expression of the hope that she would take action to "dissuade Austria from this most perilous enterprise."¹

The following day the Peace of Bucharest was signed and, for the time being, the "action against Serbia" was postponed; but it was by no means abandoned. Austria proceeded quietly on her way, extending her tentacles into the Balkans and preparing for the hour when the enterprise of extending also her dominion would be less perilous.

At the Conference in London to settle the Balkan war trouble, Montenegro had been compelled to evacuate Al-

¹ Diplomatic Documents relating to the European War, Part II, p. 1489, Signor Giolitti's speech before the Italian Chamber, December 5, 1914. Carnegie-Endowment Publication.

bania and give up Scutari, which she had captured, and provision had been made to place Albania as a separate principality, under a Germanic prince, with separate zones of influence, the Durazzo region being allotted to Austria, and the Valona region to Italy. The choice, as stated, fell on Prince William of Wied, which in itself was a victory for Austria though the new ruler was a subject of Germany.

"Prince William of Wied" repaired to his kingdom in March, 1914, and mounted his throne with somewhat the same chance of success that the brilliant bird in his quarters would have had dropped in an eyrie of eagles. He remained there only long enough for Essad Pasha to take his measure and gather his bands together to drive him out, whereupon he sought refuge on a small Italian war-ship in the harbor. The Italian Commander escorted him back to the royal palace, and there ensued the usual course of such Revolutions, and finally Essad Pasha asserted his power in Southern Albania, where later he was for a time supported by Italy as the only ostensible civil authority remaining in Albania, and King William returned home and became an officer in the German army.

The Treaty of Bucharest (entered into August 8, 1913), which determined, or was intended to determine, the status of the Balkan States from that time on, was the last blow to Austria-Hungary's hopes. From this time she set herself to destroy the arrangements accomplished. This aim was set forth definitely by the Ballplatz through the speeches of its leading public men and through the semi-official press. Moreover, no time was to be lost.¹ Germany was acquiescent and, like her, was at the top of her Power. But her vast Armament could not be indefinitely maintained. The Socialists were growing stronger and the People restive. Russia was not yet at the top of hers, but was growing stronger. Serbia was greatly strengthened and likely to grow more so, and a strong Serbia meant trouble for Austria among the Serb population of her recently subjugated

¹ Goričar and Stowe, *Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue*, chap. IX, pp. 181-2.

provinces. Turkey and Bulgaria were both for the time being *hors de combat*, but might be resuscitated and be rendered useful if aided. And, finally, Italy was beginning to be more and more exigent in demanding the compensatory balancing of interests under the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

A meeting of the Kaiser and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was arranged and took place on October 27, 1913, and this was followed by a visit of the King of Bulgaria to Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria and Turkey were both encouraged to draw nearer to their friends of the Central Empires. Bulgaria was heartened by a loan and a suggestion of being taken into the Triple Alliance.

In the early spring (March) of 1914 the Kaiser visited the Emperor Francis Joseph and then proceeded to Trieste, where he visited the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. He also cruised to Venice and was visited on his Yacht by the King of Italy and members of the Royal Italian Government. It appears beyond question that at this time both Germany and Austria were looking forward to declaring War in the immediate future which should settle for a good while the questions which they had so long been concerting.

It was in May (1914) that the insurrection occurred in Albania and King William sought refuge with his family on board an Italian war-ship in the Harbor. He was escorted back to the palace by the Italian Commander. But Kings who abandon their thrones never return to remain—at least, in Albania. Austria, who had had some part in its inception, sent her fleets to patrol the Coast, and the Kaiser sent his crack war-ship, the *Goeben*, to be on hand, and the insurrection was quelled. But King "William of Wied" reigned no more. Although a military force was recruited by Volunteers from Austria and other regions to hold King William on his Albanian throne, greater events were preparing, and a vaster war than ever Albania or Austria in all their history had ever dreamed of was drawing near with portentous strides.

Toward the middle of June (12), 1914, the Kaiser again

visited the Archduke Ferdinand, accompanied now by Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz, and to meet him came the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold. From this conference the Archduke proceeded directly to the Austro-Hungarian Manœuvres in Bosnia, which were set for June 25-27, and were conducted by General Potirik as the Army Inspector of Sarajevo.

Between the close of the Conference at the Archduke's Castle and the Manœuvres, Count Berchtold prepared a Memorandum, laying down Austria-Hungary's political policy: which was to reduce Serbia to a condition in which she would be negligible politically.¹

The Archduke was recognized as the protagonist of the Anti-Pan-Serb Spirit.

What happened at Sarajevo is known. On the morning of the 28th of June when the Archduke and his Duchess were passing through the streets of Sarajevo, the old Capital of Bosnia, an attempt was made on the Archduke's life, which failed of its object, but wounded a member of his staff. A little later in the day, while the Archduke and the Duchess were on their way to visit this officer at the hospital, a second and successful attempt on the life of the Archduke was made. A bomb was thrown and pistol shots fired by a young Serb, an Austrian subject, and both the Archduke and the Duchess were killed.

"The crime of Sarajevo" was the spark that lit the magazine which set the world aflame. The fuse apparently lay unlighted for a month and then the explosion came. The magazine had been stored by Austria-Hungary and she had only waited for the match to fire it.

It seems unquestionable that the conspiracy that resulted in the Archduke's assassination was wide-spread enough to include among its members a number of Serbians, who were filled with the Pan-Serb Spirit that had grown under Austria's repressive rule, and that several of these participated in the work that led up to the terrible deed. But the im-

¹ Autograph letter of Emperor Francis Joseph to the Kaiser, July 2, 1914, with enclosed memorandum. (*Austrian Republic's Red Book.*)

mediate actors were Serb subjects of the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor, who looked to Serbia as their Mother Country. And it is unthinkable that the Serbian Government or any member of it was in any way cognizant of the plot. Yet this was the plain implication of the Austrian Government in its action against Serbia, on whom it endeavored to fix directly the responsibility for the crime.

"The Iron Count," Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, in a letter dated July 1, 1914, wrote to the Emperor Francis Joseph protesting that they had no sufficient evidence to hold Serbia responsible.

It appears certain in the light of all the evidence that has come to light that Austria-Hungary, or, more specifically, the Rulers of Austria-Hungary were fixed in their resolve to destroy Serbia and extend Austria's power, no matter at what cost.

CHAPTER X

ITALY'S SITUATION AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

THE Foreign Policy of Italy for over thirty years had been conducted with the Triple Alliance as its central principle, not only as a bulwark for Italy's defense, but as an instrument for her possible expansion, whether to round out her borders along the lines of her recognized nationality or to extend her influence to regions where she deemed such extension vital to her growth. When the war broke out, the entire force of the Consulta, from the Minister almost down to the youngest under-secretary and functionary, had been reared in the dogma that the Triple Alliance was Italy's Ark of Safety, and had held until recently that her sound foreign policy was absolutely and irrevocably bound up therewith. This view was especially supported by two elements in Italy: one among the Business class of the North, the other among the "Blacks," or Vatican supporters among the Noble class in Rome. Against this was the feeling of hostility to Austria-Hungary which was deeply implanted in the hearts of the People.

To the westward Italy's foreign policy was confined almost exclusively to maintaining advantageous relations with France and England. Spain came in for an occasional bit of attention as an old, historic Power that had had close relations with Italy; as more recently interested in the problem of the Mediterranean, and as a pious supporter of the Vatican. Toward America the attitude was one of well-nigh complete indifference. In the first place, there was almost universal ignorance of America, save among the agricultural laboring class, mainly from Southern Italy, and this ignorance was quite equalled by their indifference. Academically, it was known that there were two American Continents, and that therein were regions of immense ex-

tent and fertility; also, that there was vast wealth there, which might be profitably exploited some day. But how they compared with each other, Italians generally knew little and cared little. They were recognized as a good field for exploitation by their emigrant class, and the Italians were content to leave it at that. In fact, nearly all of Italy's political interest was in Europe, and mainly in Eastern Europe, including the Eastern Mediterranean and the regions bordering thereon. These she regarded with a jealous eye, and her interest in them constituted a part of her chief grounds for adherence to the Triple Alliance. In dealing with them she had strained the relations with Austria-Hungary under the Triple Alliance during the Turkish war almost to the point of rupture. And Austria's interference during that war with Italy's action against Turkey gave their relations a blow from which they never recovered. Serbia was regarded with mingled feelings of sympathy and possibly jealousy—the former by virtue of Austria's attitude toward her; the latter by virtue of her attitude toward Montenegro and Albania, both of which were prospective fields for protection by Italy. At least in "the Dictionary sense" Greece was looked on with some suspicion, as having her eye fixed on the Dodecanese Islands; Northern Epirus, and possibly other regions in which Italy was much interested.

Such was Italy's situation when in the last week of July, 1914, the tornado of the World War came tearing from the eastward, drawing great States and Nations within its devastating and devouring whirl, and spreading ever-increasing terror and anguish over the world.

Her war with Turkey had contributed distinctly to strengthen her national spirit; but it had drained her resources and exhausted her military equipment, which had not been appreciably replenished. She was short of everything requisite for a war—whether at the front or at the rear. From guns to tin cups, from coal to cotton or leather or jute, she was short. Her people were worn with War and had settled down to Peace, and Peace was in their hearts.

No country in the world was more ready to "seek Peace and ensue it."

Italy was, indeed, still a member of the Triple Alliance, but was rather entangled in it than bound by it.¹

Furthermore, during Italy's war with Turkey, Austria, as has been stated, so far from acting as an ally of Italy, had distinctly opposed and thwarted her. If she had not kept her from going to Constantinople, she had at least impeded her in her action against Turkey. As she had demanded in October, 1911, that Italy should cease her naval operations in the Adriatic, so in April, later on, when in answer to the Turkish fire the Italian squadron damaged the Turkish forts on the European side of the Dardanelles, Austria had threatened that the repetition of such an occurrence would be serious.

Italian Statesmen watched jealously Austria's covetous moves toward the southward. Their partnership with her in the Triple Alliance was a concession to her power. There was no sentiment in it. But the People were never reconciled to the situation. Trieste had been in Austria's possession and under her rule for generations, but the population was Italian and the spirit was Italian likewise. Moreover, its possession by Austria was a continued menace to Italy that Austria might some day dominate the Adriatic. The Trentino was Italian in race and in sentiment, and was the gauge of Austria's will not only to withhold from Italy a defensive boundary, but to tyrannize over a numerous Italian population and destroy their Italian spirit by Austrianizing them against their will.

Thus, Trent and Trieste became in Italy what Alsace and Lorraine were in France. They were known as the *Irridentist*—that is, unredeemed provinces. Representatives sat in the Italian Parliament, who were born in those Provinces. Some years back an *irridentist* was placed in the Ministry, but Austria substantially threatened Italy with war, and the ministry resigned rather than yield. On the

¹ It had been recently renewed by San Giuliano (1912) but, as appeared later, mainly as a measure for balancing interests, under Art. VII.

declaration of War with Austria, one of Italy's first steps was to place an irridentist in her Ministry.¹

The People of Italy in the Summer of 1914 had no dream of war. They made it plain in various ways. They wanted peace and release from the exactions of military service.

In June, 1914, after a socialist demonstration, against the Government's order, in the dispersal of which a life or two were lost, certain malcontents undertook in the Romagna even to start a revolution and set up a local Republic at Ancona. They disarmed a general who drove from his headquarters to see what was going on. But the movement was handled with wisdom and without violence. The ringleaders were arrested or chased away, and the Country was as quiet as ever. About the same time, a railway strike of threatening proportions was averted, the Government taking into consideration the reasonable demands of the men, and Italy settled down to peace and to reap her harvest.

If, however, Italy was loosely entangled in her triple alliance, she was bound much more straitly by the commercial and financial ties which Germany had through more than a score and a half years woven around her. Taking advantage of her poverty and political situation, Germany had, with a definite and far-reaching policy of financial intervention, first invaded and then substantially subjugated Italy Commercially. The entire upper part of the Peninsula had fallen under her power. Not only had she aided Italy with advances in her work of development, she had loaned her, or, rather, had sold her, her experience in organization, and had impressed her with her power of organization to an extent which constituted a serious commercial subjugation. Germany had not only founded and financed manufactories, business establishments, industrial, commercial, and financial; but where she did not own them she influenced them and often controlled them. This was her true hold on Italy—a hold far more binding

¹ The eloquent Triestino, Barsillai.

than any political treaty. It constituted for her so far-reaching and all-pervasive a system of control and of agencies that when, later on, Germany made up her budget of propaganda and control she scarcely gave herself trouble to consider Italy. And when shortly after she started the fire and, discovering that Italy was not her catspaw, sent Prince von Bülow down to Rome, he said that if he did not succeed in his mission he "would despair of reason."

Yet every clear-headed man in Italy and out of Italy who knew her situation and knew how the war was made and what it meant, knew that Italy's vital interests were on the side of the Entente and that in the struggle she must take the side of Liberty. It was simply another case in which Germany misread the psychology of a people; as she did in the case of Belgium and of England, and, later, in that of America. She did not know that in Italy deep down in the hearts of her people is the inextinguishable fire of Love of Liberty. She did not know that this lies under their love of Italy; their idea of Italy's aspirations—that it burns always under her sacred Egoismo—and that when the line should be drawn between Liberty and its opposite, Italy could be only on one side. Germany thought it meant only geographical extension—communal expansion.¹

The outbreak of the War found Italy totally unprepared and, in a way, in a situation singularly unfortunate. She was a member of an alliance which had lasted for over thirty years, and had but recently been renewed with the two Germanic Empires which had made war against substantially the rest of the Great Powers of Europe. Moreover, the principles for which the Central Empires contended, and which the War was made to establish, were

¹ The writer said to a distinguished Italian interventionist Statesman once in the days when the phrase *Sacro Egoismo* was the watchword of Italy: "It seems to me that your press talks too much of your geographical aspirations and that you give the appearance thereby of lacking a moral principle." He reflected a moment and then said: "Do you not consider that the rounding out of the nationality of a free people and their Liberation contain a moral principle?"

the very opposite of those for which the Italian people had fought through the generations and which had finally cleared the Peninsula of all but Italian rule. The struggle fundamentally was between Autocracy and Democracy. Austria was contending for that which meant the destruction of Italian aspirations. Her success would quench forever Italian hopes of the redemption of her unredeemed children—a principle deeply implanted in the Italian heart and which underlay their history for generations. This the Italian People knew even if some of her Statesmen did not appear to appreciate it. And, furthermore, they knew that the success of the Central Empires meant the doom of the Italian Democracy. The Italian Countryman or Workman may be ignorant, and generally is bounded in his knowledge of all outside of his limited horizon, but he is not generally stupid. He is often very keen, and he knows definitely what he wants. He may change suddenly under some new impulse given by some leader or new situation, but in each change he is moved actively and often passionately. He may appear indifferent to many things that one would think would stir him. But the fire is in the stone and may easily be struck by him who knows how, and at times even by accident. It is this which makes the Italian situation often so obscure and apparently contradictory.

In speaking of the sentiment of Italy a distinction exists between the political leaders who constitute the Government and the People of Italy. Indeed, an Italian Statesman of great note holds the view that the People may be ever so patriotic, but "need others to do their thinking for them." The former may have views and aims quite diverse from those which animate the people, and at times they are sufficiently in conflict with the latter to cause their repudiation and that of those holding them. This is well understood among the directing class, and the Opposition are quick to take advantage of any mistake on the part of the Government. Thus, as the Government is responsive to the Chamber, the aim of whoever may be

called on by the King to form a Government is to secure as his coadjutors those who in combination may be able to carry the Chamber, which in turn is certain to desire to act in conformity with the views of the Country. This leads by virtue of the constituency of the Chamber in blocks or groups to the reposing of power in one or at most in two or three men, who, by their personal ability or address, are able to direct the policy of the country, while their coadjutors, content with the name of Ministers, administer their departments for the most part rather as so many bureaus. When it is considered that there are not less than fifteen different blocks or groups in the Italian Chamber divided from each other by differences ranging all the way from those so basic as to touch the fundamental principles of Government to those so tenuous as scarcely to be palpable to an uninstructed outsider, the complexity of the Italian system may be partly comprehended. Also some idea may be had of the complexity of the views of the various elements throughout the Country which lie at the basis of this division. For in this as in all other things touching Italy, one, to obtain a true comprehension of what might otherwise appear incomprehensible, must go back to the history of the region whose views and interests are faithfully represented by those forming these several groups. Whether it be in the North or in the Central provinces or in the South; in the Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, Emilia, the Veneto, Tuscany, the Marches, or in provinces of the South to the very end of Sicily, the same rule applies. The key to their action is to be found in their history and traditions, which are interwoven in the life and thought of the people to an extent quite incredible to those from lands virgin of such ancient traditions. This cannot be emphasized too much for those who would understand Italy. It must be borne in mind that until but yesterday, as History counts, these regions were as separate the one from the other as America is to-day from England, and were more inimical toward each other. Also certain regions burned with hostilities to

which other regions were strangers, as, for example, in the North, where in Lombardy and the Veneto the hostility was against Austria and Hungary, and in the South where the hostility was rather against Turkey. There were few common bonds that could be reckoned as equally potent, equally to be counted on everywhere. Formerly, the chief of these were the racial bond, the race feeling, and the religious bond; latterly, in the last two generations the National feeling—which is comprised in the word: Italy. It absorbs all regions and all elements. However diverse and conflicting local interests and views may be, and however opposite and jealous the several portions of Italy may be the one of the other, they are more jealous for Italy. And Italy means for them wherever Italy was once and Italians are still. No passage of time, nor long control by an alien power serves to settle conclusively this matter. Did Italy once possess it? Do Italians in race, speaking the Italian tongue, still abide there? This is the question with them. If so, then for them it is Italy.

When the war broke out, the Government of Italy was presided over by Signor Antonio Salandra, who had been called on to form a government only a few months previously on the voluntary retirement from power on the ground of ill health of Signor Giovanni Giolitti, after the latter had secured from the Chamber an overwhelming vote indorsing his policy in the War with Turkey, known in Italy as the Libyan Enterprise.

Signor Giolitti is one of the Italians about whom an outsider finds difficulty in forming a judgment completely satisfactory to himself. His friends defend him and his enemies denounce him with equal vehemence and sincerity. A Piedmontese, devoted to the Monarchy, brave, strong bodily and mentally, he had had an active past. His name had been mixed up with a bank scandal—his enemies assert, justly; his friends, most unjustly—and he had lived for a time in Germany, whence he had returned to new triumphs. The charge, indeed, appears to have been that he was implicated rather politically

than personally, for hardly any considered that he had personally corrupted himself. His ambition was for power, not for wealth. He had now been for fifteen years the head of the Italian Government and substantially the dictator of Italian policy, and though he appears to have retained his power by making at need concessions to all parties and groups hardly capable of reconciliation with any direct line of high governmental principle, he was conceded to be a master in the political game and his friends followed him with implicit faith.

He had recently—in the Autumn of 1913—gone before the Country and in a general election based on his last concession to the most advanced parties, of unqualified universal manhood suffrage, secured a great majority. Then having, as stated, obtained a vote of confidence with a majority of some three hundred and eighty-three votes, he pleaded ill health and retired from the Presidency of the Council, leaving to some one else the task of the finding of the funds necessary to meet the budget entailed by the Libyan enterprise so deftly indorsed.

This his critics declared his habitual way of procedure—to retire in the presence of a serious situation, leaving on others the burden of solving the difficulties created by himself, while he stood with his parliamentary majority in hand controlling the situation without assuming any responsibilities therefor. Prophecies were freely made that he would now return to power within five months as he had already done on, at least, two previous occasions. It was known afterward that, although Italy had conducted the Turkish war with her own resources, as the Government had been able to boast she had done, the effort had completely exhausted her military supplies of every kind, and the World War found her wanting every imaginable necessary of war from boots to field-guns.

Giolitti was succeeded in the premiership by Signor Antonio Salandra, a forceful and able man with a certain infirmity of temper which led him at times to say sharp things, and a talent for striking phrases which hung in men's minds—both dangerous endowments.

The outbreak of the war caught Giolitti out of power, and the new currents of that unexpected flood for a time swept a considerable part of his following out of his hand, and threatened to do so permanently.

With Salandra remained Giolitti's Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the veteran Deputy for Catania, thus establishing a certain touch with the former premier and a certain continuity of his policy.¹

San Giuliano was a man of great cleverness and address, as are most Sicilians, and of great force and steadfastness of purpose.

San Giuliano had in his earlier life travelled in Albania, and made a study of that little-known country and people. His letters therefrom had been printed by him and, indeed, published in a small volume and limited edition, long out of print: *Lettere sull'Albania*.

The guiding principle of the Italian Government was that which Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance laid down: the restraining of Austrian extension in the Balkans in a way to impair the equilibrium between her and Italy as accepted in the treaty. That of Austria was the holding of Italy in the condition existing at the date of the Treaty, while she herself had a freer hand to extend her power. This aim is shown unmistakably by the official records.²

On July 20, 1914, Austria having definitely determined to make war and crush Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, telegraphed to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome that it was necessary for Austria-Hungary to consider the possibility

¹ The immediate cause of his retirement was the resignation from his ministry of Signor Nitti, the radical deputy from near Naples, one of his cleverest, ablest, and most ambitious lieutenants.

² The long diplomatic correspondence which ensued on the Austrian declaration of war discloses clearly the conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable points of view and, in fact, vital interests of Austria and Italy. The Italian correspondence of the period prior to December 9 has not yet been published, as the *Green Book*, published just before Italy entered the war, begins with that date. We have enough, however, in the Austrian *Red Book* No. 2, in the Austrian Republic's *Red Book*, and in published Italian documents to arrive at a clear comprehension of the whole matter.

that Italy, in case of warlike complications between the former and Serbia, would endeavor to interpret Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in a way which would conform neither with its sense nor wording, and would claim compensation. He thereupon gave him explicit instructions as to what he should say to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, detailing the very phrases he should utter. "You will," he wrote, "express yourself in this sense": that "so far you had not received any precise information as to the results of the trial at Sarajevo nor with regard to the steps we propose to take in this matter at Belgrade. Nevertheless, I had acquainted you with the fact that the evidence established up to date," etc., "are likely to compel us to assume a serious attitude at Belgrade." Then followed permission for him to say that it was entirely within the range of possibility that a peaceable issue might be reached in their undertakings in Belgrade, and instructions to say that he was convinced that in clearing up their relations with Serbia, Austria-Hungary could rely on Italy's loyalty in fulfilment of the terms of their Alliance. This was followed on the same day with a long note of instruction containing in much detail the argument which the Ambassador was to employ with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to convince him that in possibly resorting to a declaration of war, Austria-Hungary had no intention of territorial conquest, and that, therefore, Italy could not appeal to Article VII.¹

This was the day before Herr von Jagow declared to the Russian Chargé at Berlin that he was "in complete ignorance of the Austrian note to Serbia"—a statement which is now known to have been untrue—and it was also the day before the Russian Ambassador at Vienna left the capital for the country, "in consequence of reassuring explanations made him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs." So much for Austria's good faith.

To the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador's prepared arguments the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged "a

¹ Austro-Hungarian *Red Book* 2, No. 3.

conciliatory attitude," and expressed his "decided intention to assist Austria so long as her demands were justifiable." This conversation, naturally enough, the Austrian Ambassador reported as giving him "the impression of many friendly phrases with as many mental reservations."¹

The following day the Austrian Ambassador at Rome was instructed (telegram dated July 22) to inform the Marquis di San Giuliano confidentially and in pursuance of the information already given him, that Austria's decisive step was now fixed for Thursday noon, 23d instant.² As to the contents of the note to the Serbian Government, the Austrian Ambassador was to say that "it contains demands dealing with the suppression of the agitation which endangers our (the Austrian) territories." The Austrian Ambassador was further informed that a forty-eight-hour limit would be given, and on the 24th instant the Signatory Powers would be notified, and he would be placed in a position to acquaint the Italian Government officially. A second telegram of the same date cautioned the Ambassador that "further verbal comments" would hardly be necessary, as he had already informed the Marquis di San Giuliano of what he had to expect. He was, however, permitted to refer to the "Narodna Odbrana" as a fighting organization, scattered all over Serbia.³ These telegrams were followed immediately by a copy of the Note to Serbia, containing Austria's ultimatum.

The instructions to the Austrian Ambassador were duly carried out. He "in strict confidence" gave the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs the information contained in the telegram of the 22d, and delivered at the proper time the copy of the ultimatum to the Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister being at Fiugi taking a cure. San Giuliano, on receiving the note, "expressed his misgiving concerning Italian public opinion;

¹ *Id.*

² The delivery was deferred suddenly by the fact that the departure of the Boat on which the President of the French Republic and the Minister for War were leaving Russia was unexpectedly deferred for several hours.

³ *Id.*, Doc. 6.

nevertheless," adds the Ambassador, "he at once wrote a letter to Secretary-General de Martino with the professed instruction to inspire the Press with moderation when the news of the delivery of our ultimatum shall reach Rome."¹

The Secretary-General was reported, on receiving the copy of the ultimatum on the 24th, as agreeing with the Austrian Ambassador's contention, "that he could not fail to admit the purely defensive character" of Austria's action. On concluding the reading the Italian Secretary-General made the sage remark to the Austrian Ambassador that apparently they "had reached a turning point in history."²

None of these exchanges of professed good-will prevented Italy from notifying Austria that should the conflict reach the stage of war, she would reserve the right to claim compensation under Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

On the following day the Italian Ambassador at Vienna informed Count Berchtold of this fact, adding that, "Beyond this the Royal Italian Government, in the event of war, intended to maintain a friendly attitude in accordance with its obligations under the terms of its alliance."³

The following day Austria notified Italy that Serbia, having refused to comply with the former's demand, she had broken off diplomatic relations with her, and "to her regret and much against her will" she was for the same reasons given, "placed under the necessity of forcing Serbia by the most drastic means to alter radically her hitherto hostile attitude."⁴

The tone of the Italian Press was no doubt moderated by the suggestions of the Secretary-General of the Consulta; but it showed sufficient feeling regarding the situation, recalling Austria's attitude during the Italo-Turkish war, to draw from Count Berchtold, on the 26th of July, a long instruction to the Austrian Ambassador at Rome referring to it, and trying to explain away Austria's reference at that time to Article VII. He evidently suspected the attitude

¹ *Id.*, Doc. No. 7, July 23, 1914.

² *Id.*, Doc. 9.

³ *Id.*, Doc. 8, July 24.

⁴ *Id.*, Doc. 10.

of the Italian Press as being inspired by the Marquis di San Giuliano. He also sent to the Ambassador a copy of a despatch received from Berlin saying that Von Jagow had complained at not having been informed earlier, as an Ally, of Austria's step at Belgrade, and that he had replied that neither had Italy been informed any earlier; but he considered Austria's action perfectly correct, and he added that he would remind the Italians that Italy had not previously informed her allies of her forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Turkey.¹

All the time that Austria was reassuring Italy and declaring that it was against her will that she attacked Serbia, and Germany was declaring that she had no knowledge of the steps Austria intended to take, reposing in their Government offices were documents showing facts which established beyond all question the deliberate intention of Austria-Hungary, backed by the Emperor of Germany and his government, to fling herself upon Serbia and establish her power, beyond future possibility of shaking it, over the Balkan states.

Austria had, in the opinion of many of those familiar with her intentions, been long working consistently toward her aim of securing what she coveted in the Balkan regions to the South of her, which would establish her power both on the Adriatic and the Ægean Seas. To accomplish this, it was necessary as a first step to reduce Serbia to impotency and thus dispose of the Power that was now looked to as the chief centre of the Pan-Serb or Jugo-Slav idea and propaganda.

Having found her aims deferred by the result of the Italian-Turkish war, and having been frustrated in her designs by the results of the Balkan wars and by Italy's refusal to accede to her plan in August, 1913, Austria promptly availed herself of the terrible episode of the 28th of June at Sarajevo, and prepared to occupy Serbia. She felt sure of Germany's co-operation, but she was more than uncertain as to what Italy's attitude might be.

¹ *Id.*, Docs. 13, 12.

On July 2, 1914, the Emperor Francis Joseph sent to Emperor William a personal letter enclosing a memorandum prepared by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs prior to the Sarajevo assassination, outlining Austria's policy and apprehensions, and calling on him to back her up in her proposed programme.

Austria's established policy as presented by her Emperor himself to the German Emperor was: to prevent a Balkan alliance under Russian patronage which tended to Pan-Slavism; to take Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance; hold Roumania by a guaranty of her territory; diminish Serbia; reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey, and thus keep Russia in check by an impressive presentation of her power, military and diplomatic.

The autograph letter, sent by the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Kaiser, dated July 2, 1914, states what his policy was. In accordance with his policy, "a new Balkan Confederation would be formed under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, whose purpose it would be to stem the flood of Pan-Slavism and to assure peace to our (His and the Kaiser's) countries." The correspondence shows that Italy was now hardly considered in his discussion of the Triple Alliance.

The key to his plan was the winning over of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance and making it plain to Roumania that the friends of Serbia could not be Austria's and Germany's friends, and that Roumania could no longer count on them, should she refuse to abandon Serbia.

"The aim of my Government," wrote the Emperor, "must in future look to the isolation and diminution of Serbia."

Having given the above-mentioned programme, he added: "However, this will only be possible after Serbia, which at present forms the centre of Pan-Slavic politics, has been eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans."

"You, too," continued the Austrian Emperor to the German Emperor, "will probably have gained the conviction after the most terrible recent events in Bosnia that a recon-

ciliation of the differences which separate us from Serbia is impossible and that the Peace policy of all European Monarchs will be menaced as long as this hearth of criminal agitation in Belgrade continues to exist with impunity."

"The memorandum enclosed with this letter," adds the Emperor, "had just been completed when the terrible events of Sarajevo took place." It was prepared with the same aim as that of the Emperor's letter, and he says of it that it "contained convincing evidence of the irreconcilability of the differences between the Monarchies and Serbia, as well as of the danger and intensity of the Pan-Slavic movement."

The memorandum of Count Berchtold enclosed with this letter and which, as stated therein, was prepared prior to the assassination of the Archduke, sets forth in even greater detail and with more explicitness Austria's policy to increase her power in the Balkans and, with this aim, to reduce Serbia to a position of absolute political insignificance. Roumania was to be shown "by acts" that her support was no longer essential to Austria. Russia and France were to be balked in their alleged designs to foster a new Balkan Confederation, and Austria and Germany were to "take action seasonably and energetically in the present status of the Balkan crisis against a development which (says the memorandum) Russia is systematically striving for and furthering and which can possibly be no longer retarded."¹ So boldly was this intention stated that even Count Tisza protested against the step proposed.

"I did not have an opportunity," he wrote on July 1 (1914) to his "Most Gracious Lord," the Emperor, "to speak to Count Berchtold, and to learn of his intention to use the crime of Sarajevo as an occasion for settling our accounts with Serbia until after my audience. I had not concealed before Count Berchtold that I should consider this a fatal error and that I should in no way share the responsibility therefor.

¹ Documents 1 and memorandum: Supplements and Appendices to Austria-Hungarian ("Republic's") *Red Book*, Carnegie Foundation Translation.

"In the first place, we have up to the present time no sufficient evidence to make Serbia responsible and to provoke a war with this state, in spite of eventual satisfactory explanations by the Serbian Government, we would be in the most disadvantageous position imaginable. We would be regarded by the whole world as the disturbers of peace and would kindle a great war under the most unfavorable circumstances." ¹

Notwithstanding this protest, the Emperor Francis Joseph sent off his letter with Count Berchtold's memorandum the following day.

The Emperor William, according to Tisza, had certain "prepossessions in favor of Serbia," which Count Berchtold urged His Majesty, the Austrian Emperor, to combat, using the recent occurrences to move him to an active support of Austrian Balkan policy.

Whatever the German Emperor's prepossessions in favor of Serbia may have been, they appear to have been sufficiently "combated" when the Emperor's letter and the enclosed memorandum were delivered to him, for we learn from a secret telegram sent to Count Berchtold by the German Ambassador, Count Szögény, on July 6 that the Emperor "read both documents with the greatest attention," and stated that he had expected that Austria would take serious action against Serbia, but that he felt it necessary to confess that he would have to bear in mind the possibility of a serious European complication, and would therefore desire to refrain from giving a definite answer until after he had conferred with the Imperial Chancellor. But that after the Austrian Ambassador had "emphasized again with great vehemence the seriousness of the situation," the Kaiser instructed him to inform Francis Joseph that "in this case, too, Austria could depend upon the full support of Germany," and that he did not doubt that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would agree entirely with him. He said that "this was especially true with regard to an action on our part against Serbia. According to his (Em-

¹ *Id.*, Doc. 2.

peror William's) opinion, however, this action must not be delayed." Russia's attitude, he said, would certainly be hostile, but that he had been "prepared for this for years, and even if a war should arise between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we (Austria) could rest assured that Germany would stand at our side in its accustomed fidelity." Furthermore, he said that as the situation stands to-day, Russia is far from being prepared for war and would surely be very reluctant about resorting to arms. But she will arouse the other Powers of the Triple Alliance against us and fan the flames in the Balkans. He said that "he understands very well that His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty will be reluctant, in the view of his well-known love for peace, to march into Serbia; but if we have really convinced ourselves with the necessity of a war against Serbia, he (Emperor William) would regret if we allowed the present moment which is so favorable for us to pass."

"So far as Roumania is concerned, he would see to it that King Charles and his advisers comported themselves correctly."

The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin sent a second secret telegram giving an account of a long Conference just had with the Emperor's Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State, who announced that "the German Government was of opinion that it rested with Austria to decide what should be done in order to improve the existing situation, and that, regardless of the character of Austria's decision, she might safely rely upon the conviction that Germany as the ally and friend of the Monarchy would support her, and further that the Imperial Chancellor, as well as his Imperial Lord, considers an immediate action on our part against Serbia as the most thorough and best solution of our difficulties in the Balkans. From the international point of view (said the German Emperor), he considers the present moment as more favorable than a later time; he agrees with us entirely that we should not consult Italy or Roumania prior to a possible action against Serbia. On the other hand, Italy should even now be informed by the

German, as well as our Government of our intention to effect the incorporation of Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance."

The impression created in diplomatic circles at Rome at the outbreak of the war through Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia was that the ultimatum had come as a complete surprise to the Italian Foreign Office. It was believed, however, that Germany knew of and approved the step, and some resentment at this was reflected in the press, as manifesting indifference to Italy if not a slight on her as the third member of the Triple Alliance. This was followed almost immediately by a generally accepted idea fostered by Germany that Germany had not been consulted, and as there was a general belief that the Triple Alliance was much more exigent than it subsequently proved to be, there was a general relief that Italy, not having been consulted, was left free in her action. Before the war became general, the feeling was strongly against Italy's siding with Austria, and even after it extended, the feeling was in favor of Italy's maintaining a position of armed neutrality. Socialist and Republican elements held meetings in various parts of Italy, calling on the people to refuse to take any part in the strife—a somewhat unnecessary proceeding in view of the popular hostility to Austria.

The popular feeling against Austria, always too strong to be overcome by the bonds of the Triple Alliance, was intensified primarily by Austria's having placed Italy in a somewhat equivocal position. And the Austrian Embassy was kept guarded as usual to prevent any hostile demonstration.

On August 3 Italy announced officially her determination to remain neutral. It was based on the reasons that her treaty obligations only required her to support her Allies defensively; and further that she had not been consulted by her ally before it took the steps, which it is now known Italy had made a strong effort to prevent. Meantime, Italy prepared quickly for eventualities. Stock exchanges were closed; the moratorium was decreed; food-

stuffs and some other necessities of life were forbidden exportation, and some hundred thousand men were called to the colors; but this was not considered to be mobilization, and Italian bonds remained substantially unaffected.

A little later some 240,000 men, besides the regular army, were called out "for exercise and training," and were sent to the northeastern frontier for protection. France was given to understand by clear intimation that Italy would not engage in an attack on her.

Turkey began to show great unrest after the dramatic arrival in the Bosphorus of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and the unrest extended to Egypt, and indeed to Italy's North African possessions as well. In Albania also unrest manifested itself. The Italian fleet was mobilized in the southeastern ports, and the feeling steadily increased that before long Italy and Austria would be at war. Every effort was made to import grain and other prime materials.¹

¹ The Austrian Republic's new *Red Book* shows how Austria, finding her policies seriously affected by the unexpected issue of the Balkan wars, and giving up hope of renewing an efficient Russian alliance as a pivot for her Balkan policy, determined to show by a military deed her power in the Balkans in a manner which should impress Roumania and the Balkan states, and doubtless Italy and the rest of Europe as well. The Austrian authority above cited states how Count Berchtold supported by the joint minister of finance, Balenski, the minister of War, Krobatin, and the prime minister, Count Sturkgh, set to work to render Serbia thenceforth a harmless quantity in her political policy. Her intention, as therein disclosed, was to bring about an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey and so impress Russia that the latter would abandon its position as the general protector of Pan-Slavism.

The true causes of the war, as given in this interesting presentation of Austro-Hungarian views and plans, were France's desire to re-establish her old power in Europe, beginning with her recapture of Alsace and Lorraine; secondly, England's deep-seated apprehension of Germany; thirdly, Russia's aim to dominate the Balkans and control the Dardanelles with their outlet to the open sea; and, finally, Roumania's enmity to the dual monarchy.

CHAPTER XI

ITALY'S ATTITUDE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

WHILE Italy was wholly unprepared for war—at least, for a war of such Titanic proportions as that which was sweeping over Europe—Austria, as she herself showed in her premeditated action, was fully prepared. She held by land the commanding frontier from the Swiss border to the Adriatic, laid down by her for the very purpose of commanding Italy when she surrendered to the latter the Veneto; while, in the Adriatic, she held an equally superior position constituted by her possession of the Istrian and Dalmatian ports, islands, and inner waterways, which furnished for her convenience ports and protected waters, whereas Italy's long Adriatic coast was flat and without protection. Serbia and Russia, the latter being occupied with Germany, were not sufficient to engross all of Austria's attention should Italy have begun hostilities against her at that time, and the political position in the Balkans was such as required the most careful and sagacious handling on the part of Italy. Montenegro was friendly, but lay under the perpetual shadow of Austria, and the king of Montenegro, however friendly personally to Italy, was too astute not to recognize the great peril to his country, under the existing conditions, of breaking completely with his voracious neighbor to the Northward. Albania was a debatable land in which Austria's influence was potent, if not preponderant, and was apparently on the increase. Greece, under a king who was the brother-in-law of the German Emperor, was more than restive at Italy's continued possession of the Dodecanese Islands, which she had taken from Turkey during the Turkish War. Roumania was very distant and was under a scion of the Imperial family of Austria, and the attitude of Bulgaria was really controlled by Imperial influences and was too obscure to promise much that was favorable to Italy.

And, finally, Turkey was friendly to Germany, and certainly more friendly to Austria, who was making advances to her, than to Italy, with whom she had been at war only two years before and who had taken from her the *Ægean* Islands and the last of her possessions on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Indeed, all of these States except Roumania soon fell one after another into the hands of the Central Empires. Turkey and Bulgaria declared war on their side, Montenegro and Albania fell into their possession, Greece was held neutral with the greatest difficulty, and in time both Serbia and Roumania were overrun by Austria and put hors de combat.

Thus, Italy was in a situation whose difficulties cannot be exaggerated; and her eventual extrication therefrom was due mainly to the fortitude and devotion of her people, whose sacrifices in its achievement cannot be too highly extolled. It was by no means beyond possibility that, following Italy's declaration of neutrality and Germany's victorious advance through Belgium and the eastern provinces of France, Austria would attempt to seize the Veneto and a portion of Lombardy. This possibility Italy disposed of by strengthening her garrisons on the Austrian frontier.

It is frequently said that this or that country saved the cause of the Allies. Such assertions all have this much of truth in them: that the exercise of the full power of every country engaged on the Allied side was called for and was none too much to secure the final and complete victory. And, so far as human intelligence can decide, there were occasions when, had the action of any one of those countries been different, the results would have been different. Of no time nor action can this be affirmed with more positiveness than of the period when Italy declared her neutrality and, transferring the main body of her troops from her garrisons along the French border to the Austrian frontier, released the French troops who might otherwise have been required to guard the Italian frontier of France, and thus contributed effectively to the victory in the first and decisive battle of the Marne. This has ever been the conten-

tion of the Italians; it is the foundation of the charge on the part of the Central Empires that Italy was against them from the first, and there seems no reason to question the soundness of the Italian contention.

On August 20 the Pope died after a brief illness, his death hastened, it was said, by the shock of the World War, of which the complications which the Vatican found itself facing were only a part. He had been first a simple Parish priest and afterward the beloved Bishop of Venice. It is said that he wept when he was elected to the Papal throne. He was a good man, universally esteemed and revered for his simple piety and philanthropy. In the beginning he is reputed to have threatened to "put on his hat and walk out of the Vatican." But if so, he found the situation beyond his control, and later he resigned himself to his fate and, leaving the direction of the Vatican Polity to those about him, he applied himself to piety and good works. His successor, the new Pope (Cardinal della Chiesa), who on his elevation took the name of Benedict XV, was of a noble family of Bologna and had been trained in the Papal Diplomatic Service. He was therefore more familiar with politics than his predecessor. He was elected as early as possible after the death of his predecessor.¹ The very natural reason for this was given that the situation demanded as brief an interregnum as possible. But the fact that, on the very day of his election, two of the American Cardinals landed at Naples and posted on to Rome to take part in the Conclave, only to learn that the last "Scrutiny" had taken place just an hour or two before their arrival, caused some gossip. It was rumored that the selection of Cardinal della Chiesa was to some extent due to the efforts of the Cardinal Archbishop of Budapest, and that the "Scrutiny" on which he received a majority showed a majority of only two. However this may have been, there was, at times, a tendency to attribute to the Vatican a certain tenderness toward Austria-Hungary which on occasion caused some animadversion on the part of those opposed to the Vati-

¹ He was elected September 4, 1914.

can's declaration of neutrality. The representatives of the Missions from the Central Empires and the Kingdoms composing them withdrew from Rome, it was said, to Switzerland, where their presence was a cause of considerable anxiety to the Italian Government.

Certainly the position of the Holy See was a difficult one. The Spiritual Head of the Church could hardly do otherwise than declare his detachment from all secular strife and his neutrality in a war in which those who acknowledged him as such were numbered by millions on both sides. It may be said, therefore, without undertaking to go into the merits of the question in any way, that the animadversion referred to was accordingly not directed against the Pope personally, but rather against the Vatican. The line was not always easy to draw with precision. Yet it was drawn, and rarely if ever was criticism directed against the Pope, even during the most crucial hours of the war.

The situation, however, always somewhat delicate, became during the war yet more so, and amid the complexities of the unwonted strain it might have become intolerable but for the tact with which it was for the most part handled on both sides.

Nevertheless, this was one of the burdens which Italy had to carry, and to an outsider it appeared to be carried mainly with mutual forbearance.

During the ensuing months, Italy gradually prepared for eventualities, arranging to acquire, from without, grain, coal, oil, steel, guns, and ammunition, and organizing for manufacturing what she could within Italy herself. She labored under great disadvantages, not the least of which were the machinations of the Germans who swarmed in Italy, particularly in the industrial regions of the North. As Italy worked with more or less secrecy and her Government kept its own counsel, there were times during this period when the Allies, hard pushed in France, apparently felt some anxiety; indeed, there were times when they manifested an inclination to exercise a certain compulsion on her by shutting down on her supplies from without. Ex-

actions were imposed on her as conditions for furnishing to her necessary supplies, and the exercise of certain rules of international law hitherto recognized was extended to a degree which caused much inconvenience and even some peril.

The escape of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* to Constantinople early in August and the effect on the action of Turkey was a serious complication to Italy as well as a blow to the Allies—how serious was fortunately not known at the time. It unquestionably prolonged the war; but it tended to define more clearly the points at issue.

The stopping of the Germans before Paris and the victory of the French in the first battle of the Marne tended to offset the apparently insuperable power of Germany, and as the interim passed, Italy grew clearer and clearer in her view of the questions at issue.

Unfortunately, both England and France at sea were stretching the International Code to Italy's great disadvantage and exasperation, as well as to that of some other neutral countries, and there were times when their dealing with shipments of cotton, mineral oil, metals, and other necessities was such as to give considerable color to the charge that it was sheer high-handedness.

Still, the general impression prevailed that Italy was drawing closer and closer to the Allies, as later proved to be the case, whatever the views of certain elements friendly to Germany might be. The sympathy of the people was undoubtedly with the Allies; especially against Austria-Hungary. During the autumn and winter the Austrian Embassy was kept constantly guarded, and the presence of troops engaged in picket service on the streets to prevent demonstrations on the part of the people became one of the habitual sights of Rome. These matters were always tactfully handled by the Government, which appeared unexceptionally well informed, and took such precautions that Carabinieri and troops were invariably sent with due provision in sufficient numbers to the proper points to control the situation, and in all the critical months between the

outbreak of the war and Italy's entry into the war there was no bloodshed in Rome and no serious outbreak.

The Vatican also was guarded on occasions, as unobtrusively as possible, to prevent any "accident"; for the feeling between the Vatican and the political elements composing the order of Free Masons was such as to render advisable the forestalling of all possibility of any "regrettable incident." No great danger of such trouble appeared on the surface, but from time to time the radical press adverted to the Vatican's attitude, and some anxiety must have been occasionally felt, inasmuch as inquiries came from Americans as to the protection of American priests and property. They were assured that as full protection would be given them as to any other Americans; that is, all the protection possible.¹

In October (16) the Marquis di San Giuliano died—in harness, as he had lived—and the Premier, Salandra, took over his portfolio until his successor should be selected.

In November, Baron Sidney Sonnino was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Salandra's reformed cabinet, and from this time became an ever-increasingly dominant force in the Italian Government. He had represented for some thirty years a constituency in Tuscany, near Florence, and with his intelligence and his character he had long been a forceful factor in Italian public affairs. He was born in Pisa. His father was a Jewish banker, or of Jewish extraction, and his mother was Scotch, which may account for certain elements both of intellect and decision of character which he possessed. Also it accounts for his having been reared a Protestant. That he was patriotic, goes without saying. He was able, self-contained, courageous, resolute, reticent even to secrecy, laborious, firm even to im-

¹ These had formerly been a political organization of great activity in withstanding the advance of Clericalism against the union of all Italy with Rome as its capital; but with the general recognition of this accomplished fact, the Free Masons had settled down into a merely influential element of the normal Italian political life. They, however, still retained an effective organization, and strong feelings of antagonism still survived, as was evidenced by the Assassination about the end of the war of the head of the Free Masons in Rome by a crank.

movability, indifferent alike to flattery or censure. He gave himself and all that he was—and it was much—to his duties and his country. He avoided all demonstrations for or against him. He had been one of the chief founders of the *Giornale d'Italia*, but he cared not a button for the press, either for its praise or its criticism. He only used it to promote his principles. He worked alone, listened to the views of others with due deference, but formed his own conclusions, and when he had reached them was immovable. What he said, he stood by, and when he spoke, it was the truth; but he spoke little either in public or private.¹

Sonnino was an opponent of Giolitti, to whom many of the leading men in the chamber owed their advancement. He had been twice Premier, but his ministry had in each case lasted only ninety days. He had no turn for handling Parliament, and in a parliament of "Blocks" the premier must possess this gift. But his high character and his force were generally recognized and in this crucial hour he was recalled to take charge of the Foreign Office. It was said that at the beginning of August, 1914, when on the outbreak of war Italy had to make her decision, Sonnino was in favor of her holding by her alliance with the Central Empires. Be this as it may, after he assumed the responsibilities of the Foreign Office he manifested no such views, and after Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, Sidney Sonnino was the backbone of the war spirit of Italy, the protagonist of the view that stood for fighting the war through to the end. Like most Italian statesmen, his interest was addressed toward the East and he was not greatly interested in the West. Like them, he knew little of America.

During the autumn of 1914 both the German and Austrian Ambassadors were replaced, the former by Prince von Bülow and the latter by Baron Macchio; both diplomats of great experience, and considered by their respective

¹ When Von Bülow had failed in his mission, he said that he "had been unfortunate; he had come to a country where every one talked about everything and had found in power the one man there who never said a word about anything."

governments to possess exceptional abilities—also, both supposed to possess special qualifications for dealing with Italy. The new Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Baron Macchio, had been Minister for Foreign Affairs, and knew intimately the entire history of the Triple Alliance. And Prince von Bülow, the new German Ambassador, had been Chancellor, and not merely was supposed to be exceedingly friendly to Italy, but was married to the stepdaughter of the Marquis Minghetti, who had been an Italian Premier of note.

Prince von Bülow arrived in Rome toward mid-December, some five or six weeks after the change in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy. He immediately took up his quarters in his charming residence and began to entertain extensively, amid the roses of the villa called by their name and, according to account, he engaged *sub rosa* in other work than mere entertainment. His advent caused considerable anxiety on the part of the Embassies of the Allies. It was recognized that he was Germany's "Big Gun." He was clever, suave, cordial, diligent, resourceful, and had all the self-assurance of the German high official, and with his prestige it was not known what weight his influence might bear in the apparently evenly balanced scale of Italian proclivities. He had already, as had been thought, rendered Italy signal services in her diplomatic field with her neighbors, as was evidenced by his decoration of the Collar of the Annunziata.¹

Prince von Bülow's receptions and dinners were attended by the pro-German element in Roman society and in political life, and by Neutral Diplomats, and Germany was prompt to avail herself of the exasperating measures adopted by the Allies to assert their power at sea and indicate to Italy how completely dependent she was on them. The Allies not only stopped neutral ships on the high seas and took them into their ports, where they were held, often to the

¹ Von Bülow was one of the dozen members of the Order of the Annunziata, the highest Italian order, whose members are considered Cousins of the King, and as such have the privileges of precedence over all but Royalty.

great loss of both the consignors and consignees, but imposed on Italy conditions which were extremely damaging to the shippers, and certainly were not conducive to the bettering of the plight of the Italian people.

In America, as in other neutral countries, there was at times exhibited much exasperation at the action of England and France in this line, and on an occasion it was even declared in the House of Representatives by a member prominent enough to have been the leader of his party that America was in more danger of getting into a war with England than with Germany. Strong protests were, indeed, made to the Allies by the United States on the ground that the practice was not justified by International Law, and eventually the practice was substantially modified. It was by no means unnatural that some exasperation should have been manifested by Italy when it is considered that she was not only dependent for her subsistence on the importation of the cargoes of the ships which England and France were stopping on the high seas and conducting into their ports, but that her people were, for the most part, friendly to the Allied cause. There were, indeed, times when the situation growing out of this action of the Allies was sufficiently serious to cause the representatives of some of the neutrals personally friendly to the Allies grave concern. The effect on the press was instantaneous. From having been most cordial to the Allies in their attitude, the journals became sharp and critical, and began to discuss the merits of the respective sides in a spirit not always too favorable toward the controllers of the seaways.

This policy was, of course, based mainly on the apprehension on the part of the Allies that Italy might export to the Central Empires a portion of the material thus imported by her. But unfortunately it appeared to the Italians that the Allies were actuated in part by a less defensible motive: that of forcing Italy into the war on their side. This Italy would not tolerate. The Italians have a vast deal of sentiment and are as easily influenced through their sentiments as any people in the world, but they cannot be

pushed. Even where it may be manifestly to their material interest, they will not submit to such methods. In the matter under discussion the Government met the situation by a decree assenting to the Allies' demand that thereafter bills of lading negotiable or payable to bearer should no longer be permissible. But even so, the difficulty was not sensibly alleviated.

During the autumn and winter, although Italy was neutral, she proceeded quietly with her work of preparation for eventualities. She sent commissioners and agents abroad to purchase supplies of all kinds necessary for whatever action on her part events might demand. She called out classes, or categories of classes for training and practice, and she endeavored to place herself in a posture, at least, of defense.

Owing to her situation already described, her difficulties in accomplishing this were very great. And these difficulties were increased by the mystery with which her work was veiled. Some secrecy may have been necessary, but undoubtedly the extreme secrecy which it apparently was deemed necessary to adopt aroused suspicion on the part of some and created a want of sympathy with her on the part of others, which resulted in consequences far from fortunate for Italy herself. It proved in the sequel an unfortunate policy that was adopted of preventing the American Press correspondents from visiting the Italian front. As soon as the immediate fighting fronts had been covered by their War correspondents, the leading American journals and periodicals sent among their cleverest men to view and report on the Italian situation. No abler nor more earnest body of men appeared in Italy than those American War correspondents. They comprised the best in America. Some were trained and tried men of international reputation who had been correspondents in all the wars of the last twenty-five years; others were new men chosen because of exceptional ability. Some had visited all the other fronts on both sides, and all had been on all the Allied fronts and had been given there every facility. They came to Italy

friendly and full of expectancy, only to find themselves debarred as neutrals from any opportunity to visit the Italian front, or learn anything of Italy's work save what could be picked up at the rear, and the sources at the rear were not always friendly to Italy. Rome swarmed with those who if not unfriendly were at least indifferent to the Allied cause. Every effort was made to procure for the Americans the opportunity to receive the same consideration that they had received elsewhere, but without avail. The reply was always a reference to some one else—sometimes to Baron Sonnino, usually to General Cadorna—and at the end they were turned back. What is said as to this is intended simply as an historical statement of an unfortunate situation, which in the end had the consequence of leaving the outside world to question what the reasons were for the exclusive Italian policy. The reason given for the exclusion of the neutral correspondents was that not all of the neutral press representatives could be admitted to see the Italian front, and that no distinction could be made between any of the class. No question can be raised as to Italy's right to pursue her own policy. But the flood-tide of American interest in Italy's work passed, and the golden opportunity to set it before America was lost. The consequence was what might have been expected, and, indeed, was foretold. Some held that Italy had nothing to show; some that she was not serious. Others became merely indifferent, and so remained to the end. Yet, during this entire period Italy was girding herself for the most stupendous effort in her history, and her entire people were steeling themselves to face the supreme decision on which was to hinge their salvation or their destruction.

Of this decision on the part of the Italian people, should it come to the issue, there could be no doubt in the minds of those who knew them and their history. The only question was what their statesmen who were responsible for the conduct of Italian policy might, on consideration of all the facts involved in the momentous judgment, conclude that Italy could or should do.

An Italian legion had already been enrolled and gone to France where, among other gallant young Italians, two of the seven Garibaldi brothers, who had responded to the call of Honor, using the sacred name of Liberty, added their young lives as a precious sacrifice to the shining roll of that distinguished race whose sword is ever at the service of those who stand for Freedom. Their bodies were brought home, and were received with honors befitting their noble spirit. And as they were in at the beginning, so their survivors were in at the end—those Garibaldis with other Italians pushing back the enemy in the last fierce drive along the now historic Ladies' Way.

It was a little before Prince von Bülow arrived to try his practised hand with Italy that the Italian Government began to signify to Austria-Hungary Italy's profound interest in the struggle that was shaking the foundations of Europe.

The collapse of Serbia had had a great effect on the situation both in Montenegro and in Albania, where Austrian influence had permeated a large part of the country, while Italy still retained a certain influence in the region of Durazzo, and to some extent in the whole Southern region. Albania, owing to its strategic position and also to its supposed mineral deposits, was a sort of Naboth's vineyard among the contiguous Powers. It was a nest of intrigue both on the part of the rival Albanian chieftains and of the neighboring countries. Italy watched Austria and Greece jealously and they both watched Italy. Serbia and Montenegro also came in for their share of suspicion until they were placed hors de combat by Austria. Albania's strategic relation to Italy was obvious and the latter had maintained its position there through backing Essad Pasha, a force in the revolutionary movement which had driven out King "William of Wied." Conditions there, however, were far from satisfactory. The minority, Malessori-Catholic,¹ ele-

¹ The Malessoris were the Catholic elements in Northern Albania. It is said that King William of Wied asked the old Malessori chief: "Who are these people whom they call Malessori?"

ment had tended toward Italy, but was now in a difficult position, while the Orthodox and Mohammedan elements were divided. But neither was friendly to Italy further than dependence on her to defeat their enemies made friendliness expedient. Liberty is the passion of the Albanians no less than of the Italians.

As early as the latter part of August, Italy, moved, doubtless in part, by apprehension that Albania might fall completely under Austrian influence and, repudiating its neutrality, even side openly with Austria and Turkey, and certainly in part, by her apprehension that Valona might be lost to her forever, began to provide against the latter contingency. On August 28 the Italian Ambassador at Vienna was authorized to report to the Austrian Government that the British and French Governments would not occupy Valona, as there had been some idea they might do. The Italian Ambassador took occasion to reassure Austria as to Italy's attitude of neutrality not being affected by this fact. A few days later Italy disclosed to Germany her "great desire to occupy the Island of Saseno, of course only in perfect harmony with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and only for the purpose of upholding the agreements concerning Albania."

The Italian Ambassador suggested that such a step "would enable Italy to display some activity, and thus divert public opinion from its attitude of hostility to the Triple Alliance. Besides, it would serve a useful purpose to state publicly that the occupation had been decided upon by the Triple Alliance. The Entente Powers would understand, probably to their discomfiture, that the Triple Alliance is still working together."

Germany was requested to broach the matter to Austria-Hungary and was assured that the measure would be a "purely temporary occupation for the duration of the war."¹

This arrangement was carried through and Austria's con-

¹ Austro-Hungarian *Red Book* 2, Docs. 49, 50. *Id.*, Doc. 55, dated September 12, 1914.

sent to the step was secured, when the Italian Press announced semi-officially that Italy had no intention of occupying Valona. The Marquis di San Giuliano said that the suggestion of the proposed occupation of the Island of Saseno was to be ascribed to a misunderstanding. The Italian Ambassador at Berlin, however, said the change of plan was because "it had become apparent that Greece would respect Albania's neutrality, and the intended diversion of Italian public opinion from the relations with Austria had become superfluous, since these relations had become quite satisfactory." The chief reason was doubtless that Austria's consent having indicated her inability to prevent the step, it contained an inconvenient condition. Notwithstanding these denials, public opinion in Italy was kept directed toward Italy's interests in Albania, and both sides in the strife were kept in a state of anxiety as to her eventual action. The Marquis di San Giuliano's last days were occupied with the question of the sending of an Italian expedition to Albania "to be landed from time to time, to be used according to the development of affairs."

On October 22 an understanding was arrived at between Italy and the Entente by which Venizelos was allowed to send a Greek regiment to Argyrokastro, "to avert massacres," under a promise to withdraw his troops at a later date should the Powers so desire, and Italy was assured that "the Greek Government would not object to an Italian occupation of Valona." Four days later the Italian battleship *Dandolo* made port at Valona with "a sanitary expedition on board," and contemporaneously, "special correspondents of leading Italian papers arrived in Valona." A few days later it was reported to Austria that a small detachment of Italian marines had landed on the Island of Saseno, and the Italian flag had been mounted on the highest point of the Island. The local Italian representative at Valona informed the local authorities there that the occupation had taken place, and described it as a measure "for the protection of Albania's neutrality and for the maintenance of the London Agreement." He also added

that no similar measures were contemplated in respect to Valona.¹

Local representatives, however, are not always fully informed, even in Italy. There followed the long correspondence between the two Governments in regard to the application of Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, without its leading to any immediate result. Italy based her position on what the Austrian Ambassador at Rome termed "the old cry of woe that Italy had not been notified in good time of our intention toward Serbia."²

Austria appeared to consider that her engagement "not to annihilate Serbia" should suffice for Italy; but Italy rejected this idea promptly and announced that she "would not permit any encroachment on Serbia's integrity and independence." So much in her own interest.

On December 20 the Government at Durazzo, according to the record, appealed to Italy for protection, and requested the earliest possible intervention. This Government was that of Essad Pasha, who had for some time been supported by Italy. However, it served. On Christmas Day there were disturbances and "rifle-shots" in Valona, and the Italian population sought refuge in the Italian Consulate, and the Consul requested the protection of Italian war-vessels. Also on Christmas Day, Italy, acting on the appeal, promptly landed marines with "landing-guns" at that point, and followed it up immediately with a force of several hundred Carabinieri. The assigned reason was "the preservation of order and the protection of Italian citizens." Every one, however, who knew the situation, knew that Italy would never voluntarily retire from a position so advantageous, if not so essential to her.

Soon afterward Austria-Hungary notified Italy that she would reserve her right to compensation for Italy's occupation of Valona under Article VII. So the year closed.

Amid the crashing of Nations into the fray there was much anxiety as to what Italy's course would be. The

¹ *Id.*, No. 73, dated December 1.

² *Id.*, No. 61.

precise terms of the Triplice Treaty were not known, and, indeed, are not completely known to-day. France knew that Italy was not bound to unite in any action against her should she be attacked or find herself wantonly provoked to defend her vital interests; for a secret treaty to this effect had been negotiated between them in 1902.¹ But she knew the feeling in Italy both as regarded Germany and herself, and Italy's allies were asserting vociferously that France had committed the first acts of war and that the *casus fœderis* provided for in their treaty had actually occurred. Germany, indeed, notified Italy of her expectation that Italy would mobilize her army immediately.

Italy's reply was, as has been seen, to declare that the *casus fœderis* provided for had not arisen and to declare that she would preserve her neutrality. This, though certainly not wholly unexpected, or at least un hoped for, was an immense relief to the Allies—France, England, Russia, and Serbia—as it was not then known that Italy had in 1913 notified Austria-Hungary that should the latter declare war on Serbia, she would not consider herself bound to join her. Even in Italy there were many persons who, ignorant of the true situation and possibly rather inclined toward maintaining the Triple Alliance as against France, considered that the Government had not acted fully up to the pledges which the Treaty was popularly supposed to contain.

Unfortunately, the actions of certain Italian Statesmen and the manner in which Italy's entry in the war was dealt with created the impression that Italy was indifferent as to which side she espoused, and eventually entered the War solely for what she could make out of it. Nothing could be more erroneous than this view, which has borne such unhappy fruit for Italy. Certainly, with the Italian people there was never any question as to on which side lay their sympathies, and even among the Italian Statesmen, to those who were the most responsible for the policy which cre-

¹ Cf. articles signed XXX in *Le Revue de Deux Mondes*, March 1 and March 15, 1920.

ated the impression referred to, must be given the credit for acting in a spirit of entire if, possibly, short-sighted patriotism. They knew better than any one else Italy's unfortunate condition. The naked truth is that when the War broke out, Italy was in a most difficult and perilous position. Her want of every conceivable necessary of war, save men, they knew, and, knowing all this, they feared Austria's power, holding as she did positions that commanded Italy's frontier from the Swiss line to the Cattaro. They knew and appreciated Germany's power and appreciated the motives which might make her Italy's ally in the future as she had been in the past. If the Alliance was simply an *alliance de convenance*, still it had served well enough as to the outside world. And, finally, they knew France—whom they did not now fear. And they had no illusions as to her attitude toward Italy. The Italians have long memories and deep sentiment. And Oudinot's attack on Rome, and Charette's Zouaves are not yet forgotten. "The ruin of the Vascello" is still carefully preserved as a monument above the Porta San Pancrazio; and wreaths are ever hung over the tablets which mark the breach beside the Porta Pia. Nevertheless, Italy enabled France to withdraw all but her customs officers from her frontier, and when she entered the war later on the side of the Allies, it was not because of her treaty with France; but because her People felt that the Allies were on the side of Liberty, and that Italian Freedom was linked with that of England and France not by treaties but in the essential Nature of things.

CHAPTER XII

ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AUTUMN OF 1914

It was considered at the time both by England and France that a great step had been gained in obtaining from Italy a declaration of her intention to remain neutral. Also the manner in which she manifested this neutrality was undoubtedly of great service to France and the Allied Cause, apart from the immense moral support which Italy's decision had at this crucial time. Had Italy, instead of satisfying France that she was sincere in her declaration of neutrality, and even pursuing a policy of neutrality benevolent in character, taken any steps to throw a veil of doubt over her action, France, so far from withdrawing her troops from the Franco-Italian frontier, might have been compelled to maintain a force there sufficient to hold that frontier against any sudden change in Italy's policy, and the issue of the Battle of the Marne might have been essentially different.

There are those in Italy who maintain that Italy violated her neutrality by the excessive benevolence of her attitude toward the Allies, and that, instead of withdrawing so many of her troops ordinarily posted to guard the French frontier, and sending them to strengthen her Austrian frontier, she should have applied the same measure to both frontiers. Italy, however, had no apprehension of any violation of her confines where they marched with France, but was far from feeling secure as to her Austrian frontier. And, moreover, it was along the Austrian confine that she looked for amelioration of conditions which had been irksome and mortifying to her for many years. Nice and Savoy might be regarded by all but dreamers and irreconcilables as irretrievably lost, but the Trentino and Trieste were still measurably Italian in all but title, and in those elements from which Austria had deliberately extirpated

Italianism. The Adriatic was still the spouse of Venice, though no longer hers in possession. Divorces are not recognized in Italy, and on its eastern shore yet existed cities and settlements where the Lion of St. Mark still stood as the Governmental emblem, and which maintained their Italianism (*Italianità*) after generations of foreign subjugation. Italian officers speaking the Venetian dialect, disguised as fishermen or boatmen, were safe among these people even when exploring the islands and inner waterways which Austria utilized to double the effective power and menace of her Navy. The memory of Custozza and Novara, of Solferino and Lissa, still remained indelible among the people—however, for compelling political reasons, the statesmen might ignore and feign to forget them—and remained in their memory also the eternal, unforgettable infamy of Austrian subjugation in Lombardy and the Veneto, which had branded Francis Joseph with the stigma of “Emperor of the Hangmen.” Notwithstanding this, however, and notwithstanding all the assurances given informally to France and England by Italy, the secrecy and astuteness of the Italian statesmen and, perhaps, also in some measure the exaggerated popular idea of their tendency to a certain Macchiavellianism served to keep the French and British statesmen in a condition of some anxiety throughout the early period of the War.

This situation was not without a certain value to Italy, as some of her Statesmen were quick to recognize, and it was utilized promptly—first as a means of facilitating the securing of articles of prime necessity and of equipment, and later of securing acknowledged recognition of Italy’s services to the Allied Cause.

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, Italy set to work in her own way to prepare for eventualities. She could not escape being drawn into the sweep of the vast convulsion, and this her Statesmen well knew, as did every one who knew her people, her situation, and her history.

The terrible history of her subjection to Austrian tyranny has been told in outline in a previous chapter. Her physical

situation with its difficulties and its perils may be seen from a glance at the map. This will disclose how France might attack her from the Swiss confine around to the southern point of Sicily, and how Austria held the commanding position from Switzerland around to Valona. Italy, however, proceeded on her path according to her own methods, with much deliberation, some hesitation and possibly, some want of precision, due to the position in which she was at the time. As stated, she was substantially denuded of everything necessary for any step that might require her taking the field. It was subsequently charged against the Government, when she finally entered the War, that it had failed to realize the necessity of providing duly for the dread decision she was called on to make. The criticism, while apparently borne out by the supervening facts, was, nevertheless, not really justified in view of the conditions existing at the time. While wheat, steel, coal, and all other articles of prime necessity might undoubtedly have been bought more cheaply than ten months later, Italy was not then in a position to acquire them, and had she undertaken to acquire them in the quantity in which she subsequently was called on to do, she would soon have found herself obliged to declare immediately for what purpose she was accumulating such stores. This would have meant a complete change in her policy, even had she been in a condition financially and politically to enable her to make such disclosure. But she was not in this condition. She could no more have done the other than she could have openly mobilized her forces. What she did was to change her War Minister, who was held somewhat responsible for her state of depletion, and set quietly and deliberately to work to provide for future contingencies. She raised an internal loan of some \$200,000,000 from her own people, and arranged shortly afterward for another voluntary subscription loan. Her industrials were induced quietly to enlarge and adapt their plants to possible needs; agents and missions were sent abroad to study, investigate, and report; her financiers were called in to confer, all so quietly as to

create an air of mystery not wholly uncongenial to Italian policy. And gradually her available men were called out—not by classes nor for mobilization, but by categories of different sections, and ostensibly only for training, while other categories of other classes were released—until such confusion existed in the public mind that few among the uninitiated could tell how many men were under arms or where they were. Suffice it to say that when, ten months later, Italy entered the War, she had forces sufficient on her Austrian frontier to make a successful Offensive on a front extending for some 800 kilometres.

Certainly the difficulties of Italy were largely increased by the fact that for the greater part of the period since she became united, she had fallen, industrially and financially, under the direction, if not the control, of Germany.

Many of her railways, her electric power, her industrial establishments, her financial institutions, were largely organized, financed, and influenced, if not controlled, by Germans. Where would it stop? Even before the War it was to some a matter of concern; when the War came, it was found how perilous had become Germany's grasp. Italy had to look elsewhere—had, as it were, to begin almost *de novo* to build up with other forces.

So much was undeniable. But material prosperity does not comprise the whole equation of life. Germany had reached out Briarian arms, and Italy was in some danger of being compressed materially into a German mould—of becoming Germanized.

When, in October, the Marquis di San Giuliano died, working to the last moment of his consciousness with intrepid courage and unwavering resolution, Signor Salandra, on taking personal charge of the Foreign Office, made an address to the Personnel of the Consulta, in which, outlining his plans for Italy's guidance, he uttered a phrase which attracted great attention as embodying his policy. He declared that he proposed that Italy should thenceforth regard only her *Sacro Egoismo*. This phrase, which may be the equivalent only of her "own vital interest," but probably

meant more, was one of those epigrammatic phrases which, struck off to meet a particular occasion and the feeling which it exemplifies, remains to trouble the user afterward when the occasion has passed. It was universally commended at the time, and served to rally behind the Government many who hitherto had manifested little adherence to its programme. The very want of detail in the definition served to attract. But it produced on the outside world an impression of scepticism as to Italy's true position.

Even in Italy it subsequently came in for considerable criticism as having given the world an idea that Italy's aims in the war were wholly selfish; but at the time it was much and generally applauded. It undoubtedly imported something of that sibylline character in which Italian statesmanship has appeared at times to delight, but it was a warning to whom it concerned that Italy proposed to pursue the path blazed by her higher interests, and it was a step in the direction which eventually led her out in the open day, aligned on the side of the Allies.

At this time, be it remembered, the issue between Austria and Germany and France and England had not become so clearly defined as it became soon afterward; nor had Germany's atrocious system of terrorism been then so boldly and wickedly developed. The conflict still partook somewhat of the character of former wars. Alsace-Lorraine and the invasion of Belgium, and the Freedom of the Seas were the watchwords on the one side and on the other. These appeared to appertain rather to the interests of France, England, and Germany than to Italy. Moreover, the fury of the war appeared to be directed by England, France, and Russia on the one side against Germany rather than against Austria, and with Germany Italy had, so far, no quarrel. Indeed, Germany had, no matter what her motives, stood her friend and, in fact, had at times rendered her signal service, both commercial and financial. Italy's traditional hostility was only against Austria. Her rights, as she deemed them, had been ruthlessly trampled on by Austria. It was Austria that had held and squeezed

dry her provinces, driven out her sons into exile, hanged by hundreds those who resisted her. It was Austria who had held Italy herself under her guns, whereas Germany had professed great friendship for her, even sympathy with her aspirations, and had undoubtedly rendered national service in her economic and financial development.

The Italian Chamber at this time was the same Chamber which had been elected shortly before the war, under the leadership of Signor Giolitti, and when Signor Giolitti voluntarily resigned the premiership, he had just received a vote of confidence by a great majority. This majority, it was felt by many, he could still count on. In fact, the Chamber was Giolitti's, and it was considered doubtful whether it would follow another leader without Giolitti's indorsement.

The conditions in Italy at that time, political and economic, were accordingly far from reassuring. She was certainly the poorest of the Great Powers, and she was very dependent economically on Germany. Her grain, cotton, oil, steel, and meat she imported largely from America, North and South, as she did much of her other necessities of life; her coal she got from England or Germany, as she did most of the other articles essential for her existence. She was thus dependent on other countries, and especially was she dependent on Germany, which controlled in many fields both her commerce and finance.

Politically she was equally badly off. The Socialist element had been growing stronger and was in open and bitter opposition to the Government.¹

The "*Non expedit*" of the Vatican had been withdrawn and "the Clericals" had, for the first time in years, taken open part in the Elections, and now composed an important if small block in the Chamber, certainly not with the design of relieving the Government from embarrassment.

In fact, it was charged that some 212 deputies had, in some way, combined and, in consideration of Vatican sup-

¹ It already numbered nearly sixty votes in the Chamber, to which it bore about the same relation that the Irish vote bore to the House of Commons.

port, signed what was known as the Gentiloni Agreement or Memorandum. Many of these deputies denied having entered into such an agreement; but, at least, the "Roman Question" (as the whole question of the relation between the Quirinal and the Vatican is termed) had once more shown signs of having come to life to plague the Italian Government anew. And this "Roman Question" was a burden whose weight no one outside of Italy can estimate.

The "Roman Question" is not merely the Papal claim to the Right of the Pope to the restoration of his Temporal Power, together with the Papal estates and all that appertains thereto, though it includes this in one interpretation of the term. It is the whole question of the relation between the Quirinal and the Vatican. It is interminable, unsuppressible, and all-pervasive. Its very indefiniteness adds to its troublesomeness and its peril. It infects nearly every national question and increases its complexity. Indeed, speaking generally, it may be said that one of the difficulties that Italy has to endure is the inherent fact that no National question is simple; none can be considered on its own individual merits in relation to a recognized present condition, but has to be considered in relation to others past and present, often themselves far from defined, which adds vastly to its intricacy. The Roman Question is ever on the horizon even when not imminent, and during the war it was well within the horizon. For the Vatican was understood to be much out of harmony with the Quirinal in some of the most vital questions that in that period took on new vitality and poignancy. It had its own relation to the other powers quite distinct, and certainly, at times, quite out of harmony with those of the Quirinal. This relation included diplomatic relations, sentimental relations, and business relations. It had, likewise, its own Press and its own propaganda. These facts will indicate one of the difficulties that confronted Italy at the outbreak of war.

Signor Giolitti, who for fifteen years had been the most

powerful political leader in Italy, arrived in Rome to attend the reopening of the Parliament, which took place on the 3d of December (1914), when it was supposed by some that the Salandra Ministry would indicate to the country that its vital interest demanded its siding openly with the Allies. Up to this time the former premier had given no public indication of his attitude toward Italy's future policy; nor, indeed, had the Government given any clear sign of its future policy, save as embodied in Salandra's sibylline announcement that Italy would regard her "*Sacro Egoismo*." The Statement of the Government, made by the premier on the 3d of December, contained a declaration of Italy's right to remain neutral, but went on to assert that in the origin of the war and in its manifest finality there existed a conflict of interests between Italy and the Central Empires, and that neutrality did not suffice to guaranty them against the consequences of the vast conflict. He added that, in the seas and lands of the ancient continent, whose political configuration was being transformed, Italy had vital interests to safeguard and just aspirations to affirm and sustain. The reference to the Trentino and Trieste brought forth a tremendous burst of enthusiasm, showing the drift of public sentiment. It soon became known, however, that the personal friends of Giolitti were earnestly engaged in minimizing the supposed meaning of the Government declaration, and on the 6th of December Giolitti read in the chamber a correspondence which had taken place in August, 1913, between his former Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis di San Giuliano, and himself relative to Italy's position as to neutrality when Austria sought her co-operation in her contemplated attack on Serbia. It showed that Austria at that time had designs against Serbia, and attempted to secure Italy's co-operation, but was informed plainly that Italy would in such case consider herself not bound by the Treaty of the Triple Alliance to unite with her ally. The disclosure by the former premier of his correspondence with the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the latter's reply to Austria regarding Italy's

construction of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, continued to cause much apprehension, and what had at first been accepted as a patriotic disclosure to establish the righteousness of Italy's position was considered by many as a step in an intrigue to weaken the existing cabinet and secure the reins of power in the interest of the Central Empires. The Chamber, however, on a vote of confidence in the Government, registered 413 for and only 49 against the Government. The Chamber rose for recess on the 11th of December.

Immediately after the arrival in Rome of the new German Ambassador, Prince von Bülow, Signor Giolitti had an interview with him, which caused much criticism, and which his explanation, that he had accidentally encountered the Ambassador on the street and had called on him the next day simply to pay his respects, did not serve to disarm. It was alleged by his adversaries that his visit to the German Ambassador took place on the 18th of December, the day after the latter arrived in Rome and the day before he had his first conversation with the official representatives of the Government, Premier Salandra and Baron Sonnino, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It would appear that the Ex-Premier undoubtedly had the intention of taking from his successor and the latter's Minister for Foreign Affairs, if not the credit for the policy of neutrality for Italy, at least that of being the leader of the party of neutrality. He appears to have been successful, and from this time Signor Giolitti became the protagonist of the policy of neutrality, if not absolute, certainly until Italy should be attacked or in imminent danger of being so. It cannot be said that his work—which in the sequel proved unavailing, secured for him great appreciation from Austria, for not a word of appreciation appears in the Despatches between the Austrian Foreign Office and its representatives in Rome; while, on the other hand, his reported part in the negotiations which were carried on with the intent to prevent Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies obtained for him such bitter hostility from

those who espoused her entry into the war that his house had to be guarded as carefully as the Austrian Embassy, and he who had once been the People's idol was, it might almost be said, driven from the city.¹

Also he had an immense prestige for astuteness, and when his pronunciamento appeared regarding the wisdom of Italy's remaining at peace, and accepting the "Parecchio" ² that could be obtained for her at Austria's hands without war, it was taken as an open challenge to the Government as the responsible representative of the Italian people. It was, indeed, charged with such grave consequences to the country that the Government was aroused to the imminence of the peril, and it forthwith set itself to meet the challenge before the People. The Press was promptly unmuzzled, and the press campaign that ensued was superlatively bitter, as Italians love to have them.³

Fortunately for his opponents, Germany's and Austria's attitude had sunk deep into the hearts of the People, and they were easily played on by those who advocated throwing off the yoke and boldly proclaiming Italy's independence of all foreign trammels. The War party was as passionate as the other party was cool and deliberate, and the former worked with the tide. The Interventionists, as they were

¹ It was generally rumored throughout Rome that his friends spirited Signor Giolitti away three days before the Parliament was to be reassembled, in order to prevent the execution of a plot against his life. This plot was aluded to later in the Chamber. Whatever may have been the basis for the story of the plot against the life of the former premier, it is certain that his activities in connection with the effort of the Central Empires to prevent the war party in Italy from attaining their aim of drawing her into the war had a great effect for a considerable period, and at times gave promise of being successful. It was believed that not only from Rome but from his country place at Cavour, in Lombardy, he was the inspiring spirit of the anti-Interventionists, and it served to have only a letter from him to one of his followers on the question of the Government's policy to throw the country into a ferment.

² Parecchio: the "equivalent."

³ Among the most violent of the attacks on the former premier was the *Giornale d'Italia*, a journal which had been founded in part by Sonnino and—it was said—Salandra, and in which the former still retained an interest. It was conducted by a devoted follower of his, and thus came to be considered as a sort of semi-official organ of the Government.

termed, had all along been vociferous in their denunciation of the neutral position which the Government had assumed, and they were kept in a state of activity by men as earnest as the Advocate Barzelai, the eloquent irredentist Deputy of a Roman constituency, and Signor Bissolati, leader of the interventist socialists, and one of the most devoted and lofty-minded Italians of the time.

With these men were others of equal earnestness, if not in such signal position, such as the Deputies Albertini (head of the great Italian newspaper, the *Corriere della Sera*, of Milan), Eugenio Chiesa, etc., and the tide began to set so strongly toward war that the Government was fain to take measures to prevent Italy's being swept into the war in a condition of substantial unpreparedness.

A Government crisis began in November, due in part to the apprehension that Italy was not preparing herself properly for eventualities, but it resolved itself into a simple Cabinet reorganization, and several new members considered stronger men, less liable to Giolittian influences, were taken in. Among these, Signor Carcano, who took over the Treasury, was an old Garibaldian, while the War Ministry was intrusted to General Vittorio Italo Zupelli, whose father, a native Istrian, with just prevision, had named him Italy Victor, sixty years before. The appointment of these gentlemen was an indication of the drift of Italian sentiment which could not be mistaken. The efforts of the representatives of Germany and Austria, encouraged by Giolitti and the anti-interventionists, who were supposedly encouraged by the neutralists of the Vatican, were now redoubled.

The new terms which Austria was, in face of the imminently threatened break, prepared to offer were given out through suggestions in the press, and Herr Erzberger, the German Catholic representative, came to Rome and into evidence somewhat inopportunistly, as his presence and supposed mission added fuel to the already lighted fires of popular indignation against the ultradiplomatic intrigues of Germany and Austria. However divided Italian public

opinion may be, and however violent factionalism may in its manifestations appear, no surer way to bring union can be imagined than an attempt on the part of outsiders to interfere between them. It is inevitably fatal to the side espoused.

CHAPTER XIII

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN INTRIGUES TO KEEP ITALY NEUTRAL

IN anticipation of the arrival in Rome of Prince von Bülow, the new German Ambassador, and of the probable purpose of his selection being to draw Italy into a position of obligation to Germany, the Italian Government on December 9 (1914) made a protest to the Austro-Hungarian Government against the invasion of Serbia by the Imperial forces without coming to an understanding with Italy before doing so, and declared that such a step, even without the intention to annex permanently Serbian territory, tended to disturb seriously the equilibrium in the Balkans provided for in Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. It recalled to Austria-Hungary that that power had assumed precisely this position against Italy a few years before, during the latter's war with Turkey. And it demanded of Austria-Hungary an immediate exchange of ideas and a concrete arrangement with Italy on a matter which touched so closely Italy's most vital political and economic interests.¹

On the same day the Italian Government notified its Ambassador at Berlin of the step taken, and instructed him to inform the German Government thereof, and to explain to it the close connection between Italy's foreign and domestic policy, and make it plain that the current of public opinion manifested by those in favor of neutrality did not signify any renunciation of Italian interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic, or of Italy's aspirations, but simply that they considered that these would be rather promoted by her neutrality. And that, should the contrary appear, the reaction in Italian public opinion and the consequences thereof would become very grave, and this the Government was obliged

¹ *Italian Green Book* (May 20, 1915), Docs. No. 1 and 2.

to take into cognizance, and prevent if possible. This step, it was understood in Italy, was to place Italy in an entirely independent attitude in her dealings with Austria, and obviate any contemplated action on Germany's part as an intermediary.

To this notification, the Austro-Hungarian Government responded in a long argument, declaring that its occupation of any part of Serbia was simply momentary and in pursuance of military exigency, and it declined any exchange of views as to the matter as unnecessary.

Germany, however, acted promptly and, as might have been foreseen, effectively to prevent Italy's having any opportunity to break with Austria, and on December 15 the Italian Government received information from its Ambassador in Vienna that Germany had "succeeded in convincing" Count Berchtold of the importance of entering into an exchange of views with Italy touching the "compensations" provided for in Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty should Austria-Hungary occupy any part of the Balkans either permanently or as a merely military occupation.

On December 19 Prince von Bülow informed the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his first interview with him after his arrival in Rome, that he was *au courant* with the representations made by Italy at Vienna, and that he had stated at Berlin that Italy was in the right and had every reason to desire discussion of the matter. Sonnino thereupon declared that the majority of the Nation was in favor of the preservation of neutrality, but only on the presupposition that by means of Neutrality it should be possible to obtain the fulfilment of certain National aspirations. And that the Savoy Monarchy derived its greatest strength from its representation of the National Sentiment.¹

This was followed by considerable correspondence between the Governments of Italy and Austria-Hungary, with an occasional exchange of ideas and consequent steps on the part of Italy and Germany, in which Italy's interests and aspirations beyond the Adriatic were presented

¹ Italian Green Book, Doc. No. 8, December 20, 1914.

veiled in more or less nebulous diplomatic language. Through it all, however, Baron Sonnino, speaking for Italy, held firmly to the idea of Italian revindication of what Italy deemed Italian. Austria-Hungary, pressed by the Serbian forces, withdrew from the regions occupied by her in Serbia; but Sonnino insisted that this did not settle the question he had raised. He did not, he stated, wish to be placed in the position of appearing to seek a quarrel with Austria, but the ground of future friction and enmity—and more, still remained and should be eliminated.

Meantime, the Italian People began to show unmistakable signs of leaning toward the Allies. The Austrian Ambassador, fresh returned from his Christmas holiday, complained to Sonnino on January 6 (1915) that the Italian spirit appeared to him more bellicose than when he had left Rome before Christmas. Sonnino apparently did not consider it so. He said the Chamber was readier to follow the Government's lead in its programme of neutrality; but he pointed out that this very attitude favoring neutrality was based on the belief that such neutrality was the best mode of attaining certain national aspirations, and, while admitting that Austria's retirement from Serbia made it appear less opportune at the moment to discuss Italy's rights under Article VII, the questions which caused friction and peril still inhered in the situation and should be solved. He then broached the ever-burning question of territorial recession to Italy of those regions occupied by Italians, giving therefor certain obvious reasons. The Austrian Ambassador was far from ready to accept such an idea, but suggested instead that Albania (that is, annexation of Albania) might satisfy Italy! This Baron Sonnino promptly disposed of, saying that Italy's interest in Albania was a negative one and was confined to seeing that no other power annexed it. He returned to the Italian demand for the redemption of the Italian elements which still remained outside of Italy's confines and which had, as experience showed, been in grave danger of being suffocated by Slavic or German pressure. This conversation resulted in an under-

standing that these matters should be further discussed in both Rome and Vienna.¹

Meantime, Von Bülow was diligently at work with the apparent design of satisfying Italy that Germany was securing from Austria all that Austria would in any case concede, however much less it might be than Italy might demand. Italy's demand of the irredentist formula of "The Trentino and Trieste" he declared unrealizable. This attitude was also approved at Berlin.²

In the discussion which went on, each side endeavored to induce the other to formulate what would be demanded or conceded; but both were too wily to be caught in such a manœuvre, which would have placed in the other's hands a potent weapon. As the discussion proceeded, however, Italy's aspirations were gradually disclosed in plainer and more enlarged terms. Baron Sonnino informed Prince von Bülow on the 1st of February that he would not define Italy's demands so long as Austria stood out against the principle of cession of territory held in the Empire, whether they concerned the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, or anything else, and he gave an intimation that the difficulties and exigencies were not diminishing.³ This was a plain intimation of Italy's claims now extending beyond the irredentist formula of, "The Trentino and Trieste." Austria-Hungary now began to argue that Italy herself had gone beyond the provisions of Article VII in holding on to the Dodecanese and in occupying Valona. But that argument of *Tu Quoque* had little effect on the Italian statesmen, and the chief result was that the discussion turned off to old issues which rather increased than diminished the antagonism between the two Governments.

About the middle of February there was a certain stiffening of public opinion in Italy. After considerable more or less apparently futile discussion as to Article VII, Baron Sonnino, on February 17, instructed the Italian Ambassador at Vienna to inform the Austrian Government clearly

¹ *Green Book*, May 20, 1915, Doc. No. 2, pp. 12, 13, 14.

² *Ib.*, pp. 16, 18.

³ *Ib.*, p. 21.

that its failure to interpret this Article otherwise than as requiring the antecedent accord with Italy as to compensation could not be regarded by Italy as other than a violation of such Article and evidence of Austria's determination to resume her freedom of action and, in such case, Italy would hold herself fully justified in resuming her own freedom of action with a view to safeguarding her interests. Fate was now moving with sure steps.

The day before, the Italian Minister had set forth plainly to Prince von Bülow Italy's position in this matter. Laying aside the trammels of official reserve, he in reply to a question whether Italy would not be satisfied by concessions in Albania or elsewhere, informed the German Ambassador that it was not a question of greater or less concessions that might appease Italian national aspirations and suffice to assure Italy's neutrality. He declared that it was not a question of a lot of conquests or of megalomaniacal ambitions, but of the most sensitive idealism (*tasto*) of the popular spirit (*anima*)—of the national sentiment. The Monarchy of Savoy, he explained to him, found its chief root in the personification of this national idealism, and so strong was this root that it had enabled it to rule and win out in face of the Papacy, and in the long contest with it and with Socialism in its most revolutionary period. It was not a question of this ministry or of that. The flood of public opinion would overwhelm and sweep away all obstacles whatsoever. Nor could it be stayed by fine arguments, or obscure presages of danger, however great.¹

After further discussions, in which Austria declined to concede Italy's interpretation of Article VII, to the effect that the movement on Austria's part against Serbia required an antecedent accord with Italy, the Italian Minister sent, on March 4, a final reassertion of Italy's position to the following effect: First, that no military action by Austria in the Balkans could be taken without a complete antecedent accord with Italy, who stood rigorously by the text of Article VII. Second, that every infraction of the fore-

¹ *Id.*, pp. 29, 30.

going would be considered by Italy as an open violation of the Treaty, which would cause Italy to resume her full freedom of action to guaranty her own rights and interests. Third, that no proposal or discussion of compensation availed to lead to an accord which did not contemplate cession of territory already possessed by Austria. Fourth, that, based on Article VII, Italy exacted compensation for the initiation of the military movement in the Balkans by Austria-Hungary, independently of the results which such movement might attain, without waiving her right to demand further compensatory concessions conditioned on further advantages which Austria-Hungary might obtain. Fifth, that with regard to the compensation for the initiation of the military movement, so far from its being kept secret, as Austria had desired, it must be effectively carried out by the immediate transference of the territory ceded to Italy, who would occupy it at once. Sixth, that, for reasons already given, Italy would not admit any claim by Austria-Hungary for compensation for Italy's occupation of the Dodecanese or of Valona.

This bold notification appears to have awakened both Germany and Austria-Hungary to the gravity of the situation, and the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Burian, on March 7, voluntarily informed the Italian Ambassador that he would very shortly give an answer to the Italian view of the principle of Article VII. Prince von Bülow, on his part, notified Baron Sonnino that his Government considered that it could assure Italy of Austria-Hungary's final change of attitude on the principle of Article VII. This was followed a day or two later by a communication from Berlin that the Austrian Government had requested Germany to notify Italy that it was ready to enter into negotiations with Italy conformable to Baron Sonnino's proposal, and on the basis of the cession to Italy of territory possessed by Austria. The proposal was also made that the Government's declaration to the Italian Parliament should be prepared in concert with Austria. On this, Baron Sonnino observed that he had never proposed to inform

the Parliament of the opening of negotiations regarding the matter, but had referred to the necessity not to keep secret the accord as soon as it should be concluded.

This having been presented clearly to the Austro-Hungarian Government, the latter hastened in face of the manifest gravity of the situation to accept the principle of Italy's contention for a previous arrangement for compensation out of the Italian territory held by Austria. Sonnino, however, was too astute to permit Italy to be hung up in the air indefinitely by such a step. He therefore laid down three conditions: first, secrecy during the negotiations; second, the immediate putting into effect of the terms arrived at; third, the application of the principle to the entire duration of the war. And he fixed a limit of two weeks for any negotiations touching this matter.¹

The condition as to cession of territory held by her was not, in Austria's view, possible, and Prince von Bülow used all his diplomacy to obtain from the Italian Minister a modification of it. But Sonnino stood firm. Perhaps, he knew what the result would be, as he certainly knew what the effect on the Italian people would be should Austria reject his conditions. On this, Austria haggled for a time; but eventually, on April 1, she offered The Trentino, but demanded therefor a free hand in the Balkans, including complete control in Albania, and Italy's repayment of all the government's outlay in the region ceded and her assumption of the proportionate part of the public debt. She also demanded guaranties of Italy's benevolent neutrality. This, Sonnino likewise rejected, referring to Austria's offer as "a strip of territory," and Burian renewed his request that he formulate his demands. When later on in April (8), after further negotiations in which Austria-Hungary appeared at first to spar for time, the Italian Minister finally consented to formulate Italy's demands, they were so far-reaching and comprehensive that the Austro-Hungarian Government declined firmly to accede to those on which Italy counted most, and Italy cast in her lot with the Allies,

¹ *Id.*, p. 41. Telegram of March 10, 1915.

and made her decision of renouncing formally her treaty of defensive alliance on which she had founded her whole foreign policy for thirty odd years. The step contained in it the dread decision of war.

During these negotiations, along in February (1915), the conditions in Italy appeared to have reached a somewhat new phase; public opinion appeared to indicate that the military situation had improved greatly within the last two months and that matters were approaching a crisis. A marked rise in the price of all foodstuffs had at one time caused serious anxiety, and a certain commotion had ensued, more especially in the southern part of Italy and in the region bordering on the Adriatic. The Government, however, was manifestly using its best efforts to ameliorate the situation. It had done away with imposts on grain and had taken possession of vessels available to transport grain to Sicily and Sardinia and to Adriatic ports from which fear of floating mines and of other war perils had driven the customary privately-owned vessels on which that shore largely depended. The store of grain reached, by report, as high as 8,000,000 bushels. It was evident that something of moment impended. All sorts of rumors circulated in regard to negotiations between Italy and Austria and Italy and Germany. In face of what impended, Italy, as generally happened in face of a great crisis, grew calm.

It was well understood that if Italy were to maintain her position and, possibly, even her form of Government, she must find her condition improved at the close of the war. The division in public sentiment was whether this should be done by diplomacy or by arms. The improvement in her situation depended on two conditions: the realignment of the boundaries between her and Austria so that The Trentino should be taken within those boundaries and become once more geographically an integral part of Italy; and the extension of those boundaries along the Alpine summits and the rivers so as to leave her with a defensible confine. Secondly, the extension of her authority so as to create for her defensible frontiers to the eastward. This meant that she

felt that, so long as Austria commanded all of the strategic positions and the extended inner waterways and harbors on the eastern side of the Adriatic, so long, Italy would remain under the menace of her guns.

Some informal steps were taken about this time by representatives of neutral powers to sound the representatives of other neutral powers as to the possibility of acting in a certain concert and addressing identic notes to the belligerents; but it was learned that Italy did not feel inclined to take part in any collective action, but felt rather that even should any move be made along parallel lines at any time, it would be better for her to move individually.

The great movement made by the Allies with a view to forcing the Dardanelles and capturing Constantinople had a certain effect on the public opinion of the people in Italy; but the statesmen who were better informed inclined to feel that the enterprise as actually conducted in the first instance by the sea power alone could hardly succeed unless the forces were greatly augmented. Should the requisite forces be sent, it was considered that it would tend at least to "ripen matters," especially in the direction of the Balkans.

It is impossible not to recognize in the dealing of the Italian Foreign Office with Austria during this period a determination to push Austria-Hungary to the wall, and if Italy should, or could, escape entry into the war, to demand therefor complete compensation through the liberation of Italian territory—as complete as Austria could make. It is impossible not to recognize further that the chief motive for this policy was the desire to meet the demands of the Italian people themselves, by the redemption of the irredentist regions and their inclusion within Italy's confines; and, secondly, by laying down those confines so as to be defensible. There was no pretense of sentiment about Baron Sonnino in his dealing with Austria. His reasons were always the inexorable necessities of the situation. He desired secrecy as to the fact of the negotiations because, pending their conclusion, the Italian people would become excited. He desired compensation because Austria-Hun-

gary, to bind Italy, had bound herself to certain things which she had violated. He desired immediate execution of any agreement arrived at, because he doubted the good faith of Austria-Hungary. He enlarged his demands from time to time because he was in no hurry to have them accepted and thus bind Italy to inaction. So he brought on himself in the sequel the charge of having traded with Austria-Hungary and with the Allies. If the charge be that he simply traded, the charge is not true. The passion of Italy, burnt in till it has become a part of the fibre of her national life, is the Redemption of those elements of the Italian race who, through the years, though subject to the effacing rule of the stranger, have retained their Italian character and yearning to be reunited to the great body of the race. Next to this, the ruling principle of the Italian Foreign policy was the strengthening of Italy by obtaining for her defensible boundaries in place of those which had been fixed by Austria for the very purpose of holding her under the menace of her guns by land and by sea. This Sonnino had ever in mind; this aspiration he strove to realize, and he subordinated to it all else. If this was an egotistic policy, it was, at least, no more so than was the policy of Italy's neighbors. In entering into the Triple Alliance the egotistic aims of all the signatories were frankly recognized, and its very basis was the *do ut des*. Provision was made by Article VII, as we have seen, for reciprocal compensation should either signatory extend its power at all in the Balkans.¹

¹ There is an interesting document in the Austrian *Red Book* No. 2, Doc. No. 8, January 14, 1915, being an instruction from Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Rome, giving a summary of two reports from Prince von Bülow at Rome to his Government. In the summary the German Ambassador says both Giolitti and Baron Sonnino "reaffirm their friendly attitude toward the Triple Alliance, and regret that Italy was not in a position to enter the war on the side of her allies." They are reported by him as having dwelt on the failure of Austria-Hungary to communicate with her ally before she addressed her note to Serbia; the bad impression in Italy at the aggressive terms of the note; the view that Austria-Hungary could not conduct a war and was doomed to destruction; and the belief that the Italian dynasty could not maintain the throne if Italy should fail to obtain territorial advantages from the general conflagration.

During the progress of these negotiations, which were naturally not wholly unknown to the Allies, the latter were striving unremittingly to prevent any settlement of the questions involved which would keep Italy from siding actively with them. They accordingly followed with acute interest the efforts of the German and Austrian Ambassadors: Prince von Bülow and Baron Macchio, to bring about a satisfactory solution of the questions between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and endeavored sedulously to prevent the two governments from coming to an agreement. The wide and irreconcilable divergence of fundamental interests of the two nations presented to the Allies a fertile field for the exercise of their active diplomacy. They recognized the passion of Italy as they recognized the supreme importance in Italy's view of Italy's emancipating herself from the perpetual menace of Austrian invasion by securing frontiers that would be reasonably defensible along the whole Austrian line. To these two motives they addressed their diplomacy, with fruitful results. As the possibilities of a successful issue of the German-Austrian and Italian negotiations fluctuated, the Allies grew more anxious and more pressing, and active negotiations began between their representatives and the Italian Government to bring Italy into the war on their side. The record of these negotiations has not yet been published, but the secret Treaty, which was signed at London on April 26, 1915, as their practical result, was published by the Revolutionary Government of Russia in 1917, and was translated and republished first in an English periodical,¹ and is now accessible to all in this unofficial form.

The conversations which led up to the treaty extended over some little time, as Russia had to be consulted and brought into the plan, as the generally accepted guardian of the Slavs of the South. The result, however, was the Treaty of London. On the same day, April 26, Italy adhered to the London Pact of September 5, 1914, and bound herself to make peace only when her Allies should do so.

¹ *New Europe*.

Nor were England and France entirely complaisant, for it was recognized that Italy's demands were by no means as moderate as they had hoped, and, if acceded to in full, would have a tendency to place it in Italy's power to make of the Adriatic substantially a closed sea and almost an Italian lake. The military situation, however, became so serious, and the belief became so strong that Italy was renewing her negotiations with Austria for the "Parecchio" of Giolitti, that England and France acquiesced in Sonnino's demands, and after certain delays the Treaty of London was signed on April 26, 1915. The secrecy with which its terms and, as far as possible its existence, were guarded, showed Sonnino's careful handling. The rumor became current that France and England had engaged to give more than Austria, and, unhappily for Italy, became prevalent; also the rumor that she was trading at the same time with both sides, and was playing the one against the other to extort the greatest price possible. Even the supposititious terms were stated; but the true facts were not known until the publication by the Bolsheviks of the Russian copy.

It is understood that Baron Sonnino's explanation of what has been charged as an example of Italy's wish to drive a hard bargain is, that there was no intention of bargaining at all; but the proposal of the terms laid down, so far as they related to the Trentino, Trieste, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic, was based on the necessity to remove from the field of uncertainty and of future contention questions in which Italy was vitally interested, and which if left open might create antagonism and clashes between Italy and the other Allies which might prevent the peace, for which so much sacrifice was being incurred, from being established on a permanent basis. These questions concerned Italy's most vital interests, as they related to the redemption of her irredentist elements, and to her securing frontiers reasonably defensible against her age-long foe and oppressor. As to the rest of the terms, the *Ægean* Islands were, he contended, taken from Turkey and were held by Italy under the treaty of Lausanne, and Turkey had failed to meet the conditions

on which they would have been restored to her. The provisions regarding Italy's share in Asia Minor and Africa were based on Italy's right to be placed on a parity with the other great powers among the Allies, and to have recognized her equal right with them to the development of her economic interests. Fiume was conceded to the Croatians because Russia's consent to the treaty had to be secured and Sazonoff demanded it—ostensibly as an outlet for the Slavs of the South.

Such, it is understood, are the reasons assigned by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the terms demanded of the Allies. That he was somewhat exacting can hardly be gainsaid, but what he demanded was mainly enemy territory, much of which had been wrenched from Italy, and that he had sound reason for his apprehensions and for the position he assumed, touching the frontier in the Alps and the Eastern Adriatic, subsequent events have fully established. The charge which has done Italy so much harm—that she bargained with the two sides to see which of them would give her most for the espousal of their cause—however it may appear to be sustained to those who know only the surface, is not justified in the view of those who knew the Italian people at that time. These know that they could not have been led to espouse any cause but that of the Allies, at least so long as the Allies held out any recognition of Italy's claim to the redemption of her unredeemed co-nationals. The whole body of the correspondence between the Italian Government and Italy's former allies under the treaty of the Triple Alliance discloses the inflexible resolution of Italy to wrest from Austria-Hungary the irredentist regions, which Italy, at heart, has never ceased to claim as her own, and which, indeed, had never ceased to claim Italy as their mother save in so far as Austria, by transposition and other means, smothered their voice. This and the second, but equally stringent demand of Italy, that Austria should not, without previous arrangement with her, extend her power in the near Balkans in any manner that would change the Status quo in

the near East, were steadfastly maintained by Baron Sonnino from the very first step in his correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian Government.

The steady enlargement of Italy's idea of what the Treaty of the Triple Alliance referred to as "Compensation," as that idea became defined, the Austria-Hungary representatives termed "Blackmail"; but nothing is disclosed in the Italian correspondence to give reason to believe that Italy would have accepted any "compensation" which Austria offered, or would have offered. Indeed, Baron Sonnino's correspondence is an interesting specimen of the old diplomacy in which the opponent is steadily driven from one position to another without securing anything tangible. Austria was gradually forced to yield, little by little, concessions which she had stoutly maintained she would never yield, and when she had yielded, she was never any nearer attaining her aim than when Italy first laid her complaint before her. A reading of the Italian Foreign Minister's correspondence discloses the fact that he gradually unfolded to Austria's startled vision a programme for Italy which meant the complete surrender of every position relating to Italy's claims which Austria had ever assumed toward her much-imposed-on ally. It will disclose further that he made it plain that it was "not a question of this minister or that, or of this or that ministry," whether the conditions defined were demanded, but that those conditions were demanded by the Italian people, and no ministry could stand which did not meet their aspirations.

Finally, when he, on April 8, consented to formulate Italy's demands, they were such—and were probably intended to be such—as to place it out of Austria's power to accept them, and Italy's hands were free to deal as her vital interests demanded.¹

¹ The conditions formulated consisted of eleven Articles:

I. The cession to Italy by Austria-Hungary of the Trentino with the frontiers of the Italian kingdom of 1811, as defined by the Treaty of Paris of February 28, 1810.

II. The correction of Italy's eastern frontier to take in the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia, with the extension of the eastern frontier as therein described along the Isonzo and the Alpine Ridges.

III. The constitution of an autonomous and independent State of Trieste

To the demands of the Italian Government, an immediate answer to which was somewhat peremptorily requested, the Austro-Hungarian Government replied on the 16th of April (1915) that Articles II, III, and IV were unacceptable for reasons given, as were also Articles V, VI, and VII. Article VIII alone was accepted, while Article XI was rejected with a long argument against its inequity.

On the rejection of the Italian demands by Austria-Hungary, Baron Sonnino on April 21 notified the Austro-Hungarian Government that its reply did not form an adequate basis for an agreement which should create between the two states that enduring and normal situation which was mutually desired, and announced that the difficulties seemed to be insurmountable. To this the Austro-Hungarian Government, through Baron Burian on the 29th of April, in view of the intimation that Italy might find it necessary to go to war with Germany and Austria to realize her aspirations, replied to the Italian Ambassador

and its territory as therein described, with renunciation of all sovereignty over it by Austria-Hungary.

IV. The cession to Italy by Austria-Hungary of the Curzola Archipelago, as therein described, including Lissa.

V. The immediate occupation by Italy of the territories ceded in Articles I, II, and IV, and the evacuation of the Trieste territory by Austro-Hungarian forces, and the discharge from Austrian service of all soldiers and sailors derived therefrom.

VI. The recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italy's full sovereignty over Valona and its Bay, comprising Saseno together with such hinterland as might be requisite for their defense.

VII. Austria-Hungary's immediate and complete cessation from interest in itself in Albania as comprised within the frontiers traced by the Conference of London.

VIII. The granting immediately by Austria-Hungary of complete amnesty, followed by immediate release of all those prosecuted and convicted on military or political grounds, who were natives of the ceded territories mentioned in Articles I, II, and IV, and of the evacuated territories in Article III.

IX. In complete satisfaction of all pecuniary claims of Austria-Hungary against said territory ceded or evacuated, including any proportional quota of the public debt, Italy to pay the former 200,000,000 Lit Ital, in gold.

X. The maintenance of perfect neutrality by Italy toward Austria-Hungary and Germany throughout the war.

XI. The renunciation by Italy of all power thereafter during the existing war to invoke in her own favor the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary to make the same renunciation as to all that regarded Italy's effective occupation of the Islands of the Dodecanese.

with counter-proposals, including one that pointed to Austria's conceding to Italy Valona, provided the rest of Albania were left to Austria. This having been communicated to Baron Sonnino, he, on the 3d of May, sent to Austria Italy's renunciation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and her resumption of her complete liberty of action, together with her reasons for such action.

Subsequent to this startling declaration the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted new concessions—it was alleged, at Germany's urgent insistence—but these were deemed insufficient, as by no means meeting Italy's minimum demands, and Austria was informed that Italy was taking other means for the protection of her interests. Meantime, both Governments, while wearing the mask of unbroken relations, were straining every effort to be ready for the manifestly approaching struggle which each knew would be to the death. The steps which Italy had taken for the protection of her interests, to which Baron Sonnino referred in his Despatch of May 23 (1915) to the Italian representatives abroad, were those alluded to by anticipation in the Pact of London of April 26—the necessary completion of her preparations for war.


On the 23d of May, after a brief, but stormy period covering several weeks, in which riots had occurred in various cities in North Italy, and "demonstrations" were of habitual occurrence in many cities, and in which a Ministerial crisis had taken place, Italy announced her final decision by declaring first that a state of War with Austria-Hungary existed in the zone contiguous to the Austro-Hungarian frontier, and immediately afterward by declaring on the 23d of May (1915) that a state of War would exist between the two countries from the following day.

Within an hour or two after receiving the announcement Austria-Hungary also threw off the mask and accepted the challenge. The Emperor issued an address to his People and armies, denouncing his "treacherous enemy," Italy.

The decision of Italy was by no means only that of her statesmen charged with her Foreign policy. It was alleged by those who favored her continued adherence to the long



EUROPE AT THE TIME OF ITALY'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR.



moribund and now extinct Triple Alliance that the Italian people were opposed to entering the war, and were dragged into it against their will, under the compulsion of Great Britain and France. But this charge was not as true as if it had been reversed and it had been charged that the People themselves had dragged the Government into the war. Ever since the outbreak of the war there had been an element, both in the Government and among the People, strongly adherent to the maintenance of neutrality, as there had been an element which favored Italy's entrance into the war. But as the time passed and events crowded each other, the former element weakened and the latter grew perceptibly stronger, and for many weeks the war spirit had steadily augmented, especially among the people. That it had not flamed out with greater strength before was due to several causes. One was the long-established conviction that Austria-Hungary was stronger than Italy, coupled with an apprehension of Germany's added power and apparently invincible military organization. Another was the knowledge that Italy was unprepared for war, which had been sedulously diffused by the anti-war party. Yet a third was the broadcast teaching of this party that, however hostile Austria-Hungary might be, Germany was essentially friendly to Italy, and would insure Italy's securing from Austria-Hungary through diplomacy, all of that to which she had so long aspired and as much as she could possibly gain by War.

To these reasons was added the traditional habit of Italy to trust to her leaders until some unexpected disclosure of their inability to bring about a successful issue. All of these views were promoted by a tremendous propaganda, and to their support was brought the entire Opposition to the Government, an Opposition composed of various elements, socialistic and clerical, and another element headed by one of the ablest public men in Europe: Signor Giolitti, who had been almost Italy's political Dictator for fifteen years.¹

¹ Against these labored sedulously and effectively the British and French Ambassadors, Sir Rennell Rodd and M. Camille Barrère, both accomplished Diplomats.

CHAPTER XIV

CONDITIONS WHEN ITALY ENTERED THE WAR

THE rumors of an entente arrived at between Italy and the Allies fell on soil already well prepared to receive them and bore rich fruit in sundry directions. It emancipated the People from the fear that the Government might be overreached by Austria and Germany and be drawn into some arrangement which would bind Italy and debar her from availing herself of any future situation to take her stand with the forces of Liberty, and thus prevent her maintaining a position as one of the great powers, which would have been a deadly blow to her national pride and in a measure to her national consciousness. It relieved the People of the fear that even should she yield to the eager pressure of Germany and receive by diplomatic arrangement the unredeemed provinces of Trent and Trieste, she would subsequently be despoiled of them by the Empires, should they prove victorious. It satisfied them that Italy was now equipped and ready.

From the beginning to the end of April matters matured rapidly. Austria, engaged in pushing back the Russians beyond the Carpathians, awoke at last, under the urgency of Germany and of her own representative at Rome, to the imminence of Italy's breaking from her neutrality and flinging her might on the side of the Allies and began to yield a grudging and still piecemeal assent to the demands which a little while before she had flatly rejected, and Germany offered to guaranty the putting into effect of the concessions. But it was too late, and doubtless it would have been too late even had she yielded earlier. For the People had long been steeling themselves for the final, irrevocable step of war. They had made great sacrifices to equip their Patria, and the greatest of all sacrifices: when their sons had gone "for the training"—for war.

It had for some time been contemplated to unveil a statue to Garibaldi and "the Thousand" at Quarto, the little port near Genoa from which they had sailed on the 5th of May, fifty-five years before, for the wresting of the Sicilians from a foreign yoke and the uniting them to the kingdom of Italy. Great preparations were made for the celebration of the anniversary of what was one of the most inspiring events in the history of Italy.

The Cabinet was to attend the ceremony, and it presently became known that the King and Queen would also attend. The conviction spread throughout Italy that the occasion would be availed of to announce Italy's decision to take her place with the Forces of Liberty battling in France, and declare war. All Italy was on the *Qui Vive*. Then suddenly, two days before the event was to take place, the announcement came that, after all, owing to the gravity of the moment, neither the King nor the Cabinet would attend the unveiling. Why this sudden change? All sorts of rumors flew about. The one generally accepted at the time was that the Government had received an intimation that the attendance of the Italian Government on the occasion would be considered by Austria and Germany as a Declaration of war. Another reason reported was that in the excitement none could tell what might be said or what step might be taken to precipitate the crisis.

The Italian Government, however, signalized the Day of the Quarto celebration by denouncing formally the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. The King, on the occasion, sent a ringing message to the Sindaco of the town, in which he united the names of Victor Emmanuel, Mazzini, and Garibaldi.

This act of the Italian Government was probably the chief reason for the change of programme of the Quarto celebration, though undoubtedly other causes played their part also, one of these being the fact that Italy was not quite ready to make a Declaration of war, however ready she might have been to receive one. Also, whether the Government was ready or not to declare war, an element

of those who attended had prepared to do all in their power to force the Government's hand.

The absence of the King and of the Cabinet from the celebration at Quarto may have given it a somewhat different trend, but certainly not one less violent. The orator of the occasion, Gabriel d'Annunzio, the poet and novelist, who had come from France for the purpose, delivered with telling effect an address which was rather a lyrical rhapsody on Italian Liberty and aspiration than an historical address. It fell on ears attuned to receive it, and was, in fact, a firebrand stuck into a magazine charged and ready for the explosion. That night the streets of Genoa were choked with the crowds that apotheosized Garibaldi and the orator, d'Annunzio, and clamored for war. After this it was a continued progression—nothing could stop it. Not Austria's late conversion, nor all the propaganda of her and Germany's allies—not the Ministry itself could have stayed the flood, even had it wished to do so, which it later transpired was not the case.

At Milan, the centre of German commercial and financial interests, demonstrations occurred which quickly turned into very practical demonstrations against Germany. Shops were sacked and bonfires built of their contents before order could be restored. At Turin other demonstrations and disorders—in other towns likewise, if not so extreme.

In Rome, where the anti-interventist element was well organized, it was held in check by the interventist elements, who in turn were held in check by the Government representatives of order. But the daily demonstrations kept the Government in such anxiety that half the garrison of Rome was continually on duty, and the Embassies of Austria and Germany were protected by troops to prevent any unfortunate incidents.

The orator of Quarto came to Rome in a sort of triumphal procession, and for days spoke in a species of lyric frenzy, from hotel balconies or in theatres to excited crowds who followed him in a state of exaltation. On the 14th he spoke in the Costanza Opera House, which was heavily

guarded, all approaches being picketed, by a strong force of police and soldiers, including an extra force of cavalry to preserve order and prevent demonstrations before the Government offices and the Embassies of the Central Empires. The overflow demonstrators, left outside of the Auditorium, resisted all efforts to disperse them, building barricades and tearing down a rear wall around an open lot adjoining the Opera House to use as missiles against the soldiers should the latter be too firm in attempting to clear the streets.

The house of Signor Giolitti was also guarded by cavalry. On the 8th of May the tragic news of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the day before, with its great loss of life of passengers, sent a thrill of horror throughout Italy, as throughout the rest of the world, and many who had hitherto stood neutral, suddenly took their places with the war partisans. The parliament was gazetted to be reassembled on the 12th of May, but owing to unexpected conditions this was deferred till the 20th.

Meantime, the peril of the situation was perfectly recognized in Germany and Austria, and the subjects of both were rapidly leaving Italy—it was said, under orders of their respective Governments.

But notwithstanding all this the efforts to withhold Italy from flinging her weight into the Allied scale did not for a moment relax. The situation, however, was now desperate. From the 12th on, as the Austrian Ambassador at Rome reported to his government, reports were flowing in from "all the larger cities" about demonstrations by, what he termed, "the hired mob," and for days past Rome had been in what he described as, "a state of siege." The Austrian Ambassador pleaded for the immediate decision on an eventual agreement with Italy, so that should circumstances permit, a new Ministry might be approached with "a ready proposal." This proposal was formulated in fifteen Articles, covering all the questions dealt with in the previous documents.¹

¹ Austrian *Red Book*, No. 2, 185. Telegram of May 15 from Baron Macchio to Baron Burian.

Even in this exigency the Austrian Government hesitated and haggled until the bitter end, conceding only bit by bit, until finally, after War was actually in sight, it made its final concession.

It had, indeed, long been too late, for all Italy was now aflame, and no government could have withstood the aroused passion of the Italian people.

On the 12th and 13th the streets were the scenes of noisy demonstrations headed toward the Government buildings, which were, however, turned aside by the troops stationed on every street leading thereto.

On the evening of the 13th Salandra and his Ministry resigned, and it looked almost as though Germany had won.

On the 14th of May the official press announced that, "The constitutional Parties having been unable to give their undivided support to the trend of the Government's Foreign policy at a time when the seriousness of the situation makes such support imperative, the Council of Ministers has decided to hand its resignation to his Majesty."

This was the formal official notice of what the people believed to be the work of those who were afraid of Germany, or loved Austria, and would sacrifice Italy to these powers. Although not wholly unexpected it was a bombshell. There was a sudden explosion which shook Italy from the Swiss confine to the far end of Sicily. It was now for the King to speak, and to him Italy appealed, through the People.

The days that followed were full of excitement. The "larger towns," like Rome, gave themselves up to demonstrations, clamoring for the end of futile discussion and for the Declaration of War. The Crown Council was summoned in consultation by his Majesty, the King.

In the crowds that thronged the streets and piazzas, the cry was constantly heard, "A basso Giolitti! A morte, Giolitti!" And his friends averred that his life was seriously imperilled.¹ The Name "Oberdan" was chalked up on walls—even on the War-office walls.

¹ Giolitti had written a letter denying that he worked against the Ministry. It was his friends who compromised him.

Every street in Rome that led to a Ministry was picketed by troops in imposing numbers. In the end the People triumphed. The President's "Lusitania-note," warning Germany, made a deep impression and encouraged the Interventionists.

On Sunday, the 16th, the most imposing demonstration occurred that Rome had ever seen in modern times. In the afternoon the crowds assembled in the historic Piazza del Popolo, with standards and flags, and almost as if by magic a procession was formed for a huge demonstration and soon, flowing through the streets were a hundred thousand people, headed for the Quirinal, marching to the music of the National hymns. Wherever there were old Garibaldians they were borne on men's shoulders. Up by the British Embassy and down the long "Venti Settembre" they streamed toward the Royal Palace and the Foreign Office. But it was a good-natured crowd, for they knew that day that the King had recalled Salandra and his Cabinet, and that the issue was already decided. The King had spoken. Italy would enter the war.

It was reported that both Marcora, the President of the Chamber, and Carcano, later the Minister of Finance, had successively been asked to form a Cabinet, but had declared it impossible except by Salandra. Both were old Garibaldians; so the people were satisfied.

On the 20th the Chamber reassembled, and the Government, now reassured as to its strength, made its declaration, and asked for full powers. It was well understood what this portended, and all Rome was afoot. The approaches to the Montecitorio Palace, where the Parliament sat, were guarded by troops in numbers, and the galleries of the Chamber were so packed that it was with difficulty that the Ambassadors could get places.

The declaration stated that the Government was conscious of having taken the measures imposed by the noblest aspirations and the most vital interests of the country, and asked for full powers.

After the declaration of the Government, which was sup-

ported by the war-socialists, the bill granting full War-powers to the Government was proposed, and was carried by a vote of 407 to 74. The following day the Senate adopted the measure granting the Government full War-powers by a unanimous vote. This meant War, and it was celebrated that afternoon by a great demonstration of the people at the Campidoglio, from which historic spot, headed by the *Sindico* of Rome, and bearing the provincial banners among which figured now those of the Trentino and Trieste, they marched to the Quirinal, where war-speeches were made, and the crowd, assured now of their royal leader's profound sympathy with their aspirations, enthusiastically cheered the King and Queen, who came out on the balcony to unite in the demonstration of Italy's complete accord in this fateful hour.

Next afternoon, the 23d, was published the order for the general mobilization of the army the following day, and the provinces along the border were declared in a state of War, a war which, as a socialist deputy who favored it said, was for the "protection of Civilization against Barbarism." And, at last, on the same day, Austria answered the Italian note denouncing the Treaty, and offered to make larger concessions. No wonder the Italian Foreign Minister declared it was "too late." "All my endeavors to continue the discussion," said the Austrian Ambassador, "were met with the ever-recurring phrase, 'It is too late.'"

On the 23d the Italian Ambassador at Vienna handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Italy's Declaration of war, stating that from the following day, the 24th, his Majesty, the King, would consider himself in a state of War with Austria-Hungary, and the Ambassador asked for his passports. Within an hour or two, the Emperor of Austria issued a proclamation to his people, calling on them to meet their "treacherous ally." It had already been written when Italy declared war. As nothing could be heard from Vienna, the Austrian Ambassador at Rome was given his passports. And the German Ambassador requested his and received them. That night the respec-

tive Ambassadors left their posts and the armies of Italy and Austria-Hungary confronted each other along a front of some 500 miles, to settle the long-vexed question as to who should be master of Italy and its people—a question which in one form or another had been under discussion since ancient Rome found her progress barred and her security menaced by the Barbarians who poured down through the passes in the Alps to which Julius Cæsar gave the name they bear to-day.

Italy boasts and has a right to boast that she was the first Christian nation to elect to surrender voluntarily a position of security and enter the war on the side of Freedom. It was not until August 23, 1916, that war with Germany was declared, and just before this event a Convention was agreed on by which the property and persons of unoffending civilians on both sides were to be respected. On August 21 War was declared by Italy against Turkey, which had been acting for a good while in a manner that testified her hostility to Italy and her people.

Italy, indeed, had originally little hostility against Germany, and confessedly owed her in the past a debt of obligation for important aid rendered her, both politically and practically. Her war against Germany was, as the war Socialist Deputy, already quoted, said, to protect Civilization from Barbarism.

The instant that War was declared the people of Italy quieted down. All the excitement which had raged during these last few days had subsided. The people of Italy, fully conscious of what it meant, stopped the noisy demonstrations of the piazzas, and set themselves to the silent and serious demonstration of what patriotic devotion could achieve when profoundly in earnest. The Italian people were never so admirable as when in this mood. The day of the actual Declaration of War, the streets of Rome were as quiet as on any spring afternoon. All of the stir and struggle had been transferred to that long front where for 500 miles the armies of Italy began the huge task of forcing back their age-long foe from the most difficult ter-

rene known in warfare, fortified to the last point of military science, and defended by an army which its commanders believed so powerful that they had, a few months before, deliberately delivered gage of battle to half the world.

Prince von Bülow, although he did not succeed in holding Italy to neutrality, was successful in his mission to the extent of securing from the Italian Government, before he left Italy, a Convention which was intended to safeguard mutually the economic interests of the two countries, the one in the other, even in the event of War between them. Germany had in recent years established in Italy vast interests, commercial, industrial, and financial. There were in Italy, by a census taken in 1914, some 80,000 German residents, permanent or engaged in affairs likely to lead to permanent residence; the German holdings amounted to seven or eight hundred millions of dollars. The Italians, on the other hand, had many emigrants, mainly laborers, in Germany. Germany and Italy agreed not to trouble the respective civil nationals, or confiscate private property belonging to them. And Germany agreed to keep up the pensions to the Italian laborers within her borders.

That the advantage was mutual cannot be denied, though the balance was in Germany's favor. Prince von Bülow apparently had some doubts as to the complete security of this arrangement, for the title to his Villa adjoining the Villa Medici was transferred to an Italian connection.

The presence of the German Embassy, vacant as it was, on the site of the most celebrated of the ancient Roman temples: the Temple of Jove on the Capitol, was a continual reminder to the Italian people of the unmeasured egotism and insolent aspirations of Germany.

There was a feeling among certain elements in Italy who had been reared in touch with the Triple Alliance that Italy had been placed in an equivocal position by the Government's departure from its declared Neutrality and by its Declaration of War. This idea was sedulously fostered by the influential pro-German and pro-Austrian ele-

ments, also by the Peace Socialist party, known as the Official Socialists, which numbered in the Chamber a not numerous, but able minority.

A powerful propaganda had been carried on by Germany and Austria, not only in Italy, but in America, to play on Italy's sentiments of honor and loyalty, and hold her up, as bound irrevocably by her Treaty of Alliance with Germany and Austria, yet inclined to blackmail them, and extort from them concessions to which she knew she had no right. The silence of the Government on the subject, whether due to pride or diplomacy, left the implication of their enemies for the most part unchallenged, and the consequences were very unhappy. Even when the *Green Book* was laid before the Country at the historic Session of the Chamber of May 20, the very eve of the Declaration of War, the Documents which it contained began only with the 9th of December, 1914, and the foes of Italy still insisted that their charge was not refuted.

So considerable was this feeling in Italy that eventually the Government deemed it advisable to make an exposition of Italy's precise position in relation to the step taken by her in entering the war. And on the 2d of June, 1915, less than ten days after Italy's Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary, Premier Salandra made a formal address at the Campidoglio (the Capitol) in which he set forth her precise position.

Italy, indeed, was very sensitive on this point, which the Italians considered touched their national honor, and the press of the Allies had not always been prudent. During the previous winter a member of the French Ministry had uttered in the French Chamber a gibe against Italy which offended her so deeply that it threatened serious consequences, and he was obliged to disavow his speech. It was, that Italy was "waiting to fly to the succor of the Victor." Nothing could have wounded her more deeply, for she was at that time nerving herself for the dread decision—not between War on the one side or on the other, but between War on the side of the Allies and Neutrality; and every

mother in Italy knew it and knew with blanched cheek what that decision would inevitably be. At that very time the quiet mobilization was going on, and hardly a cabin in Italy was without a man away in camp—"for training"—those who were left knew for what.

Signor Salandra set forth in his speech the facts touching Italy's relation to the Triplice and to the war. He quoted from the despatch sent by the Italian Government to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna on July 26, 1914, reporting the warning given to the German Ambassador at Rome (von Flotow) that Italy held that Austria had no right to take such a step as she was taking (against Serbia) without previous accord with her allies. Austria, in fact, declared the Italian Premier, by the terms of her notes and the demands made therein, which indeed were of little value against the Pan-Serb peril, but were most offensive to Serbia and indirectly to Russia, clearly demonstrated her wish to provoke war, and Italy notified her that because of this and because of the defensive and conservative character of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance she felt under no obligation to aid Austria in the event of her getting into a war with Russia, because any European war which might ensue would be the consequence of Austria's own act of provocation and aggression.

This was, he stated, followed up by a plain notification to Germany and Austria on the 27th and 28th of July (1914) that unless Italy should obtain the recession of the Italian provinces, held by Austria, and adequate compensation, the Triple Alliance would be irreparably swept away.

"Impartial History," declared the Premier, "will say that Austria, having found Italy hostile in July, 1913, and in October of the same year to her plans of aggression against Serbia, attempted last summer in agreement with Germany the method of surprise and of the *fait accompli*."

"The execrable crime of Sarajevo was availed of as a pretext a month after it occurred. This is proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the remissive offers of Serbia. Nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Aus-

tria have been contented by the integral acceptance of her ultimatum." In proof of this, he quoted the declaration of Count Berchtold made on the 31st of July, 1914, to the Italian Ambassador that if mediation had been exercised "it would not have been able to interrupt the hostilities already initiated with Serbia." And to this he added the statement of the Austrian Ambassador, Merey, made on the 30th of July to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marquis di San Giuliano, sustaining Austria's position, declaring that Austria could give no pledges in regard to not acquiring territory to the damage of Serbia, because she could not foresee whether in the course of the war she would not be obliged against her will to seize Serbian territory, which would, added the Italian Premier, have reduced Serbia to the condition of a vassal State, an act which he showed would, in turn, have eventually brought Italy into a similar condition. In proof of the necessity for Italy's action, he proceeded to show how the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Conrad, had long held the view that war with Italy was necessary, whether because of the question of the Italian Irredente Provinces or of Italy's policy in regard to everything that Austria undertook in the Balkans and in the eastern Mediterranean, and that he had maintained that, in consequence of Italy's opposition to all that Austria wished to undertake in the Balkans, it was necessary to beat her that Austria might have her hands free. He had, indeed, deplored that Austria had not attacked Italy since 1907. The Premier went on to show how the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had recognized the future of the military party, and held that the Kingdom of Italy should be reduced to impotence in order that the Italian Provinces held by Austria should be deprived of hope in the future, and had advocated the administration of these Provinces with punitive rigor.

He further recalled how, after the brilliant operations initiated by the Duke of the Abruzzi against the Turkish torpedo squadron at Previsa, Austria had intervened imperatively to prevent Italy's further operations, whether in the

Adriatic or the *Ægean* Seas. And how, on the 2d of October, 1911, after this act of Austria, the German Ambassador at Vienna had informed the Italian Ambassador that Count Aehrenthal had requested him to telegraph to make the Italian Government understand that if it continued in its naval operations in the Adriatic and *Ægean* Seas, the Italian Government would have to deal directly with Austria-Hungary. When Aehrenthal failed and was succeeded by Berchtold, the latter declared to the German Ambassador that he held the same views with his predecessor in regard to Italy's operation against the Ottoman coast in Europe and the islands of the *Ægean*, according to which those operations were deemed contrary to the pledges assumed in the seventh Article of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. He related how he opposed Italian operations against the Dardanelles, and declared that if the Italian Government desired to retake its liberty of action, the Imperial and Royal Government would do likewise, adding that he would not admit Italy's right to take any action of the kind in opposition to his point of view. This attitude of Austria, declared the Italian Premier, reinforced Turkey, which felt itself protected by the Allies of Italy against every attack in any vital part of her empire.

Having shown Austria's attitude of hostility to Italy in the critical moments of her war with Turkey—a war which, he asserted, was caused in part by the necessity to forestall the rapacious progress of the Central Empires—the Italian Premier took up and discussed the charges made by the Emperors of Austria and Germany that Italy looked with lascivious eyes on the patrimony of the former's House, and the charge of the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, that he was endeavoring to obtain concessions from Austria to purchase Italy's fidelity. The Italian Premier declared that the objects of Italy in discussing these concessions were three: First, the defense of the Italian race, which he declared Italy's first duty; second, to obtain and secure a defensible frontier in substitution of that imposed on Italy in 1866, which left the gates and the shores of Italy wide open to

her adversaries; third, a strategic position in the Adriatic less unsafe, less unhappy than Italy possessed, the effects of which were made clear by this war. He described the gradual increase of the offers of concessions, and declared that Italy had been more than temperate on her part, and he defended with warmth the policy of his Government in rejecting the offers which Germany, and eventually Austria, had tendered to Italy to maintain her neutrality.

These, if accepted, would, he asserted, have constituted a renewed Triple Alliance, formed of one Sovereign State, Germany, and two States substantially vassals, Italy and Austria, and he declared in the name of his Country that the dream "of universal hegemony has been broken. War has arisen. The peace and civilization of Humanity in the future must be founded on respect for complete National Autonomies, among which Germany will be obliged to live the equal of the others, but not their mistress."

This speech made a profound impression in Italy. It relieved those who had felt that Italy had placed herself in an equivocal position before the world and it inspired the hope that the world would now understand the sound basis of her action.

CHAPTER XV

ITALY'S FIRST YEAR OF WAR

To gain any idea of what Italy's military accomplishment was during the war, one must not only study the war-map of the war-front, where Italy guarded nearly 500 miles of mountain front, but must project the imagination to this mountainous region where, with the strategic positions all against her, and a frontier laid down with the express intent of rendering Austria impregnable while it rendered Italy vulnerable, she was forced to fight up-hill and maintain what she might win under conditions whose difficulties were unparalleled in any other part of the Allied front.

The map will show a zigzag line following with faithful subordination a frontier commanded by the chain of strategic positions laid down by Austria, from the Swiss border to the Adriatic, when the latter turned over: first, Lombardy and later, Venetia to France to hand on to Italy. In length, it is said in Italian works, to be actually longer than the line from the shores of the North Sea to the Swiss border, where France was straining every energy though supported with all the power of Belgium, England, some aid from Portugal and Russia, and later all the power of America.

Beginning at the Swiss border, where she controlled the Stelvio Pass, Austria's line ran almost due south, taking in the commanding summits to and including the Adamello, and on across the head of Lake Idro (Eridio), and so on south to the top of the great divide between it and Lake Garda, where it doubled back and presently turning eastward crossed the lake, and at a commanding point turned southward again along Mount Baldo, thus securing on both sides of Lake Garda the command of this long lake for no inconsiderable part of its length. From this point the fron-

tier stretched eastward, crossing the Adige, and then turned northeastward, ever following the commanding strategic line, taking in the Trentino and the Sugana Valley. Then utilizing the lofty barrier of the Carnic Alps, it passed south-eastwardly to swerve south at Montasio and, crossing the Friuli plain, reached the Adriatic some distance west of the Isonzo. Within this meandering line of mountain fortresses Austria had locked the Trentino and Gorizian provinces, and had formed, as she supposed, an impregnable barrier. But more than this, she had created a formidable menace to Italy as a guaranty of the latter's good behavior. A glance at the map will show that Austria, holding the Trentino, extended like a wedge down toward the base of the plains of Lombardy and Venetia, and thence stretched along their flank in a way to enable her to descend on these fertile regions and cut them off from Italy, whenever she was willing to make the sacrifices needed for the enterprise. She held all the passes into Italy and all the mountains guarding them. She possessed the superiority, not only in position, but in numbers and matériel of war, and, according to past history, she was superior on the field.

Against these elements of superiority Italy had only herself, her immemorial wrongs, and the spirit of her people, informed by patriotic fervor and love of Liberty.

Hopelessly inferior when the war broke out as to equipment and training, Italy had made good progress during the ten months that had elapsed since that eventful day; but she was still inferior in equipment and matériel. Moreover, Austria had not neglected during that time to prepare for eventualities. The natural defenses of her frontier were strengthened to the last degree of modern military science, and every approach to that long and beetling line had been fortified till they were the final expression of scientific skill.

When Italy entered the war, Germany had dug herself in above the Aisne and the Vesle. Austria had cut herself into what she believed as impregnable as Gibraltar. Moreover, Austria believed that she controlled the Adriatic. She had but a few weeks before torpedoed and sunk the

French war-ship, *Léon Gambetta*, an exploit which had called forth a biting criticism in France against attacking such an invulnerable coast as Austria held on the Adriatic.¹


There had been a time when Italy's entry into the war against her might have been apprehended by Austria—when Russia was pushing forward victoriously through the Carpathians, and Roumania and Greece were apparently on the verge of espousing the side of the Allies. This danger had now passed. The scale was swinging the other way—Russia was being pushed back through the Carpathians. She had lost a considerable part of what she had gained, and her armies were showing evidences of suffering from the demoralization of the internal administration of Russia, which had eaten into the military administration. Libau had fallen on May 9, and the forceps were being pushed farther forward, both to the northward and to the southward, to close in and crush completely all within their grasp. Roumania, who at one time was expected to come in with Italy, had thought better of it, and Greece was falling under the sway of those friendly to the Empires.


It was just at this time that Von Mackensen, having got his full strength up, was concentrating all his efforts against Przemyśl, and was forcing the Russians back from the San. Demitrieff had retreated beyond the Wistock before the German-Austrian forces early in May. Ivanof was conscious of the peril to his armies to the south of the Vistula, and as Demitrieff retreated, Brusiloff's position in the Carpathians became too precarious and he also fell back. By the end of May Przemyśl was almost recaptured from the Russians, and the beginning of the end of the great Russian offensive was in sight. The city fell June 3, but its capture had been a foregone conclusion for some time. Lemberg fell a few weeks later, and the great forceps were closing in on Warsaw.

It was charged by Italy's foes, and credited by many not her foes, that Italy entered the war believing that it was already won by the Allies. The charge is without a shadow

¹ Gustave Hervé in *La Guerre Sociale*, April 30, 1915.

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




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THE ITALIAN WAR.



of foundation. Indeed, it was so far from true, that no one who knew the facts could have failed to realize the gravity of the situation in France, where, during April and the early part of May, the new German weapon, the asphyxiating gas, had given them the advantage in the fighting along the Ypres Canal, in the long second battle of Ypres, and on down in Artois, north of Arras, Kitchener's new army was being rushed across the channel with all despatch to receive the hard-pressed and worn troops on the Flanders line. Nearly all Italians doubtless believed that Italy's entry in the war should prove decisive, and within a reasonable time; and a great many believed that it would bring the war to an end within a few months—perhaps, by the end of the following autumn. But none but fools imagined that therefore the final victory would be won save by hard fighting and vast sacrifices. History may show that the Italians have glaring faults, but it does not show that they shrink from sacrifices, however vast. Italy knew well how badly Russian affairs were going. She also knew that the enterprise of the Dardanelles, so boldly undertaken and so valorously pressed, was not justifying the hopes entertained of the issue. In fact, Italy was more familiar with the character and the situation of the Peoples to the east of her than her more westerly Allies. She was under no illusions.

In the very beginning of her participation in the war Italy had to consider certain things which presented to her a somewhat delicate situation, diverse from that of her allies politically. Her left flank rested on a small neutral country with a population racially divided, of which the considerable majority were of German origin. This country was insulated, and was dependent on the Central Empires for much of the prime materials on which the people subsisted, in exchange for which she furnished them her products. She was thus in a somewhat peculiar position as regarded the belligerents. She might, whether with or without her consent, prove a covered way for them to pass and descend on Italy, and in any event, whether she remained neutral or

not, she could not but be a middle zone in which the emissaries of Italy's enemies might lurk with security and become conduits of intelligence to the enemy regarding Italy, and that in fact is what happened. Thus, there was always an eye to be kept on that quarter, and a close watch was necessary to see that material sent into Switzerland should not find its way to the enemy.

From the military standpoint, also, the situation was individual to Italy. The political difficulties caused a situation which affected somewhat the military. From the point of junction at the Swiss border, commanded by the Stelvio, along the entire front through the mountains, the line had been laid out by Austria with especial reference to leaving her holding the commanding positions.

Thus, it may be said that Italy was exceptionally exposed to attack through the passes that led down through the Trentino, and those which to the northeastward led down into the Friuli plains, where the first lines of any strength were those of the Tagliamento, while, on the other hand, Austria was secured by the possession of the imposing mountains guarding the Trentino route and by those guarding the Isonzo line, completely dominated by Monte Nero; by the fortress of Tolmino; by the lofty table-lands of Bainsizza, and by the supposedly impregnable Carso. This line may be likened to—what it was, indeed—a vast rampart, a mile high, with frowning towers yet higher, jutting forth overlooking Italy, and guarding a score of gates through which those who held it could pour down on the Italian plains, overwhelming them like the avalanches from the mountains behind them. This was what the Austrians boasted as their aim and determined purpose, and what they on two occasions attempted, and would have accomplished but for the resolution with which they were first stayed and then swept back. Down these defiles, through these gateways, Goth and Hun had poured of old to ravage the Italian plains and sack the Italian cities, and through them the Roman Legions had surged, driving their way upward to conquer the invaders in their own lands, as later

another and even greater soldier of Italian blood had passed to impose for a time his will on the world. And now Austria, who had fallen before him and then had triumphed over him, once more held the ramparts and the gates, ready to swarm through them and wreck her vengeance on those who barred her way. In fact, it was through the passes mentioned that the two drives were made by Austria in the summer of 1916 and the autumn of 1917, which placed Italy for a time in such deadly peril, and might, and indeed probably would, have decided the issue of the war but for the way in which Italy summoned all her forces of resolution and valor in the supreme efforts which first held, and then repelled the invasion.

Italy was distinctly inferior to Austria, not only in position, but in matériel of war, especially in artillery. It was necessary for her to deprive her potent enemy, if possible, of the advantage of initiative, and this she could do only by attacking and forcing the fighting. Otherwise, Austria with some twenty-five divisions might, by attacking at once along the Trentino and Isonzo lines, overwhelm one of the sections of the far-stretched Italian front.

The Trentino section probably offered the best field for an attack with a promise of immediate gains, for it was understood that the Austrian forces were not as numerous there as on the Isonzo front, which more immediately guarded what might be considered the direct passageway into Austria and the road to Vienna. And the Trentino was an inspiring name for Italy. But such an attack would not have the moral effect on Austria that a successful advance on the Isonzo would be likely to have. Accordingly, it was decided to make the chief assault on the latter front, while the assault on the Trentino front was intended rather as a containing movement. In any case it was necessary to perfect the plan with the utmost nicety in every detail—and this was done.

The genius of the Italians lies in this direction, as was evidenced on numerous occasions during the war. And General Cadorna was a master in this matter.

An attack was made on the Austrian positions guarding the Trentino wedge from every side: on the Val Giudicaria, up the valley of the Adige, the Val Sugana, up and across the heights of Fiera di Primiero, through Cortina di Ampezzo, on toward the massives of the Tofano, and Cristallo. And on along the massives of the Carnic Alps the assaults were pressed in regions where only ardor fused into stern valor could avail for even the least success. And then the chief assault was delivered—from the mountains above the Isonzo to the southern border of the plains that stretched away to the Adriatic. The attack was not merely most difficult, it would have appeared at first impossible, and only the fury with which the assaults were delivered and pressed can account for the successes that were gained. But it was not an ordinary battle or series of engagements. Italy felt that she was fighting for her own.

Not a stream, valley, or mountain in all that region that had not once belonged to Italy, and been fought for by her sons generation after generation; not a town or village nestled in a little valley, or perched on a mountain shoulder, but had furnished some hero or man of mark to enrich her annals. The genius of her people spoke in every façade and rang from every campanile. Her poets had sung of them; her painters had pictured them; her martyrs had died for them; and although under Austrian oppression and expropriation, the Italians there had sensibly diminished in numbers, schools had been closed, and the use of the Italian tongue had been proscribed, it was to the Italians still Italy, the very stones without which the arch of Italian Unity would never be complete, nor would ever stand.

So, Italy felt that she was fighting for her own, and this inspired her accomplishment of what on its face appeared almost impossible: the seizure of many important fortresses in the Austrian first line of defense, and the definite pushing back of the Austrian line beyond mountain after mountain and valley after valley, until it was to the westward sensibly forced back and to the eastward was beyond the Isonzo.

But it was not without huge losses that this advance was achieved, and the toll taken in those regions for every foot gained was heavy indeed. In the Trentino the terrain was such that save in narrow, tortuous valleys, even in times of peace, none but trained mountain-climbers could make their way. In this region now the Alpine Corps was used, and was indeed necessary; for the work in important parts had to be done amid the eternal snows, and against them were pitted the Austrian Alpine Corps.

War had not yet been declared against Germany, and for sundry reasons; the most cogent of which was that Italy had quite enough on her hands as it was, and could not reach Germany save across Austria and France. She preferred that Germany should declare war on her, and in such case her people would have been instantly consolidated against her, as they already were against Austria.

The absence, however, of a state of War with Germany enabled the latter to continue her intrigues within Italy, and spies swarmed everywhere. Moreover, the pro-German element was able to maintain a portentous, if secret, propaganda of depression and sabotage against the War. Journal after journal supported by German money to defeat the Allied cause had sprung up, and engaged in this defeatist work only to be suppressed by the Government.¹

Nevertheless, the Italians drove forward, if slowly, steadily, and by the close of Autumn they had captured the principal Austrian positions in their first line from the Stelvio to the Adriatic, and a portion of those in the Austrian second line. And when the winter closed in, the Austrian advanced lines were in certain sectors thirty or more kilometres farther from their original front than when the war began, and the Lombard and Venetian plains and cities were to this extent rendered more secure.

Italy began to breathe more freely, and so did France

¹ The Premier, in his address of the 2d of June, in which he stated Italy's position, referred bitterly to the large sums of money expended in this treasonable work.

and England; for the apprehension that Austria might send potent reinforcements to the German-French front had sensibly diminished, even though Russia had been driven back and the Dardanelles enterprise, on which so many hopes had been founded, had come to naught. This advance of Italy, however, had not been accomplished without heavy losses, far heavier than was known generally; for Italy did not publish her losses. Austria had ever the position of advantage; and every point, every height, was guarded, and had to be captured and held under a commanding fire from some eminence yet higher. Often tunnels had to be cut in the living rock, and among the noted engineering feats of the war was the tunnelling and the blowing away of the entire top of the mountain on which was established a fortress believed to be impregnable which commanded all the approaches for miles on either side. It was the exceptional difficulties of the terrene which, added to the customary difficulties of all the fronts in this war of Titanic forces and weapons, rendered the work of the Italians so extraordinary that they have been said to have performed the miraculous and to have accomplished the impossible.

To begin with, the main Italian front was on the extreme northern frontier of Italy, and not only her troops had to be transported long distances, but all provisions and matériel of war. All of her coal and iron and much of her food-supplies had to be imported. There were railroads with more tunnels than kilometres, and almost as many bridges. These all had to be guarded, and when the actual front was reached, the difficulties of transportation were such that it took five men to perform what three could do on the French front. No inconsiderable part of her fighting was done amid perpetual snows; and often her lines had to be established on mountain-tops where guns, ammunition, equipment of all kinds, timber for huts, provisions, everything, had to be carried up on cable railways swung from peaks thousands of feet high.

On the 22d of May the order for general Mobilization was

issued. But the Italian army had long been substantially mobilized.

On the 25th the King left Rome for the front, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian armies. He had appointed his maternal uncle, Thomas, Duke of Genoa, to act as Regent in his place during his absence, and to those assembled at the railway-station to bid him adieu, the King said, as the train pulled out: "Arrivederci alla guerra finita." From this time till the war was ended, he was always at the front, living simply, with his Headquarters in some modest country-house which, wherever it was, was known as the Villa d'Italia; spending his days at the front among the men, inspecting the lines; receiving in the evenings Government Officials or national guests, who were lodged much more luxuriously than the Royal host. He apparently did not interfere in any manner with the Command, which was intrusted to the General Staff, known as the Commando Supremo, with General Luigi Cadorna at its head until after the event of Caporetto, when General Diaz was placed at the head of the Commando Supremo. But undoubtedly his cool judgment, complete training, sagacious counsel, and serene courage, which is the family endowment of the House of Savoy, were ever at the service of the General Staff, and must often have been an inspiring element in the decisions which led to eventual victory.

The continued and almost uninterrupted presence of the King at the front—for he returned to Rome only a few times during the war when his presence there appeared to be required by some great political exigency—was at times made the subject of comment by those who probably would in any case have been inclined to be critical. But there can be no question that his presence among his soldiers, where he was often to be found in such exposed places as to bring protests from those in charge of the lines, was a moral factor in Italy's stubborn resistance and an effective contribution to the final success that cannot be measured. Stories about the Spartan simplicity of his life; the fearlessness with which he exposed himself when not prevented

by those responsible for the safety of his person; his unaffected and fatherly interest in the comfort of the soldiers; his tireless devotion to duty; his knowledge and understanding of conditions, were current among all ranks, and were treasured in the hearts of the men in a way which no attempt at regal splendor could have accomplished. He was a King according to the modern Evangel—the true Chief and Captain of his people, and Italy knew it. On occasion he issued a ringing message to his people which rang like a trumpet; but for the most part he effaced himself personally and left the applause to others, content to feel that Italy was reaping the fruit of his devotion.

While the King was at the front, self-effaced so far as public participation in the command of operations was concerned, yet felt by all Italy, military and civic, to be on the spot where his presence counted most, the Queen was with equal quietness, yet with equal effectiveness, heading the work which War always, and this War especially, imposed on women. And nowhere more than in Italy did the women perform with devotion and efficiency this work. The dearth of materials, the narrowness of means in Italy were exceptional, and had to be made up by exceptional personal devotion to the cause. In this the Queen of Italy took the lead. As soon as Italy entered the war she placed the great Quirinal Palace in the hands of competent experts, and transformed it into a hospital, complete in equipment, and up to date in every respect. The work was done under her personal supervision, and when in the summer the hospitals at the north began to be crowded, and the wounded were sent farther south, the former palace of the Popes and the present palace of the King of Italy was filled with Italian wounded—private soldiers—under the personal superintendence of Her Majesty the Queen herself. There were other hospitals added under her superintendence later on; but the Quirinal Palace was the first hospital conducted by her, and was so conducted until the end of the war.

In this connection it may be as well to state here as elsewhere the work of the Royal House of Savoy during the

war. As the Queen conducted her hospital in her palace, so the Queen Mother established and conducted a similar one in the Villa Margherita. And under the King as Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army and Navy, the Duke d'Aosta commanded the Third Italian Army, whose accomplishment on the section of the Isonzo next to the Adriatic, from the inception of operations to the final defeat of the Austrian armies, is one of the achievements of the war. And the Duke of the Abruzzi commanded the Italian Fleet during all the earlier period of the war, when the command of the Adriatic was secured, while the younger members of the House of Savoy performed their part with devotion, shunning no danger and shirking no toil, in their several positions as soldiers and seamen representative of Italy, rather than of the Royal House. The Duchess d'Aosta became the head of the Italian Red Cross, and not merely in an administrative capacity, but in active work, not only at the rear, but in the war zone wherever duty called, she gave herself in full measure to the great cause.

General Cadorna, who was at the head of the Commando Supremo, was, like nearly all the commanding Generals on both sides, no longer young. He was the son of that General Cadorna who had commanded the troops at the capture of Rome in 1870. He had a great reputation in Italy, not only as a Commander of troops in the field, but as a writer of high authority on Military Science. And the skill with which the Italian army in every department was organized justified fully his reputation, as well as that of the Minister for War, General Vittorio Italo Zupelli. To these two was largely due the unobtrusive, complete, and successful organization of the Italian Army, which on Italy's entry in the war was stretched along the extended Italian Austrian border, and immediately advancing to the attack, forced the fighting along 800 kilometres of front, which kept the war substantially beyond the Italian confines till the invasion after Caporetto and never slackened till the snows in the mountains prevented further offensive operations on either side. When this interposition came, Italy had pushed

back the Austrian lines along nearly the entire front an appreciable distance, in some sectors as much as thirty kilometres. She had forced the nearer passes of the Dolomites and the Carnic Alps, and captured the commanding mountains above the valleys of Cortino di Ampezzo, the Val Sugana, and the Val Lagerina. Cortino di Ampezzo was occupied on May 30. Throughout the summer the fiercest fighting continued about Monte Croce and the Val di Inferno, the Italians forcing back the Austrians step by step, till they had secured positions which overlooked the Pusterthal, with its important railway line.

On the Isonzo front the Italians had forced the Austrians back in the beginning from the frontier to the line of the Isonzo, where the latter occupied a position of great strength from Monte Nero to the Adriatic, and by the 1st of June the Italian armies were attacking the river line, their left against Monte Nero, the chief forward bastion of the Julian Alps; the centre against Gorizia, and the right against Monfalcone on the coast, and the roads to Trieste, guarded by the great rock table-land of the Carso. Monfalcone, with its shipyard, fell on June 9, but the heights of the Carso towered before them, apparently as impregnable as Gibraltar. Gradisca was captured and a crossing was forced at Plava to the north of Gorizia, notwithstanding floods and the determined resistance of the Austrians. Great efforts were made to capture both Gorizia and the Carso, but the former was too well protected by the heights of Monte Sabotino on the north, Podgora in front, and the Monte San Michele on the south, while the Carso was one of the strongest defensive positions on the entire war-front. The general movement forward was begun in mid-June. The crossing of the river was effected, Sagrado was captured, and by the end of June the Italians had established a bridge-head beyond the river and were pressing up the side of the Carso under the flaming fire of the Austrian defenses, made to protect every point. It was carried once, but when the Italians had reached the top it could not be held against the tremendous fire directed against it. All that the Italians

could do was to hold what they had so hardly won and consolidate their new positions along or above the Isonzo, and prepare for the opening of the Spring. Italy had gained some 2,000 square kilometres of its Irredentist regions, emancipating some 100,000 Irredentist Italians, and was intrenched on the slopes of Podgora and Monte Sabotino, the key to Gorizia.

The fighting had been furious and the losses heavy, but the spirit of the Italian troops had been greatly raised by their success, and the morale was excellent, both at the front and throughout Italy. Notwithstanding the obstinate defense of the Austrians, it had been shown that Italian Generals were their superiors, and Italian troops could drive them from their strongest positions, fortified and defended by every device known to military science.

At sea the Italians had been equally active and equally efficient, though the field of their activity was mainly the Adriatic, which was far removed from those zones which were of chief interest to the other Allies. But however the latter might concern more nearly England and France, the Adriatic was of vital concern to Italy, and indirectly to her Allies as well.

Immediately on the entry of Italy in the war—indeed, the following day—the Austrian fleet had steamed out of Pola and bombarded points along the low Italian coast, with its railway running along the margin of the sea, constituting one of the main lines of transportation from Central and Southern Italy to the war zone. In no long time, however, the Italian Fleet, under command of the Duke of the Abruzzi, had secured command of the Adriatic, and thenceforth the Austrian battle-fleet was substantially bottled up in Pola, and its activities were mainly confined to the submarines, and to sudden dashes of minor squadrons to which the eastern coast of the Adriatic readily lent itself. So effective, indeed, was the menace of the submarines in the Adriatic that it eventually controlled the method of marine warfare in that sea on both sides. But the Italian ships had secured command of the Adriatic. They had

also secured comparative immunity from the Austrian battle-fleet for their transport service, and were able to perform without great loss the arduous duties of transporting Italian troops to Valona, and keeping open their communication with their naval base on the Italian side. Furthermore, the Italians performed the main transport service in bringing off from Durazzo the important remnant of the shattered Serbian army, with their large body of prisoners, who, on the defeat of the Serbian army by the Austrians and Bulgarians, had made their way across Albania to the sea.¹

The destruction of Serbia and the shattering of the Serbian army at the hands of the Austrian and Bulgarian armies is one of the most amazing events of the war, and one of the least creditable to Serbia's Allies. From the political standpoint, it was one of the greatest of the blunders committed by the Allies. Doubtless some day the inner story of this astonishing page in the history of the war will be written; meantime the main facts are as follows:

Serbia's stand against Austria-Hungary spurred on by Germany, having been the immediate occasion of the war, she was called on at the very beginning of the struggle to

¹ The magnitude of this accomplishment of transportation may be gauged by the fact that "between December 12, 1915, and February 22, 1916, 11,651 refugees, invalids, and wounded were transported from the Albanian coast to Brindisi, Lipari, Marseilles, and Beserola; 130,841 Serbian soldiers were landed in Corfu and 4,100 at Biserta. Six Italian liners, two French Auxiliary Cruisers, five Italian and one French hospital ships, two Italian Ambulance ships, and fifteen Italian, fifteen French, and four English Steamers were engaged in the work. Some 23,000 Austrian prisoners were transported to Asinara between December 16, 1915, and February 12, one English, two French, and eleven Italian steamers being engaged in the work. Besides which the Naval Base at Valona was created and supplied and the Expeditionary force in Albania was transported and supplied; the major part being performed by the Italians.

"The Italian Navy at the outbreak of the war comprised fourteen battleships, six of which were Dreadnoughts, cruisers, sixteen light cruisers, some fifty destroyers, and nearly seventy torpedo-boats, about twenty submarines, three naval ships, and numerous airplanes." (Archibald Hurd, *Italian Navy in the Great War*.)

To this list during the war were certain additions, but on the other hand there were a number of losses, including the fine *Leonardo da Vinci* and the *Benedetto Brin*, which were blown up in or just outside of Harbor by treachery, the former in Taranto Harbor, the latter at Brindisi.

withstand the shock of the almost full weight of Austria thrown against her. For Russia had not yet got into the struggle in the South sufficiently to distract greatly the Austrian forces. For a time Serbia recoiled, but, gathering her forces in a supreme effort, she attacked the invading army with such resolution that they were driven back beyond her borders. The Austrians then were forced to give much attention to the Russian armies that were driving forward on that eastern flank of the Empire. When they began to obtain success in this direction and Russia was falling back, Italy came into the strife. Thus, Serbia was still able to cope successfully with the forces thrown against her. Throughout the following spring and summer (1915) the Allies were engaged in a blundering way in an effort to secure the adhesion of the other Balkan States to their cause, especially of Bulgaria, who, as the sequel proved, was as strongly pro-Austrian as Serbia was pro-French. The Gallipoli enterprise was an episode—a costly one—in this proceeding. It was considered that if Constantinople and the Dardanelles were captured, the somewhat difficult diplomatic contest in the Balkans would be won—Roumania and Greece would join the Allied cause, and Bulgaria, whose strategic position was of great importance, would be forced to take the same side. Greece, where at the time Venizelos was in power, was eager to have the Allies send a sufficient force to the *Ægean* coast to join her in a movement against Constantinople, which she felt could be captured only by this plan. She, however, wanted what the Allies were unwilling to grant her, and they thought that they could capture Constantinople without her, and force Greece to come in without making the concessions she demanded. These concessions would have disposed of all chance of their winning over Bulgaria, whom they thought of more value than Greece. The defeat of the Russians and the failure of the attack on Constantinople lost Roumania for the time being to the allied cause, and Greece fell more and more under the influence of the Empires, until she also was, for the time being, wholly lost to

the Allies; Venizelos was driven out, and it was a close thing that she did not side openly with the Central Empires. Bulgaria appeared now to be the key to the situation, and she long played her cards with such skill that she was wooed zealously by both sides. Finally Germany and Austria won, as a clear apprehension of the situation might have satisfied all concerned they would inevitably do in such a contest. They dangled before Bulgaria Constantinople, even if they did not promise it to her, while, on the other hand, it had been conceded to Russia by the Allies. And they, at least, promised to give her all she wished of Macedonia, Serbia and Roumania. Bulgaria's demands were known, but the Allies were unwilling to concede them until too late, even if they ever were willing. Important territory which she demanded was held by Roumania; and Greece and Serbia likewise were in possession of a part of what she claimed and had once possessed. An attempt was made to obtain Roumania's consent to turn over to Bulgaria what she held that Bulgaria claimed. The same course was pursued with Serbia, but not unnaturally this was refused in both cases. The only possible way to have secured for Bulgaria this *sine qua non* would have been to insist firmly, and then compensate Roumania from other territory equally valuable to her. This, however, was not done, and in September it became known that Bulgaria was mobilizing. Serbia, recognizing the increasing menace to her, desired to attack her hostile Balkan sister before she could mobilize, but the Allies fatuously believed that they still had a chance of appeasing Bulgaria, and prohibited the only possible method of insuring Serbia's security. So, Bulgaria mobilized unhindered. Von Mackensen had come down to take command on the north of Serbia, and the attack was made on her simultaneously from the north and the east, and was pushed home. Belgrade was evacuated on October 9. The Austrians crossed the Save and the Drina, and forced the Serbians back while the Bulgarians advanced against Nish and Uskub, driving the Serbian army from their positions. Uskub fell toward the end of October. On the 30th the

Austrians captured Kragujevac. Nish held out till substantially invested, but fell in November, and the shattered Serbian army, which had done such heroic fighting, retreated southward and westward, leaving more than half of Serbia in the hands of the Austrians and Bulgarians, who soon overran nearly the whole of Serbia, and all of Montenegro and Albania, save Valona, which the Italians held. Some twenty odd thousand Serbians got away to the south, where they were able to maintain themselves till relieved by the Allies who, under General Sarrail, had occupied Salonika in October. The major portion, approximating 100,000 men, having lost or destroyed nearly all of their guns and trains, made their way—taking with them some twenty odd thousand Austrian prisoners—through the snow-clad mountains of Montenegro and Albania to the Adriatic coast, whence eventually they were transported to Corfu and other points for reorganization. It was one of the most inexplicable of the disasters suffered by the Allies during the war—this sacrifice of Serbia and her brave army.

While the Italian Armies were engaged in the Titanic struggle against the Austrian Armies, and the Navy was guarding the Terrene and Adriatic shores, doing necessary transport-service and fighting whenever chance offered, political events were taking place in Italy which bore strongly on the progress of the war and on its final result.

The enforced retreat of the Russians continued steadily through June, and, after Przemyśl, Leopoli was abandoned, and the retreat continued under conditions which enabled Austria to reinforce her armies against both Italy and Serbia.

The apparent disorganization of the Russian armies; the failure of the Gallipoli expedition to accomplish its object, and the manifest pressure on the Serbian army had their repercussion in Turkey, and the Porte assumed promptly a more hostile and certainly a harsher attitude toward Italy and Italian citizens within the Turkish dominions, and began to encourage the already serious revolt against Italy in the provinces of Tripoli and Cirenaica, which had been left to her by the Treaty of Lausanne after the recent Italo-

Turkish war. Since the outbreak of the war the summer before, followed by the bracing-up of Turkey through the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople, Turkey had shown much insolence toward Italy. In November Turkish officials had invaded the Italian Consulate of Hodeida and seized the British Consul. He had, after a long diplomatic wrangle, been released, and on Italy's firmness the matter had been adjusted in February (8). The Consul had been released, excuses had been made, and due honors had been rendered to the Italian flag; but the feeling had always remained. The diplomatic situation soon became more tense, and the capture of a Turkish vessel, laden both with arms and munitions of war, and with the even more potent "sinews of war," despatched by Turkey to the already hostile Senussi in Cirenaica, led to an immediate explosion on the part of the Italian Press, and a general demand that the equivocal situation should cease. Contemporaneously, Italian citizens endeavoring to leave Asia Minor were obstructed by the Turkish authorities, and after an ultimatum had been sent by the Italian Government without any satisfactory response, Italy, on the 20th of August (1915), declared war against Turkey, and some two months later (October 10) against Bulgaria.

The Isonzo line, where, as has been stated, the Italians elected to make their supreme effort, was well adapted for defense from the Austrian side. The Austrians believed it impregnable, with its hills and mountains, and deep, winding river rushing swiftly between them to debouch at last into the plain, and finish its course as though trying to escape the frowning guard of the Carso. Of this line the two pillars are Monte Nero and the Carso, the former rearing its huge bulk as a vast buttress of the Julian Alps above the passes that lead down to Cividale, and thence to Udine and the Venetian Plain; and above Tolmino where the Isonzo has through the ages cut its way through, swerving by Plava around Monte Kuk; on between Monte San Grado on the East, and Monte Sabotino on the West; on, under

Podgora, by Gorizia and thence on through the open plain. The Carso is a huge, high, rocky table-land between Gorizia and the Adriatic, bordering the Gulf of Trieste from Monfalcone almost to Trieste. Between these two mighty pillars lie other mountains that guard the Isonzo River line. Most of these are on the Austrian or Eastern bank, but Monte Sabotino is on the Western side and, while higher up, where the river has cut a great gorge through by Plava, the Austrians were at the very first driven, or retired behind the Isonzo, they held on grimly to Monte Sabotino and the Podgora, as the keys to Gorizia and the passway to Trieste.

In the beginning, in June, 1915, the Italians had forced the crossing of the Isonzo at Plava, and established a bridge-head on the hill of Plava, above the Eastern bank. This they extended till they had got Zagora on the lower slope of Monte Kuk, north of Gorizia. With the same dash they had early seized and established themselves on Monte Nero, though only after desperate fighting, and with losses which were too heavy to be published. General Cadorna's bulletins gave only the barest facts. His very reticence, however, and absence of all declamation inspired a new confidence in him. But the Italians, though weaker in artillery, had won against the Austrians, and had wrested from them one of their most impregnable defenses in the Julian Alps. It was a measure of spiritual forces between the two Peoples, and Italians had won. So, though the cost had been great, Italy rejoiced. She felt that she had the Generals, she had the men. They had given her the fruits of their genius and valor. Those were great days, those early weeks of what Italy came to speak of as "Our war." Hardly a week passed that did not register the capture of some mountain or valley, town or village, whose name meant to Italy enough to mark her security and her glory.

With Russia being driven steadily back and Serbia held up and in danger of breaking, it was necessary for Italy to push forward. In the Trentino she had driven as far Northward as she could till the snows should begin to give way and she had, as she felt, established her position there. But the

region at the head of the Adriatic was still open, and on fine days Gorizia—beyond the Isonzo—still shone in the autumn sunlight, guarded by Sabotino and the Podgora. To the Southward, beyond Gorizia, the passes led on to Trieste, guarded by the Carso; moreover, a foe as grim as the Austrians was on the way. The Cholera had come with the Austrian reinforcements from the Eastward, and no time was to be lost. Should the Austrians break through, they might be stopped; should the Cholera break through, all Italy might be swept. It did not break through, and the skill with which it was barred was one of Italy's claims to gratitude on the part of her Allies.

Both the Sabotino and the Carso had to be taken to make good Italy's aspiration, if not to save the Cause. All summer the Italians, their right wing under the Duke d'Aosta, had been fighting forward foot by foot. The Carso was carried once to the very top, but flesh and blood could not stand the fierce fire, shell-fire, that swept the rocky plateau, with no shelter nor means of improvising shelter. It was at the end of October when the Italians began the great attack on Monte Sabotino. With only the organization and equipment of that early period of the war the position was impregnable. What valor and devotion could accomplish was accomplished; but neither Sabotino nor the Carso was carried till the summer of 1916, and the latter not completely till much later. The ground, however, was laid during that autumn and winter of 1915, and heroism was never displayed more unmeasuredly in Italy or elsewhere than in those bitter months, when the Italians, keyed to the limit of endurance, dashed in wave after wave of desperate valor only to break in crimsoned foam upon impregnable cliffs. Yet, as the sheerest headland may in time be tunnelled by the recurrent waves, who shall deny that the persistent storming by the Italian soldiery in that autumn and winter prepared the way for the final capture of the Sabotino, the Podgora, the Bainsizza Ridge, Monte Santo, San Gabriele; of the Carso, and finally of the whole of now redeemed Italy! It was the spirit which underlay,

inspired, and informed that long and desperate adventure that led Italy to gird herself anew for her protracted and arduous task of reorganization, reconstruction, re-establishment, and reapplication of all her forces, economic and military, to the vast labor, sacrifice, and endurance that now opened before her.

The year 1915 closed without the war having been brought apparently nearer to an end. Although there had been a certain shifting of relations, it could not be said that any distinct advantage had been gained on either side which gave promise of an early settlement. In France, while there had been a certain change in the situation which made it probable that the German armies would not be likely to make a great advance again, the latter had dug themselves in from the North Sea to the Swiss border, and held within their lines nearly the whole of Belgium and substantially a dozen departments of France. The Germans, however, were to a great extent shut in by the Allies' blockade from the seas beyond the North Sea, and even in the North Sea her action was limited. Wherever elements of the British and German fleets had met, the results had been in favor of England save in one engagement in the Pacific, where the Germans had outmaneuvered the British. On the other hand, to meet this she was speeding up her submarine campaign and was intensifying, in every way in her power, her "policy of Frightfulness." She was sinking passenger-ships. She had built and was now using her Zeppelins in raids which dropped bombs indiscriminately on towns fortified and unfortified, and was pushing her campaign of moral effect in every direction conceivable. Her organization for propaganda throughout all countries had reached extraordinary proportions, causing great anxiety among the Allies and those in sympathy with them. German organization was beginning to impress the world, and her propaganda was telling in many directions. Against this the Allies' action at sea touching neutrals was creating much irritation and causing lack of sympathy. The attempt to capture Constantinople had failed miserably, and

Gallipoli had finally been evacuated in December. The expedition into Mesopotamia had a like fate of failure. In both enterprises the greatest courage and resolution had been shown without the necessary organization. On the other hand, Salonika had been occupied, though whether it could be permanently held was still a question, and the movements against the German Colonies had met with general success. The African Colonies had been largely occupied, and the German forces there were everywhere on the defensive.

On the Russian front the Central Empires had been largely successful. The Russian armies had been driven back substantially all along the line, and had lost all that had been gained in the beginning of the war. The Tzar had taken personal charge of the command of his armies. These occupied a line some 200 miles east of Warsaw. It was known that something was wrong, but what it was no one quite knew.

On the other hand, England was now aroused to the gravity of the situation and all of her forces were beginning to be marshalled. The great British Dominions were now aroused. In the sequel 3,000,000 men joined the colors by voluntary enlistment!

On the long right wing of the line of the Allies where Bulgaria had come in, not only had Russia been driven back, but Serbia had been destroyed; a month later, Montenegro had been overrun and crushed, and Turkey had been reorganized and strengthened. Italy alone had a clear success to show for her work.

CHAPTER XVI

ITALY AND THE ALLIED CAUSE IN 1916

THE year 1916 opened with the situation of the Allies far from satisfactory. The economic forces of the struggle, however, were beginning to be considered and brought into exercise. It was one of the crucial periods of the war, for Germany and Austria had got their "second wind," and had utilized the intervening months to create new forces that brought the War into a new phase. And from now on, Italy's action must be considered in connection with the whole field of operations.

The New Year was ushered in with the announcement of the Declaration of war on Austria and Bulgaria by the de facto Government of Albania, a step in which Italy had a large part. It was also signalized by the news of Austria's reply to President Wilson's second note on the sinking of the Italian passenger-ship *Ancona*. The reply was termed a "come-down," but was immediately followed by news of the sinking of a P. & O. passenger-boat in the Eastern Mediterranean—*The Persia*.

Italy was now well aware that the struggle before her was to be long and bitter. If there had ever been any illusions that her entrance in the War would terminate it quickly, they had been dispelled. It was now War à outrance and to a finish. She adjusted herself to prosecute it with all her power. The snow in the Alps rendered any great advance on either side impossible in those regions in the winter months; but positions were fortified and preparations made to take advantage of the first opportunity.

Montenegro was a source of anxiety—Albania was the same. The key to the Cattaro was the Lovcen, the peak which commanded it. The Montenegrins needed guns to defend it. Finally guns were sent. The morning after they arrived, and before they could be taken ashore, an Austrian Squadron dashed out of the Cattaro and sank the vessel,

with the guns on her, in the harbor. The Austrians, on January 10, carried the peak by assault. On the 14th the Austrians, pushing forward, captured Cetinje, the capital of Montenegro, with important military stores.

Italy, for her part, was preparing for an offensive which should capture Gorizia and open the way to Trieste and the Balkans. Roads were being constructed; supplies accumulated; her manufactories for war material of all kinds enlarged and "speeded up," and all preparations were being pushed forward for an offensive as near *al fondo* as possible.

The Austrians were now pushing forward in Albania, and about January 23 occupied the town of Scutari. In the end of January (28) the Italians occupied the town of Durazzo, and set to work to rescue the remnant of the Serbian army, which together with some twenty odd thousand Austrian prisoners had, after one of the most tragic retreats in History, reached the coast in a starving condition. Offers of assistance were tendered in this work, but Italy preferred to undertake the main part of it herself, and although relief supplies and a certain number of ships were contributed by others, she mainly performed the work of transportation. The troops, which numbered some 80,000 men and boys, mainly without organization, were got off and taken to Corfu for rest and reorganization; the Austrian prisoners were brought off and distributed in various prison-camps; the refugee and the civil population were taken to Italy. It was a laborious and difficult work, but was successfully performed.

Durazzo was not tenable permanently and, after the Serbian soldiers and the refugees had been removed, the town was evacuated and Italy proceeded to establish her position at Valona and extend her lines from that base, with a view to co-operating, as she did eventually, with the Allied forces based on Salonika, where General Sarraill was in command. Of these forces Italy formed the left wing. The centre and right wing were composed of the French, the British, the Greeks, Russians, and, later, the Serbians.

The failure of Italy to prevent the occupation of Monte-

negro was the subject of sharp criticism in the press of England and France. It was referred to caustically in the British House of Commons, and this was so hotly resented in Italy that there was danger that the press polemic which ensued might have serious consequences. Italy was in no mood to stand further insinuations of bad faith. The German propaganda was as active as ever. The counter-charge was made by the Italian press that the only way to have saved Montenegro was through saving Serbia, and that the responsibility for the failure to accomplish this lay, not at Italy's door, but at that of England and France.

The crushing of Serbia and the incidental crumbling of Montenegro had been a grave blow to her. And the charge made by Serbia and intimated by the other Allies that Italy had failed to do all in her power to relieve them rankled in her heart. Both the capture of Lovcen, the key to the Cattaro, and the seizure by the French of Corfu (January 14) were a shock to Italian pride, and Italy sent a detachment over to Corfu and mounted the Italian flag beside those of France and England. A few days later (January 17) Montenegro capitulated unconditionally to Austria, who was said to have demanded the surrender of all arms and the giving of hostages. The story soon got about that King Nicholas, who had escaped and was now in Paris, had made a secret treaty with Austria to save his People and Dynasty. However this was, a little later Montenegrin forces were in the field again.

Just at the time that Montenegro obtained her peace by unconditional surrender, the Italians attacked the Austrians on the ridge of Oslavia, and recaptured the trenches which they had recently lost, and, continuing their assault with great resolution against desperate resistance, regained and re-established themselves finally in their dearly won position on the heights to the Northwest of Gorizia. It was a good start for the coming offensive, and may be said to have been the beginning of a year of desperate and uninterrupted fighting, in which the ultimate issue of the war was as much at stake as, later, on the Meuse or the Somme.

The situation in Italy, however, was now causing serious, if carefully concealed, concern to the other Allies. The tone of the Press, where not censored, was acrid; the attitude toward France especially was growing more and more one of exasperation. Italy was manifesting signs of feeling isolated and of being treated without consideration. She knew that they were suspicious of her; that they were saying that she was not putting forth all her powers; that she was sparing her men and her ships; that she was trying to keep at peace with Germany; that she was waiting only to realize her own aspirations to make a separate peace. The Allies' attitude toward neutral ships was not only causing irritation among the neutrals, but in Italy as well, where it resulted in holding up and delaying shipments of necessities of war and of life: grain, coal, oil, etc., on which her very existence depended.

In February (11), 1916, Monsieur Briand came down to Rome to visit the Ally of France. It was held by some that he came to see what was going on in Italy, and to secure from Italy closer and stronger co-operation against Germany. He made an excellent impression and accomplished much of what he came for. Whether he secured immediately much more of the "closer co-operation," which was heralded as the motive of his visit, may be a question. The simple fact is, that all of the Allies had at that time about all the burden they could carry. They were all pursuing, in addition to the general policy somewhat loosely defined, some individual aim, and had not yet awakened to the necessity of merging their special interests and of flinging all into the one scale to win the war. It required the shock of manifestly approaching defeat to awaken them to the peril of so fatuous a policy.

It was in February, 1916, that the German armies under the Crown Prince launched their attack against the French fortress of Verdun, which the Crown Prince had almost completely invested back in the early autumn of 1914, when the defeat of the movement on Paris compelled him to relinquish his prize. That he had not captured Verdun

had without doubt been a blow to his prestige, and this probably explains in part the sacrifice of men in the third attempt which he made.¹ The ancient fortress was now defended by a modern system of intrenchments, which had been made in the autumn of 1914 by General Sarraill, who was later sent out to command in the Balkans. They curved around across the Meuse in a blunt salient to the North, some eight or ten miles below Verdun, through the plain of the Woëvre, and so back to the heights of the Meuse at Les Eparges. The position constituted a menace to the Germans in any advance they might attempt to make to move on Paris, and was a constant reminder of the failure of the Crown Prince to capture it both in September, 1914, and in 1915, when he had again attempted fruitlessly to obtain possession of the place. After a series of movements in other directions, which were intended simply to distract attention from their real object, the Germans, who had massed heavy guns and all other necessary material for the purpose, launched this attack from the North, on the East side of the Meuse. The bombardment began on the 16th of February, and the Infantry were sent forward to the assault on the 21st.

Under the shock of the terrific and continued attack the French recoiled at first, and for a brief space it looked as if the attack had been successful. Not only military reasons, however, but also political reasons demanded that Verdun should be held. Thus this struggle was not only a fight to the death between assailants and assailed, but became, as it were, a tug of war between the two nations to prove which was fundamentally the better. The contest lasted substantially the whole year, but the French won. It was one of the decisive movements of the war.

On the 25th of February arrived Pétain with his reinforcing army in automobiles, and the German advance was repulsed on the east side of the Meuse. In the autumn the

¹ Von Tirpitz states that as early as October, 1914, he was informed by the competent Officer at G. H. Q. that "Verdun was not attacked any more on account of the shortage of ammunition, as it was not desired to expose the Crown Prince's army to a reverse." (Von Tirpitz's *Memoirs*, I, p. 51, n.)

French forced them back a sufficient distance to render safe from them the spot where Verdun stood, and finally, about mid-December, established their line beyond danger of being driven out. The battle of Verdun, however, was over by mid-July. Its full cost to Germany will possibly never be known. It was enough.

When the Germans were held up at the end of June, the main fighting in France was transferred to the Somme region, where for weeks the fighting raged which had begun with the Battle of the Somme, and was continued on until what is known as the Battle of the Ancre in November brought the British to within a few miles of Bapaume and the French to the edge of Péronne. It was the high tide of Allied success that year on the French front.

While this Titanic struggle went on, taking every man and gun that was in France, the struggle elsewhere was not less bitter. The fight for Mesopotamia and the control of the strategic points on the traffic ways between the West and the East had so far proved a fiasco for England. A brave endeavor had been made to relieve General Townshend, who was now shut up closely in Kut-El-Amara when almost in sight of Bagdad; but it failed and at the end of April (29) General Townshend was forced to surrender. Later on, the disaster was retrieved by the expedition under General Maude and his successor, General Allenby. But for the time being, it was a serious setback for the Allies. Only in the nearer East was there light, where on the same day (February 16) that Germany began the attack on Verdun, Erzeroum with its stores fell into the hands of the Russians, who pushed on Westward and captured Trebizond. They then pushed Southward, but were later driven back. The way to Bagdad was effectually barred till the following year.

The Turks were now sufficiently encouraged to cause anxiety in Egypt, both to the Eastward and to the Westward, and England began to take more serious measures.

On May 21 the Battle of Jutland was fought between the battle-fleets of England and Germany (the former called the Grand Fleet, the latter called the High Seas Fleet). It was

the greatest naval battle of the war—perhaps of any war—and the most obscure. It is still being fought over. England's first report of the battle made it appear almost as a defeat. Germany decorated her streets as for a victory. But the German High Seas Fleet never came out again to fight, and eventually, after the defeat of her armies, was surrendered in mass to the Allies, and was brought captive into a British port by the British Grand Fleet, under command of the Admiral who had led the attack that forced the Jutland fight.

It was to Italy that many eyes were turned in the early part of 1916, amid the gloom of the destruction of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania; the invigoration of Turkey and Bulgaria; the obscurity of Greece; the increase in the submarine campaign, and the murderous persistence of the attack on Verdun—Italy, without coal, grain, or metal save what she could obtain with difficulty; with scarcely anything in sufficient quantity—Italy not yet at war with Germany, nor certain that she would be; with her Sphinx-like Minister for Foreign Affairs, and her strong political antiwar element; with her men, amid the measureless snows of the Trentine and Carnic and Julian Alps, driving, in Arctic cold, under incredible hardships, tunnels through mountains of ice and rock, scaling icy precipices, swinging their cables across vast gorges.—Would she stand it? Could she stand it?

As the spring drew nearer it was evident that Italy was irrevocably bent on getting Gorizia and Trieste, and Austria-Hungary began to feel the need of some action that would weaken the incessant drive that Italy was making on the Isonzo front, and relieve herself from the ever-increasing pressure toward Gorizia and Trieste. Moreover, the "gradual advance of the Italians into the Trentino, which was approaching closer and closer to the main lines of his defense, aroused in the enemy a desire to free himself from a pressure which was growing more threatening."¹ Russia

¹ Review of Trentino Operations, dated August 6, 1916, published by Italian Press, August 7, 1916.

had been driven back sufficiently to give Austria a freer hand on her western and southern front, but was preparing for another attempt later on. Germany was being held up at Verdun. The time appeared ripe for a blow at Italy before Russia should be ready. Austria accordingly made carefully elaborate secret preparations for an offensive against Italy through the Trentino. Here Italy had pushed forward the year before, capturing mountain peaks and valleys, as fortune followed her, in her movement on Trent, until the winter caught her holding among the peaks and precipices a line irregularly advanced; not always well consolidated, and in places not capable of consolidation until other peaks should be secured.

East of Lake Garda, where the Austrians had, in 1866, laid down their frontier, the line ran deepest down into Italy, a little north of Rivoli, and not a great distance north of Verona and Vicenza, which it threatened. This line the Italians had pushed back till, speaking in a general way, it ran eastward from south of Rovero to north of the Col Santo supported by the great Pasubio, on across the Val Maggio and the Val Sugana, following the old frontier to Monte Gallo, and on northwest of Borgo.

From Trent a half-dozen valleys run east, south, and west, divided by mountain ridges between which communication is difficult, thus affording to the Austrians the choice of a half-dozen corridors down which to conduct their attack, which, if pushed through, would reach the Venetian Plain, cut in behind the Italian army on the Isonzo and sever irremediably their communications. Elaborate preparations were made for a drive *al fondo*. Some 2,000 guns, including many great guns, were assembled from every part of the Austrian front, and some from the German—the noted 420 mms. which had done such effective work in Belgium. It was reported that from the Val Lagarina to the Val Sugana there was a gun for every twenty yards, a number of them the most powerful guns in existence. The Grandduke Charles, the heir to the throne, was brought to Trent to take personal command, with General Conrad von Hoetzendorf

as his chief of staff, than whom no man hated Italy more. It was intended to parallel the German move which was giving the Crown Prince of Germany the supposititious honor of capturing Verdun. It would impress the Austrian Peoples. The offensive was termed the "Punitive Expedition." Italy was to be "punished for her treachery." Italy knew "the Huns" and had cause to know them. Over sixty invasions had penetrated those plains, or nearly penetrated them, since Ancient times when Rome began to defend them. Their history was the history of Italy's blackest hours. Once more the Huns were hammering at her gates—everything had been prepared for a rapid and tremendous push into the Venetian Plain. "Vast depots of food, clothes, equipment, medicines, and, above all, of ammunition," had been established.

The Italians soon became aware of the portentous preparations being made for the offensive, and in view of their magnitude were naturally anxious. General Cadorna, after making a careful tour of inspection of the Trentino lines, moved his headquarters at the end of April to this Sector, taking them up with the First Army, whose commander was soon afterward removed on the ground that insufficient provision for defense had been made against an attack in such force.


The offensive began on May 14, with an artillery bombardment of great violence along the entire Italian front, from East to West, from the Carso to the Giudicaria. It soon became evident, however, that the real assault was on the Trentino front, on the sector between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana. Here, after a terrific bombardment, the Infantry in great masses were launched to the attack under an artillery cover unprecedented on that front in violence or effectiveness. Eighteen divisions, or some 400,000 men and some 2,000 guns, were employed in the offensive. The Austrians knew every foot of ground: mountain and valley, and their attack was admirably planned and well carried out. Both Artillery and Infantry were skilfully handled. The Italian advanced positions were swept away by the

flood of shell poured out on them. Then, under the tremendous bombardment of the great guns, moved forward as required, other positions were rendered untenable. From point after point, position after position, the Italians were driven, with increasing losses in men and guns. Austria's dream appeared on the eve of realization. If the Italians could drive up-hill, the Austrians could certainly drive down-hill, and drive they did, their massed and powerful artillery, used steadily with great ability and success, and rendered more potent with the increasing momentum derived from each captured peak or shoulder, valley and village, ever pressing down toward the opening to the plain beyond the rolling Piedmont, where Italy, her flank cut into, her armies divided, her people stampeded, must, Austria believed, sue for peace. The mountain flanks of sheer rock afforded no shelter against such a continuous storm of shells. No intrenchments were possible. Under the pressure of the vastly preponderant artillery,¹ sweeping mountain crest and flank, valley and roadway, Cadorna was forced to withdraw his centre back beyond the Posina torrent, with the abandonment of much that had been won at such cost in the preceding year. It was a difficult and dangerous step. If accomplished successfully, it would be a skilful manceuvre; if not, it would be a break in his line which might involve more than the fate of his army. Refugees, their homes now abandoned, were pouring down toward the plain from the villages with all their movable belongings: their flocks and cattle and household stuff, to escape the heavy shelling and onrush of "the Huns," adding to the confusion and peril. But Cadorna was an able General, and especially able at organization, and the movement was accomplished successfully, and what might have proved an irremediable disaster was, in the sequel, only a reverse—a serious reverse, it is true, but one that was recovered from in time. Not an available place for a stand but was held tenaciously, and fought for until beyond hope of being held longer; not an inch was

¹ The Italians reckoned that the Austrians outnumbered them four to one in this offensive in both guns and men.



THE TRENTINO OFFENSIVE, MAY-JUNE, 1916.



yielded without a struggle, and the cost to the enemy was dear. By the 22d of May Cadorna had got his line back to a position where the army could be thrown and held in fighting shape and effectively manœuvred, and although it was forced back yet farther, and the losses were immense, it was ever a fighting force to be reckoned with, and it held until sufficient reinforcements could be brought up, first to stay the oncoming tide, which threatened to overwhelm Italy, and then to sweep it back with immense losses beyond the Italian confines, almost to the original lines before the offensive began.

When the Austrians renewed their attack (May 24) after a brief respite, due to their need in view of the stiffening resistance of the Italians to reorganize their attacking force, it was with increased violence, and the Italians were forced by sheer weight yet farther South toward the open country, until they were almost down on the plain where lay with bated breath awaiting the issue Vicenza, Verona, Padua, and many another fair Italian city, and beyond them the roads to the heart of Italy. Here the Italians made their stand and maintained it till the end.

If the time had been well utilized by the Austrian General, it had been even better utilized by Cadorna. During these weeks of furious fighting Cadorna had availed himself of the one advantage he had over the enemy: the inner line, and he had been organizing an army to support or, if necessary, take the place of Brussati's worn-down and wasted forces.

The order to draw up this plan for mobilizing a new army was given one morning in May (21). It was ready the following morning. By midnight that night the first troops of the new army were on the march.¹ Cadorna had drawn troops from many directions, and had assembled around Vicenza an army of over 400,000 men, fully equipped and ready to take the field. It was an accomplishment worthy of any general and any people in History.

The gravity of the situation was now well understood

¹ *Italy in the War*, Sidney Low, p. 133.

throughout Italy, and she had girded herself to make her stand to the death beyond the plain which had been the prize and the grave of so many invading armies.

When June came in the Italians, after two weeks of as fierce and unremitting battle as had taken place in the war, with every advantage save one against them, had made their last stand above and across the mouths of the valleys that opened on the Venetian Plain, and the Austrians, believing themselves victorious, were pressing forward with all the ardor born of success and lust of loot, and heightened by the furious desire to wreak their vengeance on an enemy whom their Emperor had denounced to them as having betrayed Austria. "The men," said the Report of the Italian Supreme Command, "were promised an easy invasion and the sacking of our rich Countryside and wealthy cities, where the victorious troops would find food and pleasures¹ in abundance." But when men stand on the threshold of their home to defend their own, new forces come to birth in their souls.

A few days later (June 3) General Cadorna, confident of the stability of his army, now strung to the highest pitch by the peril to their Patria, announced to his Government that the immediate danger of invasion of Italy was past. The Italians had stopped the Austrians. The latter were now dashing in impotent rage against the Italian lines. The Italians had been ordered to hold them to the death, and they held them. Cadorna now was forming a plan by which he hoped to inflict a memorable defeat on "the Huns," and perhaps destroy their invading army. He would contain them with his centre, which was drawn back for the purpose, and at the proper moment would attack simultaneously along their right and left flank, and if possible cut them off. Reinforcements were from the first hurried forward as fast as possible, and at the right time the new army was thrown in, and the fortune of the struggle and of the war was changed—as it was changed when Pétain rushed

¹ By this term the Italians understood was intended the handing over of the Italian women to the Austrian soldiery.

his new army in automobiles to Verdun to relieve the hard-pressed troops who had held so well the defenses of that pass to Paris. The Italians knew now that Italy herself was at stake, and all Italy was now in the fight. For some time, notwithstanding Cadorna's encouraging announcement, the issue appeared to hang in the balance. Austria, balked at the very moment of seizing the prize, as she deemed it, was loath to relinquish her aim, and continued to hurl her masses against the Italian positions, only to break in foam against them. Their force was spent, and as the Italians grew stronger the tide turned. By the middle of June the Italian General knew from "the sporadic character of the Enemy's attacks; the diversity and distance of the objectives they aimed at, the very improvidence and the almost desperate violence of the actions which were followed by periods of exhaustion," that these final expressions of the Enemy's offensive activity were not guided by any organized scheme.

On June 16 the Italian Counter-offensive began on both flanks of the Austrian Army, and although the latter fought with desperation, the *slancio* of the Italians soon began to tell, and a few days later the Austrians began to withdraw their big guns preparatory to retiring, and about the end of June Cadorna, pressing his advantage, began to push them back. Back, back he pushed them, still fighting fiercely—recapturing point by point, peak after peak, and valley after valley, until early in July he had substantially recouped the disaster of May and driven the Austrians back almost to the lines to which they had been driven the year before. Only in a few sectors were they able to hold any substantial gains. But like their Allies and kindred, the Germans, the Austrians in their retreat destroyed the villages, or what remained of them, through which they were driven. It is a racial trait which Caesar remarks on in his Commentaries on the Gallic War. The Austrian losses in killed and wounded were reckoned by the Italians at over 100,000. But their great loss was their failure, notwithstanding their vast effort, to win through to the Italian

plains; their loss of prestige with the Italians. Like the battle of the Marne, to which it has been resembled in its results, it was a turning-point in the war not only for Italy; but for the Allied cause.

The reversal of the tide of invasion had a strong moral effect in Italy. The Italian armies had beaten the Austrians a second time, holding superior positions and with superior artillery, and this time flushed with victory.

It was certainly a fact that Russia's action in turning with her reorganized armies on Austria-Hungary in early June, and pushing vigorously her new offensive which wrested from Austria territory which Austria had taken from Russia the summer before, not only prevented Austria from bringing more troops over to the Trentino battle from the Russian front, but distracted Austria's attention from the Trentino offensive and centred it now on the Russian front, where serious peril once more threatened her. It was the second time that Russia had come to the aid of the Western Allies. But while acknowledging this, the Italians felt, and had a right to feel, that they had won through the superior moral and military qualities of the Italians, for in fact they had done so. Also they had on their side rendered to Russia a great service, when turning on the Austrians they had dogged their heels, holding them continually engaged, and preventing Austria's despatching earlier to the Eastern front the nine divisions which she had contemplated sending to stay the new Russian advance. Further, Italy had by her supreme effort and the aid rendered the Russians materially assisted the other Allies, who later on when Russia fell out of the fight felt instantly the immeasurable difference.

Not unnaturally, in the tense condition of the public mind in Italy, all sorts of rumors became current as to the cause of the success of the Austrians' attack, and naturally there was much looking about to find a scapegoat. The losses in men and material of war had been enormous, and it had been a close thing, but they had saved Italy. The Government had been very reticent regarding matters that were in

every heart and on every tongue. There was even question as to how far Italy herself remained unshaken.

Premier Salandra and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Sonnino, were recognized as the strong men in the Cabinet; but they "ran things" in their own way and vouchsafed little information to the country, which was not only tingling with nervousness over the situation; but was stirred to its depths and was ready to make extreme sacrifices. It wanted, however, to know the exact situation—to be taken into the confidence of the Government—to feel that the whole country was admitted to its share of the responsibility and the patriotism in this crisis, and especially was entitled to the contribution of all its powers to the service of the Patria. England and France had shown the way. Sonnino was silent; Salandra was aloof.

The Parliament had assembled on June 6, in the midst of the tense anxiety of the days which racked Italy from the Carnic Alps to the extreme point of Sicily. Even Cadorna's message that the danger of the immediate invasion of Italy was for the present past, had not reassured completely the profoundly moved public opinion. The fight was still going on; the hospitals were growing ever more crowded; the trains were still stuffed with soldiers being rushed to the battle-front, where the losses, magnified by rumor, were touching the remotest regions of Italy. Italy wanted to know the true situation. The Chamber met. The Premier insisted on his programme: the discussion of the routine business of the Government. It meant that no explanations, no confidences would be given. The Chamber rebelled. The Premier was firm. Back in March (19) the Chamber had given him a vote of confidence of 394 to 61. But neither he nor Sonnino was popular personally. They had the respect, but not the personal friendship of the Chamber.

Salandra, in a debate afterward, said, in rejecting some appeal against his policy, that the Chamber had "supported the Government." "Yes," replied one of his opponents, "as the rope supports the hanged." The Premier made an

angry retort which was not forgotten. About the same time he made a speech in the North, in which a phrase or two were caught at as infelicitous. And finally, in his speech in the Chamber, he uttered a phrase which was taken as a criticism of the General Staff that tended to create want of confidence in the army. He stated that it must be frankly recognized that "had the positions been better prepared and better defended, they would have held out longer." Just then Cadorna was regarded as the saviour of the country, and the criticism was highly resented. But the real reason for the Parliamentary crisis lay in the profound feeling of the Country that something of unmeasured seriousness was going on which might have vast consequences and that the Country was not sufficiently informed about it. The Official Socialists were against him because he was for fighting the war through; the Interventionist Nationalists because he had not declared war against Germany; the Giolittians on general principles of loyalty to their leader. So, when on June 10 he demanded a vote of blind confidence, the vote stood against him. Two days later he announced his resignation.

His overthrow and resignation, when it had taken place, were somewhat of a regret to many of those who had accomplished it. For although not popular, he had the respect of even his opponents, and there was no one in sight to handle the reins and guide with as much firmness. Sonnino could do it; but he stood in the same relation to Parliament with Salandra, and had even less address in handling the Chamber. It was rumored that Salandra was not averse to laying down the reins under the circumstances and, to employ another metaphor, that he had "ridden for a fall." In this exigency, with the enemy at the gates, Giolitti was considered to be out of the question. Eyes were turned only toward those who were associated with Italian Independence. What was felt to be needed was the union of all forces in defense and a leader who could rally them. A national Cabinet, such as had been tried in France and England—not with any great success, it was true, but still

as a working machine—might meet the exigency and tend to satisfying conflicting interests, and dividing the responsibility. In the crisis the King came back to Rome. His presence had a tranquillizing effect and his broad views clarified the situation. A National Ministry was formed under the presidency of Signor Boselli, the Nestor of the House, whose life was associated with the idea of Italian Independence and Italian greatness.

Paolo Boselli had been a fighter in the great days of the Risorgimento, when Italian genius turned what might have been the red glow of a dying day into the effulgent splendor of a rising sun. He had served with Garibaldi, and his name and fame were a link with Italian glory. He was the head of the Dante Alighieri Society, whose literary name represented only partially its far-reaching patriotic Nationalist scope and aim. He was an old man, bordering on eighty; but in Italy young statesmen are the exception. He was an orator with a ringing voice; a devoted patriot, of broad and catholic views, and when he spoke he could ever command the attention of the House. Men forgot his age and listened to the flowing eloquence that sprang from a broad patriotism, founded on all that Italy aspired to, and, freed from all suspicion of personal interest, pointing ever to the goal of Italian Redemption and Italian Glory. Though the Nestor of the Chamber, he had never held high position in the Government, but this was remedied by his being given the Collar of the Annunciata. And he had, to close with, also a faculty for harmonizing conflicting views. Thus, he was the person eminently fitted to preside over a National Cabinet. With him were associated Sonnino, who retained the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the leaders of both the Socialist and Clerical groups and parties. The former was Signor Leonidas Bissolati. He was one of the great Italians. He might have lived in the time of Brutus, or Cato, or Mazzini and, so far as his powers permitted, have been their peer. Like Mazzini, he had been a Republican, but, for the general good, subordinated his principles regarding the form of Government to the substance of Liberty under

a Constitutional Sovereign, who lived and reigned for the People. He was an orator of a high order, in virtue of his sincerity and profound earnestness and devotion to the cause of the People. He had at one time edited the *Avanti*, the Socialist organ; but when the war came he broke with the Official Socialists, who opposed Italy's entry in the war, and as soon as Italy entered the war he enlisted, was seriously wounded, and being incapacitated from further service in the trenches, returned to his duties as a Deputy, and became one of the forces which pushed the war against Austria, and later against Germany. He was not a good politician, but was an independent thinker and a statesman of vision and lofty purpose. His adhesion to the new Cabinet was an element of strength for it.

When the history of this war shall be fully written and the final assessment of its great events and their consequences shall be made, the great Austrian offensive down the Trentino will be reckoned one of the critical events of the struggle and its defeat one of the masterly campaigns as well as one of the turning-points in the war. If Cadorna miscalculated Austrian intentions in the beginning and failed, as Salandra said, to provide better for guarding the gates of Italy, he quickly repaired the error, and by the creation and handling of his new army added to his old one, proved himself a great general in the field no less than in his Headquarters' cabinet.

The work of the Italian Army in its counter-stroke, of staff and line alike, was not excelled by anything anywhere during the war. They forced the Austrians back when in sight of their prey; clung to them doggedly throughout the entire retreat; wrenched from them substantially all they had seized; inflicted on them immense losses, and saved not only Italy but probably the Allied cause. For had Austria succeeded in defeating Italy and forcing her to sue for Peace, she would certainly have occupied Lombardy and, conjecturally, Piedmont and have menaced France's South-eastern frontier. Verdun might not have held out; Paris might have fallen, and Versailles might have witnessed a

Peace Conference with the Central Empires and the Allies in reversed rôles from those played in June, 1919.

Baron Sonnino remained at the head of the Foreign Office, and continued the most dominant force in the new Cabinet. He and Bissolati did not always get on well together, for each was a man of strong convictions, and eventually they clashed so irremediably that Bissolati resigned. But this was not until after the Armistice, and during the war they worked in harmony, at least, to the extent of presenting publicly a united front to the enemy.

Besides these were Orlando, a man of high gifts, who took the Interior, and Meda the clerical Representative; and Scialoia, who later on followed Sonnino and Titoni as head of the Foreign Office.

As soon as the peril of the Austrian Trentino offensive was over, and while the Italians were still pushing them back through the higher Alps of that region, and while the battle was still muttering around the Montecitorio, Cadorna began to force his way with renewed energy toward Gorizia and the passes leading to Trieste. It can hardly be said that the operations here had ever ceased; for all Spring had gone on what would have been considered in any other war a general engagement. Moreover, the preparations for the great movement, which was being planned for the moment when all should be ready, were unremitting. Roads were being built under conditions so difficult that their construction appeared a marvel of engineering and would have been so a little time back even for the Italian *Genio*: the performer of marvels. Matériel of war was being accumulated for an offensive on a scale hitherto undreamed of in Italy.

In the first determined advance on this line a new weapon was used by the Austrians—the asphyxiating gas, the deadliest and wickedest of all the weapons yet conceived by man.

The Italians had knowledge of it and masks had been made to meet the danger; but they were primitive and inadequate. The training with them, which men were required later to go through, had not yet been devised. The

officers could not yet give intelligent orders nor the men cheer with the masks on, and when the Italians were sent forward, they either did not have masks that were protective or they took them off, and the result was a loss that was ghastly. Seven thousand men are said to have been stricken in this appalling fashion, during the attack, with a tale of officers that substantially exterminated them. Against so murderous a weapon the attack at the moment failed of its farthest objective; but for all that it was only a postponement, and a little later the offensive was pushed with a resolution and carried forward with a desperate ardor that knew no abatement.

Every branch of the Italian service was brought into full exercise in this supreme effort and, what is more, every one met the demands made on it. The Italian military units mainly retain their old nomenclature, as such and such a regiment or other command—of Genoa, Milan, Turin, Venice, Florence, Naples, Palermo, etc., but under the system adopted in later years, while Liguria, Lombardy, Tuscany, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia, etc., are still commemorated in the names of the Regiments or Battalions that shed lustre on them in the past, these commands are composed of troops representative of every region in Italy, the intention being to give the troops the feeling of being national and representative not of a province or city however renowned, but of Italy: Mother and Patria of all. Within these general lines there are certain corps which have a special prestige, as demanding certain qualifications for admission, such as the Cavalry, the Bersaglieri, the Alpini, the Arditi, the Granatieri, etc. The *Genio*, or Engineers, were everywhere, and were expected to do and did everything that was necessary to assist, facilitate, and contribute to the support of all the rest. They not only constructed the systems of trenches, they ran graded roads up impossible mountains; built bridges over rushing rivers and bottomless ravines; cut tunnels and corridors through the rock mountains; swung telefericas (cable railways) from mountain peaks across deep valleys; tunnelled and blew off mountain tops which re-

sisted assault, and performed work everywhere and always, without which the Titanic achievements of the Italian army would have been impossible. This age has always regarded the ancient Romans as the great road-builders of History. Future ages gazing on the remains of this war will say that the Italians surpassed all others, even their ancestors, in this Titanic accomplishment.

It was along in midsummer, 1916, that the great Italian offensive on the Isonzo front was made. On the right was the Third Army, under General, the Duke d'Aosta. Next him, commanding an army corps, was General Capello, whose Chief of Staff was General Badoglio, one of the younger and most brilliant Generals in the Italian army. Farther to the West commanded General di Robilant, General Giardino, and General Diaz. They all came into great note later.

Before this the Italians had already torn from the Austrians long stretches of their front, including many of their cherished positions above the Isonzo. They had, as already stated, established their bridge-head beyond the Isonzo above Gorizia, and were on the slopes of the mountains both to the North and the South of Gorizia. They had dug or cut themselves in on the slopes from above Monte Kuk to the Carso to the South. Beyond them frowned other mountains: Kuk, the Bainsizza, San Gabriele, San Michele, the Carso—Titanic ramparts in a Titanic strife. But where the river had through the ages drilled its way between the mountains above Gorizia, Monte Sabotino was still held by the Austrians as a mighty bastion on the Western side of the Isonzo. Thence the Oslavia-Podgora ridge stretched away, protecting the town in the hollow beyond them, which it had cost so much blood to try to capture.

In places the Italian and Austrian trenches ran within a few yards of each other. On Kuk and Podgora Hill, and at many other points, the Italians had driven their trenches up and were sticking fast just below the Austrian lines. They could talk to each other readily—exchange banter and bullets at a few paces distance.

It was in the beginning of August, 1916, that the first spring in the new move on Gorizia was made. It opened August 6 with a terrific bombardment of Monte Sabotino, tunnelled and chambered like Gibraltar, where it faced the Italian lines. Under cover of this barrage the Italians forced their way up the mountainside, carrying position after position, capturing garrisons and guns, and by evening were masters of the chief western defense of Gorizia, with much spoil of war. Between them and the town, however, still stretched the Oslavia-Podgora defenses. It took three days' continuous fighting to capture them. They had once been like a garden. Vineyards and orchards covered their smiling slopes. A calvaria stretched up to Podgora's top whence one looked down over the river slipping under its willows below, with gardens bathing their feet in its cool waters, and beyond, the pretty town, set amid villas, which had been a sort of Austrian Riviera. The Podgora now was a waste. Ploughed and upturned by shells, it looked like some vast, disembowelled carcass torn by wolves and vultures, and left with only shreds and grisly bones. The calvaria had been blown away—no trace remained, but Golgotha was there—grisly, ghastly, red and white, the evidence of man's infinite capacity for courage, suffering, and destruction. It is folly to say the Austrians do not fight. They have always fought. They are of fighting races. They were well commanded and disciplined, and fought with fury. They were beaten on the Isonzo as in the Trentino, because the Italians, inspired by a superior spirit, fought better. The losses on both sides were appalling. But at such work as this the Italians are unsurpassed in all the world. They had all turned into Arditi.

It took three days to secure Podgora. Even after it was flanked on both sides and cut off, it held out. But three days after Sabotino was captured, the Italians rushed the broken bridge under a withering fire, and at last planted the Italian flag on the station in Gorizia. That night Italy rejoiced "with exceeding great joy." She had regained Gorizia, the jewel of the Isonzo, and her sons were

pushing on to San Gabriele and San Michele. And who knew how far they might go?—possibly even on to Trieste?

The yield of Gorizia in mere booty of war was some 18,000 prisoners, with 400 officers, over 30 big-caliber guns, besides a large quantity of other guns, machine-guns, rifles, ammunition, and other corresponding spoils of war. Later on, in further forward movements in September and October, when the Italians captured Monte Santo and a part of the Carso, they added to their prisoners enough to bring the tale up to some 40,000, with over a thousand officers, and they doubled, likewise, their captured booty of war. But although Gorizia had been lost, the Austrians were still firm. They still held the commanding positions beyond Gorizia, made almost impregnable by Nature, and where she had missed, reinforced by all that military science could effect, and held by troops as good as Austria had ever furnished in all her conquering history: Germans, Hungarians, Croats, Slovenes, now inspired by every motive of hate and fear to fight with desperate courage. But the requirements of modern warfare demand, after an advance such as Italy had made on the Isonzo, time enough to carry forward and install the ordnance needed to open the way for a further advance of the troops. This took some days, and although the Second Army made desperate attempts to take San Gabriele, and the Italians established themselves on its rough flank, the position proved impregnable, as did that of Monte Kuk, to carry which was attempted just afterward. The Third Army, however, had better fortune, and though its persistent endeavor to capture San Michele was costly, it was pushed through to final success, and the Italians established themselves on the Carso, and held the heights on both sides of the Vallone. And Gorizia was made securely Italian. A little later, in mid-September, Monte Santo was captured, and in October and November Cadorna was still hammering at the mountain walls, with inflexible resolution to open the road to Trieste.

Notwithstanding the boldness with which the British and French asserted their success in the great offensive in France,

it was known to the well informed that the situation there was not as satisfactory as the authorities were given to asserting. The great offensive on the Somme had made progress, and had resulted in the capture by the British of some 125 guns, over 400 machine-guns, and nearly 40,000 prisoners; and, by the French, of over 200 guns, 1,200 machine-guns and trench-mortars, and 70,000 prisoners. But they had not reached the final objectives. The losses of the Allies had been enormous, but Bapaume and Péronne were still untaken. The German lines, though pierced in places, had not been smashed, and the Germans appeared as strongly intrenched in their new lines as ever.

If the war were to be brought to a close within a reasonable time, it was necessary to bring other factors into the solution of the problem. Greece was not in a position to count for much. The only other powers that could be brought in to aid were Italy, who had not yet declared war on Germany, and Roumania, who had stood neutral, warming toward the Allies as they pushed the forces of the Central Empires back, and cooling toward them as their fortunes waned. Roumania was unwilling to declare war against so potent an enemy as Germany; but Italy might do this if Roumania would declare war against Austria. It was arranged accordingly.

On August 2 (1916) the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed by the Russian Ambassador at Paris of the nervousness of the French Government because the offensive on the Somme had not given the desired results. Therefore the entrance of Roumania into the war was particularly desirable now.¹

England and France were at this time endeavoring urgently to obtain Russia's co-operation in bringing Roumania into the war: Russia was resisting Roumania's demands, which included the Banat, Transylvania to the river Theiss, and Bukovina to the Pruth, in which regions only some 37 per cent or 38 per cent of the population were of Roumanian stock, and the rest were Serbs, Magyars, and Ger-

¹ *Secret Treaties*, F. Seymour, London, p. 53.

mans. However, in view of the urgency of the Allies, Russia yielded,¹ only stipulating that she should not be compelled to continue the war till all of Roumania's claims were realized. Even this, however, she was compelled to yield in view of the situation in France,² and after President Poincaré had telegraphed the Tzar personally (August 9) of the desirability of an immediate agreement with Roumania, Russia consented.

The exaggerated report of the success of the Allies had its effect in other directions than on the Italian and French fronts. During the time that the Italians were scaling the cliffs of the Julian Alps, and the French were holding, with ever-growing resolution, the semicircle about Verdun, and French and English were on the Somme putting forth their herculean efforts, Diplomacy had not been inactive or less successful. It was apparent to all now that the enemy could not be defeated until they should be closed in on every side, and shut off from continued replenishment of their supplies from the Eastward as well as from the Westward. So long as Roumania was neutral, there was a source of supply open to them which could not be closed. Greece likewise, so long as she remained under her existing Government with her King, the brother-in-law of the Emperor of Germany, in command, was a cause of anxiety to the Allies in a situation where it had transpired that the weight on the two sides was so nearly in equipoise that any fresh accretion to the power of either might give it the preponderance. Her hatred of Bulgaria and the peril that she would run should a blockade be declared against her had hitherto been considered by the Allies fair guarantees of a reasonably assured neutrality on her part; but Constantine was very popular with the army, and Greece had her heart set on obtaining certain territory which she could only obtain at the hands of the victorious side. Her policy, therefore, tended to oscillate somewhat as fortune appeared to favor one or the other of the opponents. It was of extreme importance to her that she should make no mistake in her

¹ *Id.*, pp. 51-53.

² *Id.*

final decision. Italy still held the Dodecanese Islands, formerly Greek Islands, and although she was pledged by the Treaty of Lausanne to restore them to Turkey on certain conditions, it was unquestionable, now that she and her Allies were at war with Turkey, that the Islands would not be restored to Turkey, nor would Italy, who had secured by the secret treaty of London the consent of England and France to her retaining them permanently, give any intimation that they would be given up to Greece.

Moreover, Italy now held Valona, and was eager to extend her control over the Albanian territory beyond that important and commanding position, an extension that would cut into Northern Epirus, which Greece considered Greek. An arrangement as to the boundary of Northern Epirus had once been arrived at between Greece and Italy (in 1914); but other things had later intervened which had changed the entire Balkan situation, and rendered it most unlikely that Italy would now feel bound by this understanding.

And finally, to the continued anxiety of her Allies, Italy had never declared war on Germany. Strong efforts had been made by her Allies to induce her to take this step, but so far without avail. The criticism directed against her had only exasperated her; pressure angered her, and argument and persuasion had been equally fruitless of results. She had maintained her formal neutrality as to Germany for over a year, and left it to Germany to declare war if she wished. She had, she felt, enough on her hands already. She would leave it to Germany to make the first declaration. For her part, Italy would wait until Germany moved, or at least until she did some act which would consolidate Italian feeling against her and give the Italian Government assurance of the full weight of the united Italian people behind them.

Germany had long given what the other Allies considered sufficient cause for a declaration of War against her, had Italy desired to make one; but the Italian Government hung back from the step which was urged on them so ear-

nestly. Not only had Germany, by the attitude of her Government, outraged the sensibility of the Italian people, but German guns were among those employed in sweeping away Italians before the Trentino offensive in May. Several Italian ships had been sunk by submarines of German build, manned by Teutons who spoke pure North German; whereas, according to report, the Austrian submarines were manned generally by Austrian subjects from along the Adriatic seaboard who, though speaking German, were readily distinguished from the German Austrians both in coloring and speech. Thus it was generally held that the "pirates" were Germans. Finally, Germany, in her failure to carry out her engagement to pay to the Italian laborers within her borders the pensions due them, gave Italy a ground on which the Italian Government felt they could with security count on the backing of the Italian people—now vastly reassured by the repulse of the Austrians in the Trentino and by the capture of Gorizia. Moreover, Russia had made an astonishing recovery and was pushing forward again, driving before her the Austrian army, capturing much territory and prisoners by scores of thousands. Accordingly, under the unremitting urgency of the other Allies it was arranged that Italy should, on August 27, declare war on Germany to date from the following day, and on the same day Roumania should declare war on Austria. This was done, and on the same day Germany declared war on Roumania. Two days later, the 30th, Turkey declared war on Roumania, and the following day Bulgaria declared war on Roumania.

The declaration of war against Germany had little immediate effect on the situation in Italy. The ground for the announcement had been prepared in advance with address. It had long been anticipated and the political effect was already discounted. The Italians knew that the Germans had for a good while been aiding their chief enemy with all the means at their disposal; and they felt that as Germany did not march with Italy and had about all the burden she could well carry, she was not likely to prove a new danger

of great magnitude for Italy. Moreover, at the moment it was generally believed that the entry of Roumania into the conflict would have a very weighty result. It was also believed by many that Greece might soon be brought to come in on the side of the Allies.

Roumania started off with a dash. She invaded Transylvania and within a few days she was occupying the Carpathian passes into Hungary, while the Austro-Hungarian army retired before her. The Roumanians pushed forward into Transylvania until they encountered Von Falkenhayn, who had come up with an Austro-German army especially superior in artillery to the Roumanians, and the latter were forced back. On the other hand, the Turkish and Bulgarian troops had invaded the Dobrudja. This, however, was not immediately considered a great peril, and it was not until Von Mackensen, who, at first, was held up by the Roumanians on the Bucharest-Tchernavada line, pushed forward later with an efficient German army that any serious anxiety was apparent. The Roumanians were now swept back. Costanza fell into the enemy's hands together with its important stores of wheat and oil, which had been accumulated there with the expectation of getting them out to the Allies. Tchernavada was taken. Von Falkenhayn forced the passage of the mountain passes and swept on across Roumania. Von Mackensen crossed the Danube and, advancing, threatened the destruction of the Roumanian army. By the end of November the Western half of Wallachia was overrun, and on December 1 Bucharest was abandoned by the Government, which retired to Jassy, and was occupied by the Germans a few days later. Von Falkenhayn continued his advance Northward into the oil regions of Ploesti, the wells in which, however, had been partially destroyed when those in charge of them left before the advancing Germans. The Dobrudja was now completely overrun, and the Russian army under Sakharof, with which it had been attempted too late to support the Roumanians, was driven across the Danube into Bessarabia. Braila and Galatz were

lost, and before the end of the year the whole of Wallachia was in the firm possession of the enemy. Roumania had been crushed almost as completely as Serbia had been crushed a year before and the enemy had, through the diplomatic errors of the Allies, retrieved their misfortunes, and were in a position to continue the war, both on the East, and the West, with renewed vigor.

The overwhelming of Roumania was a blow to the Allied cause which happily was little appreciated at the time. The capture of the oil regions and of Costanza, with its stores of oil and of grain which had been accumulated there awaiting the opening of the Dardanelles, furnished the Central Empires stores which put them on their feet for the ensuing season. Furthermore, it brought them to the Black Sea and eventually resulted in their control of the Russian Black Sea fleet; a situation which had far-reaching consequences in both Russia and Turkey.

Italy was putting forth at immense cost all her efforts to wrest from Austria the commanding positions of the Grand Pasubio and the Carso, without which she could make no decisive progress, whether in the Trentino or on the Giulian front. All through October and November the desperate assaults went on, making little progress so far as the map showed, but steadily pushing forward step by step to the consummation which was to come later when in the last and crucial test the temper of her weapon was to prove superior to that of her powerful adversary.

The chief assistance rendered the Allies at this time was Italy's successful offensive against Gorizia in those August days when her sons were pouring out their blood like water to secure the keys to Gorizia and Trieste.

The result of the diplomacy of this summer was the destruction of Roumania and the perilous situation of Italy after October, when the Germans came down to aid and by their power and generalship increase vastly the fighting strength of the Austro-Hungarian armies massed against Italy.

Italy's economic condition at this time was by no means

fully appreciated by the other Allies. She was reduced to so low a state as to supplies, essential for the prosecution of the war, including the means of subsistence of her people, that the representatives of the Government had to go to Paris to present the situation to her Allies in its full gravity. A Conference was held there in November at which the perilous state of the case was laid plainly before them and steps were taken to afford at least in part the necessary relief. The naked fact is, that however hard pressed the other Allies were in the matter of such necessities, Italy was always harder pressed. She never had more than a bare margin above what was required to keep her going.

In the early part of November (7) President Wilson was re-elected by a scant margin of a score or so electoral votes, after a tremendous contest in which the fact that he had kept America out of the war had been strongly emphasized by his supporters. Yet the German vote was understood to have been largely thrown against him, at least in the eastern and central western part of the United States. Shortly after his election his attitude toward the general situation began to be realized. He began to assume a definite policy to bring before the consciousness of the world the perilous situation in which it was plunged.

About the middle of November, 1916, a suggestion came from Switzerland that the time had arrived when some step should be taken to enter into conversations to ascertain whether some basis for peace might not be found. On December 12, 1916, Germany and Austria made formal proposals to "enter forthwith into peace negotiations," which were subsequently rejected by the Allies, who considered them as arrogant and insincere. It transpired later that these Powers desired to forestall any action by the President of the United States.

The President of the United States about a week later, December 18, addressed to all the Belligerents a note, containing a suggestion which, it was stated, he had "long had in mind to offer, and which was in no way associated with the recent overtures of the Central Powers," and which he

requested might "be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances."

In this note he suggested "that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the Nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed as satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible to frankly compare them."

He called attention to the fact that "the suggestions which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have had in mind in this war are virtually the same as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." Then, after outlining what they were understood to have stated "in general terms," and saying that as thus stated "they seemed the same on both sides," he added, "yet never had the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out." He then suggested that an interchange of views might clear the way, at least for conferences, and make the permanent concord of the Nations a hope of the immediate future, and a concert of Nations immediately practicable.

This note was made the occasion for an attack on the suggestion contained in it by important elements of the press in all the Allied Countries—including Italy. The construction was placed on the note that the President had stated that the aims of both sides were substantially the same, which was far from the fact, as was shown very soon afterward when he took another step, laying down the principles by which he declared the action of America would be guided.

On the 24th of December the Pope delivered a discourse to the Sacred College of Cardinals in which he expressed his hope for the restoration of peace, but made no mention of the step which had been taken by America.

The simple fact was that the conditions were such at that time in all the countries of the Allies that the Govern-

ments did not feel in a position to accept any suggestions which might leave them in the condition which then existed, and they feared the effect on their Peoples of anything that might tend to diminish their powers of resistance.

CHAPTER XVII

ITALY IN THE DARK PERIOD OF THE WAR

THE year 1917 came in with the attention of the world focussed on the political rather than on the military struggle that had so long engrossed all thoughts. The German and Austrian notes, or so-called "Peace Proposals," hastily got out to forestall the step contemplated by the President of the United States; the note which the President, undisturbed by the German and Austrian coup, had proceeded to address to all the Belligerents; the reply of the Allies to the first, and the discussion of the, as yet, unprepared replies to the second, filled all minds in the early days of the new year. That something of moment was in the air all believed; that it might possibly lead to Peace—that consummation devoutly to be wished—many hoped. The allocution of the Pope in the end of December, urging the Peoples to cease from a war which was destroying Christendom, added to this hope, but increased the anxiety of the Governments. The stiffness of the Allies' reply to the German and Austrian Proposal, however, diminished any confidence that a Peace Conference would be held very soon. The close relation of the Papacy to Austria-Hungary was traditional, but, after all, the Pope was Italian and must have the Italian's feeling for Italy. So the Italians reasoned, and while they were content to follow their leaders so long as they held out to them the expectation of final success, many still cherished the hope that the Peace would come before long.

A meeting of all the Premiers of the Allied Governments, except Russia, took place in Rome at the beginning of January, and the whole situation was gone over by them. Great secrecy was maintained as to the reasons for their meeting, and many theories were advanced; but it took no

great acumen to divine that among the causes which called them into conference in the Eternal City were the necessity for arriving at a basis for a reply to the note of the President of the United States that would be satisfactory, not merely to themselves, but to the People of their several countries; and the necessity to come to a decision regarding both Roumania and Greece. The condition of the former was now well-nigh hopeless. While the Conference was in session at Rome, the Russians were driven out of the Dobrudja and the Germans were consolidating their hold on Moldavia. The condition of Greece was one to cause serious anxiety. Italy was said to be in disagreement with her Allies as to the policy regarding Greece, and this disagreement touching the fourth paragraph of the Allies' note to Greece was said to be one of the causes of the conference. Not only had the question of Greece's relation to the Allies to be settled, but the entire Adriatic question was involved in a confusion to which the Greek situation contributed its share. The flags of three, if not four, of the Allied Countries floated over Corfu. And in despite of the flags, Greece, which was neutral, claimed the island as hers against all the Allies. Also she claimed Northern Epirus alike against Albania and Italy, and whether she was ruled by King Constantine or Venizelos, she was likely to continue to assert her claim. Russia was represented by her Ambassador and a General. She had no Premier to represent her at the Conference, but this was before her débâcle, and although it was not yet known outside, Russia had been promised by the Pact of London Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles, and Italy had been conceded rights in Albania hardly consistent with the claims that Greece was asserting. Greece, indeed, was at the moment a sort of storm-centre.

England and France were considered as backing Venizelos. England, however, was not yet ready to stand for the removal of Constantine from the throne. Italy was more conservative. It was wittily said that she feared Venizelos's friendship more than Constantine's enmity.

Finally, another reason for the Conference was suggested by those who were not too firmly convinced of the solidarity of aims of all the Entente Powers; this was that England and France were not too well assured of Italy's complete solidarity with them, and came both to satisfy themselves on this essential point and to gratify the pride of the Italian People, and thus bind Italy more irrevocably to the Allied Cause.

They returned somewhat reassured and a better understanding was supposed to have been arrived at touching both Greece and the Adriatic. Also an understanding was reached as to the form of the reply to the President's note of December 20; but the reply was to be sent from Paris after Russia should be apprised of the result of the Conference. Indeed, the situation in Russia was becoming one of the anxieties of the Allies. No one appeared quite certain what Russia was doing. The Russians at the Conference were reported as having been in opposition to much that the other Allies were in agreement about. Vague rumors were recurrent of Russia's relation to proposals for a separate peace. A crisis in her Ministry was reported a few days later. The Premier Tripoff was succeeded by Galitzine, but Prokowsky remained as Foreign Minister.

An important step taken by the Conference was the decision to form a mobile army, composed of forces of all the Allies, for use where needed.

On the 10th of January the reply of the Allies to the note of the President of the United States was forwarded to Washington. Opinion was somewhat divided as to this reply. In phrase it was diplomatic and formally courteous. Under the form was a tone of unconcealed resentment. It laid down plainly the determination of the Allies to proceed unlet and unhindered in their policies, and their somewhat extensive aims were set forth with considerable particularity. Incidentally it contained an allusion to and repudiated the President's reference to the apparent similarity of the aims of the two sides, as expressed generally by their respective spokesmen. In substance the note might

be considered a rebuff to the President for the step he had taken.¹

The press had assumed and continued to maintain an attitude very critical toward America. Though the character of the attacks on the President had been somewhat modified, articles charging the United States with Imperialism, and with casting covetous glances both to the Southward and Northward—toward both the South American Republics and the British Dominion of Canada—appeared in the Extreme British Periodical Press, and were taken up and added to by the Italian Press. Steps were taken to form a Latin-Countries League; conferences having, perhaps, originally an economic basis, but also having, possibly, a political drift were held, and apparently were regarded sympathetically by the authorities. The fact that South American countries had not adhered to the note of the United States Government was extensively played up in the Press, and from having been formerly referred to as "the Little South American Republics," they were now termed "The Great South American Republics." Restrictions touching commercial concerns were tightened, and a considerable number of American firms were placed on a Black List. American enterprises were impeded; and protests were met with the simple statement that Italy was dependent on Great Britain for necessities of war, and the latter had the decision in these matters.

Unexpectedly a shock came from the other side. A leading American Journal, *The New York World*, in an editorial discussing the relative moral bases of the claims of the Belligerents on the two sides, declared that alone among the Allies Italy had not been invaded, and that she was engaged in an immoral enterprise; and was prosecuting a war of conquest. The *World* had strongly supported President Wilson, and was erroneously regarded in Italy as his official organ. It was, in fact, an independent Democratic journal, and in no sense an organ of the Government, though

¹ It was rumored that the note would have been even sharper in tone but for the Italians, who urged a more friendly form.

its attitude in this matter of Italy may have been caused in part by the attacks on the American Government, and emphasized by the refusal of the Italian Government to permit for so long American Press correspondents to visit the Italian front. The discrimination against Italy as engaged on a moral basis less exalted than that of her Allies was a shock to many of those connected with the conduct of Italy's action, as well it might be, for it exposed the fact that the action of England and France was better understood in America than that of Italy. Italy knew that the fundamental ground of her action in entering the war was not desire for conquest, but for the rescuing of her own people from a foreign yoke; and with this her own emancipation from the Austrian menace.

Meantime, however beset on many sides, Italy was bending all her energies not only to render secure what she had already won at great cost, but to prepare for the spring campaign as soon as the snows should melt sufficiently to permit. Her factories were being enlarged and increased in output to an extent hitherto unimagined. Military roads were constructed in regions hitherto unpenetrated by anything on wheels; up mountains inaccessible to anything but pack-animals. Bridges were thrown across swift torrents and deep ravines; mountains were tunnelled and precipices were turned. Supplies of everything necessary for the use and maintenance of an army were accumulated and transported, and all this with an incredible dearth of fuel. If Italy had been taught organization, she had learned it well. In no war zone along the entire war-front, whether on the West or the East, were so many natural difficulties overcome with more address or scientific skill.

The public men might confer and wrangle, plan and discuss and decide; the Press might describe and censure or flatter; but the army, grumbling or swearing, kept on in the snow and the rain and the mud; digging away; cutting, drilling, and building; fighting and dying—for Italy.

On the 22d of January (1917) the President of the United States delivered before the Senate an address, the text of

which he communicated simultaneously to all the Governments of the nations at war, setting forth his ideas touching the means of preventing, through "an international concert which should thereafter hold the world at peace," the repetition of such a catastrophe as was then destroying Europe and threatening the rest of the world. He put aside without comment the spirit of the Allies' reply to his former note, save to remark that the world was that much nearer the discussion of the definitive peace which should end the war. America could enter this League for Peace only on condition that it should be secured by the organized sentiment for Peace of Humanity. It was to be "Not a balance, but Community of Powers; not organized rivalries, but organized Peace." His understanding of the declarations of the statesmen of both groups of nations arrayed against each other: that it was "no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists," was that they implied that it should be "a Peace without Victory"—an equality of rights of nations both great and small; the recognition and acceptance of the principle that "Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." He further laid down the principle that so far as practicable, every great people should be assured a direct outlet to the highways of the Sea—that the paths of the sea should alike in law and fact be free; that there should be a limitation of armament, both naval and military; so that armies and navies should become "a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggressive, selfish violence."

His declaration that the Peace aimed at should be "a Peace without Victory" was seized on by the Allied Press and made the basis of renewed attacks on the President. But underneath the attacks lay probably other grounds than this, viz.: his demand for the Freedom of the Seas; the reduction of armaments, and the acceptance of the American principle that "Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." None of these save the first, however they might be accepted in theory, was wholly accepted in practice, and England considered

that the first was a blow at her traditional claim to "rule the wave" according to her own construction of the International Maritime Code.

So antagonistic, indeed, was the general tone of the Allied Press to the President's views as enunciated by him, that the idea became diffused among the People—not without some suggestion, however—that he was working to some extent in harmony with the enemy. In certain circles the idea was prevalent that he was working to take advantage of the destruction of the European Powers and build up America so that she might become the arbiter of the destinies of the world. "American Imperialism" was at times presented in the press as an offset to German Imperialism. This idea, however, did not go very far with the People, who in Italy knew the United States better than the upper class knew them, and who began to feel that America was trying to help feed the Peoples of the allied nations. They had, indeed, incontestable evidence of the fact in the grain that came into their ports.

There was soon something else to think about. On January 31 Germany gave notice that from the following day, in all waters surrounding the coasts of the Allies, would begin a Submarine campaign à outrance, and she made good her word by sinking immediately a number of unarmed merchant ships. Three days later the United States broke off relations with her, and the following day the President invited all neutral nations to take the same action, and try to bring Germany to her senses.

Matters were now rapidly hastening to a crisis. The United States rejected Germany's proposal to discuss the Submarine campaign, so long as it continued to be carried on. Germany reiterated her determination to continue it so long as the Allies continued to blockade her ports, and before the month was out, the President of the United States, following the constitutional course, asked permission of Congress to arm the Merchant vessels of the United States, and called a special session of Congress to consider and take measures to meet the ever-increasing gravity of

the situation. The call was first set for the 16th of April, but was soon changed to the 2d, and on the assembling of the Congress on that day the President delivered before it his famous message, demanding that the World be made safe for Democracy. It was addressed rather to the Democracies of the world than to any one People, and it has been termed "The Magna Charta of the nations of the world."

The effect was instantaneous. It was a trumpet-call to Humanity. It aroused an enthusiasm throughout all countries save those which were fighting to destroy Democracy, and even there it was recognized as the death-knell of Autocracy and the reveille of a new era of Freedom.

On April 1 the American armed merchant vessel the *Aztec* was sunk by a German submarine off Brest. On the 6th of April the United States declared that a state of War existed with Germany. Cuba declared war on Germany the following day. The day following this Austria-Hungary severed diplomatic relations with the United States.

On the 14th of April the Congress of the United States authorized a bond and note issue of \$7,000,000,000, of which \$3,000,000,000 was to be loaned to the Entente Allies.

Inspired by a sort of divine fury, America suddenly flung herself into the war with all her weight. Almost immediately on the Declaration of War some forty American war-vessels were despatched to European waters. Before a great while the number was increased to a hundred and one. A selective-draft law was passed May 18. On May 19 was passed a war appropriation bill of \$3,342,300,000, and on June 5 some 10,000,000 men of military age registered under the selective-draft law. The Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces was with his staff already nearing the shores of Europe, and, passing through England, arrived in France a few days later. South America and Central America also were aroused. Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua all broke off relations with Germany.

In order to make clear what Italy's relation to the war and part in it were at this time, it is necessary to set forth in outline what the situation was in France, and also on

the Russian front, where hitherto a potent part of both the German and Austrian armies had been contained by the immense Russian armies, whose ponderous weight had several times during the struggle threatened to overwhelm both Germany and Austria.

In France, in December (1916), General Joffre was superseded in the command of the French armies by General Nivelle of Verdun fame, and was retired with the rank of Field-Marshal, which was, in fact, revived in his honor.

In England, in December (4), Admiral Jellicoe was superseded in command of the Grand Fleet by Admiral Sir David Beatty, and was made first Sea Lord of the Admiralty. Also Mr. Asquith on the following day resigned as Premier, and was succeeded by Mr. Lloyd George, with Mr. Balfour as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a limited War Cabinet succeeded the large coalition Cabinet which, if not inharmonious, had been found somewhat over-ponderous for speedy action.

The repercussion of the failure of Roumania to hold her own had a decided effect in Greece, and the Naval Allied Commander, the French Admiral, having landed troops at Athens the 1st of December, 1916, to intimidate the supporters of the Central Empires, they were attacked and after a hundred or more casualties on the two sides were surrounded and forced to surrender. A blockade soon, however, showed Greece that the policy of Venizelos was the wiser for her, and a situation was restored which after an amende had been made and Constantine's army compelled to confine itself to the Peloponnesus, brought Venizelos back into power.

Toward the end of January and the beginning and middle of February the British made a forward movement north and south of the Ancre, and secured several important ridges and towns in the direction of Bapaume, which they occupied a little later. In the Orient the British had recouped their misfortunes of the Autumn before, and with better organization had captured Kut in the end of February and Bagdad toward the middle of March (11). Also

they had made Egypt measurably secure. The British were now headed for Palestine.

A longer part of the front in France was now taken over by the English to relieve the French, and when they continued the offensive in March, they had some hundred and ten miles of front. They had pushed forward toward the middle of March to the line covering Bapaume, when it was found that the Germans were retiring to a new defensive line, which they termed the Siegfried line, but which came to be known among the Allies as the Hindenburg Line. The discovery nerved the British to fresh efforts, and in the middle of March (17) a general attack was launched, from Arras to Roye, and it became a continuous battle from that time on until the Germans had retired to their new positions in the Hindenburg Line. Bapaume was taken on the 17th, Péronne next day.

The British attacked the northern sector of the Hindenburg Line from Arras, and pushed toward Cambrai and St. Quentin. The French attacked the southern end of the Line, and passing Ham and Noyon, pushed up the Oise toward La Fère. Vimy Ridge, a position of great strength, was captured by the British on the 9th of April, and by the 12th British and French were pressing forward against all obstacles along a forty-mile front. The Hindenburg Line was pierced at Wancourt and Haninel, but the Germans, finding Douai and Cambrai threatened, had prepared what was called "the Wotan Line" for their defense.

Finally in May, after terrific fighting, some ten miles of the Hindenburg Line were secured by the British, including the capture of Roeux and Bullecourt. They captured also a great number of prisoners together with over 250 guns and nearly 700 machine-guns and trench-mortars. The entire offensive had yielded the British some 40,000 prisoners.

The British commander now turned his attention to a new offensive toward Ypres.

While the British were driving against the northern part of the Hindenburg Line, the efforts of the French were being directed more to the south against the line which crossed

the Oise west of La Fère, took in the forest of St. Gobain, and swinging around Soissons crossed the Aisne at Missy, then extended along the Aisne to Craonne, whence it ran to Berry-au-Bac, thence around Rheims some three miles, and on eastwardly by the Main de Messiges toward the Argonne. Above the Aisne on the north side stretched a lofty ridge along which ran a road now famous forever as the Chemin des Dames. On one point of this, at Troyon, the French had maintained a position. The rest was held by the Germans. Along the valley to the north of the Ridge ran from east to west the Ailette, a tributary of the Oise, and across the valley a dozen miles from the Aisne was Laon, Nivelles's objective. Great preparations were made for the offensive and great hopes were built on it. The first step was a tremendous bombardment which covered nearly a week, and was expected to clear the way for an assault so powerful that nothing could withstand it. The French Commander was reported to have set a time for the capture of Laon—a very short time—a single day. But man proposes and—a very high French military authority has said that "Providence is on the side of the heaviest battalions."

On the 16th of April the attack was launched along a front extending nearly fifty miles, and for a time there was a promise of success. The Germans were forced back across the Aisne between Missy and Craonne, and the greater part of the Ridge of the Chemin des Dames was captured. In the centre a substantial advance was made, but north of Rheims Briemont stood out. The French right reached and stormed the heights about Moronvillers, which controlled Moronvillers and the roads to Laon, but were unable to maintain their positions on the crest under the portentous fire directed on them. Craonne, toward the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames, barred their progress, but was captured finally. The French had, however, not crossed the Ailette. Laon still stood, and the offensive, though many prisoners and guns had been taken, had resulted in huge losses, and had failed to attain its object. France was profoundly shocked at the failure, and on May 15 General

Nivelle was superseded by General Pétain, and General Foch was appointed Chief of General Staff at Paris.

The morale of France, perhaps, was never more depressed than when the offensive, which had been counted on to break completely through the German lines, was found, notwithstanding her heroic efforts and immense sacrifices, to have failed in its real purpose. Not that either France or England thought of yielding, or of accepting Germany's arrogant proposal, any more than Italy even in her most desperate hour thought of accepting that of Austria. There was, however, an element that had to be reckoned with which took a pessimistic view of the situation, and from it developed an attitude which acquired the name of Defeatist. Both in France and in Italy this became a menace which their Governments had to meet.

The change of the Commander of an army in face of the enemy is in itself an admission, if not of failure, at least that matters are going badly. In this case to the military reason was added a political factor which created a very serious situation. Happily France was rich in Generals of a high order, and her selection of Foch and his lieutenants proved most fortunate.

Meantime, momentous events were occurring elsewhere.

In Russia, where the Government, sunk into a hopeless slough of Bureaucracy permeated with corruption, and undermined by German intrigue, had after many vicissitudes proved incompetent either to conduct the affairs of the country or to supply the armies in the field, Revolution had broken out. The Duma met on March 12 in defiance of a decree of the Tzar dissolving it. The Tzar was forced to abdicate (March 16) in favor of his brother, the Grand-duke Michael, who, however, declined, or was not permitted to accept the crown, and a Provisional Government was appointed. The Tzar and his family were sent under arrest to Tsarkoe-Selo, whence later, on the outbreak of a second Revolution which overthrew the Provisional Government, they were removed to a more secure place of confinement, where before a great while all met with the usual tragic fate

of dethroned autocrats. His fate was the more tragic in that the record of his life would seem to show him to have been personally a good man, sincerely desirous to advance his people along lines of modern development. But that, on the other hand, he was as a ruler unable to handle with decision the great affairs which devolved on him. He was crushed by the burden he inherited. But the cup of Russia was by no means full yet. The German propaganda had failed in Italy. It had failed in the United States. Both had gone to war with Germany. But in Russia it had proved more successful. All through the latter part of the preceding year (1916) the controlling Russian statesmen had been subject to German influence. The Premiers, Stürmer and Prince Galitzine, had been pro-German. Protopopoff, the Minister of the Interior, was even more so. German corruption, by all reports, had eaten deep into the vitals of the Government. By reason of it Brusiloff's offensive had come to a tragic end. The army had been sacrificed to it. The weak Tzar had fallen a victim. The Provisional Government went next in a second Revolution, and a Soviet Government was set up in the Capital. The army and navy now both became permeated with the revolutionary spirit. Officers were deposed and elected by the men. In the navy many were murdered. The fighting force of Russia seemed to have collapsed. It was unexpectedly revived for a time by Kerensky, the most energetic member of the new Government, who became a temporary Dictator, and appeared for a brief period to have acquired some authority over the army. Brusiloff was able to turn on the Germans and Austrians and make a sudden drive forward toward Lemberg, which resulted in the capture of some 20,000 prisoners, while Korniloff advanced farther to the south. For a time the movement gave promise of re-establishing the Russian factor in the struggle. But the hope was delusive. The army had become too much saturated with the Bolshevik propaganda, so skilfully promoted by Germany. Discipline was undermined, and Germany and Austria, who had been depleting their forces on that front, returned and in a

rapidly renewed campaign re-established their positions, and the armies of Russia disintegrated into a great disorganized mob of armed soldiery, without discipline or cohesion. Large masses of them subsequently left the front, and returned home to participate in the general seizure and division of the lands, though some elements remained under arms for some time yet. All the rest of the story is a confused succession of movements without order or direction, with Brusiloff superseded by Korniloff and Korniloff refusing to obey Kerensky, and marching on Petrograd to be defeated by Kerensky; and with Kerensky both dictator and general until he was overthrown and fled in disguise to give place in a new revolution to a new dictator, Lenin, as the head of the Bolsheviks in a new system, amid new confusion. And the end is not yet.

Apart from the exceptional difficulties that Italy had to encounter in the terrene where her troops were engaged, and her supplies had to be forwarded and distributed amid Alpine snows, the economic conditions of Italy had grown steadily worse as the war progressed, and were now becoming very menacing. The dearth of coal was such as to cause serious anxiety lest Italy should be forced to suspend her manufactories for war-material, ammunition, guns, etc. The importation of coal was cut down to about half the normal consumption in times of peace, and to this consumption was added the augmented necessities of the war. The increasing scarcity of provisions was a grave menace. The Government regulated and limited the prices, but when there was not enough to go around, the price was a secondary consideration. Throughout the entire Country women in the Cities stood for hours in the long bread-lines only to be told at the end that everything was exhausted. Incipient bread riots occurred in Rome itself. They were readily disposed of, but the causes remained and the anxiety increased. The Germans undertook to extend their blockade zones, taking in all waters about the coasts of the Allies, and also the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, their Submarine campaign was beginning to be effective enough to

excite grave apprehensions. Off the shores of Italy was among the chief regions of their piratical warfare. To counter this, England undertook to lay down and enforce control of neutral shipping. Her efforts at such control of sea-traffic were, however, both exasperating and ineffective. Italy at her alleged instance adhered to her restriction on the sailing of neutral ships from Italian ports, unless bound for some port of an allied country. Protests were filed against such action, and eventually the restrictions fell into abeyance and other measures less exasperating were adopted to secure the best results from the tonnage accessible to the Allies.

Southern Italy was dependent for existence on its agrumi or fruit crops, and Northern Italy had a large trade in silks, and as both were utilizable by the enemy for war purposes, arrangements had to be made by the Allies to buy and pay for these crops. Neutrals, such as the Scandinavian countries, were permitted to proceed to Italy to purchase fruits, etc., but only on condition that they carried to her necessities such as coal.

About the middle of March M. Briand resigned the premiership of France. Things did not appear to be going very well there. In Italy, also, there was considerable talk of Sonnino's resignation, and the Allies and the Interventionists were much disturbed, as he was considered the backbone of the war-to-a-finish element. The crisis, however, was happily tided over.

One effort of the defeatist element to prevent America from entering the war on the side of the Allies, and to bring the war to a speedy close, was by inducing the neutrals, especially America, to cease all shipments to Europe, whether of war-material or foodstuffs. This was a direct effect of the German-Austrian propaganda. It was argued that thus only could America be really neutral in fact as well as in theory, inasmuch as under existing conditions shipments could only be made to the Countries of the Allies, and that such an embargo would bring the war to a close within forty-eight hours, as the Allies were absolutely dependent

on America for their sustenance. Mexico appears to have fallen in with this idea, as toward the middle of February (12) she made a proposal that the neutral nations should stop the war by an embargo on all trade with the Belligerents on both sides. There was, indeed, an element—happily not a large one—even in the Congress of the United States, who at one time appeared to tend to a view somewhat akin to this, inasmuch as they urged the prohibition by the United States Government of American citizens travelling on ships belonging to the belligerent nations. But the President announced that he would not consent to curtail, during his administration, a single right that Americans possessed under international law, and he was overwhelmingly sustained by the Congress.

The work of the defeatist elements had been the cause of considerable anxiety in Italy, not only to those who were eager to see the war pushed to a triumphant conclusion, but to the Government itself. How far their ramifications extended, and what form they took, were not known—at least outside of official circles; but rumor made it appear somewhat formidable. Two big battleships, the *Leonardo da Vinci* and the *Benedetto Brin*, had been blown up—one inside of the harbor of the naval base itself. Suddenly the Government drew in its net and laid its hand on the culprits. They comprised a considerable number, a score or more; but among them were five men of some importance, including the editor of a former ephemeral defeatist organ, said to have been financed by the German Embassy; and a certain Monsignor Gerlach who, it was stated, had formerly been an Austrian officer but had taken orders and then had had some association with certain high ecclesiastical dignitaries. The latter and one of the other accused persons escaped to Switzerland, but a trial was held and three of those accused were convicted and sentenced to death, while certain others were convicted and sentenced to prison for longer or shorter terms. The energy with which the Government acted in this case had the effect of sending the extreme defeatists to cover for a time; but they were at work again before long.

The entry of the United States into the war was made the occasion for immense demonstrations in England and France. The American flag was mounted over the Parliament Houses at Westminster beside the national emblem, and over the Palace Bourbon beside the national Tricolor of France; and London and Paris were decorated with the Star-spangled Banner everywhere. But in Rome it was not so. The People were profoundly relieved and testified their feelings with immense cordiality; the press generally reflected this attitude, though the Clerical press manifested some disappointment. The Government confined itself to formal, but appropriate expressions of appreciation to the Government of the United States. There was scarcely an American flag displayed in Rome over a Government building, and few anywhere. An informal inquiry as to the reason elicited the reply that there were no American flags in Rome.¹ Also that the Italian People did not manifest their satisfaction in this way, and that demonstrations were likely to lead to counter-demonstrations. The latter reason appeared sounder than the former. Perhaps, another reason was that a certain scepticism prevailed among Italian public men as to America's real motives in entering the war. They could not accept the statement put forward that it was solely in the cause of Liberty and to make the World safe for Democracy. England and France, however, appeared closer to America than Italy, and their public manifestations of appreciation put Italy at a certain disadvantage with the American Public.

The other Allies pressed their advantage by sending Commissions over to the United States, composed of men of great reputation in America. At the head of the British Commission was Mr. Balfour, while Viviani and Joffre were on the French Commission. The Commissions were received with great distinction, and had much effect in securing the despatching of men and supplies to England and France. It

¹ A little later, on the occasion of some demonstration, a shopkeeper of Rome sent to ask the loan of an American flag of the American Embassy saying none was to be bought in Rome.

was not until the Press insistently demanded it that Italy also sent a Commission. This Commission likewise was composed of men of high distinction—among them Nitti, afterward Premier; the Marchese Borsarelli, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Marconi, and was headed by a member of the Royal House, the Prince of Udine.

The effect of the Submarine war soon began to cause serious anxiety. The tale of the victims steadily increased. No sea appeared really secure and, for a time, no effective means of countering their piratical work appeared to have been devised. They infested the approaches to the shores of Great Britain, and France and Italy. They at one time crossed the Atlantic and sank ships off the American coast. They lurked about the traffic-ways of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. While they threatened the food-supplies of the Allies, they were a constant menace to the communications of their forces in the Orient.

It was apparent that unless some efficient means were devised to counter this Submarine menace, it would become a very serious peril to the Allied cause, and so far no means devised appeared effective. The most obvious step demanded was to discover and destroy the Submarine nests. As far as concerned the Mediterranean, these were believed to be primarily the ports of the Balkan and Greek coasts and the Greek Islands. The former could not be reached; but Italy guarded, and for the most part efficiently, the Adriatic. The Greek coast and Islands were within the jurisdiction of the Allies under the general command of a French Admiral. The situation of the Allied cause was now by no means as reassuring as they might have wished. Russia was sinking into the slough of chronic Revolution and universal confusion. America had come in; but the defeatists were saying that she could never get her forces over in sufficient numbers to defeat the entrenched power and organization of the Central Empires, reinforced by the collapse of Russia. England and France were fighting desperately, holding their own and at times even making gains. Italy was doing likewise; but the losses were frightful. The

supplies were diminishing; the tonnage was being destroyed, and altogether the outlook was not as encouraging as the people were inclined to believe.

A little after the middle of April (1917) a meeting of the heads of the Governments of the Allied Powers was somewhat hastily arranged to take place at St. Jean de Maurienne, a small Alpine town on the Paris-Rome Railway, just inside the French border. Great secrecy was maintained as to the object of this conference. But it was generally understood among those interested to follow such meetings that the menacing Russian situation was one of the principal causes for calling it, and the Italian economic situation was another. The Greek situation was a third; also the chances and the means for separating Austria from Germany were reported among the subjects to which attention was given; and there might have been other causes as well. Whether any or all of these several matters were the real causes of the Conference is not now of great importance. The Conference resulted in Italy's securing certain concessions, including the right to occupy later Smyrna. An Allied offensive of great magnitude was begun a little later on the front of every Ally.

CHAPTER XVIII

ITALY'S WORK IN THE OFFENSIVE OF 1917

THE Allies had planned a great offensive for early spring on all their fronts. The late opening of the spring in 1917, however, prevented until May the great offensive which Cadorna had planned on the Carso front to force the Austrians from their strong positions above the upper and middle Isonzo, where their right—to employ the words of the Italian report—“pivoted on a lofty mountain system, consisting of various lines of high peaks, each of which was a dominating base connected with its neighbor; so that, taken together, they formed a formidable defensive whole.” Such were the enemy's lines between the middle Isonzo and the Chiapovano and Idria valleys, extending to the system of the Ternovo plateau, and to the mountainous line on the right of the Vipacco River to the north and east of Gorizia. Hence—to quote from the same authority—they extended “through the narrow valley of the Vipacco to the northern edge of the Carso, at Monte Faiti, and joining the Cornem-Brestovizza-Hermada-Duino bulwark, extended down to the sea.”

As soon as the weather conditions permitted, Cadorna opened his offensive from the bridge-head at Plava, and sent the Italians up the precipitous steeps of Monte Kuk, Mount Vodice, and “Hill 625.” The dash of the assault carried against desperate resistance the Austrian first line, while farther toward the sea the Italian right advanced on the Carso, sweeping the Austrian left out of their strongest positions “as far as the immediate approaches to Faiti, to Brestovizza, and to Monte Hermada.” By May 27 the Italians had reached the third line of Austrian defenses and crossed the Ternovo. The offensive was costly, for the Ital-

ians were forced to carry by assault against Austria's best troops positions which, naturally of tremendous strength, had been fortified by Austria's highest experts till they were deemed the impregnable bulwarks of the Dual Kingdom. But if the Italian losses were tremendous, they also exacted a heavy toll from the defenders. So successful was this May offensive that Austria felt compelled to draw important reinforcements from her eastern front to defend these gateways to Trieste. Cadorna was now complete master of the initiative, and he prepared for his next step, which was to assemble a superior force with superior artillery, and attack once more along the whole Isonzo front. Again he was successful. His left thrown against the Austrian right captured the advanced Bainsizza plateau and the positions on Monte Santo as far as the Chiapovano Valley, and then made a flank attack against the positions of Ternovo and an attack by both front and flank on the positions on Mount San Gabriele. On the Carso the Third Army under the Duke d'Aosta carried the enemy's first line, and then, to quote the Italian report, "made a determined bid for Monte Hermada, the most important bulwark barring his advance on Trieste." But there must be a limit to all effort, however epic its scope or exercise may be. Against these bulwarks Italy's offensive came for the time to a stand. She had poured out her blood like water on those rock mountain sides and plateaus, where every point and line were swept by a fire that cut away woods as a harvest-field is mown by the scythe, and blew away the living rock in its elemental fury.

This offensive in which Italy was forced to put forth her utmost efforts had cost her heavily—how heavily was not divulged. But she had to show for it substantial gains. She had smashed the enemy's powerful lines and, against the most stubborn resistance, had carried his most cherished defenses, in a region where every position seized was the proof at once of her success and of her prowess. She had captured over 30,000 prisoners, 135 guns, including several of the famous "305's," nearly 400 machine-guns and trench-

mortars, and a prodigious quantity of military supplies and other stores of all kinds.

With the proof of her ability to capture, against Austria's most powerful efforts at resistance, defenses so formidable that military writers had long considered them impregnable, Italy might well feel satisfied.

But not only had she strengthened her own position; she had rendered, if it were known, a vast service to the Allied cause. First, in that while Russia was crumbling internally, her armies were as yet intact. And that they had remained so was due in part to Italy's having compelled Austria to withdraw from the Russian front troops which, if left there, might have changed the situation months before the Russian armies gave way, and thus have permitted German reinforcements from the weakened Russian front to fling their weight on the already worn French and British armies at the crucial moment when they were straining every nerve on the Meuse, the Aisne, and the Somme.

The relation of Greece to the war was a cause of constant anxiety to the Allies, and with the spread of the Submarine war and the growing belief that "the pirates" were harbored in Greek waters, the situation became intolerable.

It was evident that the authorities in Athens were espousing more and more the side of the Central Empires, and that unless some firm action were taken, Greece would be lost to the Allies. Firm action was taken, and toward the middle of June (12) King Constantine was compelled by the Allies to abdicate the throne in favor of his son, Prince Alexander. Venizelos now came into power again, and a little later (June 29), under the strong pressure of the Allies, Greece broke with the Central Empires, and two weeks later (July 16) declared war on the side of the Allies.

The step secured by the Allies at the hands of the new Greek Government was of decided value to them, in that it relieved them of a certain menace on their flank, should they advance on the Macedonian-Thracian line; gave them a freer hand in searching out Submarine bases; and pre-

vented the flinging against them of the weight of those Greek troops who remained under King Constantine's command, which would have counted, at least, for something in a moment so difficult. It also had a certain moral effect. In fact, the consequences of the declaration of the President of the United States a few months previously had shown how amazing moral effects might be, and the situation of the Allies at this time was one in which a moral effect was almost as essential as military success. They were fighting with great resolution; but they were not acting in complete unison, and the consequence was loss of power and the possibility of yet increased loss in the future.

In the Balkans this want of unison amounted almost to division. The French General, who commanded on that front, was suspected by the other Allies of applying energies to the political side more than to the military side, and considerable mistrust ensued. This situation was one of the things which was reflected in Briand's retirement from the Premiership of France. The Commander was considered to be working politically in Greece in the interest of his own Government rather than in that of the general cause; and the result was dissatisfaction and distrust by the other representatives of the cause. The interests of Greece and those of Italy were, according to the views of their public men, sufficiently divergent to cause much watchfulness. Greece claimed Northern Epirus, and Italy considered herself to have claims on Albania, which Greece's aspirations might conflict with. The statesmen of the respective countries had, in the early part of the war before Baron Sonnino became the head of the Consulta, come to an understanding as to the line which should divide the regions which they severally might exploit.¹ But apparently Baron Sonnino held somewhat stronger views as to Italy's rights than those entertained by his predecessor and, although it was not known at the time referred to, he had strengthened his hand so far as concerned Albania by the Secret treaty of

¹ Cf. *The Secret Treaties*, by F. S. Cocks, London, 1918, Appendix B, Sec. VII, and *Manchester Guardian*, December 7, 1917.

London at the end of April (26), 1915. Whereas, on the other hand, Greece, who had in November, 1914, been promised Southern Albania (Northern Epirus) if she would enter the war on the side of the Allies, had later occupied Northern Epirus, though the Allies had protested against her annexation of it.¹

A small region about Coriza had been created, under a plan formed by the French Commander, into an independent Republic or State under a civil Governor sustained by a French officer. Its object was suspected by the Italian Government, and to some extent, at least, by the other Allies.

In June (4) the announcement of Albania's independence under the protection of Italy appeared in the Italian Press. The step was taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, apparently without consultation even with his colleagues, or at least a number of them. It was a complete surprise to the other Allies, and caused some resentment on their part. It was equally a surprise to a part of the Cabinet itself, and several Ministers resigned as a protest against such a step being taken without conference with the other members of the Government. Among these was Leonidas Bissolati. A protest was understood to have been made by the other Allies, and explanations were made that the step was taken on the advice of their military commander in Albania, to counteract the effects of an Austrian proclamation asserting that the Italians had invaded Albania with the intention of subjugating the Albanians; and that the term "protection" was not used in the technical political sense, but in the dictionary sense. Thereupon, the matter was dropped and the incident was closed; but the division between Baron Sonnino and Bissolati was never entirely closed, and it was considered by Italy's allies that under Sonnino's leadership she was being led into a policy of some obscurity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was thenceforth even more than before recognized as the head of the extreme expansionists or Nationalists, while Bissolati was regarded as representing

¹ *Id.*

the more moderate aspirations of Italy, and a conviction that her soundest policy was to establish friendship with her neighbors, relieve them of apprehension that she had imperialistic aims, and thus open a vastly broader field for the exercise of the genius of the Italian People.

On the 1st of August, Pope Benedict XV addressed to all the Belligerent Powers a note, inviting all those Governments to come to an agreement on the points which he set forth as the fundamental basis of a Permanent Peace. They included "the moral right of justice" as a substitute for "the material might of arms"; the introduction of arbitration according to an agreed standard, under the threat of certain disadvantages to that State which should refuse either to submit matters of internal dispute to arbitration or to accept its decision. And as a consequence to the establishment of "the sovereign authority of justice," the "true freedom and common enjoyment of the seas" under the guaranty of definite rules.

This note had much effect on a certain element of the People of Italy; for it was generally indorsed by the Clergy and the Clerical Press, and was held out to the people as the expression of the mind and will of the Supreme Pontiff, the successor of St. Peter himself, and according to it the war should be brought to a close forthwith, and no sound reason existed for prolonging it. The Central Empires promptly availed themselves of the opportunity to attempt a "Peace offensive" under the manœuvre of an apparent readiness to accept the suggestions under certain conditions favorable to their aims. The Allies, on the other hand, felt that under the existing conditions it was less favorable to their interests than to those of their adversaries. The United States Government replied to it a little later, defining the grounds on which this Government was prepared to make peace, and declaring its view of the necessity to continue the war until these were realized. The Allies adopted this answer as presenting their stand in the matter. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech in the Chamber in which he made Italy's only reply to the Pope's note,

aroused the implacable resentment of the Vatican by referring to the note as savoring of German suggestions. He made it clear that Italy had never received any Peace proposals which either her honor or her vital interests could for a moment have entertained.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DISASTER OF CAPORETTO

THE news of the breaking-up in Russia, followed by the threatened cessation of hostilities, at least, against the enemy, and the return home of the soldiers, with the programme for the participation of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Committees in the work of alleged reconstruction, had a decided repercussion in certain localities in Italy. Those tainted with Bolshevistic tendencies were secretly spreading their insidious propaganda. This was especially the case in certain industrial centres, where defeatist methods had been insidiously employed with marked success, and where the socialist Peace propaganda fell on ears prepared to accept it. The Peace Note of the Pope brought to many the hope that Peace might soon be in sight, and although the two currents had different sources and did not mingle, they bore toward a common outlet of Peace.

In August, inspired partly by these ideas and partly by the more ordinary motives of bettering Wage conditions, a strike was ordered in Turin, and against efforts to prevent its taking a seditious form, it developed suddenly an opposition by force so menacing that the Government felt called on to suppress it with sternness. A considerable number of persons were killed and yet more were wounded, and the disorder was suppressed. But the situation appeared so threatening that a large number of those engaged in the movement—militarized workmen—were rounded up and were sent to the front, where supposedly they would be under firm military discipline, and at least would not be able to engage in seditious public meetings. This supposition proved later not wholly well founded.

The point selected for their disciplining was the Sector before Monte Nero, near the town of Caporetto. Caporetto lay on the western bank of the Isonzo, where it skirts

the foot of Monte Nero, towering above its surrounding mountains. The Italians held Monte Nero; but to the south, a little distance, in the angle of the Isonzo, the Austrians had never been dislodged from the Tolmino-Santa Lucia bridge-head on the western bank. Several roads converged on Caporetto down the valley, and thence through the gradually diminishing mountains ran a good road, and a newly constructed railway directly to Cividale, a dozen or more miles away, and so on to Udine, the headquarters of the Supreme Command. When the great disaster befell, Caporetto, as the first town of importance taken and mentioned in the despatches, gave its name to the event; but the German-Austrian drive, while it converged on Caporetto, covered a wider front than that represented by the little town on the highway to Udine. The enemy were quick to avail themselves of everything to their advantage. The bridge-head on the west side of the Isonzo was a good point d'appui for their project. Monte Nero and the Bainsizza, Monte Santo and the Carso, could not be carried by assault; but, if flanked, they might fall.

The British and French had for some time had on the Isonzo front each an auxiliary artillery force. The British had had something over a hundred guns; the French had had something like three-fourths of that number. After his success at Bainsizza and San Gabriele, Cadorna considered his position impregnable, and as the British and French needed all the guns they could get on their own fronts, they took away most of their artillery. The British left only about thirty, and the French left perhaps ten or a dozen guns.

At the same time the Germans reinforced the Austrians with a number of Divisions, perhaps eight or ten, which rumor quickly increased to twenty-two. They also aided the Austrians essentially with the new tactics and methods devised by Ludendorff, who came to give his personal aid in the projected offensive.

The Italians were accustomed to fighting the Austrians and the Hungarians and Jugo-Slavs; but they had not been

pitted hitherto, at least in Italy, against the Germans, and the latter had a great reputation there, especially for organization, persistence, and military skill. Also they had new tactics unfamiliar to the Italians. Of all of these facts the Germans were prompt to avail themselves.

It was known that the offensive was on the cards, and the presence of the German divisions, multiplied by rumor, created some anxiety in Italy when the offensive opened on the Isonzo front, especially in view of the sentiment disclosed in a Defeatist circular of the secretary of the Socialist organization denouncing the war and sent secretly throughout the country. But the news from Cadorna was reassuring, and the Minister of War, General Giardino, a gallant and capable commander, made a speech in the Chamber on the afternoon of the 24th of October, in which he declared that the army was sound to the core, and that he could assure the country that it was the solid and secure bulwark of Italy. It was his maiden speech, and he received one of the greatest ovations ever tendered in the Chamber to a Minister. The body voted that the speech be printed in large numbers and circulated throughout the country. That night the enemy broke through the Italian lines at Caporetto. It was a tragic climax to a lofty and patriotic speech.

In the light of facts now known, the importance of Caporetto appears quite obvious. It was undoubtedly supposed to be securely protected, but unfortunately something was wrong and, like a bolt from the blue, the disaster came with all its fell consequences.

All sorts of explanations have been given for the tragedy of Caporetto; many theories, some by no means reconcilable, have been advanced and numerous reasons assigned. And possibly, there were sundry reasons taken in combination, rather than one or two only which led to the tragic result and came so near destroying Italy and wrecking the Allied Cause.

The Italian Government must know all the reasons and their several relations thereto; but it is a great question

whether all will be disclosed in our time. It may be asserted, though, as quite certain that those usually assigned have not the relation to the climax generally attributed to them. Only one thing is certain: that when Italy awoke to the realization of the situation into which she had been brought, and of the fate that impended over her, she gathered herself together and, utilizing every force within her reach, with every energy left within her stricken soul, she applied all her might in one supreme effort to extricate herself from the slough into which she had been flung, and succeeded. It was a supreme effort, and she has a right to feel proud of its success; for it was the decisive action of her national life, and it saved herself and possibly saved the Allies. At least eventually Peace was hastened by Austria's collapse under her final assault.

The causes that led to the disaster of Caporetto have been adverted to. The antecedent situation as a whole, with the relative bearing on it of different causes, is somewhat obscure.

First and foremost, the soldiers in all that region—as in all the sectors of the front—were tired; worn by constant labor and by even more exhausting vigil—they were, in fact, worn down. Month after month, winter after winter, they had been kept at it with little respite or relief. In winter in snow and sleet, rain and mud; in summer in sun and dust—ever toiling, ever watching, ever on a strain; they had fought and won ridge upon ridge, mountain after mountain, with infinite courage, giving up their lives, pouring out their blood like water, in assault after assault, with more to follow; yet they were apparently no nearer the goal of their aim than before their comrades had died by the thousand. There appeared to be no end to it. And the times when they were not fighting were more burdensome than when the fighting was going on. They were tired out; bored out with it all. If they got a *congedo*, it was days in a cattle-car to get home, and as many to get back. And they knew that their enemies—the Huns: Austrians, Hungarians, Croats—on the other side felt the same way. The prisoners and

deserters told them so. The pickets, when they fraternized, said the same. When would it end? The food was so scarce; the prices were so high; the *sussidio* so inadequate. When would it end? Why did not it end and let them come home? There were those who said it could be ended if the authorities would agree. The Priest thought so; the Socialists said so. In fact, the Holy Father had said so in Rome. The Priest said he had written a letter to say so. This was the burden of many letters that they received, and often the letters did not come. Were they forgot, or were the letters held by the Censors' office?

They agreed—those who became disaffected—that the time might come when the men would have to do as they were doing in Russia—at least, were said to be doing there—refuse to fight any more, and stop the whole war.

As we have seen, in the month of August and later on, the militarized Turin workmen who had been rounded up and arrested were sent en masse, fresh from the suppressed revolt at Turin, to the Caporetto sector to be taught a lesson. Instead of being taught, they gave lessons—in Defeatism. Some were deeply infected with the theory of Sovietism. They were all against the continuance of the war and of the actual régime. The fierce revolt in Turin was the proof of it. They were followed to the front by their newspaper. *The Avanti* was the Voice of the Future inveighing against the Present, and proclaiming the duty of sabotage against the war. The Secretary of the Socialist organization had sent a circular to all the Socialist Communes, urging them to disobey all the decrees that looked to the continuance of the war. All conspired to confuse the ideas of the plain soldier, who reasoned that when the Socialists agreed with the Priests, as they were doing back at home, they must be right. The new contingents from the Turin factories were not only imbued with this as a theory, they were ready to put it into practice. To some extent they did put it into practice. They deserted as occasion offered, and took through the lines with them exaggerated stories of disaffection. They also took with them definite informa-

tion as to the location of the defenses and batteries; of telephone stations, etc.

On top of this came to the soldiers there the growing conviction that they were being treated unjustly; that they were being kept at the front longer than others, and that back of the front, where there were better rations and better barracks, towns and cafés and women, the streets swarmed with men who, they considered, were favored and pampered and spared the hardship of the trenches, at the expense of those at the front. It was, they felt, unfair—unjust—outrageous. They were put upon and abused. They talked about it—growled about it—sneered about it—wrote and sang songs about it.

This must have been known to the head of the Supreme Command. Rumors of it were floating around the Capital months before; they had, however, ceased as Italian valor stormed up the mountain sides above the Isonzo, capturing position after position and sweeping the Austrians before it; but they had of late begun again, and there was much talk of Defeatism.

It was said later that Cadorna had such implicit confidence in his men that he had discouraged persistently any complaints of them, and that any officer who reported lack of loyalty in troops under his command was likely to find himself relieved and sent to Libya, or at least transferred to some other command. Thus, officers refrained from reporting anything resembling defection within their commands, preferring to try to master it themselves to facing the danger of being rebuffed and detached.

This is given, as the Press says, only by way of faithful chronicle. The report was current after the disaster; but reports current after the events must be received with care.

There was another report which was very current, assigning as one of the moving causes of the break at Caporetto the work of the Representatives of the Church among the men. No doubt there was a deep and heartfelt desire for Peace among these worthy representatives of Religion—both chaplains and nurses—and it is possible that some pious

souls may, on occasion, have sighed their wish that the Lay world, in its agonizing struggle to keep on to final victory, would let the Holy Father, whose affection embraced all, settle the matter, and put an end to the slaughter that was decimating the world.

But that there was any prearranged or organized or intentionally unpatriotic work on the part of the Chaplains or the Sisters at the front seems quite incredible. The record of the entire body of the Religious Representatives among the soldiers is absolutely the other way, and no more devoted class of workers served Italy during those long years of stress and struggle than these Catholic Chaplains and nurses, who lived among the soldiers and shared their hardships and dangers.


Amid all the stories, inextricably tangled and confused, of the reasons for its happening and of the way in which it happened, the physical military fact of the manner in which the break came appears to be that the Germans, finding themselves held up in France, and believing that should sufficient strain be thrown against her, Italy would give way and thus open a possible break in the Allies' defensive line,¹ came down to render the Austrians the necessary aid to overwhelm Cadorna's hard-fought Right on the Isonzo. And having come, Von Ludendorff introduced his new system of hammering to pieces the first line; then of capturing it under cover of the moving barrage which, in a region where every foot of road and every possible approach were known to the assailants, would prevent the arrival of reinforcements from the rear. Having effected this, the plan was facilitated by what was termed the method of infiltration, which demanded a certain amount of individual thought and independence from the men who according to plan would penetrate the Italian lines, and when there form groups or units for capture, holding and, under favoring conditions, for further progress.

¹ The account given is taken from sources which appear to the writer worthy of credit among the mass of stories and relations by writers and other persons, some of whom were participants in a part of the tragic events, and all of whom desired to tell the exact truth as far as they knew it.

The advance began with a stratagem which seems to have deceived the Italian outposts by causing them to believe that the first enemy units were bent on mere friendly fraternization, such as had previously gone on to some extent between the outposts and pickets, and as goes on in all wars where troops lie in close proximity to each other for a long time. With these, masking as such, were picked troops, carefully instructed and skilfully led to seize and utilize guns and strategic points, and behind these came the veteran shock-troops, burning to wipe out the long account with those who had so long held them off and so often driven them from their chosen positions. It was reported throughout the army that the officers were, many of them, from the Irredente region and spoke Italian perfectly, and that in the darkness they gave the Italians orders, which contributed to the Austrian success.

The plan appears to have worked beyond all expectation.

How many Italian troops, infected by the defeatist propaganda, proved false to their duty in this first scene of the tragedy is not known. The story that there were in a certain Division a considerable body thus infected was sufficiently circulated to justify the belief that the charge was true; but the number could not have been relatively large and, according to report, they were confined to two or three regiments of a single Division. However this was, the advance soon developed into an engagement, and this in turn into a fierce battle which swept to right and left as the Germans and Austrians came on along a more extended front, pouring through the passes and overwhelming those who strove desperately to bar their way. The attacking army were far from having it all their own way, but, whether by stratagem or by sheer fighting, fortune favored the assailants. They, either by betrayal or by the favoring fortune of war, early destroyed or got possession of the central telephone station of the Italians, whence orders were distributed to all the commands in all parts of that sector, so that no orders could be given, or those given were such as to add to the general confusion under the night attack.



**THE AUSTRO-GERMAN DRIVE AT CAPORETTO, OCTOBER, 1917,
SHOWING THE BREAKS IN THE ITALIAN LINES.**

17

The general commanding this army (the Second Army) was, according to report, absent from the front. He had been ill and had been sent to Padua or some other place to convalesce, and he returned to his Headquarters the day before the break, but was so ill that he was ordered to a hospital the following day. So sudden and swift was the penetration of the front that, according to the report current at the time, the Commander of the Division (Twenty-fourth) holding the front above Caporetto was surrounded and caught in his headquarters before he knew of the break in his line. On parts of the line of the advance the fighting was as fierce as in any battle of the war. Regiments were wiped out in their desperate efforts to save their positions. Regiments of the Bersaglieri, as ever, stood their ground and fought till exterminated. Elements of the Twenty-fourth Division fought with a valor sufficient to redeem the reputation of the Division from the stain brought on it. But the valor of the now flanked and isolated commands was unavailing. Within a few hours the flood of the assailants had poured through the passes and were, if not in the plain, on the commanding points above it where they were able with their barrage to prevent the arrival of reinforcing Italian troops.¹ In places the most dire of misfortunes that can befall an army—a panic—appears to have seized on some of the retreating troops; in others the Italians fought with surpassing courage to hold up the pursuit to give the disorganized elements time to escape, and those still unshaken time to retire.

Success begets success, and in nothing so much as in military action. With success, the Austrian and German forces acquired new powers, and in a region which was as well known to the Austrians as to the Italians, they were able to press the retreating Italians irresistibly, pushing them into ever-increasing confusion and disorder, and rendering vain the efforts made by the Staff and the still unshaken troops to stem the ever-rising tide and sweep back the overwhelming flood.

¹ The author was personally informed at the time of the facts as herein stated by eye-witnesses and persons of undoubted veracity and information.

After occupying Caporetto, the invading host pushed on and, with the impetus of victory, sweeping over the opposition, which was attempted in the hope of stopping them, captured Cividale with its large accumulation of stores, and scarcely stopping to consolidate their gains and gather up their booty, drove on straight for Udine, which was held only long enough to evacuate the hospitals and withdraw what could be moved in the few hours of confusion left after it became evident that the town could not be saved. Here the Second Army fell into complete disorder. A great number of the older and more experienced officers had been killed in the great offensive, and many of the officers left were too young and inexperienced to control under the extraordinary and novel conditions of the tragic situation.

The headquarters of the King and the General Staff had been removed to the neighborhood of Treviso, and the line of the Tagliamento had been chosen as the first line of serious defense, with the line of the Piave as the stronger defensive line behind.

The victorious and rapid advance of the invading armies had rendered necessary the withdrawal of all the troops on the Isonzo front, and the Third Army—the army which had captured and held the Carso—had been hastily ordered to abandon the positions they had won and maintained at such cost, and retire to the Tagliamento to cover the retreat of the now completely disorganized Second Army, and hold the crossings of the Tagliamento. The order was executed and the withdrawal of the Third Army was successfully accomplished. It withdrew from lines in face of a potent enemy eager to destroy it. With its flank exposed to the well-organized and victorious German-Austrian army, now pressing forward with all the ardor of success, it marched some forty-five miles, stopping neither for food nor for rest, and when it reached the first possible line of defense, it turned at bay and held it long enough to enable the ruck of fugitives, military and non-combatant, to escape, and the situation to be cleared sufficiently to provide for the permanent defense of the strong line of the Piave. It was

one of the most notable and brilliant feats in History, and will rank, when all the facts are known, with any of the similar movements of the great commanders. Parallel to the roads by which this army passed in its heart-breaking march was that from Udine, filled with the ruck of soldiers of the now disorganized Second Army and the refugees from the towns and countryside, fleeing before the Huns. The greater part of the former had now, all semblance of organization lost, thrown away their guns and were simply making their way westward. Many were under the delusion that the cause was lost and the war ended. Others joined other organizations. A panic had spread through the countryside, and the stricken population abandoned their homes and, taking such movables as they could carry, headed westward, fleeing in terror before the invading foe. The roads were packed with vehicles; in places thousands of farm vehicles and driven stock mingled indiscriminately with army cars, caissons, ambulances; pedestrians carrying all they had left in the world, all moving at the same gait. The wounded creeping, or hobbling along on crutches, helped by others, were in the throng. The pace of the slowest, which was hardly ever more than half a mile an hour, set that of the entire retreat. The autumn rains had begun and poured down steadily. At times there was a complete block, and the melancholy procession came to a stand for hours, or numbers straggled off across the sodden fields to seek some country lane that offered the illusory promise of a quicker way to safety. Many abandoned their vehicles to make better time on foot through the indescribable confusion and horror.

It was mainly after leaving Cividale that the Second Army began to break up. After Udine was abandoned, though units still fought gallantly, it broke up completely as an army and, possessed by the idea that all was lost, flung away arms and accoutrements, and, self-disbanded, spread over the country, headed for the Tagliamento and home.¹

¹ Cf. Trevelyan's *Scenes from Italy's War*, chap. VII. Also see the reports of foreign press correspondents who were in the retreat.

It was not until the Tagliamento, now a rolling flood, was passed that any feeling of security was had and order could be brought from the chaos of retreating soldiers and panic-stricken refugees, who poured westward. Happily for Italy and for the Allied Cause, the Third Army had been brought, by a supreme effort, to the west side of the Tagliamento in good order, though with loss of many guns which could not be got out of the mountains, and this Army covered the retreat and held up the eager enemy till the mass of the refugees could get across and the pursuit be somewhat checked. So eager was the pursuit that on October 25 the enemy were threatening Cividale. On the 28th they were threatening Udine, which they occupied the following day.

On the 31st they had reached the Tagliamento. The Tagliamento, however, was not considered as strong a line as the Piave, and no adequate system of defenses had been provided for holding it in such a catastrophe as had befallen the Italian arms. It was, however, held long enough to permit the non-military and the disorganized military mass to find safety on the western side of the Piave. The upper Tagliamento was crossed and the western side was occupied November 4, and the Italians, fighting rear-guard engagements at every step, fell back to the Livenza. This, however, could not be held, and the Italians fell back to the Piave, where the stand was made that held the Austrians and Germans beyond that strategic line, and saved Italy and the Allied Cause. The enemy reached the Piave on the 9th of November. Here Italy turned at bay.

When it became evident that the enemy could not be held on the Tagliamento, the First Army, the Fifth Army, and the Fourth Army (under General Count di Robilant, an experienced and able soldier) were, about November 4, withdrawn from the advanced Trentino line, not only to shorten the line of the Italian front, which the loss of the Second Army necessitated, but to prevent their being cut off should the enemy, who had advanced from Plezzo to Belluno, and were threatening to close in behind them, prove strong enough to seize Feltre and force the crossing

of the Piave, of which there appeared some danger at first. The movement was a difficult one under any conditions, but was especially so under those which now prevailed, with the Austrians burning to give Italy the coup de grâce. It was, however, effected with great address, and substantially everything military was brought off in the withdrawal, and thereafter the Fifth and First Armies held the left, and the Fourth Army held the centre of the shortened Italian line in the "Grappa Area" until, exactly a year later to the day, it opened the victorious and decisive engagement of Vittorio Veneto.¹

The line now extended from Lake Garda to the Asiago plateau, and on across to the bend of the Piave at Quero; and the Austrians and Germans were striving furiously to break through down the valley of the Brenta, and along the region between the Brenta and the Piave. Cadore and the Sette Comuni were lost, and the Italians, fighting desperately, were pushed back on the Asiago. But the key to the situation, the Grappa, was held fast. To lose it at that time would have meant the turning of the Piave line, the loss of Venice, and possibly of the whole Venetian Plain.

General Diaz had now been placed at the head of the Commando Supremo in the room of General Cadorna, with General Badoglio and General Giardino as his lieutenants, and it was determined to hold the Piave and save Venice; and the Asiago-Piave line was that on which Italy stood till she moved forward a year later to avenge her disaster by inflicting a yet greater one on her foe.

Three days after the enemy reached the Piave, the Trentino army had arrived on the new line where it was to take its position, and the enemy was stopped there as well, and as the issue proved, was stopped there for good. But at the time this was not known. Italy was profoundly shaken; her existence was at stake, and the whole Allied Cause was in peril.

In the early days of the disaster, when the Second Army

¹ Later the Italian armies were reorganised on a new system, and on this front were numbered 1st, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th.

was losing all organization, an address was issued, bearing the name of the Comando Supremo, denouncing the betrayal of the country in unmeasured terms, and calling down the maledictions of Heaven on the traitors. A little later it was itself denounced as a piece of enemy propaganda.

The King issued a brief but ringing appeal, that rang like a trumpet throughout Italy, and the people awoke to the peril and arose to the exigency as one man. It was this fact of Italy's imminent peril that was her salvation. Under the shock she gathered herself together in one supreme effort of resistance.

She realized that she had lost in a month all that she had fought for and gained at such cost, in two years and a half of sacrifice and carnage. She had lost one of her armies, scattered to the winds, disorganized and disintegrated; she had lost, at least, a third of all her war material of every kind; she had lost several provinces among her fairest, and their population, to the number of over half a million, beggared in a moment, having lost everything, were thrown upon her already weighted down hands, in an agony of despair that appealed to her deepest sympathies and challenged her utmost resources. But more than all this, she had lost confidence in a great element of her army; she had lost in the eyes of the world and, possibly for the moment, in her own eyes, the respect that she felt she was entitled to. All of her aspirations had suddenly been swept out of her reach, and in their place her whole future was imperilled by one cataclysmic blow of malign fortune. The old enemy was within her gates. Venice might again be lost; the old days of Radetsky might once more be known in Lombardy. Italy might again fall under Austrian domination, and all the fruits of her vast sacrifices perish.

The catastrophe was appalling. The French and British authorities offered to send assistance. Generals Foch and Robertson came down to look the situation over. The former visited the war zone to gauge the condition of the army. They both visited Rome, to gauge the resistive power of the nation. A meeting of the leaders, Civil and

Military, was held at Rapallo (November 6), *inter alia* to take stock of the situation, and lay down the lines of future action necessary to redeem what was lost and give promise of success, which at that moment appeared to be waning. The foundations of closer co-operation along lines military and economic were laid. If Italy could and would meet the situation with all her power, troops would be sent from France to help her; if not, then not. Italy had responded to their question. She would hold. She did hold, and, encouraged by their promise, she held with her own forces.

The story was published in the countries of the Allies that Italy was saved by the British and French contingents sent to her relief, and this has become the generally accepted story. It is not a correct statement of fact. That the relief promised and sent to Italy had a great moral effect in stiffening the Italian morale is undoubted, and, possibly, this has not been sufficiently recognized in Italy. But the fact is, that the fighting that was done on the Piave at that time was done by the Italians themselves. The only active military assistance her armies received immediately in that crisis was from her own naval forces, who were brought in to help defend the lower Piave. They improvised rafts and floating batteries and, bringing them into the lagoon and mouths of the Piave, contributed efficiently to the salvation of Venice and the Venetian Plain; and, as turned out, of Italy and of the Allied Cause.

Italy was ready to fight, but she must have food and coal and steel. The representatives of France and England returned to France satisfied, and troops began to come into Italy. They could not, however, in any event, be got into the fighting zone for two weeks, and the Italians set themselves to the task to save Venice. The French and British troops were not sent to the front at all in that crisis; for they were not needed. The four French divisions were stationed behind the Po-Mincio line, convenient to the defense of the front from the Stelvio to Lake Garda, and were later placed south of Bassano as a general reserve. The British were, as they arrived, placed in the region about

Mantua, behind the front lines. They were, in the first days of December, sent to relieve the worn First Army in the Montello Sector; and the French were, a day or two later, brought up into line to relieve the Italians in the Monfenera-Revassacca Sector.¹

By the time the British and French had arrived at these positions, the crisis had passed on the Piave. The Austrians had been definitely stopped, and were taking their revenge by harrying the unfortunate inhabitants of the countryside on the eastern side of the river, who had not been able to escape. The aid that the British and French rendered at that time was substantial, but was wholly moral and economic. The military aid that they rendered was later on.

Italy had responded to their question. She would hold. In the crisis she girded herself with new forces evoked from within herself, and barred the way of her invaders. All division was suddenly closed. The Defeatists took to cover in the sudden storm of mingled grief and rage. The opponents of the Government hushed their clamor and sided with former adversaries in the supreme effort to save Italy. Never in all Italy's history did the Italian people exhibit greater patriotism or more heroic virtues. The great industrial companies opened their stores to replace the munitions of war that had been lost beyond the Piave. One Company alone, the Ansaldo, furnished the Government, without a scrap of paper, over 2,000 pieces. All Italy rushed to the rescue. In Rome the Government rose to the greatness of the occasion.

The danger was not only on the Battle-front. The refugee population, stripped of everything on earth, had fled panic-stricken from the Huns, and were scattering throughout all the northern part of the country; others were filtering through southward. There was danger of their spreading panic throughout the Peninsula. Prompt

¹ It is said by Italian authorities that Foch did not believe that Italy could hold the Piave line, and was for Cadorna's withdrawing behind the Po-Mincio line; but that Cadorna held a different view, and his decision prevailed. (*Cf. Modern Italy Review*, March 13, 1919, pp. 132-3.)

measures were taken for their relief. The Government appointed a Commission for their assistance and appropriated a large sum of money for that purpose. This was supplemented by private relief unstintedly applied, and provision was made for their transportation and disposition in many provinces and cities of the country, far from the war-zone, where they could be taken care of and tranquillized. In this crisis for the first time the offers of assistance from Foreign Relief organizations were accepted by the Government, and very soon the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross were adding their ministrations and aid to the overtaxed Italian Red Cross; the Intendenza and other Relief organizations of Italy,¹ which were striving desperately to meet the overwhelming demand suddenly thrown on them.

It was not very long before order began to come out of the chaos.

In the first hours of the catastrophe there was a crisis in the Ministry, and on a vote of confidence, Signor Boselli's Ministry suffered a defeat (October 25). It could hardly have been otherwise. For some time the feeling had been prevalent that some change in the Cabinet was demanded by the situation—that a younger and more active man was needed at the head of the Government. It was felt that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was having it too much his own way in the Government, and that the Premier should be rather more potent in keeping the proper distribution of power among the several Ministries. Moreover, the country felt that a change would tend to increase its power.

¹ Immediately, on the Caporetto disaster the American Red Cross, which had that summer sent a commission to Italy to look over the field, tendered aid which was gladly accepted. The first contribution was \$250,000, telegraphed to the American Embassy. And a Red Cross train of supplies was despatched to Italy from Paris, under Major Carl Taylor and Major Edward Eyre Hunt. This was followed a few weeks later by the Red Cross Commission under Colonel Robert Perkins, Commissioner for Italy, and his efficient staff: Majors James Byrne, Samuel L. Fuller, Joseph Collins, M.D., Guy Lowell, and Chester Aldrich. And from this time the American Red Cross was the principal American support on the ground in Italy. Its services in the cause of cementing friendship between the two Peoples cannot be overestimated.

Thus in the deepening shadows passed from the head of the Government one of Italy's great patriots who, as he had truly said not long before, had "fought since his boyhood for Liberty." Moreover, he was a statesman of broader vision than many who excelled him in grasp and force. He was, perhaps, fortunate in being relieved at the moment; for the storm that was just bursting on the country must have taxed him beyond his strength.

Signor Orlando, who a few days previously had felt it necessary to make a defense of his administration as Minister of the Interior, was called on to form a new Government, which he succeeded in doing. He soon found his powers, as exceptional as they were, taxed to the utmost, as the knowledge of the extent of the disaster became known throughout the country. Fortunately for him and for Italy, it was the very completeness of the disaster that brought the remedy. Although after the first shock of the collapse on the Isonzo had passed, dissensions began again among Parliamentary elements, they were kept for the most part within closed doors. Externally a solid front was shown and the people grew more and more resolute. It was the people of Italy who in this cataclysm saved Italy. Responding to the King's appeal to their patriotism, they united in one solid mass of fervid patriotism, resolved to do and to suffer all for Italy. The peril was still imminent. The Army was holding the Piave, and the line to be held had been shortened by nearly a third; but the enemy, now above the Italians on the Alpine front as when the war began, was attacking not only on the Piave, but through the Trentino, and there was grave reason to apprehend that the line might be thrown back to the Po and the Mincio, that ancient war-frontier of Italy—some even said to the Apennines; but these were the defeatists and the secret friends of Germany and Austria, and they spoke in whispers.

The people said Italy—all Italy—must be saved.

Italy was saved. Although the Fifth, First, and Fourth Armies had, as stated, to be drawn back from the Trentino

positions which they had so victoriously conquered, and although the Italians were for a time in danger of being driven down to the plain and back from the Piave, with the loss not only of Venice, but of much besides, they, as in the former crisis a year before, made their final stand on the threshold of their door and held the enemy at bay. The latter later actually crossed the Piave, but were flung back again. They seized the Grappa, but were driven off. For Italy was now resolute to retrieve all that she had lost.

In other fields, as well, the situation at this time was serious. Russia, whose collapse had enabled the Germans and Austrians to withdraw troops from that point and throw them in with crushing weight on the hitherto fairly balanced Italian front, was now in complete anarchy. Under the destructive forces of Revolution and Civil War, she appeared to have sunk into national Madness, and to have thrown away all semblance of ordered existence. The former Dictator and Commander of Russia, civil and military, Kerensky, was after a disastrous attempt to bring everything under his authority, overthrown and fled for his life just at the time that the Italians were fighting their rear-guard actions between the Tagliamento and the Piave (November 7).

The new leaders, Lenin and Trotsky, promptly concluded at Brest-Litovsk a peace with Germany as with a victor, and signed a treaty which Germany was later on, when the Allies were victorious, compelled to renounce in toto.

In France and Flanders there had been heavy fighting all the autumn. What is known as the Third Battle of Ypres began the last day of July, and continued with little intermission through August, September, and October, until its close with the battle of Passchendaele, which the British captured on the same date that Italy was withdrawing her armies to her final stand on the Asiago-Piave line. It had been for over three months as stubborn fighting as was known during the war, and the losses had been enormous on both sides. So enormous, indeed, had they been on the

British side that the British reserves had been substantially exhausted. During the same period the French were fighting with equal resolution, to force the Germans from the gains made by them at Verdun in their earlier effort to seize this crucial point in the defenses of Paris, back in February and March, 1916. It seemed necessary to restore the old position as it was prior to that time, and about the end of August this, after tremendous fighting, was accomplished, and although Verdun was a ruin, the strategic value of the original salient was restored. Another step deemed of great moment by the French Commander, General Pétain, was the clearing of the ridge above the Aisne, where the Germans still held the western end of the Chemin des Dames and Fort Malmaison, and the forcing of them from a position which not only commanded the reaches of the Aisne, but protected Laon. It was in the attempt to capture Laon that Nivelle had made such sacrifices in the early spring. The offensive began October 23, and before the month was out the Chemin des Dames was cleared, and the Germans were forced back to the Ailette.

Just after the middle of November (20) an exploit which gave great satisfaction to the Allies and aroused much hope, especially among the English who were, at the time, going through a period of unusual depression, was the surprise break through the Hindenburg Line by General Byng's army, the capture of Bournon Wood, and the driving of a salient almost up to Cambrai. Unhappily, at the end of ten days, the Germans, having massed quietly the necessary forces, made a return surprise attack and recaptured a considerable part of what they had lost.

Ten days after these fierce battles for Cambrai, occurred in another and quite distant front a capture, which in mere picturesqueness, though it had also its strategic and moral value, eclipsed any yet made during the war in its historic appeal to the Allies. All the year the Palestine campaign had been pushed forward, at times with varying fortune, but with success steadily turning to the British side. On the 9th of December the City of Jerusalem was surrendered

to General Allenby and thus, the Sacred City and the Holy Sepulchre, for possession of which the Crusades were vainly fought, and which had been in Moslem hands well-nigh since the days of Cœur de Lion, fell after so long a time into Christian possession.

CHAPTER XX

THE PACT OF LONDON AND THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPLES

TOWARD the end of December, 1917, there were published in an English magazine,¹ and in certain journals, a number of Secret documents which had been given out by the Head of the Russian Bolshevik government, now in power. Among the documents thus bared to the world were Secret Conventions which undertook to provide for the settlement among the signatory Powers of questions which had convulsed Europe for generations. The first was the basis of a Convention entered into between Great Britain and Russia, in March, 1915, by which Great Britain consented to the annexation by Russia of Constantinople and the Straits: that is, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Media line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the Islands in the Sea of Marmora and the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. "The special rights of England and France in the above territories were to remain inviolate."² The consideration for the consent on England's part to this somewhat far-reaching annexation was a similar benevolent attitude on Russia's part toward the political aspirations of Great Britain in other regions; the neutral zone of Persia to be included in the British sphere of influence.³ Within the Russian sphere of influence was to be granted to Russia "full liberty of action."⁴ This

¹ *New Europe*, December 20, 1917.

² *The Secret Treaties*, E. Seymour Cooks, London Edition, p. 19.

³ *Id.*, p. 15.

⁴ In September, 1907, the British Minister at Teheran explained in a communication to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs the nature of the Anglo-Russian agreements, in which he said: "The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather to assure for-

document is dated a month after Great Britain's abortive attempt to force the straits of the Dardanelles with her sea power alone (February 20).

It appears from the documents that after Italy entered the war, Russia's wishes "were communicated to the Italian Government, and the latter expressed its agreement provided the war ended in the successful realization of Italian claims in general, and in the East in particular," and in the recognition by Russia for Italy of the same rights within the territories ceded to Russia as those enjoyed by France and England.¹ Thus Russia, had she remained faithful to her Allies, was assured of what she had aspired to and fought for since the days of Peter and Catherine. Happily for her Allies, the successful heads of the Revolution when they later abandoned the Allies, abandoned as well the position of vantage thus conceded to Russia.

There were other secret Treaties or Documents at the time, relating to secret understandings, published. These included that relating to the partition of Asiatic Turkey—in the spring of 1916: the agreement with Roumania, dated August 18, 1916; the Russo-Japanese Treaty, July 3, 1916; the Franco-Russian correspondence relating respectively to France's intentions as to the left bank of the Rhine, and Russia's intentions as to her western frontier, March 11, 1917, which, tragically enough, was only one day before the Revolution in Russia and the abdication of the Tzar. Also there were documents published relating to the correspondence between the Allies and Greece.

The document, however, that most nearly concerned Italy among those published in Russia and later in England, was the Treaty of London, signed by the representatives of England, France, Italy, and Russia, April 26, 1915, a week before Italy denounced the Treaty of the Triple Al-

ever the independence of Persia." This view Sir Edward Gray confirmed in the House of Commons, February 14, 1908. But "full liberty of action" accorded now to Russia was scarcely compatible with the independence of Persia. Great Britain's consent to the entire arrangement must be read in the light of the situation existing when it was given.

¹ *Id.*, pp. 21-22.

liance, and two or three days less than a month before Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. By this Treaty it was provided that a Military Convention was to be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces against Italy. On her part, Italy undertook by all means at her disposal to conduct the campaign in union with France, Great Britain, and Russia against all the powers at war with them. And the Naval forces of France and Great Britain were to render uninterrupted and active assistance to Italy until such time as the Navy of Austria should be destroyed or Peace should be concluded.

Italy was to receive by the future Treaty of Peace the district of Trentino; the entire Southern Tyrol up to its natural geographical boundary; which was specifically stated to be the Brenner Pass; the City and District of Trieste; the County of Gorizia and Gradisca; Istria entire up to Quarner, including Volosca and the Istrian Islands of Cherso and Lusinia, as well as seven smaller Islands, which were named, with the neighboring islets, all of which regions were described by boundaries.

Italy was likewise to receive the province of Dalmatia in its existing frontiers, including Lissierica and Trebigne in the north, and all the country in the south up to a line drawn from the coast at the promontory of Planka, eastward along the watershed in such a way as to include in the Italian possessions all the valleys of the rivers emptying at Sebenico. Also all the islands situated to the north and west of the coast of Dalmatia. Then was described the part of the coast to be neutralized—from Planka to the extremity of the Sabbioncello Peninsula; a part of the littoral south of the promontory of ancient Ragusa, so as to include the entire gulf of the Cattaro. The Montenegrin ports were not to be neutralized on the Adriatic.

Certain territories on the Adriatic specifically named were

to be included by the Powers of the Quadruple Entente in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, viz.: in the north of the Adriatic, the entire coast from Volosca Bay on the border of Istria to the southern frontier of Dalmatia; including the entire coast belonging to Hungary, and the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume and the small ports of Novi and Carlopago; a number of islands which were named; likewise in the south of the Adriatic where when Serbia and Montenegro had interests, they were to have the entire coast from Planka up to the River Drin, with the chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and San Giovanni di Medua, with a number of Islands, which were named. Consent was given to the assignment of the Port of Durazzo to the independent Mohammedan State of Albania.

Further, Italy was to have in absolute property Valona, the island of Saseno, and as much territory as would be required to insure their military safety. Having obtained the foregoing, Italy undertook in the event of a small autonomous and neutralized state being formed in Albania, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to repartition the northern and southern Districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The southern coast of Albania to be neutralized. Also to Italy was conceded the right of conducting the Foreign Relations of Albania; and in any case, Italy was to be bound to secure for Albania a territory sufficiently extensive to enable its frontiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the east of the Lake of Obrida.

Outside of the Adriatic Italy was to obtain all the twelve islands: the Dodecanese, already occupied by her, in full possession. France and Great Britain and Russia admitted in principle the fact of Italy's interest in the maintenance of political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her rights in case of a partition in Turkey to a share equal to theirs in the basin of the Mediterranean, to wit: in that part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia.

There were other provisions relating to Italy's equality of

interest with the other signatory powers in Asiatic Turkey, conceding her right to occupy Libya; her right to her share in any war indemnity corresponding to her sacrifices and efforts; her right to compensation, should the other powers obtain Germany's African colonies, by way of the extension of Italy's African possessions. Great Britain was to facilitate the immediate flotation on the London market for Italy of a loan of not less than £50,000,000. And by the last Article but one (Art. 15), "France, England, and Russia pledged themselves to support Italy in not allowing the representations of the Holy See to undertake any diplomatic steps having for their object the conclusion of Peace, or the settlement of questions connected with the present war."

The last Article (16), which, indeed, was a separate convention, provided that this Treaty was to be kept secret and that "as regarded Italy's adhesion to the Declaration of September 5, 1914 (which was the declaration that no one of the Allies would make peace, or engage in negotiations for peace, save in common with the others), this Declaration alone would be published immediately on the declaration of War by or against Italy."

And, finally, Italy declared that she would actively intervene at the earliest possible date, and at any rate, not later than one month after the signature of that document by the contracting parties.

There had been rumors of this secret Convention in circulation soon after it was signed. Its existence was indeed mentioned as a fact at the time that Italy was being swept into the strife. And from time to time, later on, it was alluded to in the Press, but only enough to soothe the amour propre of the Italian People—and none but the confidants of the several signatories knew what its terms were. They knew vaguely that it extended Italy's power in the Adriatic, and to some extent beyond that historic sea. The newspaper that more than any other was considered to represent Baron Sonnino declared (April 19, 1915) that the politico-strategic question of the Adriatic could "be solved only by one method—by eliminating from that sea every

other war-fleet but Italy's," and that "neither a fort, nor a gun, nor a submarine that is not Italian, ought to be in the Adriatic." The Treaty was on its face manifestly one whose publication was never contemplated as a possibility in the situation that existed then, and its publication subsequently was undoubtedly an embarrassment to the signatories; as its contents, in terms of apparently cold barter, were a shock to the International Public. However clever may have been thought, by those interested, the extortion from the other Powers of so much of regions not wholly theirs to give or trade away, the impression on others was painful. Was it true, after all, that Italy had dickered and bartered with the two sides before making her choice; was all the talk about her war for Liberty and for Civilization mere moonshine and deception?—a mask to cover sheer material interests? Had she taken advantage of the hard case in which France and England found themselves to hold them up and extort from them all she could get? This was the question that arose in the minds of many whose hearts had gone out to Italy in her heroic struggle and sacrifice. Her enemies were quick to take advantage of her equivocal situation to blacken her secretly or openly, and it took all the efforts of her friends and all the devotion and sacrifices of her people to clear away the unhappy impression caused by this secret arrangement.

England and France could say nothing, but were aggrieved at having been forced into the arrangement. And now to be publicly placed before the world as having been made to divide that to which their title was more than questionable, placed them in an unhappy position. Their Governments had to meet interpellations as to a number of the matters concluded in the Convention. Serbia and Greece were both enraged at the provisions that related to the territories to which they aspired.

In Italy, Article XV was that which caused the greatest sensation. The Vatican was quick to resent the secret engagement made to prevent the Holy See from taking any steps in the conclusion of Peace, and interpellations were addressed to the Governments, which in Italy did not receive

any very definite response, though the impression was conveyed that the translation as given was not correct, and the interpretation put on it was erroneous. In the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of the Government, stated (December 20, 1917) that "the Treaty did not say that the representatives of the Holy See should not be allowed to take any diplomatic steps to bring about Peace," and in a further statement (February 14, 1918) he said that "the only thing that this clause does is to say that if Italy objects to the Pope's sending a representative to the Peace Conference, we would support the objection." Whatever this clause may say, undoubtedly the reason given by Lord Robert Cecil was the intention with which it was framed. The Italian Government was nervous in regard to any step that might look toward the Internationalization of the position of the Holy See, and was as firm now in opposing everything of the kind as it had been at the time of the Second Hague Conference, when it had obtained England's support in preventing the Holy See from securing the admission of its representative to that Conference.

The year 1918 opened with Italy holding steadily the Piave line, and forcing every energy to the utmost in her desperate effort to restore her lost position by increasing her output of war material and supplies. It was like making bricks without straw, for she was never so short of provisions and supplies of prime necessity as now, and she had long been short of them. There were times this winter when it appeared as though she could not possibly hold out. The Submarine campaign was being carried on ruthlessly, and with what looked not unlike success. Much attention was now being concentrated on Italy, and the enemy, having cut deep into her territory and forced her to a desperate stand on the Venetian Plain, were now trying to give her the coup de grâce by cutting off her food-supply and reducing her people to a condition in which disorders must occur. The Army had to be supplied, even if the civic population suffered; and at times, in cities like Naples and Messina and

Palermo, the supplies of food were actually exhausted.¹ The grain ships coming to their relief were sunk on sundry occasions almost in sight of port.

Toward the end of January (21) Premier Orlando and Signor Crespi were compelled to go to Paris, like Jacob's Sons to Egypt, to get Bread,² and to England to get Coal.

Connected with this dearth which was an evident peril, was another peril, which was equally actual, though not so apparent: a psychological peril. This consisted in the steadily deepening apprehension that with the increased activity of the Submarine campaign, the food-supply of Italy would be cut off and the people be starved. And this apprehension was being fostered in every way by those who were against Italy. Russia had collapsed and the Austrians were preparing to fling all their forces on Italy. Moreover, a question had been raised as to whether England and France still would stand by the Treaty of London.³ Contributory to this depression was the financial situation in Italy. Since the disaster in the autumn and the increased need to buy yet more extensively in foreign markets, without any corresponding increase in exports, Italian lire had steadily depreciated with the consequent rise in the cost of living.⁴

The subsidy or stipend for the wives and families of soldiers was for an average Italian family now only about six cents per capita per day in American money; threepence in English money. The Government strove earnestly to

¹ The report was made to the writer in January, 1918, that Palermo had been without grain for two days. Naples had only two days' supply, and hardly any city outside of the war zone had more than a week's supply.

² The deficit of the preceding harvest in Italy was 12,000,000 quintals.

³ The *Echo de Paris* wrote a reassuring article on this, January 12 (1918), which gave the Italians great satisfaction.

⁴ Reduced to terms of Swiss francs as the standard, the following table will show the comparative depreciation of the money of the Allies at the end of December, 1917:

England.....	17.35
France.....	23.40
Italy.....	47.40

Cf. Corriere della Sera, Milan, January 8, 1918. Prior to the war the difference had been less than 1.

meet the situation by controlling prices and by creating an Exchange Commission which should control all exports; by mobilizing and sequestering all food-supplies; by mobilizing and utilizing all tonnage; and by impressing on the Allies the need to recognize Italy's right to her proportionate apportionment of the stock of food available.

America had, the year before, recognized the need of conserving and apportioning equitably her food-supply among all the countries dependent on it in any degree, and the President of the United States, under authority of the Congress, had appointed a Food-Control Commissioner with very extensive powers to effectuate this.¹ The American people had responded to the appeal made to them with a patriotism which insured its success as nothing else could have done. But certain difficulties had been encountered in the practical application of the foundation principles of the scheme, when it came to dealing with the several Governments interested. Each one was, perhaps not unnaturally, desirous to secure for itself as much as possible, and Italy believed that she was not generously treated by the International Commission, or Board having charge of the final distribution. And whether because she was the farthest away, or for some other reason, her complaint apparently had a considerable basis of fact. She was always short of something of prime necessity; sometimes of several things, and occasionally of everything. At times she lived, as it were, almost from hand to mouth. But she lived, and she fought.

There was now beginning to be a feeling among the Allies that no complete and crushing victory was likely to come; but that no Peace was likely to come either unless the Enemy were prepared to recede from their arrogant position of the preceding year. But the world was longing for Peace, and certainly it could not sustain much longer the strain and drain of a war that was exhausting it to the point of sheer destruction.

¹ Mr. Herbert Clarke Hoover, who had had a large experience in administering the Belgium Relief supplies.

It appeared manifest that the Enemy should not be left under any misapprehension that the Allies would consider any peace not consonant with the principles whose preservation had brought them to make such immeasurable sacrifices. And on the 7th of January, the British Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, delivered an address before the Trades-Unions in which he set forth the conditions which England would consider a basis on which to begin a discussion of Peace terms.¹

On the 8th of January President Wilson delivered before the Congress of the United States the address in which he laid down his now famous Fourteen Points. These were as follows:

- (1) Open Conventions.
- (2) The Freedom of the Seas.
- (3) The Elimination, as far as practicable, of Economic Barriers, and the Establishment, as far as possible, of equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the Peace, and associating themselves for its maintenance.
- (4) International Disarmament.
- (5) Impartial adjustment of Colonial claims, with considerations of the interests of the Populations concerned.
- (6) The Evacuation of Russian territory, and Assistance to her.
- (7) The Evacuation and Restoration of Belgium.
- (8) The Freeing of French territory, the Restoration of her invaded portions, and the righting of the wrong touching Alsace and Lorraine.
- (9) The Readjustment of the Frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizable lines of Nationality.
- (10) The Freest opportunity of Autonomous Development of the Peoples of Austria-Hungary.
- (11) The Evacuation of Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, with Restoration of Invaded Regions; the delimitation of their Frontiers on Historic lines; access to the Sea and International Guaranties of the Political and Economic Independence and Territorial integrity of the several Balkan States.
- (12) The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to be assured a secure Sovereignty; other Peoples thereunder to be assured all opportunity for autonomous development; and the Dardanelles to be free under International Guaranty.

¹ *Secret Treaties*, p. 41, n.

(13) The Independence of Poland with access to the Sea, and her Political and Economic Independence and Territorial integrity to be guaranteed under International Covenant; And finally,

(14) The Formation of a General Association of Nations under Specific Covenants for the affording of Mutual Guaranties of Political Independence and Territorial Integrity to Great and Small States alike.

There was no apparent conflict, save on one point, between the address of the President of the United States and that of the British Premier delivered the day before to the Trades-Unions. Only in regard to the Freedom of the Seas was there likely to be a wide divergence.

There was a certain difference of opinion regarding Russia from whose confusion the President apparently expected better results to proceed than was generally believed possible, or than time has brought to pass. But on the whole the two declarations were not irreconcilable, and they had the appearance of having been to some degree concerted. The reference to Italy that her frontiers should be settled on lines of clearly recognizable nationality was accepted in Italy as far as it went, but only thus far, and the Press was very critical. Italy was disappointed at the meagre space in the address assigned to her in comparison with that given to France, and especially at the omission to indicate appreciation of Italy's need of defensible frontiers. Moreover, the test applied would take away Italy's claims to the Greek Islands, and her share in Asia Minor. The Vatican press tended to accept the address as consonant with the Peace Note of the Pope of August 1, 1917, but claimed that it should have come earlier to have any important effect.

The attitude of other Powers engaged in war toward this new and firm exposition of principles was watched with keen interest in Italy. So judicial a tone was novel in the discussion of such matters as the address treated of. France and England were, to judge from the Press, apparently critical of the position assumed by the President, though they did not desire to alienate the good-will of one who was bending every effort to send them succor. Moreover, there

was a tone in the message which augured ill for certain of their aspirations. The message referred to France's right to Alsace and Lorraine; France, however, had other aspirations besides these. There were, for example, the Saar Valley and the left Bank of the Rhine. The message referred to the absolute freedom of navigation at sea, in War as well as in Peace. England regarded this principle as a blow at her control of the Sea.

Germany affected to accept the principles in part; but with reservations which would have nullified much that the President set forth as fundamental. And the President, on February 11, laid down in another address, as elucidating and supplementing his fourteen points, four principles as follows:

I. That each part in the final settlement must be based on the essential justice of the particular case, and upon such adjustments as will be most likely to bring a permanent Peace.

II. That Peoples and Provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game—even the great game now forever discredited, of Balance of Power. But that

III. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the Populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.

IV. That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them, without introducing or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the Peace of Europe, and consequently of the World.

These principles were more or less accepted, though with a reserve due to the question in the minds of those controlling the policies of the various Governments concerned, as to how far it was intended to apply them. The theory was unassailable; the practical application was quite a different thing. Even in Germany the Chancellor, in a speech made on the Points, declared his adherence to them in principle, as a basis on which to begin discussion—a manoeuvre probably intended to effect what the earlier German note

had failed to accomplish. He declared that he "gladly welcomed the President's statement in respect to the forever discredited Balance of Power," and he added that the "maintenance of Equilibrium" was "an English invention,"¹ an assertion which Mr. Balfour, on behalf of England, warmly repudiated.

The German Chancellor made the reservation that the effectiveness of the President's principles was dependent on their acceptance by all nations, and that a Court of International Arbitration must be established by all nations to render them operative.

There were other reservations made besides those of the Imperial German Chancellor to the declaration of the President of the United States; though they were not made so publicly. England was not yet ready to accept the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. Some others were diffident as to accepting doctrines so novel as that, Government was based on the consent of the governed. It took some time to bring them to it, and to other doctrines laid down by this Teacher of Democracy. In time they came to it. It was adding a new force to the Allied cause. But the Peoples accepted them first. To them it was a new Gospel, and they heard it gladly.

As the time passed, it became evident that everywhere some change was taking place, and that when the spring opened, there would be a renewal of the conflict with even greater intensity than ever before, and that the offensive might include the entire front from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

The situation in Italy was growing more distressing as means grew more scant. A certain increase of apprehension on the part of the Allies that the one or the other might not hold out was felt. France, who was short of provisions and had put her people on an allowance of 300 grammes per day, was going through the throes of the early stages of the Caillaux trial for treasonable communication with the Enemy, and Bolo Pasha was tried, convicted, and shot for

¹ *The League of Nations*, M. Ertzberger, Miall's Translation, London, p. 29.

treason. Italy was undergoing extreme privation, owing to the diminution of tonnage and the sinking of the supply-ships destined for Italian ports. And on top of it all came the complication of the question of exports whether to Switzerland or to other countries, and the further complication of what was known as the silk-waste (Cascami) export scandal relating to earlier exports to enemy countries, in which certain prominent manufacturers and a deputy of wealth and standing were alleged to be implicated; all of which had to be investigated by the Government. And to make the situation more difficult there was a feeling prevalent that notwithstanding the sacrifices undergone by the Italian People, Italy and her part in the war were undervalued by her Allies. This feeling applied especially to the part that her fleet had performed. The sinking by Austrian cruisers of the British Mine-Sweepers in the lower Adriatic in May (15) the year before had always been held, though perhaps not openly, as chargeable to Italy's failure to protect better those waters, and some endeavor had been made to obtain Italy's consent to place her fleet under the French Admiral in command in the Mediterranean. All such suggestions, however, Italy had firmly rejected, at least so far as concerned her independence of action in guarding her coasts and interests in the Adriatic, and some feeling had resulted therefrom. There was a time, indeed, when the feeling growing out of this might have been characterized more strongly.

In the early Spring, steps were being taken to clear the North Sea, and the suggestion of the creation of an Admiral-in-Chief came up again. But Italy, whose coast was largely unprotected, had her own views touching the employment of her fleet, whose disposition her Government knew had a political as well as a military bearing, and the only result of the attempt to exert pressure upon her was to exasperate her. Her Government leaders knew their People better than their British and French colleagues knew them, and they undoubtedly had sound ground for questioning whether they would be sustained if they with-

drew the Italian fleet from the command of an Italian Admiral, and placed it under command of a French Admiral; or if they withdrew it from the Adriatic and sent it to the North Sea.

Taking all these things together, the situation was somewhat gloomy.

The long vigil on the Piave was wearing on the Italian troops, and the British and French Divisions back of the Piave front were, toward the middle of December, moved up to the front, and assigned to the Sector of the Grappa and the Montello.

Russia had now not only fallen into complete collapse; but the tumultuous surge of her wreck threatened to sweep over her late Allies. For a time the Bolshevik Government paltered; but the German armies swept on. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk, imposed on her by the Central Empires, and signed March 3, placed her at their mercy, and Germany extorted what she wanted. She was to get Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Esthonia. She got £300,000,000 sterling, one-half in gold; and she got the substantial monopoly of Russian trade. She occupied the Ukraine and seized Odessa and other Black Sea ports, which gave her control of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Roumania came next. Having disarmed certain disorderly Russian regiments within her borders, she was forced by Germany to make Peace and disarm. Finland was subjected to the peril of imminent destruction, and was declared a Republic under German protection: protection of the lamb by the wolf.

Having got these things accomplished, or in process of accomplishment, Germany largely moved her troops and guns, now no longer needed on her eastern front, to her western front preparatory to her final offensive.

The great offensive in France began as customary with a fierce bombardment, and the attack was launched on March 21 along a front of fifty-four miles. The Germans were largely preponderant in numbers and guns,¹ and besides had

¹ British authorities state that British Divisions had been reduced to about 10,000 men each, and there were 58 Divisions from Ypres to the Oise, while the Germans had 192 Divisions on the western front.

the advantage of the initiative. The first attack was directed against the British lines, especially against the joint where the British and French lines under different commanders abutted on each other without being really united. Notwithstanding plenty of gallantry displayed by the British, the line was pierced in several points west of St. Quentin, and the British were compelled to fall back. The enemy forced the crossing of the Crozat Canal and the Oise, and by the morning of the third day there was a gap of eight or ten miles in the British lines, whose reserves had already been thrown in, and the Germans with plenty of reserves were advancing steadily. It is said that the Emperor himself had come to witness the attack, and the final victory of his armies, and that as the Germans pushed forward he exclaimed with imperial pride: "This is my battle."

The left was obliged to fall back to prevent being turned on the right by the Germans, and territory which it had cost four months of hard fighting to win was lost in fewer days. There was gallant fighting against heavy odds; but the Germans were now confident of victory, and were sweeping forward irresistibly. Line after line was taken and lost.

By the morning of the fourth day the exhausted British were in full retreat and the Germans were crossing the Somme. That night there was a big gap at Serre between the two armies, and the situation of the Fifth Army from Serre to the Oise near Noyon was extremely critical. The simple fact was that the whole situation was extremely critical. "The gap was filled by non-combatants and odd-job men," hastily collected for the purpose, and the retreat continued, covered by three French Divisions who were rushed up across the Oise on the second day, and who took up a line behind the Crozat Canal and covered the retreat the following day, and then with some isolated British regiments, fell back to protect the line of the Oise. That evening General Fayolle arrived with reinforcements to save the Allied cause from possibly irretrievable disaster.

In face of this disaster a step was taken which should

have been taken long before. The Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States were brought to the realization that the only way to meet a united military Power under one Commander was to oppose to it a united military Power under one Commander, and on the 26th General Foch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the armies fighting in France.¹ The effect was immediately apparent, and from this moment the hitherto separate armies were fused into one cohesive power and employed as one great army by its great Commander.

The extraordinary thing is that this step had not been taken earlier. The British Premier had some time before made in Paris an exceedingly frank speech, in which he admitted that a series of unhappy errors had retarded the success of the Allied arms, and bespoke a closer co-operation as necessary to prevent disaster. The speech was not lacking in boldness, and he was attacked for it in the House of Commons. But he was not bold enough at that time to stand for a single Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in France, who would undoubtedly be French.

The first German offensive directed toward Amiens finally came to an end (April 6) when within six or eight miles of Amiens, where a barrier was formed which they vainly strove to break through. They addressed their next push along the Lys, both north and south of Armentières, where they drove through, forcing the British back to a line west of Mt. Kemel to the Forest of Nieppe, and around to

¹ The nomination of General Foch is now known to have come from General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, who in a conference boldly announced that the method hitherto pursued was leading to defeat; that without a single commander of all the armies they could not win, and then mentioned General Foch as the best man for the place and expressed his readiness to place himself and his troops under General Foch's command. The nomination was immediately seconded by Mr. Lloyd George, and thus the decision was made that turned the tide in the war.

To General John J. Pershing is due a greater debt than apparently is generally known. From his disposition and command of the American military forces in France came about, not only first, the singleness of command of all the armies in France under Marshal Foch; but, secondly, the admirable work at St. Mihiel; thirdly, the great achievement of the Americans in the Argonne, and, finally, the important fact that the United States had at the close of the war a real and efficient army of her own.

the west of La Bassée, where a stand was finally made by the British reinforced by the French Divisions despatched by Foch to their support. This offensive was brought to a close about the end of April, by which time some 300,000 men had been hurried across from England to supply the place of the British Reserves, now quite exhausted. This offensive had resulted in losses to the Allies of some 1,500 square miles of territory; 100,000 prisoners; 1,000 guns; 100 tanks, and ten million pounds' worth of other matériel. The total Allied casualties were about 300,000, to 500,000 on the part of the Germans.

The Germans having failed in their objective, which was the capture of Amiens and the complete separation of the British and French armies, now after a month spent in re-organization, addressed themselves to the French front covering Paris. On the morning of the 25th of May they launched their attack against the heights above the Aisne, along which ran the Chemin des Dames. Here, as in the earlier attack against the British lines, they were largely preponderant. The French were swept from the Ridge, and that evening the Germans were forcing the passage of the Aisne at several points between Vailly and Berry-aubac. The British right was forced back on Rheims, and the Germans, driving forward, forced the passage of the Vesle at Fismes and Braisne. Soissons was captured on the 29th. But Rheims was held, and the Germans pushed on to Fère-en-Tardenois, where they captured the great depot of matériel there. Extending their wedge east and west, they captured Oulchy and pushed on to the Marne, which they reached at Jaulgonne, Château-Thierry, and Dormans. Driving westward along the valley of the Oise, they took Neuilly. They later forced the passage of the Marne and established a bridge-head, which they began to extend. They seemed now well on the road to Paris, from which they were only some forty miles distant. Apparently they were quite irresistible. For the first time they had made a breach in the French line, and were in the open. But Foch was a great General. He brought up his reserves

and barred the way at Villers-Cotteret. He held Rheims throughout, as he held Amiens, and the two bastions served his purpose, when he flung his weight on the stretched sides of the great salient on which Germany counted to break the French defense. Across this breach at Belleau Wood on June 5 the Americans, fresh and stalwart, were flung—Marines and Regulars—and they blocked the German drive. It required some three weeks, from June 5 to June 24, to clear the Belleau Wood; but it marked the first step in the Counter-offensive that stopped the German advance.

The final German drive for Paris was made when on July 15 the Germans were making at the same time a last assault on the bastion of Rheims and Gouraud's lines to the east, and they forced the passage of the Marne and established a bridge-head between Fossoy and Dormans. Crossing over some five or six divisions, they extended the bridge-head eastward toward Epernay. The situation looked grave enough with this bridge-head on the south side of the Marne—but the hour had struck. On the 15th of July the Americans cleared Château-Thierry, which they held from this time.

On the western side of the Salient Foch, on the morning of the 18th of July, flung against the enemy the weight of the armies of Mangin and Degoutte, with the Reserves and the Americans; while on the eastern side Gouraud stood firm till his moment came. At Fossoy were the Americans, who flung them back across the river.

Mangin's troops pushed forward from the Forest of Villers-Cotteret. Degoutte moved up the valley of the Ourcq. And that day was the turn of the tide of the war. The day closed with the Mont de Paris, overlooking Soissons, in Mangin's hands; and some 15,000 prisoners and 300 captured guns were in the hands of the French and Americans.

From now on, though the struggle was long and furious, the tide set in steadily for the Allies and their associates: the Americans, who began the advance which, though at times stayed, never ceased till it crossed the Rhine.

In the middle of June, whilst the Germans were deliver-

ing their terrible and telling assaults on the French front along the Oise, where the armies of Von Boehm and Von Hutier were pushing forward between Soissons and Villers-Cotteret, and those of Von Below were endeavoring to encircle the coveted bastion of Rheims, now a mass of ruins, and with their eyes set toward Paris, which they appeared fatally bent on having, whether as a city or a ruin, a move was made in Italy.

While the Germans were driving forward in France in April, advancing on Amiens, a movement began, with both a military and political object, which was destined to have far-reaching consequences. The main object was political, viz.: the breaking up of Austria-Hungary through the emancipation of her subject Peoples: the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks or Bohemians, the Jugo-Slavs and, if possible, the Hungarians. The military object was the securing of the active co-operation of the military elements of these races, who had been impressed to fight under the flag of Austria, in the work of the emancipation of their several countries, and were now prisoners of war in Allied countries, mainly Italy and Russia. There were in Italy a large number of these prisoners, some of whom had deserted and voluntarily surrendered; and a considerable force had been enlisted from among those in Russia who were now giving a good report of themselves in Siberia. President Wilson's ringing words, addressed to the Peoples of the world in advocacy of the emancipation of the Peoples subject to the tyranny of Austria, backed as they were by the whole power of America, had had an immense effect throughout all those regions, and indeed throughout the world. It was the belief of the organizers and friends of the movement that a strong contingent could be recruited by voluntary enlistment from among these prisoners in Italy, who would not only render efficient service against Austria in the field; but whose presence under the flag of Freedom would have a far-reaching effect on their co-nationals who were enrolled in the armies of the Enemy.

Under the inspiration of exiled Patriots from among the oppressed Peoples, and with the cordial encouragement of those individuals among the Allies who, either as lovers of Liberty or haters of all Oppression, saw in the situation an opportunity to advance at once the cause of Liberty and the Allied cause, the movement gathered head. A conference of those interested in the proposed plan was held in London between a number of exiles representing an element of the Peoples subject to Austrian rule, and a number of Italians of influence, and a certain understanding was arrived at, which although inchoate, furnished sufficient basis to give promise that a General Conference to be held in Rome might have important results. Accordingly, a General Conference assembled in Rome in the earlier part of April, popularly known as the "Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities"—oppressed by Austria. It was attended by representatives, naturally self-appointed or selected by the groups of exiles, of those Nationalities; and by certain ardent advocates of the plan from among the Allies. And among both were a number of men of importance. There was much discussion and some division, but a series of Resolutions were adopted for publication, and a further series were adopted—not to be published. They were, however, rather expressive of the aspirations of the groups for independence than declarative of a programme. This was natural where the ground was unbroken before, the membership represented different and possibly even conflicting interests, and where the method of effectuating the several aspirations proclaimed was wrapped in uncertainty and obscurity.

That the Conference was held with the sympathy and good-will of the Allies goes without saying; but it is equally undoubted that the aspirations of those representing the several Oppressed Nationalities could not be said to have been followed *pari passu* by a sympathy which could be certainly transmuted into action.

Before the Conference broke up—or at least before the membership dispersed—they were received by the Premier, Orlando, as a token of Italy's sympathy as a People; but

the Italian Government did not consider that, as such, it had formally recognized the Conference.

The Conference, however, accomplished more than was considered likely in the beginning, and its effects were clearly traceable later on. Largely through the efforts of Colonel Stefanik, who was the soul of the Czecho-Slovak (Bohemian) movement, a Czecho-Slovak Legion was formed from among the Czecho-Slovak prisoners, and was placed under General Grazziani, an Italian officer of great daring.

A Convention was drawn up and signed a little later (April 21) by Premier Orlando on behalf of Italy, and Colonel Stefanik on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia, by which Italy recognized the Czecho-Slovak Committee which had been formed as a Provisional Government, and recognized in them certain Governmental powers, as, for example, the creation of a Court or Tribunal to deal with offenses on the part of their co-nationals.

An effort was made by the Jugo-Slav representatives and their friends to obtain for them the same rights and recognition; but as to these Sonnino, who was dominant in the matter, was inflexible. He probably had a conscientious objection to availing himself of men who were placing their lives in jeopardy to accomplish the liberation of a region, a part of which he had no intention of relinquishing to them. He certainly had a serious objection to the idea of a great Serbia, which would absorb all the rest of Jugo-Slavia; and would expect in recognition of their services all of Dalmatia, and possibly Istria and Trieste. He believed that such recognition as was now demanded would cause Austria to fight with renewed bitterness immediately, and in the future would lead to the newly constructed Jugo-Slav kingdom falling under Austrian influence in a way permanently disadvantageous to Italy. He had, indeed, a profound distrust of the Jugo-Slavs and although, under the strong pressure brought to bear on him by those who held more liberal views, he yielded so far as to consent to the release of individual prisoners among those of this nationality, who had given satisfactory proof of their adherence to the idea of

Independence, it was coupled with the condition that they should be sent to the Balkan front, and at best only a few hundred out of many thousands were accepted, under the rigid tests instituted. It was at this time that the foundation was laid of the resentment against Italy's position which later, when the Armistice came, led to so many complications and to such implacable hostility.

As the Germans pushed forward in their imposing offensive in France in the spring, they recalled their troops from Italy to add to their weight on the Aisne, and the British and French troops likewise were withdrawn from Italy, with the exception of three British Divisions and two French Divisions, in exchange for which, two Italian Divisions were sent to the French front, and some 50,000 Labor troops were sent to France to release for service at the front there an equal number of fighting troops. Thus, there were actually at the moment in France more Italian troops—fighting and work-troops—than there were British and French put together in Italy.

Tremendous efforts were made by the enemy throughout all this period to shake Italy's morale. The destruction of Italian cities was a part of Austria's regular plan: Verona, Padua, and especially Venice were the constant objects of bombing attacks. Venice suffered from some threescore attacks, which destroyed a number of her most renowned edifices: and many lives. That many more were not killed was due solely to the fact that the population was largely removed from Venice. Padua was a military post and so was subject to bombardment. Verona was bombed and many lives destroyed. Such warfare was wholly futile so far as military results were concerned. It only served to enrage the Italian People against "the Huns."

When the second, or June offensive, occurred in France, and the Germans were making their desperate effort to break down the bastion of Rheims and open the way to widen the salient already thrust toward the Marne, the Austrians in concert with them made a move to break the Italian defense on the Piave. It was certain that no more

British or French succors could be sent to Italy. When, a little later, Germany, finding herself pushed back, was calling for assistance on the French front, it was evident that the best assistance that Austria could render her Ally would be to crush Italy, who was sending troops to fight in France. Accordingly Austria made imposing preparations for an offensive to begin the middle of June, and on June 15, after a tremendous bombardment on the Italian positions along her entire front, seventy Divisions of Austrians were sent forward to push through to Italy's heart. Italy was not ignorant of what was impending over her, and all preparations possible had been made to meet the portentous attack. The British Divisions had been moved over to the Asiago, and a few hours before the Austrian attack was launched, Diaz ordered a counter-bombardment of the assembling Austrians. The offensive, however, could not be prevented, and it was made with such weight and determination that the first assault had a measure of success sufficient to call forth all the power of Italy to withstand and finally repel it. The centre of the Asiago defenses was pierced; the crossings of the Piave were forced at several points of much strategic importance—at Santa Donà and Campo Sile, where a bridge-head was established, and at Nervesa, where the Enemy succeeded in pushing forward and seizing the Montello, the key to that position. It looked serious enough for a while. It had not been done without great sacrifice. The fighting had been heroic and the losses enormous. But there was no break in Italy's morale now. She knew that she was measuring herself with Austria for the future, and she threw in all her might. She flung in even her boys: the class of 1900, and they fought like veterans. In a day or two she had the Enemy stopped—in a day or two more they were being thrown back across the Piave, and from the Asiago. A flood in the Piave aided the Italians by cutting off the supplies from the Austrians, who were still holding positions on the west side, and General Diaz (June 23) flung his full weight upon them and cleared the western side of the Piave, taking some 20,000 prisoners and many

guns. As the flood subsided he sent the cavalry over, who scoured the eastern side of the river and cleared it, save toward the sea where the enemy, screened and sheltered, held a stretch of the Delta. Diaz then turned his attention to the sector of his front where the enemy had seized heights which, if left in his possession, would menace his Piave line. Here also he won the prize of complete success, and the enemy were flung back with the loss, not only of the guns they had captured when they seized the positions, but of some 200 guns of their own.

For the third time Italy was saved, and for the last time an Austrian offensive, planned and prepared with all the military skill at her service, came to naught and ended in disaster. General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, on whom rested the responsibility for the disastrous enterprise, was replaced by a German Commander.

But the next time an offensive was opened on the Piave it was Italy's offensive, and it ended on November 4 in shattered Austria's appeal for an armistice.

The appointment of Marshal Foch to the command of all the armies in France had so marked an effect in welding into one potent weapon the hitherto separate and independent armies of the Allies that it was supposed that Italy would unite promptly in the step that had been taken. This, however, was not done, and although there was much talk in the Press in Italy of the "one front," and there was, without doubt, more consultation and a greater desire to act in unison in the movements that took place on the several fronts, the Italian armies remained, like the Italian Marine, quite independent. Italy was justly apprehensive that the preponderant opinion in France that only on that front could the enemy be definitively beaten might result in her forces being despatched to that seat of war and her own front denuded. Besides this, there was a strong political reason for not weakening her front in the manner indicated. It would have been a blow to Italian amour propre to place her armies under a French Commander-in-Chief which might have had unhappy results. The morale

of both troops and People had been re-established; but it was questionable whether it would have stood the transfer of a great number of troops and guns to a front as distant as that where Germany was apparently pushing forward irresistibly. The talk of the *Fronte Unico* in the Press was possibly due to the effect that the suggestion had in tranquillizing the spirits of those who suffered from a certain feeling of isolation and apprehension that some situation might arise in which Italy might find herself abandoned. Indeed, later on when Italy, under the shadow of another expected offensive, was urging the sending of troops anew to Italy from France, and there was some perturbation of mind on the part of many over Italy's isolated situation, the Premier himself, on the eve of a visit to Paris to attend a conference after the tide had turned on the French front, made a reference in the Chamber which was construed to signify that Italy had placed her armies under Foch's command. The inference, however, was repudiated in Paris and it threatened to produce unhappy consequences. Happily, the matter was satisfactorily adjusted. In fact, a certain amount of feeling had developed out of the situation as it existed. France had the support and assistance of several million men besides her own troops. Their presence was not only of military value to her, but also of equal political value. Italy had no one, save five British and French Divisions as a counter-balance for whom she had had to send substantially an equal number of Italians to France. The British, American, and other foreign troops in France not only were a security to France; but brought there vast supplies and a great sum of money, which tended to keep the conditions of life much easier than in Italy, where but meagre supplies and no foreign money came. The relative value of French and Italian currency marked the difference. The franc had depreciated hardly perceptibly, the lira, which at the outbreak of war was substantially at a parity with the franc, was now greatly depreciated. Italy felt that she was not being justly treated by her Allies. There lurked under this feeling a real danger

that her people might one day awake all at once to a realization of this situation. That day would have been a sad day for her Allies no less than for Italy. She appealed to have troops sent her even more as a recognition of her right and for the moral effect than because of any immediate apprehension that her armies would be beaten in battle. She appealed to the Allies. They were hard pushed themselves. She appealed to the United States. The Secretary of War had come down on a brief run from Paris, and his visit had inspired hope. On his return home the American Press published a statement that a Division would be sent to Italy. It was taken as a pledge. A regiment was sent—a fine-looking, well-drilled regiment. They brought the flag and it had a great effect. They were detrained and paraded through several cities and made a fine impression. The Regiment was received with great honor. The King and the General Staff reviewed it on an historic plain. The guard of honor was composed of battalions of Italy's picked veterans. In war, numbers are readily multiplied and the idea got abroad that the Americans were coming to Italy in considerable numbers. It had a tranquillizing effect. America and the Americans were taken to Italy's heart. Wherever they went arose the shout, "Vivā l'America!" Children adopted them as their own; walked beside them with an instinct of protection; climbed over them in a sort of proprietary way; women who had forgot to smile since their men went away now smiled at them in reassured content that the home-coming was nearer than before.

A new element had come into the war. The words of the President of the United States were now carrying far. Not that the Statesmen received the new Gospel with any great measure of satisfaction. It was too contrary to all their theories, plans, and practices—too far-reaching. It cut too deep for them to assent to so radical a Revelation as that which asserted the right of equality of Small Nations with Great at the bar of International Justice; rejected the right of the latter to deal with the former as chattels; declared that the Right to Govern was based on the Consent of the

Governed, and abolished at once the Secret Conventions and Balances of Power. But every word that the President uttered was sinking into the hearts of men in all countries as the note of a New Evangel for the salvation of the World, not only in this war, but after the war should cease, so that there should never again be a recurrence of so immeasurable a catastrophe.

And the Statesmen of the Old School, though unconverted, recognizing their power and the power behind them, bowed and proceeded to get from these principles such reinvigoration for their People as they might.

These declarations of Principles were followed up by the President in several other deliverances. One (in Baltimore, April 6) wherein he accepted the challenge of the Central Empires of the use of "Force to the uttermost." "America," he declared, "would give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world, and make it fit for freemen like ourselves to live in." There were others (in May) urging America to put all that she had into the balance for the Freedom of Mankind. In an address at Mount Vernon, on July 4, he answered Von Kühlmann, the Imperial German Minister for War. In this he declared for "No Compromise," and laid down the ends for which the Associated Peoples of the World were fighting, and which must be conceded them before there could be Peace.

In this declaration, made as it was in almost the darkest hour that the Allies had known: when Germany was pushing her way across the Marne; and when Italy was in what might have been her death-struggle on the Piave and the Asiago, the President's note of resolution must have sounded like a death-knell to the Protagonists of Tyranny and Oppression, as he laid down the ends for which the Associated Governments were fighting. These he declared were:

I. The destruction of every Arbitrary Power anywhere, that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the Peace of the World; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of Territory, of

Sovereignty, of Economic Arrangement, or of Political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the People immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the Material Interest or Advantage of any other nation, which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and respect for the common law of Civilized Society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another—to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed; and Peace be established on a mutual respect for Right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of Peace, which shall make it certain that the combined power of Free Nations will check every invasion of right, and serve to make Peace and Justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion, to which all must submit, etc.

In a word, he declared the aim to be: "The reign of Law, based upon the Consent of the Governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of Mankind."

This high note, reiterated in later addresses—like that of his Labor Day address of September 1, when he declared that the war was to make the nations and peoples of the world secure; to oblige Governments to act for the People and not for the private and selfish interests of a Governing Class, and to let men know that Governments are their servants and not their masters, went out into all the World and evoked new powers from the almost exhausted forces of Liberty. It was translated into every Tongue; it was disseminated in every country; it reached every encampment—if only to be denounced—and it sank in. It inspired the armies of the Democracies—it depressed the armies of the Autocracies. It went into Belleau Wood with the Americans, and it crossed the Piave with the Italians.

CHAPTER XXI

ITALY AND THE LAST CAMPAIGN

THE situation in Italy in June was an appalling one. Italy, with an outburst of sudden force which even her own leaders may well have believed impossible, had hurled the Austrians back across the Piave along the greater part of the Piave's course, and had wrested from their grasp the positions on the Asiago and the Grappa which, if retained, would have rendered inevitable the abandonment of the Asiago-Grappa-Piave line and the loss of Venice: the Queen of the Adriatic.

But even after this extraordinary outburst of fury and power the situation was sufficiently grave to cause deep anxiety. The Austrians still retained positions from which they had not been dislodged, which were a standing menace should they become reorganized and stiffened by German assistance; and of this, it was believed in Italy, there was serious danger when Germany should realize that she could not break through to Paris. They held the positions in the delta of the Piave, and where the mountains came down to the plains the Grappa was still partly under their guns. The class of 1900 had been thrown into the mill. There was a thrill at the achievement of the seventeen-year-old boys. But Italy had ground her seed-corn. Had the Italians had more assistance when they drove the Austrians back across the Piave, they might have cleared the Venetian Plain, and possibly even have struck so heavily as to have crushed the Austrian army then and there and thus have brought Germany to terms before the summer closed. This, at least, the Italians thought and later asserted.¹ But without such support, they could not follow up their success, as it would have left them in an exposed position, with a much longer line; their army greatly exhausted; and

¹ Official Report of the Commando Supremo on the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto.

the extended lines of communication running through a region devastated by the Enemy, with roads broken and bridges destroyed. Thus, the Enemy was given the opportunity to recover from his demoralization and reorganize his armies—an opportunity which was promptly availed of, under the encouragement of the German advance to the Marne.

The tide in France turned July 18, when Foch struck the German salient that had reached and actually crossed the Marne. It was, however, only by such fighting as the world had never seen before this war, and rarely in this war, that he broke the impetus of the triumphant German advance and flung them back across the Marne; across the Oureq; across the Vesle; across the Aisne; and presently, across the Somme and the Meuse. It was a long and terrible struggle. It covered nearly four months of as desperate fighting as at any time during the war. There never was a moment when the cause did not hang in the balance, and when any relaxation might not have swung the scale the other way. Every resource that could be brought into play was called upon and flung into the Titanic battle.

The third German offensive in France which began May 27 and was directed toward Château-Thierry had a success which developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The French lines had been stretched to the point of breaking; their reserves had been substantially exhausted and in this critical moment the Americans were thrown in to fill the gap, and filled it so effectually that immediately on their repulse of the Enemy, the Allies were able to pass to a successful offensive. Belleau Wood was seized and cleared by the Americans—Marines and Regulars—in a continuous battle from June 5 to 25. It marked a turning-point.

The advance began, as has been stated, on July 18, when on the western side of the great Marne salient the Americans—as to whom the prevailing view among the Allies had previously been that they were “suitable only for defense”—and a French Moroccan Division, had been used as “the spearhead of the main attack, with the result that the

counter-offensive was of decisive importance." "Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions," says the American Commander, "the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies."¹

The clearing of the Marne salient was practically accomplished by the early part of August; that of the Amiens salient followed promptly and the Germans, fighting desperately, were driven back to the Vesle and put on the defensive.

By this time the power of the Americans was sufficiently recognized by the Allied Commanders to lead to the acceptance of General Pershing's firm proposal that a separate sector should be confided to the American Army. This sector included the now noted San Mihiel salient which the Germans had held firmly since September, 1914, as one of the bastions of their lines, and which commanded the Paris-Nancy Railroad and also that which leads from San Mihiel to Verdun. If captured it would provide "an advantageous base of departure against the Metz-Sedan Railroad system which was vital to the German armies west of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armaments and munitions."

After its capture Pershing's Army which consisted of fifteen American Divisions, six in reserve, and four French Divisions was to join in the general battle which was set to take place along the whole front, the Americans driving forward on the Meuse-Argonne front which had been practically stabilized in September, 1914.

The complete success of the San Mihiel operation and the successful carrying out of the second part of the programme by Pershing, with his Americans, contributed to the great success attained by Foch's forces who were engaged now in the crucial battle extending along the whole line from the North Sea to the Swiss border, a battle which covered the entire period from the middle of September to the hour

¹ Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F., p. 36.

in November when the German messengers of defeat passed through the French lines to ask an armistice at the hands of the Allies.¹

"We have won," said the British Premier nearly a year later, when he laid the Peace Treaty on the table of the House of Commons, "but how close we came to losing! My God! how close it was!"

While the two sides were locked in a death-grapple in France, in Italy also was a struggle going on not less Titanic, nor less decisive.

Although she had thrown the enemy back across the Piave, and from the heights that dominated the centre of her long curved line and threatened her flank, Italy still faced the peril of a renewal of an attack which, if the thrust could be driven home, would force her back to the Po; cut from her several more of her richest and most cherished provinces, capture Venice, her only naval base on the upper Adriatic, and the token and seal of her integrity; and possibly bring about her complete collapse. Should such a catastrophe occur now, even though Foch, with France, England, and America to give their all to him for the purpose, should force the German armies back to the Rhine, Italy would be lost.

That this was a real danger, few in Italy doubted. In Italy's condition of depletion, apparently all that Austria had to do, intrenched behind the Piave and on the mountains above the Italian lines, was to hold her present line and wait till Italy's exhausted forces collapsed, worn out with the long struggle. She still held the dominating Alpine heights; she still held the provinces of the Veneto, protected by the Piave before her; she still held Istria and the secure reaches of the inner waterway behind the Dalmatian islands. And with these advantages of position, she had sixty-three and a half divisions to fifty-six on the Italian side, including five British and French divisions, and

¹ Says General Pershing in his Final Report, p. 53: "Twenty-two American and four French Divisions on the front extending from the southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest had engaged and successfully beaten forty-seven German Divisions, representing twenty-five per cent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the Western front."

one Czecho-Slovak division. In the matter of artillery, Austria had also a superiority of some 1,200 guns. Added to this was a steadily growing feeling among the People that Italy was being deliberately kept isolated and kept down; that her Allies, especially France, were in some manner barring the way to prevent American troops from coming through to Italy, and that France was doing this to keep Italy isolated and dependent on her. Feeling against France began to deepen.

This feeling was, doubtless, one of the reasons why Italy would not place her armies under Marshal Foch. It was intimated—by those who had no Governmental responsibility—that France might, if she had the command, denude the Italian front and sacrifice Italy to save herself.

Meantime, means of living were growing more and more narrow; the People were becoming more and more worn and exhausted. Italian currency depreciated more and more, and prices rose higher and higher.¹

As earnest efforts as could be made with propriety were made to secure the despatch of a reasonable number of American troops to Italy, if even only for training, with a view to the moral effect, and also to the amelioration of economic conditions in Italy. But the military authorities in France were not favorable to the proposal.² They considered their presence in France more important. It was considered there that Italy could hold defensively the Asiago-Piave line without further assistance, and that no evidence had been given that General Diaz contemplated an offensive. It was intimated that if he should fight and get worsted, then it would be time enough to send him support. Indeed, it was intimated that he ought to fight—

¹ Coke sold in Rome in the autumn of 1918 at 500 lit. ital. per ton. There was no coal to be bought at any price.

² The only American troops in Italy were the 232d Regiment (Ohio troops), Colonel Wallace; some 30 Ambulance units, attached to the Italian army, and about 1,000 and odd American Aviators, who were sent to Italy for training. Besides these there was in the Adriatic a Squadron of Torpedo-Chasers, under Captain Nelson.

All the American troops in Italy were under command, first of Major-General Eben Swift, and on his retirement of Brigadier-General Charles G. Treat, heads of the American Mission of Military Observers. These all rendered efficient service, as was cordially recognised in the Italian reports.

that Italy ought to make an offensive such as was now being made in France.¹

Diaz was not only a soldier; he was an authority on military science. He had studied it and written books on it that had taken high rank. His position now was, that situated as the opposing forces were, with the enemy superior to him in position, numbers, and matériel, he must confine himself to the defensive until some favorable occasion should present itself, or until the morale of the enemy should become impaired, and thus give a promise of an engagement on more equal terms. This opportunity the Italian Commander patiently awaited, and at the same time sought every occasion to feel out the Enemy, and not only obtain information as to his intention and power, but ascertain as exactly as possible the state of his morale. Thus, all along the Italian front there were continual engagements, local in nature, but yet with a definite purpose which at the proper juncture would lead to a general offensive. That the Enemy's morale was declining was now beginning to be recognized, and efforts were increased to extend the propaganda which it was believed was undermining the Austrian power and would, by detaching large elements of those subject to her domination, weaken her to a point at which she might be overthrown.

The belief that the overthrow of the Central Empires would be accomplished more easily, and the World War brought to a close more quickly through Austria-Hungary than through Germany had long been held by Italians, and this idea had been earnestly pressed for some time before the final collapse of the Dual Monarchy. The arguments, briefly, were that Austria-Hungary was composed of a number of subject Peoples who, although good fighters, were now tired and possibly sufficiently affected by the propaganda of Liberty to fight with less resolution if they

¹ It was commonly asserted in Roman circles that the Italian Premier had replied to Marshal Foch's suggestion to him that Diaz ought to make an offensive, that, if Marshal Foch issued an order to that effect, Italy would march immediately. Whereupon the Marshal said he could not assume such a responsibility without studying personally the situation.

found all the Allies united in the attack on Austria. This had been the road by which the Roman Legions had passed to carry the dominion of Rome to the Danube and beyond the Danube. Napoleon's genius had selected this route to bring Austria to his feet, and then Prussia. With the collapse of Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey would come to terms, and the whole Balkan Peninsula would fall away from Germany. Should her principal ally succumb, Germany finding her flank exposed, would have to divide her forces to defend herself, and would without doubt be more amenable than now. The issue of events showed that the arguments were entitled to be received with more respect than they were received with by those to whom they were addressed. The sheer truth is that they were received with no respect at all. Not another soldier was sent to Italy, though Italy's contention was that whereas she had been given guarantees that a large part of the Austrian forces would be contained on Austria's Eastern front, since Russia's collapse substantially all of Austria's forces were being thrown against her.

In September the wind was blowing fairer and fairer for the Allies. Bulgaria was manifestly showing signs of giving way under the hammering of the Allied Army under General Franchet-d'Espérey, with the Italians on the left wing, the Serbs, French, British, and Greeks on the centre and right, all pressing firmly forward. In the middle of September the Bulgarians began to break, and east of Monastir, they were driven from their strong mountain-positions, and the French and Serbs hammered their way forward up the Scherna, driving before them the Bulgarians who, with antique revengefulness, burned and destroyed all the villages through which they retreated. The Serbs, inspired by old fires which had been relighted, forced their way to the Vardar, cut the railway, and separated the two Bulgarian armies between Prilip and Krivolak, and pushed on toward Uskub and Prilip. Velos and Istip were occupied as the French and Serbs drove forward. In the Dorian district the British and Greeks made rapid progress. The Italians to the west, in-

spired with resolution not to leave to others either the glory or the material rewards of victory, were vying with the French in clearing up the region before them. Bulgaria was now rapidly crumbling. The confine was passed; Strumnitza was occupied, and the advance-squadrons struck for Uskub to head off the retreating Bulgarians.

It was now evident that Bulgaria must give up, and the Prime Minister sent a deputation with a white flag to ask of General Franchet-d'Espérey an armistice, and offer surrender. The terms granted were substantially Unconditional surrender. They included the demobilization of the Bulgarian Armies; evacuation of Serbia, and free access through Bulgaria to the Danube, where Austria could be struck vitally. They were accepted, and Turkey was at last cut off from contact with her allies. Germany made a feint of disavowing the offer of Bulgarian surrender, on the ground that it was made without authority. But technical points are of little value against triumphant armies, and it was too late now. Bulgaria was "down and out." King Ferdinand abdicated and his son, Boris, was placed on the throne by the Allies and reigned in his stead.

The turn of Turkey came next, and was coming rapidly.

The Turks had held on stoutly enough in Palestine; but a little after the middle of September, they suffered a heavy defeat. A gap was made in the lines which they had hitherto held stretched across the entire country, and the British Cavalry passed through and began an encircling movement and cut off their retreat, while Allenby's main army fell upon them with irresistible ardor, and crushed them. The Turkish armies were severally defeated, fighting on ground which made the war-bulletins sound as though they were chapters from the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel. The fords of the Jordan were seized and the railway was held by the Arab forces of the King of the Hedjaz. Nazareth was taken (September 20), Acre was captured, Tiberias was occupied, and Allenby's forces pushed on to Damascus, gathering up prisoners and guns and war material. Damascus was occupied October 1, and they pushed on to capture

Beirut and Aleppo and open a way to Constantinople. Beirut, already under the guns of the French fleet, was occupied October 7, and Aleppo was captured just before the end of October (27). It was the chief military base of Turkey in Asia, and with its capture, and the destruction of the Turkish armies, the way was open to Constantinople. About the same time, the end of October, the British force on the Tigris, under Colonel Marshall, defeated and captured the Turkish force on the Tigris.

Turkey now asked for an armistice, which was given, and took effect October 31, she having accepted the terms dictated at Mudros. These were, the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, with the surrender of the forts of both to the Allies; the clearing away of all mines; the surrender of all war-vessels and shipping; the immediate evacuation of all territory outside of Turkey, and the immediate release and return of all prisoners.

In France from the time when Foch, now in command of all the Allied Armies there, flung himself on the side of the great salient which Hindenburg had pushed toward Paris, and began to force in the side, there had been a continuous struggle with the ever-increasing balance of success on the side of the forces of Liberty. All through August it went on, from Arras around to Belfort—from the North Sea to the Swiss border—the heaviest blows falling now on the upper left flank, now on the centre, now on the right flank. And all the time the enemy was being forced back—driven across river after river and from line after line—and France was being freed and the world was being freed. Foch and his lieutenants: Pétain, Humbert and Mangin and Gouraud; Haig and Pershing and many another Master of military science, with their lieutenants, officers and men, were fighting the battle that was to crush forever the dreadful Power that had brought the terrible catastrophe on Humanity, and establish the régime of International organization for Peace in the world.

All through September and October the great battle raged without cessation—without pause. The enemy was

driven from the Vesle; he was driven from the Aisne—the great Hindenburg Line was smashed; he was driven back fighting desperately—now making an apparent counter-gain, but in the end driven back—freeing cities and regions whose names had been burnt into men's hearts through all the desperate campaigns, till they had become the symbols of aspiration or defeat. They were now to become the symbols of aspiration and victory forever—Soissons, the Chemin des Dames, Bapaume and Péronne, La Fère, Laon, Cambrai and St. Quentin, and St. Mihiel and the Argonne; Ypres, Dixmude, and Lille; Ostend, Douai, Vouziers, and many another river and forest, city and town and village, some of which, never known before outside their own district, have become a part of the world's heritage as symbols of courage and fortitude and glorious endeavor.

All through the war after the earlier stages there had been a hope in the hearts of myriads that Peace would come some time, somehow—if even by a miracle—and—universally, that the peace would be victorious for their side.

The Central Empires claimed to have made a step in the direction as far back as the Summer of 1916.

The President's notes in the winter of 1916-17 had stimulated the hope in a way which even the cold reception accorded by the Allies and the slighting one accorded them by their adversaries had not wholly destroyed. The Pope had issued two Encyclicals calling on the Belligerents to cease from the unchristian and inhuman slaughter and come together in a peace of compromise and reconciliation. But apparently no steps had been taken by the Belligerents to bring the peace actually nearer.

The young Emperor Charles had written two letters to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus de Bourbon (the first dated March 31, 1917), containing the points of a proposal of a basis for a discussion of Peace terms, and this letter had been shown the President of the French Republic and M. Ribot, and had been communicated to the Heads of the British and Italian Governments.¹

¹ *The Nation*, London. Communication of Robert Dell, Correspondent of *Manchester Guardian*, 1919.

This proposal, which implied the securing of the assent of Germany, suggested the recession of Alsace-Lorraine or a measurable part thereof to France. At the Jean de Maurienne Conference of April 19, 1917, the matter was discussed and Baron Sonnino, who apparently had no confidence in such a means of securing peace, and regarded it rather as a "peace offensive," stated on behalf of Italy, demands which in the ensuing *pourparlers* were considered inadmissible by Austria-Hungary. Another attempt of a similar kind was made by Austria-Hungary in August, 1917. This proposal which contained concessions to Italy, was rejected by M. Ribot. About the same time (August) Germany took a step. Through a Belgian Diplomat, M. Briand was informed of Germany's desire to start secret conversations in Switzerland with a view to ascertaining some basis for Peace negotiations. Alsace-Lorraine; the evacuation of French territory and the evacuation and restoration of Belgium with possibly some further concessions were suggested.¹ M. Ribot, to whom the information was conveyed by M. Briand, declined to entertain the idea and, later, on the matter being brought up in the French Chamber, he was attacked by M. Briand and resigned.

These moves were stigmatized in Government circles and organs as "peace offensives," and undoubtedly they were so intended. A more serious basis, however, was now being created for such a step in the rapidly advancing shadow of disastrous defeat.

All during the year 1918, after President Wilson's enunciation of his Fourteen Points, it was recognized by those concerned with the direction of the war that a new step had been taken and a new phase of the war had developed.

On the 24th of January, 1918, the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, spoke before a Committee of the Reichstag and about the same time the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor in Vienna spoke on the subject of Peace, each in his own way, but both following the same lines, of apparently accepting certain of the President's points in prin-

¹ On authority of M. Lasare Weiller, a French Deputy.

ciple; but rejecting them all in application. Both speeches were manifestly for home consumption.

To these the President rejoined in an address delivered before the Congress on February 11, setting forth the first four principles which have been already cited.

Then came Germany's mighty drive forward in France beginning March 21, when, as transpired afterward, she put forth her most desperate and protracted efforts to crush the worn lines along the British and French front before the United States could fling her full weight into the scale and get her full power into action.

On April 6, in an address (at Baltimore) the President accepted the challenge of the Central Powers and gave America's response: "Force—Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit—the righteous and triumphant force which shall make Right the Law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust."

On June 24, the German Foreign Minister, Von Kühlmann, delivered an address to enhearten his people and their allies by an attack on Russia and England for having caused the war. He set forth Germany's aim, and placed the responsibility on the Allies of making Peace proposals.

To this the Allies made a prompt response, repudiating the German suggestion, and President Wilson on July 4 delivered at Mount Vernon, where the ashes of George Washington, reposing in majestic simplicity, constitute the Shrine of American Liberty, an address in which he declared that there could be "no compromise," and laid down his four principles, which became afterward a fundamental part of the Peace Negotiations.

On August 31, the President in his Draft Proclamation, calling for the registration of all men between eighteen and forty-five, declared that America now "solemnly purposed a decisive victory." She had 2,000,000 men in France.

On September 15 was made public an attempt by Austria to make peace through the Good Offices of Sweden, to whose Government she handed a communication addressed to all the Belligerent States. The communication contained Aus-

tria's argument of the innocence of the pious and pacific Central Powers, and of the responsibility of the wicked Allies. And it suggested an early Conference in a Neutral Country of Delegates of the Belligerent Powers to "broach a confidential non-binding conversation over the fundamental principles of a peace that could be concluded." At the same time with this was made public an attempt by Germany to make a separate peace with Belgium.

The President's reply to this was a prompt rejection of the Austrian proposal. "The Government of the United States," said the President, "has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider Peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain."

This was the beginning of the end. The Allied forces in France were now pressing the Germans back with inextinguishable ardor, and Austria was pinned on the Piave, powerless to stir to her Ally's support.

Finally, as all hope of procuring any additional assistance from beyond the Alps died, Diaz moved with such forces as he had already in Italy.

At first it was planned to make a strong offensive about the end of May; but this plan was abandoned for the reason that the enemy was able to increase his forces till the disproportion appeared to render such a plan too perilous at that time, even should the initial attack succeed. It was necessary, therefore, in view of Italy's inferiority in numbers and guns, to curtail her operations for a considerable time, and to remain on the defensive and simply prepare for a strong counter-attack when the moment should arrive; as, even should she now in an offensive, succeed in forcing the enemy back to his old lines, she would herself be left with her exhausted forces in an exposed new position, with the enemy still above her and superior in numbers and matériel. Italy had now nearly exhausted her reserves. She had in Albania about 100,000 men; in Macedonia 55,000; in France her Second Army Corps, 48,000, besides about 70,000 of the

Italian Labor Corps.¹ It was believed, however, by the Italian Supreme Command that the success, which they confidently anticipated in their counter-attack, would place them in a position which would be a good step toward the offensive which they were carefully preparing against the coming of the supreme moment.

The Italian Supreme Command believed that, when in the beginning of July the Austrians were driven back across the Piave, they were so demoralized that had it had at its disposal the necessary reserves which it had asked for, so that it could have passed at once to the offensive, the issue of the war would probably have been decided at that time. The enemy had lost some 200,000 men, but the Italians also had lost terribly—their losses were 90,000—and their whole service of supply had been strained well-nigh to exhaustion, and a certain time was needed for reorganization and re-equipment. There was, moreover, a certain danger that the Germans, finding their advance on Paris definitively checked, might by a sudden transfer of troops, combine with Austria and turn on Italy to clear her out of the way, with a view to freeing Austria and permitting her to unite with them on the French front. All of this Italy had to anticipate.² All of this the Comando Supremo did anticipate. As many men as possible were combed out of Departments, and from other fields of action, and all the matériel available was accumulated where it would be on hand when the supreme moment should come.

A plan was matured by Diaz, which was eventually carried out with great success and which, when the complete history of the military operations of the several armies shall be written, will reflect great credit on the Italian Comando Supremo. This was a movement to begin with a subsidiary attack to be developed in the Pasubio region, with a view to taking the Col Santo and pushing toward the Folgaria plateau, which defended the Val di Sugana line of communication, of vast importance to the enemy. This was but the

¹ Report of Italian Comando Supremo on the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto.

² *Ibid.*

first step toward an attack on the Asiago Plateau, which was to follow. At the same time, however, a larger and more ambitious plan was being worked out with great secrecy, with a view to taking advantage, should the possibility offer, of this success and passing at once to a general offensive, and at the critical moment, launching everything in a supreme thrust against the foe's most vital point and, staking all on the cast, smash his front, drive home, and end the war then and there.

The plan was carefully matured in minute detail. The troops were trained with the aim of fitting them for the purpose in hand: trained in long marches; trained in crossing rivers; trained in attack-manceuvres. The preparation for the attack on the Asiago proceeded, and engaged the enemy's attention, while more secretly the yet vaster preparations were made for the drive at the enemy elsewhere.

The local engagements—which went on continually—proved that whatever effect might have been produced by the propaganda in the interior of the Austrian Empire, it had not yet especially affected the army. The Jugo-Slavs and the Hungarians were to the end the stiffest fighters in the Austrian ranks. The Italians found the positions which they attacked defended with desperation.

The Allied successes in France, however, began to have a repercussion elsewhere. Toward the middle of September the campaign against Bulgaria began to tell, and under the pressure of the Allied arms and the propaganda that was now making its way, Bulgaria began to give back. At the welcome sign, Italy gave orders to be ready for the final cast on which she would stake all, and try to drive an offensive home.

The Austrian defensive system was, indeed, formidable. It was constructed in successive lines in the Grappa region, where it had the advantage of dominating positions, and in battle-belts. Two Austrian armies, the Sixth and the Fifth, held the line from the Grappa to the Sea. The Sixth held the sector from the Grappa joining, to the southward, the Fifth, which held the sector to the Sea. The line of com-

munications ran through the left flank of the Sixth by way of Vittorio—Conigliano—Sacile—back of the joint between it and the Fifth Army. Against this joint Diaz prepared to strike, as the weakest point in the line and that which, should the line be broken, offered the chance to divide the Trentino armies from those in the Venetian Plain, cutting the main artery of supplies for the Sixth Austrian Army and with the possibility of carrying out an encircling movement in the rear of the Grappa toward Feltre, the Bel-luno valley junction, up the Cadore and the Agordino; and, with the Grappa taken, on through the Val Cismon and the Val di Sugana. It was a bold conception which might, if successful, entrap and capture the major part of the Austrian armies in the Trentino. It was conceived with daring and accomplished with resolution and skill. Troops were assembled—generally by night—from other regions; two new armies were formed and disposed as a mobile force in a way to aid in the success of the far-reaching plan. Some sixteen hundred guns, large and small, were brought up from elsewhere and added to those already in hand for the enterprise, and a vast amount of ammunition and other matériel was provided.

The Italian armies, as reorganized, now numbered twelve, including two new ones, of which five—twenty-one divisions—were on the Grappa or eastern front.

The Autumn rains had now begun, and the Piave was liable to be in flood—a contingency which actually happened at the crucial moment of the offensive—and wash bridges away. It was necessary, therefore, to have plenty of material for renewing bridges as often as they might go, and all of the work of preparation had to be done in torrential Autumn rains. But it was done. The troops and guns and material were assembled and disposed according to programme, and the offensive was planned for the 16th of October, when suddenly the Piave rose in flood, and the movement had to be deferred. Four hundred more guns were combed out from the western Italian front, and assigned to the Fourth Army's sector between the Brenta and

the Piave. The command of the Tenth Army was conferred on the British Commander, General, the Earl of Cavan, to whom was assigned the honor of making the first crossing at Papadopoli, which was gallantly performed. The Commander of the Twelfth Army, in which were the French Divisions and the Czecho-Slovak Division, was General Graziani.

Before October was out Ludendorff was out. His boasted "organized victory" had turned into defeat and he resigned October 27. German Militarism, with its apostles and methods, had brought on the world the vastest and most appalling catastrophe it had ever known in its history, and Germany was facing with growing terror the unmeasured abyss which she had herself prepared. Bulgaria had crumbled and fallen; Turkey had crumbled and dissolved; and Austria, with shaken foundations, was toppling to her fall under Italy's furious onslaught.

The German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, had already gone like his predecessors, a sure sign of failure. In his place had come Prince Max of Baden—held forth, for those who would believe it, to be a Liberal Prince, a convinced democrat, believing in Democracy, a sort of *Egalité*, ready to espouse the side of the People and possibly, as a sop to the Cerberus of the yawning Perdition already in view, even sacrifice his own Blood.

There was one chance left, one avenue of escape. The President of the United States had, back in January, enunciated certain principles for which he stated the Americans would fight to the bitter end. The Allies had acquiesced in these principles, with certain reservations. The aid of America was essential for the success of the Allies. The German Government would now try to enlist America's Good Offices in ascertaining whether the Allies would insist on all they had claimed in the winter of 1917, when they repelled the German Peace-offensive.

Accordingly, on October 5, Germany addressed, through the Swiss Government, a note to the President of the United States, suggesting in somewhat sibylline terms the

wish to have Peace. Negotiations started on the basis of a discussion of the President's Fourteen Points. The President's reply, sent October 8 through the same Agency, was to sweep away all obscurity or question as to the Germans' meaning and to ask categorically whether the Imperial German Government accepted the terms laid down by the President in his Address to Congress of the United States on the 8th of the preceding January (The Fourteen Points) and in subsequent addresses, and whether the Imperial Government's object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application.

The President further stated that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Allied Governments, so long as the Armies of the Central Powers were on their soil. And he suggested that the Good faith of any discussion manifestly depended on the consent of the Central Powers to evacuate immediately all invaded territory.

And, finally, the President asked for whom the Imperial Chancellor was speaking—whether merely for the old Constituted Authorities who had hitherto conducted the war, or for the German people?

Germany having thus been brought up standing to find all possibility of evasion of complete defeat swept away, replied on the 12th, accepting unqualifiedly the terms so plainly stated by the President and declared that acceptance came from the newly constituted German Government and by a majority of the Reichstag.

The President's explicit statement of his terms having thus been explicitly accepted, and the Kaiser and his son and heir apparent, the Crown Prince, having been driven from the throne and compelled to seek refuge in Holland, the President now replied calling the attention of the Government of Germany very solemnly "to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of Peace," which the German Government had now accepted. It was contained in the Address of the President at Mount Vernon on the 4th of July, 1918, and was as follows:

"The destruction of every Arbitrary Power anywhere,

that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the Peace of the World; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence."

The President stated that the power which hitherto controlled the German Nation was of the sort thus described, and that it was within the choice of the German Nation to alter it. He added, explicitly, that the words thus quoted constituted a condition precedent to Peace, if Peace were to come by the action of the German people themselves.

His note made it plain that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice were to be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Governments, but that no arrangement could be accepted which did not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guaranties of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field.

He further declared that an armistice would not be considered so long as the armed forces of Germany should continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they persisted in, and he called attention to the "acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation" which were being continued by Germany at the very moment, when the German Government was approaching the Government of the United States with proposals of peace, on the 27th of September.

The "acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation" to which the President referred were first, the sinking by submarines of passenger-ships at sea and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which these passengers and crews sought to make their way to safety. Secondly, the course of wanton destruction pursued by the German Armies in their enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France, cities and towns being, if not destroyed, stripped not only of all they contained, but often of their very inhabitants.

CHAPTER XXII

ITALY'S VICTORY AND THE COLLAPSE OF AUSTRIA

IN this state of the case, with Bulgaria and Turkey completely beaten and out of the fight; with Germany and Austria asking terms and with Germany's strongest defenses smashing and her armies being steadily forced back toward the Rhine, and with unmistakable signs that the internal conditions in both Empires were sinking into chaos, it became manifest that Italy must move to a general offensive against Austria-Hungary if she would maintain her position with the other allies and her prestige as an equal among the Victor Nations. Moreover, it was possible that otherwise she might lose much of those territorial and political moral results which were included in her aspirations and for which she had made such enormous sacrifices.

There was, besides, the danger that Germany finding her progress barred in France, might attempt to return to the defensive there and send troops to the Italian front to aid Austria in overwhelming the Italian armies, which numerically were much inferior to the Allies' forces in France.¹ This plan had, in fact, been strongly advocated in Germany at the time of Caporetto.

Strong pressure had been brought to bear on Diaz to join, through an offensive, in the great fight going on beyond the Alps; but against all pressure and all criticism directed against his inaction he bided his time till the situation should change sufficiently to give some promise that the overwhelming chances against success should be modified.

Diaz was, however, keeping himself informed as fully as possible of the military and political conditions within and back of the Enemy's lines where especially signs of disintegration were increasing.

¹ Report of Italian Commando Supremo on Battle of Vittorio-Veneto.

The history of Austria showed that the existence of internal dissension, however extensive and however manifested, did not necessarily imply that the army was affected. The Austrian army had historically ever been the obedient instrument of the Chief of the Imperial Command. It was the well-disciplined weapon with which the Head of the House of Hapsburg had ever crushed Revolution and extricated himself from perils which threatened to sweep even its archaic system into the current of modern thought and progress.

The situation now was what it had often been before in even comparatively recent Austrian History—as for example, after the Revolution of 1848, when the Army intervened and saved the Monarchy. It was not at all what was charged and believed (outside of Italy) in possibly many quarters.¹ The unchanged mettle of the Austrian armies was abundantly shown in the fierce fighting of the early days of the Italian offensive: in the desperate resistance offered on the Asiago, the Grappa, the Asolo, where the fighting was as obstinate as at any time during the war. Especially were the Hungarians, Croats, and Slovenes the most determined fighters during all the fighting of the last days along the Italian front.²

Sentiment is the basis of morale, and it is characteristic of the Italians that when the flood in the Piave prevented the carrying out of the attack as planned on the 16th, the time chosen was the 24th, the anniversary of Caporetto. Anniversaries mean much to Italians, and this was a date that would appeal to the Italian soldiery, who would be inspired with a burning desire to wipe out the memory of that unhappy day. All preparations for the offensive had been carefully made for the former date. The men had all been brought up by night to the front.

At five in the morning, then, of October 24, Diaz launched his attack, when the Fourth Army, commanded by Lieu-

¹ The correspondent of a Paris paper wrote that Italy was like Manaldo, who, according to Dante, struck an already deadly wounded foe. The allusion gave great offense in Italy.

² Report of Italian Commando Supremo on Battle of Vittorio-Veneto.

tenant-General Giardino, moved forward through the mountain fog and drizzle along the whole region between the Brenta and the Piave, and Italy was instantly in the desperate final struggle with her age-long enemy. The left wing of the Twelfth Army, under General Graziani of the French army, supported the Fourth from Monte Tomba and Monfenera and at the same time the attack began where elements of the First Army in the Val d'Astico and the Sixth Army on the Asiago plateau dashed forward to assault the Redentore and the Cima Tre Pezzi. These attacks, however, as furious as they were and as desperate as was the fighting, were according to the plan only subsidiary to the great attack in the Grappa area, and to that on the Piave where the English of the Tenth Army under the Earl of Cavan were seizing the islands in the Piave in the Papadopoli area. It was intended to force the crossings of the middle Piave that night; but the river suddenly rose in flood from the heavy rains in the mountains, and it was not until the night of the 26th that it subsided sufficiently for a half-dozen bridges to be thrown across, and forces of the English together with the Twelfth and Tenth Armies crossed over to rush the enemy's lines, and establish three bridge-heads on the eastern side of the river.

With the bridges washed away and the crossing places under perpetual and accurate shelling, and the little British detachment of the Tenth Army on the long, narrow island of Grave di Papadopoli, the promise of forcing the crossing of the river looked for a day or two very slim indeed, but it was a situation in which British pluck and the British staying quality counted for a great deal, and never were they of more value or more richly compensated. They set the stroke for the entire engagement from that moment.

All this time the fighting in the Asiago and Grappa regions went on desperately. The bridges were again destroyed behind the advanced force by the Enemy's fire, or were washed away by another sudden flood, and there was a period of grave peril as the Enemy made a series of desperate counter-attacks. Italy held her breath. There was a

gap between the Eighth and Tenth Armies, the former under Lieutenant-General Caviglia, but they maintained their position. The bridges were restored and though again washed away, were again renewed, and by the 28th the enemy's front was broken in two, and the Italians were pouring across the river and advancing with irresistible impetus. By the evening of the 29th their advance Cavalry and Bersaglieri Cyclists were in Vittorio. The Fourth Army was holding the Enemy with all his reserves pinned in the Feltre area, so that no aid could be sent to the plain, and Italy's victory was in sight. The Third Army, which had been holding the Enemy on the lower Piave, awaiting its hour, was now ordered forward, and forcing the crossing, passed over to join in the general advance. Notwithstanding their desperate resistance, the defeat of the Austro-Hungarians was now certain. And by the 31st the Italians, with their left flank well protected, were advancing toward the junction of the valleys at Belluno, and the Austrians were in full retreat to reach their defensive positions in the rear, fighting only rear-guard actions, with the Italians pressing them hotly and gathering up prisoners and guns everywhere.

The Cavalry was sent forward, and while a portion crossed the Grappa at night by a perilous mule-trail, and came down to the Belluno junction, other portions pushed the enemy on the plain so hotly that the bridges of the Livenza and later, of the Tagliamento, could not be destroyed.

With the seizure of the Passes and the Feltre Basin, the Austrian defenses on the Asiago began to give way, and here, too, the Italians swept forward. They pressed on to cut the main road and the Val di Sugana railway, which presented the chief avenue of escape for the retreating Austrians, pushed hotly by the Fourth, Twelfth, and Eighth Italian Armies, storming the still strongly defended positions. By the evening of the 31st, the collapse of the Austrian army was in sight. The Grappa front was perceptibly giving way with the advance of the Eighth Army on Belluno; the roads were opening to the Cadore, the Agordino, and the Val Cison, and the entire Austrian front westward

to the Stelvio was imperilled. On the 1st of November orders were given for a drive forward along the whole Italian front, with a view to completing the rout of the entire Austrian army, which was now endeavoring to escape destruction.

By Diaz's comprehensive plan, the First Army was to advance on Trent; the Sixth toward the Egna-Trent front; the Fourth to advance toward the Bolzano-Egna front; the Eighth to advance well beyond the Valley's junction at Belluno by the Cadore road (upper Piave) and the Agordino road between Bruneck and Bolzano, throwing out a detachment to Toblach; and the Seventh Army to advance toward the Mezzo-Lombardo-Bolzano front. The movement was intended to strike for the sources of the enemy's communications, and place the Austrians completely in the Italians' power.

The Tenth and Third Armies were pushed on to the Tagliamento, and the Cavalry in that region was sent ahead to forestall the enemy at the Isonzo bridges. It was all done, and done well, though there was still heavy fighting ahead. Belluno was reached on the 1st and the communications with the upper Piave were cut, and the Enemy's forces retreating from Feltre were forced into the Cordevole Valley. The Fourth Army closed the exit of the "Marcesina high-road" from the Asiago Plateau, while the Asiago Plateau, after tremendous efforts both by direct attack and flanking, fell into the Italians' hands, and an enormous gap was opened in the enemy's front. The advantage was pressed with equal ardor and success, and the Asiago, with tens of thousands of prisoners and substantially all its artillery, fell into Italy's hands.

The disaster to the Austrian arms was now evident to both sides, and every effort was strained to the utmost on the one side to annihilate the Austrian army, on the other side to escape this fate.

The continued advance on the 2d and 3d of November was decisive in completing the disruption of the Austrian armies which, now in complete rout, were endeavoring to

escape irretrievable disaster. Pushing forward against all opposition, a sharp and decisive blow was delivered by the Fifth Army toward Trent, while the Sixth Army advanced across the Asiago Plateau; and while the flanks were protected by lateral columns which engaged the Enemy on the slopes of the Altissimo and on the Pasubio, the main body advanced sweeping the Enemy before it. The forces of the enemy on the Tonzza-Folgaria Plateau were separated from those on the Asiago-Lavar Plateau. The powerful defenses still strongly held were carried by assault; Roveredo was seized, and squadrons of cavalry were despatched toward Trent itself, which was entered at fifteen minutes past three on the afternoon of the 3d, and the Italian flag was hoisted on the Castello del Buon Consiglio.

The bare narrative of the Italian offensive, however successfully it may be pictured, gives little idea of the unbroken, murderous battle which raged for days along the entire Northern and Northeastern border of Italy. Through mountain ranges, up and down precipitous heights and through tortuous valleys, across swollen torrents, over exposed levels all swept by sheets of steel from unnumbered guns of every death-bearing caliber, pushed the Italians. Directed with skill and informed with one irresistible and primal impulse—nothing could stop them. They were mowed down or swept away only to have their places taken by others, and the advance pushed with ever-increasing ardor and resolution till in the end Victory complete and satisfying crowned their heroic efforts, and the Austrian armies, shattered and destroyed, were taken as prisoners or swept in fragments from all that bore the name of Italy.

All through the 2d and 3d of November while the advance on Trent was being pushed forward along every possible line, and every effort was being made in the Trentino region to encircle the Austrians, now retreating along every corridor of escape, similar efforts were being made along the rest of the line, and similar success was being achieved. To the West the Sixth, Seventh, and First Armies were pressing forward with ardor, forcing position after position, seizing

the passes and closing avenues of escape, whether by the Val d'Adige toward Meran and Bolzano, or by other outlets. More easterly in the Southern Alpine region, the Eighth, Twelfth, and Fourth Armies, meeting in places stiff resistance, were pushing forward to close the outlets of escape toward Trent or toward Tolmino.

Where the lines had descended and ran across the open plain the Tenth and the Third Armies, which on the 1st of November had forced the crossings of the Livenza against stout resistance, were pushing the pursuit with fervid zeal, sweeping over all opposition, and straining every energy to head off and capture the Main Austrian Army, which, now completely demoralized, with communications cut and its lines of retreat either cut or threatened by the Italians, was endeavoring desperately to escape to the Eastward.

Having described the successive stages of the work of the Italians along the entire front to the morning of the 4th of November, together with the seizure of the valleys and of the commanding mountain positions, the Report of the Commando Supremo states that, "By this time the whole Austro-Hungarian Army was in complete dissolution along the whole front from the Stelvio to the sea."

Not only in the Trentino, but to the Eastward and in the plain the rapid-moving advance troops of the Italians were rushing ahead of them cutting them off. The Tagliamento was reached and passed by the Italians on the 3d. Prisoners were now being captured by the scores of thousands everywhere; guns were taken by the hundreds—by the thousands. Equipment beyond measure or computation was falling into the Italians' hands.

It had been originally planned in the arrangements made for the general offensive to assemble troops at Venice and effect a landing on the Istrian coast to attack Trieste from the East. When, however, it was recognized that the Austrian army was collapsing, this plan was altered and the troops at Venice were sent by sea directly to effect a landing, if possible, at Trieste and capture the city. This was accomplished, and the Italian troops sent by sea occupied

Trieste on the afternoon of the 3d about the same hour that the advanced Cavalry force occupied Trent.

Thus, was realized at almost the same moment Italy's cherished aspiration for which so many had died that her two irredentist cities should be once more within her maternal protection.

While the crucial struggle to decide the fate of Italy and Austria and the future dominion over the regions that had so long been the prize of contention was going on by land, the struggle had not been less eager in that sea whose dominion was as much a part of the prize striven for as Trent and Trieste, and fundamentally even more the cause of the long contest, than those cities.

The Austrian fleet had for a great while been held sequestered behind the barriers in the harbor of Pola, the Austrians preferring the certainty of the power of "a fleet in being" to the uncertainty of one dependent on the issue of a battle on the high seas. The Italians, on the other hand, were ever scouting in the upper Adriatic to prevent raids on their coast, and, if possible, catch the Austrians at sea when it was hoped the latter would be decisively defeated, and the memory of Lissa would be wiped out forever.

Among the daring exploits of the Italian navy—which included fourteen raids in the well-defended Austrian Harbors—was the raid made by three destroyers on Pola, the night of November 2, 1916, when one of them entered the harbor and attempted to torpedo the Austrian ships in the port. Another was the raid made on the harbor of Trieste, December 9, 1917, when two torpedo-boats penetrated the port and torpedoed the *Arien* and the *Budapesth*, and then escaped. Another daring raid was that on Pola by Lieutenant-Commander Pellegrini on the morning of May 14, 1918.

One of the last appearances of the Austrian Ships, if not the last appearance, on the open sea was when on June 9, 1918, two Italian torpedo-boats, under command of Commander Rizzo, with Sub-Lieutenant Aonzo, Second in command, engaged in a scouting expedition, discovered two

Austrian Dreadnoughts steaming South under the protection of eight or ten torpedo-destroyers. Without hesitation the Commander gave his companion the signal for attack, and both boats dashed through the protective screen, one at each dreadnought, and sank the first, struck the second, and then, turning under fire from the guard-squadron, escaped without serious injury.¹

Another inspiring deed of the Italian navy, of equal gallantry occurred at the very moment when the great battle of Vittorio-Veneto was drawing to its climax, and added to its dramatic close. Two young marine officers had conceived a plan for entering the harbor of Pola with a floating torpedo-device which they had invented, which was propelled by a small engine attached to it, and carried a powerful bomb with a time-fuse, and which could be attached by a valve to the side of a war-ship, when the bomb could be adjusted and set off.

The young men descended with their torpedo from a boat near Pola early on the night of the 3d of November, and passing, though with great difficulty, through obstructions arranged to protect the war-vessels, successfully attached their bomb to the side of the Austrian flag-ship, the *Viribus Unitis*, which was blown up and sank at her anchorage.

The Austrian armies being now almost annihilated as an efficient force, and their complete destruction being hardly longer a question of doubt, Austria on the 3d of November sent a flag of truce to the Italian Commander to ask an Armistice and terms of peace. The first flag was sent by the hands of an officer of low rank, and was rejected, and the reason was assigned. Not very many hours afterward a second flag was sent by an officer of suitable rank, and the terms having been arranged by telegraph with the Allied Authorities in Paris, were communicated to the Austrian Commander, and were accepted. And the Armistice was

¹ It was said that the information of the sinking of this Austrian Dreadnought reached the Italian Authorities when they were engaged in a conference with their colleagues of England and France who were pressing to have the Italian fleet put under the command of the French Admiral.

the 4th of November.

The principal terms were: Immediate cessation of hostilities with free use of Austrian Territory and Transports for operations against Germany; The demobilization of Austrian Armies and the withdrawal of all troops operating with the German Armies; Evacuation of all territory invaded or in dispute between Austria-Hungary and Italy and Jugo-Slavia; The immediate repatriation of all allied prisoners of war; The surrender of the Austrian Fleet—three battleships; three cruisers; nine destroyers; six monitors; and fifteen submarines; Freedom of Navigation to the allies up the Adriatic and the Danube.

Austria, already crumbling to her fall before the propaganda of Liberty, collapsed and sank into dissolution as before an enchanter's wand. It was the end of the Austrian Empire and the beginning of the end of the German Empire, at least, for this occasion.

Thus was accomplished the dream of Patriots: the redemption of the Unredeemed regions of Italy; the liberation of the remnants of the subjugated children of Italy; the shattering of the Austrian Empire; the acquisition of boundaries adapted by nature to render Italy's invasion from the North and East most difficult, if not beyond possibility, and thus to place her in a position not only of security, but of advantage, should her destiny continue to point her in the future as it had done in the past toward expansion beyond the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean.

On the morning of the 4th, Udine was recaptured by a squadron of cavalry that galloped straight through the Austrians to plant the Italian flag on the Municipal building. Pushing forward for Cividale, Cormons, Manzano, Corrioli, Cervignano, Grado, and many other towns were successively occupied by three o'clock of the 4th, the hour set for the Armistice to take effect.¹

Thus fell the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Its Armies, the potent instrument of its imperial power destroyed,

¹ Report of Italian Commando Supremo,

its Navies captured, its foundations upturned and disrupted, its subject Peoples, released from the chains of compulsive or repressive force, burst on the instant into open Revolution and assertion of Independence from the Adriatic to the far side of Poland and Bohemia.

In Vienna the profound and rapidly spreading commotion took shape in a serious uprising. The Imperial standard was pulled down and the Emperor left the Capital and took refuge in his castle of Gesdelles in Hungary. He returned and issued an address to his People, but was compelled to flee again after a few days. In his address Charles declared that he had had no part in bringing on the war and had done all in his power to bring it to an end. The Italian reply to this was that he had hanged Cesare Battista.¹ But the commotion now extended to Hungary also and the former Hungarian Premier was assassinated in Budapest.

As soon as the knowledge of the crushing defeat of the Austrians and the disintegration of the Austrian armies got abroad, elements of the population of those subject regions immediately affected by it took steps to express in an effective way their feelings and hopes. The entire country appeared to slip into Revolution.

A movement in favor of a Greater Serbia had been going on for some time, fostered by the encouragement of the Allies, particularly of France. Now in the commotion caused by the defeat and the dissolution of the Austrian armies, elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared for coalition with Greater Serbia while Italian elements in the irredentist Italian Cities of those regions declared boldly for union with Italy and sent deputations to Venice to urge Italy's acceptance and beg her protection. This Italy was but too glad to extend, and assurances were given the envoys of her complete sympathy with their desires.¹

The disruption of Austria left Germany unsupported in her struggle. Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria had all fallen away from her. She was open now to possible attack and to invasion from the South and with her armies hotly pressed

¹ Report of Italian Commando Supremo.

along her front, her vaunted "two-front programme" was a thing of naught.

The fall of Austria had left her Southern frontier exposed, and had shaken her profoundly. So long as she could cherish the hope of conquering her adversaries and, imposing her hegemony on the rest of the world, extort from them compensation for all her losses, she could count on the solidarity of all her people. A few individuals stood for their old principles of Peace and Liberty; but under the drive of cupidity and lust for power, Socialism and Syndicalism and Internationalism had all flung their forces into the general scale with Militarism and Absolutism.

But with the victory of the forces of Liberty and the crumbling of the Military power that had menaced the world and deluded even the German People with the hope of universal Germanic hegemony, the elements of Socialism had discovered that delusion and rose in a commotion that augured ill for those who had led in the universal deception. A certain manifestation of the growing sedition had appeared months before when there had been a mutiny at Kiel on several ships of the fleet; but this had been sternly suppressed and the death-sentence had been executed on a certain proportion of the mutineers.

Now Bolshevism, which had been blithely encouraged in Russia by Germany as a weapon of destruction against her Enemies, had imperceptibly crept back over the Eastern German border. The serpent that had been warmed to perform its deadly work on Russia was insinuating itself into the bosom of Germany and was turning its invigorated fangs on its one-time ardent patron. Its poison had begun to course in the cardiac arteries of the Empire: in the Army itself. The wind had shifted; the poisonous gases so joyously sent forth to strike down the adversary were sweeping back among the German hosts. From the Westward it bore instead of the shouts of victory and the cries of victims, the groans of defeat and the stern murmurs of resentment. It was the startling signs of this that had caused the first half-masked effort of the Allied German and Austrian Gov-

ernments to seek in early October through the medium of the United States Government some gauge of the morale of the Allied Government and peoples. This "peace offensive" had been countered by the wisdom and address of the President, and later had come a further step though one not yet sufficiently direct to lead to more than a firm and explicit definition on the President's part of the precise conditions under which alone he would move in the direction they desired. As to the Military conditions he referred the inquirers to Marshal Foch, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied and Associated Armies in France. And all the time those Armies of Liberty on the Western front were defeating and forcing back nearer and nearer to their own borders the once arrogant Armies of German and Austrian Absolutism.

In the moment when Austria was crashing to the ground under the victorious blows of Diaz's Armies the feeling in Germany following the lead of President Wilson's inspired declaration of eternal hostility to Autocracy and devotion to Liberty, and facing the savage fact of the defeat of the German System, grew so menacing toward the old order that the "Most High"—the Kaiser—had found it prudent to abandon his capital and place himself in immediate touch with if not under the protection of his Armies. He left Berlin hastily and arrived at the German General Headquarters at Spa. But he was not to stay there long. His battle, as he proudly termed it in its beginning months before, had been lost—his world which he had done so much to create and to destroy was crashing about him.

He was informed that in the depression of defeat the Army had become infected with the poison of the Revolutionary doctrine. The Navy was even closer to revolt.

On the day that the Italians entered Trent and Trieste, the day that Austria sent her flag of truce to General Diaz to ask an armistice (November 3), the German fleet at Kiel was ordered to sea. Instead of obeying, the seamen broke out into open mutiny. The revolt assumed tremendous proportions and spread to other ports, and Prince

Henry, the High Commander, was compelled to flee for his life. Elements among the revolted sailors seized trains and rushed to Berlin where the smouldering Revolution had burst into flame, important elements of the troops uniting in the disorder. The flames rapidly swept on into a conflagration and the Prussian Capital fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks or Spartacists, as they were termed. The Imperial standard was torn down and the Red flag was hoisted over the Imperial Palace and the Brandenburg Gate.

The Socialists threatened to resign from the Ministry and the extremists threatened a general strike unless the Kaiser should abdicate.

Such a step as was threatened would have starved Berlin and have plunged Germany into untold misery: the misery of Russian Bolshevism.

The Revolution spread quickly. Bavaria having demanded the abdication of King Ludwig and declared itself a Republic King Ludwig had abdicated. The great cities of Germany swept into Revolution. Hamburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig, Cologne, Essen all turned against the ancient régime and joined the Revolutionists.

In the evening of the 6th the air, still pulsating with the throb of guns of the pursuing Allied Armies pressing eagerly forward toward the Rhine on the heels of the retreating Germans, bore to the Commander of the former a wireless message of request that the route should be indicated by which a flag of truce seeking terms might reach him. A reply was sent and a German officer next evening brought the formal request. And next evening the German plenipotentiaries, headed by Herr Erzberger, the same who had come to Rome in the winter of 1914-15 to help out Prince von Bülow, passed over the shell-torn roads and were conducted blindfolded within the French lines to request the terms of the Armistice preliminary to the peace to be dictated by the Allies. Having been taken to Guise, they were put on a special train and conducted to the point selected by the French Commander.

The following morning (November 8) they were admitted

to General Foch's presence in the forest of Compiègne where, with brief preliminaries, he read them the stern terms on which an armistice would be granted to them, and gave them seventy-two hours in which to signify their acceptance or rejection. Meanwhile, their request for a suspension of hostilities was denied, and the engagement of retreat and pursuit proceeded all along the front.

There could now be but one end for Germany. The Allied Armies were everywhere victorious from the line in Belgium where her heroic young King was pressing forward winning back his Throne and Country, to the hard-fought line where, on the extreme right the American Army was driving for Metz. But the Kaiser had choice of two ends. He might have placed himself at the head of his still fighting troops and so have saved his honor—whether he died on the field of battle or, like a King of the House of Savoy, abdicated after vainly seeking death where the battle was thickest. He did neither. He abdicated on the 9th of November, and abandoning his armies fled to Holland. His example was followed by the Crown Prince, who after renouncing his right to the Throne sought refuge on one of the Islands of Holland. Thus passed from the Imperial stage one whose boasted "glittering sword" had made more women childless than any monarch from the time of Og the King of Bashan.

A Courier was sent back to Germany to lay before the remnant of the Government there the terms that alone would satisfy the victors of Germany's good faith. As stern as they were, however, there could be but one reply, and on the evening of the 10th the Courier returned with the reply. Germany agreed because she must. The following day (November 11), the Armistice was signed at five o'clock in the morning—and at 10 A. M. the firing ceased, and the Great War was ended.

CHAPTER XXIII

ITALY'S DIFFICULTIES AFTER THE VICTORY

WITH the capture of the Irredentist regions and the destruction of the Austrian armies new duties and burdens devolved on Italy. She found herself facing problems which had come so suddenly and so unexpectedly that no time had been given her to prepare for meeting them efficiently.

Who could have believed that the Austrian Goliath would have collapsed and fallen headlong in a moment before the Italian David?

Not only had the overrun Venetian provinces been retaken; not only had hundreds of thousands of prisoners come into the Italians' hands, but Trent and Trieste, Istria and the Dalmatian port-towns, with war-swept territory amounting to thousands of square miles had been captured; and their population, mounting up into the millions, had come under Italy's dominion and her protection. All had to be taken care of.

All Government had vanished in these regions save the military rule of the occupying Italian forces. All food-supplies had been exhausted, or were on the point of being so; and all the customary means of renewing such supplies had ceased to function. The moment was critical in the extreme. The least delay in meeting the exigency would mean untold misery, and might frustrate all that Italy had accomplished in those regions. Happily, there was no hesitation. As to the Government of the newly occupied regions, provision had already been made in advance. They were promptly divided into new Provinces, and Provincial Governments were organized on the model of those in the other Provinces of Italy; but naturally with due regard to the extraordinary conditions existing there at the moment.

The question of Food was immediate and imperative, and every available means was employed to meet the emergency, a work in which the American Red Cross was privileged to co-operate with the other organizations engaged therein.

The supplying of the wants of the vast number of prisoners—both captured Austrians and released Italians returning home, presented one of the most serious of all the difficulties encountered. But a few days before, the whole region had been a battle-field, and every energy had been applied to destruction. No provision could be made in advance for so overwhelming an exigency, and undoubtedly there were for a few days vast confusion and great suffering. But happily, by herculean efforts, this was speedily relieved, and order was brought out of the chaos.

If this was true of the situation in the regions occupied by the victorious Italians, it was much more so of those regions beyond the line of Italian occupation, where to the want of provisions incident to a country long blockaded and now fallen into ruin, Revolution in some form was sweeping over the land from one end to the other. The great Empire had crashed to the ground; the two Kingdoms had fallen apart; the Emperor and King had abdicated; the headless governments were threatened with anarchy, and the former subject Dominions were setting up for themselves separate governments.

Count Tisza—"the Iron-Count," who as Hungarian premier had participated in the Cabinet meeting that decided for the ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914, and signed the death-warrant of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was assassinated. Other assassinations followed, and with starvation facing the long-deceived population, Chaos ruled with grisly Anarchy as heir apparent. It was necessary that the People should be fed—should be furnished, at least, the temporary means to support life. And to this end the Allies, or some among them, applied their efforts.

Unhappily, Italy found herself in this crisis completely absorbed in the problems of meeting the extraordinary conditions within her own now extended borders. And also

unhappily, these conditions were aggravated greatly by the unexpected action of those of her recent enemies who occupied the regions lying nearest to her borders.

Even before the Armistice was applied for, in those last days of Austria's expiring effort, when Bulgaria had fallen and Serbia apparently was coming to the fore among Balkan States, the weariness and unrest in the Serb provinces of Austria-Hungary had taken shape in a movement to declare for Independence of Austria-Hungary, and for some form of Confederation or Union with Serbia. It was a case in which there was much to gain and little to lose. On October 29 the Croatian Diet proclaimed the Deposition of the Emperor Charles, and declared for a confederation with Serbia and Montenegro. They also announced their aspiration for a Union of all the Jugo-Slavs within the limits extending from the Isonzo to the Vardar.

Now as soon as Austria fell, in the very hour in which the Italian Commander was giving the conditions on which the Italian armies and navy would stay their pressure and hold their fire, a *coup* was attempted by which what Italy had won would be transferred from her conquered enemy to the possession of a new claimant, hitherto a constituent element of the former, but now asserting a new independence. By this *coup* the Austrian ships were to be snatched from the hands of the Allies—from Italy—and retained in the possession of that element, hitherto a faction of Austria's forces, but now under a new flag and name, claiming to be a Neutral and, next day, even an Allied power. It was not a change of coats, for the same coats of those who but yesterday were among Austria's most mighty and vindictive fighters served to-day, with only the insignia removed, as uniforms for the newly converted Jugo-Slav Allies, who, between suns, renouncing their lifelong Austrian allegiance, emerged as the newly converted comrades of victorious Italy and her allies, whom but the day before they had been bent on destroying with the same ships that they now claimed title to by virtue of their later than eleventh-hour repentance.

Small wonder that Italy with the ruins of Venice and the Veneto before her eyes and the cries of her women fighting for their honor still echoing in her ears, writhed with rage over the audacious attempt to wrest from her the fruits of her so costly victory, and over the astounding fact that apparently it was being sustained by some influence proceeding from outside of Jugo-Slavia.

The firm protests of Italy finally led to the delivery of the ships to the Allies by those who had seized or retained them; but a perceptible interval intervened before this disposition was effected and the thorn embedded in the Italian heart by this surprising development long rankled.

The idea became generally diffused throughout Italy that the Jugo-Slav claims to the Austrian ships had been fostered, if not instigated, by the French in pursuance of a deliberate plan to defeat Italian aspirations and to advance their own interests, and that England had acquiesced in it for her own purposes. The fact that the French Admiral received a Jugo-Slav deputation and entertained them privately and that wherever the French flag appeared on the Eastern Shore of the Adriatic there was resistance to Italian authority was taken as proof that France was behind the Jugo-Slav resistance to such authority. Accordingly, there was soon apparent a feeling of bitterness between Italians and French, which resulted in rendering a situation, at best delicate and difficult, yet more difficult and at a later period actually perilous.

Somewhat later it was published in the Italian press that English interests had purchased from the Jugo-Slavs the shipping properties and rights at Fiume whose future disposition had become the crucial question of the Adriatic settlement.

The announcement caused such an outburst of feeling in Italy that the British Company whose name was connected with the transaction was led to deny the report. But owing possibly to the somewhat guarded nature of the denial the Italian public was apparently not convinced.

The wreck and break-up of Austria left Italy, if not in

the same position as before and with precisely the same problems, yet, at least, with as many and as difficult problems to solve. Externally, to the Eastward, in place of the one prepotential Power whose massive weight was in itself a peril, were now the disjointed fragments which had ever been Italy's greatest menace: the newly freed Balkan dominions along the Adriatic, now uniting under the new popular impulse of racial affinity and assuming a mask of Neutrality whose chief cohesive cement was hostility to others. Large elements among them had been throughout the war Austria's most zealous fighters and Italy's bitterest foes. From the time of Radetsky on, and long before the time of that ferocious warrior-tyrant, they had been in fierce antagonism to Italy and to the Italian Race. They had been Austria's most deadly and useful instruments in her inexorable progress of attempted subjugation of the Italians. Then they may have been under a certain compulsion, now they were free and voluntary enemies of Italy. They knew well the value of the regions owned and claimed by Italy—both of the fertile valleys of the Isonzo and the port-indented coast of Istria and Dalmatia.

On the other side, Italy's difficulties were not greatly diminished. France, who had in the past fought with her and for her and had been fought for by her, had come out of the war with no love for her—indeed, with her antagonistic feeling rather quickened—whether because of antagonistic interests which had developed during the Balkan campaigns or for other reasons. Wherever Italian and French troops were thrown together there was liable to be a clash.

Internally Italy's difficulties were hardly less. She was overburdened with debt and now with the disappearance of the Austrian menace on her borders all of the internal problems which had confronted her in the past and had been laid during the war again arose to trouble her.

No sooner had the immediate peril been allayed than the extreme Expansionist party began to agitate in favor of

extending the *Ægis* of Italy over regions outside of those hitherto included in any previous expression of her aspirations. Against this were aligned the Pacifists and other opponents of the Government, who had been held in check while hostilities continued, but now on their cessation were ready to reassert their opposition.

To the Socialists and other opponents of the Government were now added in some regions a new element of Extremists, who had been infected with the virus of the new Russian Bolshevism and had to be watched and held in subordination to the Law. And quite separate from these—so separate as to be almost their antipodes, yet with a common ground in their fundamental opposition to the Government—were the Clericals, who now that the war was over, were apparently ready to manifest their opposition on any occasion that might promise to advance their ideas as to the Roman Question.

Out of the obstacles which Italy encountered in the early days that followed the Armistice, in the adjustment of the questions pertaining to the Adriatic, arose a condition which had not only caused great difficulties in coming to a conclusion acceptable to all concerned, but has delayed and imperilled the final settlement of Peace.

Among the difficulties which Italy found herself confronting when the active period of the war closed were both economical and political problems of far-reaching import. She had no coal, little grain, and little of other articles of prime necessity. She had to repatriate her prisoners, some half million men of whom some—not a large number, but an inconvenient element—were the renegades of Caporetto. She had to face the problem of demobilization and the incidental problem of giving her demobilized soldiers occupation and bread; she had to reconvert her munition-factories into factories for articles of Peace. She had to organize, administer, and support the newly redeemed regions, and rebuild and administer the overrun provinces. And she had to secure and organize and administer the regions beyond the Adriatic which she claimed under the Pact of London

and the Armistice—regions where, mainly, her right was seriously questioned.

Further, she had to revert from a condition of war, where the Government ruled with recognized war-powers, to a condition of Peace, in which such war-powers having ceased, the people would expect to reap the fruit of their sacrifices and would look for the resumption of their Liberty in every form. This included abolition of the censorship and freedom of the press, of speech, and of public meetings, etc., which meant the recrudescence of opposition in every form to the Government. And all this was in the winter—with the scantiest supplies of food and coal. And all the time the grim spectre of Bolshevism was stretching farther across Europe.

There was but one means to meet the situation: an appeal to the pride and patriotism of the Italian people; to keep them satisfied; to hold up to them their great accomplishment; and the hope of further accomplishment, to keep their attention focussed on matters outside and not inside of Italy.

The feeling of National Unity on the part of the Italian People had been immeasurably intensified by the war. The disaster of Caporetto had given it a depth never approached before. The sacrifices made universally throughout the Country were a bond which had blotted out in a feeling of common sympathy all previous division. And now with the common glory of the final, far-reaching Victory which crushed the power of Austria and was the prelude to crushing that of Germany, they turned the aspiration for the redemption of the remaining irredentist regions into a consuming passion. The press rang with it. The Piazzas hummed with it. The attitude of the Jugo-Slavs only fanned the flames. Italy—all Italy had to be redeemed.¹

¹ A somewhat unsympathetic report on the conflicting contentions of Italy and the rapidly organising State of Jugo-Slavia, touching Rights on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic, said that apparently wherever there was a Roman Ruin and a few Italians the Italians claimed it was Italy. The statement contained a profounder truth than the official knew. Italy with her long record of accomplishment and failure, disaster, and disruption; of suffering

The feeling of the people in this matter coincided with that of the stronger element of those leaders who at this time had the control of Italian affairs. Undoubtedly, if the latter had not been quietly leading the people in this direction, they were happy to see the drift of Public Opinion. Thus, as the tide set more strongly in this direction the expansionists grew bolder. The Army or a strong element in it were ready to support the idea—whether against Jugoslavia or other Austrian fragments, or France. The strongest civil leader of this steadily strengthening element was the silent Head of the Consulta, who sat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his Treaty of London securely grasped, saying nothing publicly as to this or any other Italian aspiration, yet permitting, if he did not actively prompt, the expansionist idea to spread and take root where it could.

With the personal achievement of having secured so much for Italy from France and England, with his known devotion to Italian Interests, and with his indifference to public censure or applause, he came to exercise immense power. It was recognized that he did not care for the Premiership and was not working for any personal ends, but only for Italy; also that he was impervious to any influence of personal ambition. Thus, whatever rivalries or ambitions others may have had, Sonnino stood secure.

There was another element both in the Country and in the Parliament, which felt the necessity of getting back to peace as quickly as possible, so that Italy might resume, with as little delay as conditions would admit, her normal life. These held that Italy's true policy was to create friendly rather than hostile relations with her neighbors and, having regained her unredeemed regions, not to start the new era with taking over what in the future would inevitably create a new Irredentism, with Italy this time as the suppressor if not the oppressor.

and fortitude and sacrifice and achievement, now, in what appeared the dissolution of that which had caused her age-long passion, stood revealed in the glory of her final achievement as the Patria into whose all-embracing arms all the Italians were to be gathered at last.

These were looking forward, rather than having their gaze fixed on the past or even the present. They had encouraged the Congress in Rome of the Oppressed Peoples, in April, 1918. They did not approve wholly of the Treaty of London in which Sonnino took so much pride. They rather acquiesced in the Principles of the President of the United States as set forth by him in his addresses as a basis of a World-Peace which had been accepted alike by the Allies and by the Central Powers, when the latter applied in October to the President to secure an armistice that would bring about Peace.

The leader of these more moderate expansionists was the now Reformed Socialist, Leonidas Bissolati himself, a man of impregnable convictions. These convictions soon brought him into collision in the Cabinet with Baron Sonnino, and after a contest, echoes of which reached outside of the Council Chamber in the Palazzo Braschi, Bissolati resigned. A short time afterward there was published in the London press, in the form of an interview with Bissolati, a statement of his position touching the Italian frontier and the Dalmatian coast. This interview was made the occasion of a furious attack on Bissolati in the Italian press, which appeared greatly aggrieved that he should have sought to present his views on so acute a question through the medium of a foreign paper.¹

Soon after this, Bissolati delivered, or attempted to deliver, in a theatre in Milan an address in which he set forth his views on this now universally agitated question. His views were moderate, his convictions profound, his reasoning forcible, his eloquence extraordinary. No one could tell what effect such views so powerfully advocated might have on the Public. A hostile demonstration was arranged to pre-

¹ There appears to have been no question as to the fact that the views expressed in the *Morning Post* of London were those expressed by Bissolati to the Correspondent. The only question was as to the form. Bissolati's friends stated that he had given them as his views and for publication, but had not expected them to be stated as "an interview."

He has since died. And in him Italy has lost one of her most devoted sons.

vent his speaking, and the case of the Moderates was not presented. Bissolati retired from public life amid denunciation almost too furious to have been wholly spontaneous. The effect of this contest was the defeat not only of Bissolati, but of the whole Moderate programme and the triumph of the Nationalist Element. Those who were timid were whipped in; even those who were stronger bowed before the storm. The Nationalists grew rapidly bolder and more aggressive, and set about forcing the hand of the Government, which had some trouble in controlling them. A press campaign was inaugurated which assumed a complexion of bitterness toward all the Allies. And it was apparently unopposed by the Governmental censorship. And soon the sympathy with which Italy was beginning to be regarded in other countries as her contribution to the common cause had begun to be made known was supplanted by something of the same suspicion which had been manifested before her great achievement: that her motives were largely egotistic rather than those claimed as theirs by her Allies.

The Peace Congress had become the centre of the world-stage, with the President of the United States and his Principles, which had performed such wonders, holding the spot-light, somewhat to the envy of the rest of the *Dramatis Personæ*, who were ready, should opportunity offer, to unite and overthrow him. Against him was arrayed, however secretly, every form of opposition that the long-established and deep-rooted traditions of ancient secret European Diplomacy could muster. And, whether admitted or not, it was well understood among his European colleagues that between them was an issue which went to the very foundations. For at the bottom of all his principles lay Democracy. Now, at least in the beginning, hardly one of his colleagues of the Great Powers actually believed in Democracy according to the American definition—save academically, any more than they believed in a League of Nations or other organization which should lay down the confines of States, small and great, on equitable lines acceptable to the Small States, and then should establish a rule which should re-

verse the custom of ages, and protect the small States against the large States.

At the start, however, the President's Principles, whose enunciation had contributed so markedly to bring the war to a close, had been so universally accepted by the Peoples of the different Countries, as a species of Divine Revelation, that equipped with them and believed to have the United States behind him, he was too strong to be resisted. The Peoples of the Entente Powers had accepted his views almost en masse. And undoubtedly, the new spirit inspired by him had driven from their thrones the Emperors of the Central Empires and the other monarchs, who in that eventful November week when Imperialism was crashing to the earth, sought safety in Abdication.¹

For a time the feeling in Italy was directed against France and England, especially against France which was considered to have been the strong supporter of the Jugo-Slav opposition to Italy's claims touching the Adriatic settlement. And the situation became such that not only the Italian press was as bitter in its denunciation as the Censorship would tolerate, but serious collisions ensued between French and Italian troops, both on the Istrian-Dalmatian side of the Adriatic and in Italy, in which occurred a considerable number of casualties and a number of deaths on both sides. A collision at Leghorn was especially violent. Some thirty odd French soldiers were killed or wounded. How many Italians were killed was not stated. The situation became, indeed, so threatening that on a presentation of the case by Italy, General Franchet-d'Espérey, who commanded in the Balkans, was sent for to Paris and some accommodation was arrived at.

The war having ceased and the immediate peril having been removed, antagonisms revived in America as in Italy. The programme of the President in the matter of the

¹ "In November, 1918," says an English critic of the President, "the armies of Foch and the words of Wilson had brought us sudden escape from what was swallowing up all we cared for." (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, J. M. Keynes, p. 37.)

League of Nations as a constituent part of the Treaty of Peace was strongly attacked, and a section of the American press began to assail the President for his action in Paris in connection with the Peace Congress, and especially for his attitude respecting the League of Nations. The effect in Europe of this division in America was instantaneous. Articles from the adverse anti-administration American press were seized on and reproduced again and again in the Italian press, and, indeed, in the press in Paris, and to some extent in London also, as a weapon against the President and his principles. And at the same instant all the opposition to the League of Nations and to the terms of the Peace Treaty itself, so far as they had been suggested, reared its head and assailed the alleged dominating attitude of the President and of the United States.

Unhappily, the Peace Treaty with the League of Nations, which hitherto had been accepted as the basis of the negotiations, became a partisan issue in the United States. And thus, into the already difficult problems which were overwhelming the Peace Congress was injected this question which complicated everything immeasurably, and has so far resulted in intensifying the universal turmoil.

It was only when across the water came the story of the strong hostility of those who were trying to rally against the President all the elements of opposition to his Programme, that the Reactionary forces in Europe revived sufficiently to make head against his hitherto triumphant ideas, and thwart his far-reaching plan of a Peace based on principles rather than on power.

Shortly subsequent to this, whatever the influence may have been, the tone of the correspondence from Paris changed markedly, and the Italian press shifted its polemical discussion from France to "the Anglo-Saxon Entente"—which was declared to have designs more imperialistic than the Germans and Austrians had manifested.

Up to this time, however explicable may have been their resentment at the refusal of the other Powers to accept their views and concede to them their contention, the errors,

from the Diplomatic standpoint, had been preponderantly with the Italians. The Italian propaganda had been mainly confined to Italy itself. Satisfied as to the merits of their position, little attention was paid to convincing the other Nations as to its justice. They continued to claim under the Treaty of London certain concessions, the manifest reason for which had disappeared in the maelstrom of the war—such for example, as the entire line of Concessions on the Eastern side of the Adriatic—concessions which had been based on Italy's danger from Austria—and the Dodecanese Islands, whose population was Greek. And, at the same time they claimed what was not in those concessions, viz., Fiume and the contiguous coast, which Sonnino at the time of the negotiation of the London Treaty, had on Russia's insistence, conceded to the Croats as an outlet for the great region whose chief port it was naturally destined to become.

This arrayed against Italy all the other Greater Powers represented at Paris, and also the smaller powers whose interests were affected by this attitude, such as Serbia, Greece, and the Slav States along the Adriatic and beyond it. The fundamental difficulty was that these Powers believed that apart from her claims to a secure frontier and to the redemption of her own people, Italy's aspiration touching the Adriatic was to make it substantially a closed sea and thus control the great regions beyond it.

In fact, the other Powers apprehended that Italy, if she did not design to make of the Adriatic an Italian lake, at least designed to obtain such a dominant position in relation to it that she could control it, both strategically and commercially, and with it could control the great region beyond it. The Italian press spoke of it as "Our Sea": the Italian Sea; Italian maps termed the upper Adriatic the Gulf of Venice.

The problem was a difficult one at best, with the Powers concerned all having rival interests which they never for a moment put out of mind; and only a compelling common recognition of the need to solve it, without delay, by mu-

tual concessions in a broad and catholic spirit, could have resulted in a sound solution.

This, unfortunately, was wanting—and the consequences are the present unhappy conditions in Europe.

England and France had been brought, apparently somewhat reluctantly and resentfully, to admit that they were still bound by the agreement in the Treaty of London; but they looked to the United States to cut this knot. And many earnest attempts were made to find a harmonizing formula that would satisfy, on the one hand, Italy's Commissioners, and, on the other, those of the other Powers concerned. But in the end they all failed. Before the Winter was ended, the Peace Conference at Paris was in a deadlock over Italy's claims touching regions on the Eastern side of the Adriatic which have not yet been adjusted.

The President toward the end of April (22), 1919, addressed, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the chief Representatives of England and France at the Peace Conference at Versailles, a Communication to the World in which the Adriatic question with Italy's relation thereto was presented.

The President, who had visited Italy in January, where he had been received with extraordinary appreciation, was personally most friendly to the Italians; but the lines which, in harmony with the Representatives of Great Britain and France, he laid down as her frontier were those reported by a Commission of Geographic Military Boundary experts as in accordance with his principles, and these principles he felt bound by irrevocably. This report assigned the Eastern side of Istria, Fiume and the Dalmatian coast to the Jugo-Slavs. Unhappily those lines, based on certain principles, took no account of the passion of the Italian People.

On the other hand the Italian People, who in the beginning knew little of Fiume, had come since the controversy arose to feel that Fiume was Italian, and that an Italian City was being given up to their enemies. And what was more galling to them: that Italy was being placed by her Allies in the same category with those who had fought

against them. The former contravened their sentiment, the latter struck them to the heart. To place Italy, as it were, in the same scale with those who had fought against them outraged their sentiment beyond hope of correction. Fiume became on the sudden the token of Italy's sacrifices, and on it focussed the passion of her People.¹

Some intimation of the intention to issue this public statement had been previously given and, indeed, a memorandum had been sent to the Italian Commission, on April 14, and the Italian press was prepared for it in advance. The publication was promptly taken as an appeal to the Italian People over the heads of their responsible Government, and was hotly resented. The Italian Commissioners, deeply incensed, left Paris and, preparations having been duly made, were received with great honor at Rome;² and on a statement of the case before the Parliament they received not only a vote of Confidence, but of entire approval, which was echoed throughout the Country. It was wittily said that the Allies had brought Italy to a closer internal solidarity than even the Central Empires had been able to effect. Public meetings were held in Rome and elsewhere in condemnation of the President's act, and the People were stirred to deep resentment. The press, never too measured in its condemnation, applied all its powers to denunciation of the Author of the published statement, and the agitation was kept at fever heat as long as possible.

In fact, the People were deeply stirred by what was presented to them by the press as a case not merely of want of appreciation, but of betrayal by one whom they had con-

¹ It is not understood that Baron Sonnino ever personally asserted any legal claim to Fiume. However earnestly he may have wished to have Fiume assigned to Italy, he appears to have felt himself bound by the Treaty of London and to have confined himself personally in discussions to argument and to the advantage derived from the Treaty of London, leaving it to others to assert Italy's Right to Fiume.

² The French Embassy under instructions from Paris issued an "official communication" that M. Clemenceau not only did not inspire, but did not know of the President's contemplated publication nor approve of it. The Members of that Embassy in Rome met, arrayed in full uniform, the returning Commissioners at the railway-station in token of their sympathy with them.

sidered and honored greatly as their friend and Italy's friend.¹

After a short time as it became manifest that the Peace negotiations at Versailles were proceeding unhindered by the absence of the Italians, and that the Treaty would probably be signed by the Commissioners of the other Powers, the Italian Commissioners returned to Paris, and the attempt was renewed to arrive at a settlement of the Adriatic question. But, although earnest efforts were made to arrive at a formula that would harmonize the differences, unhappily they did not succeed.

Then ensued the harebrained enterprise headed by the Poet-Orator, D'Annunzio, whose picturesque audacity captured not only Fiume, but the sentiment of many besides the Italians, who acclaimed him as a second Garibaldi. It, however, destroyed all chance of settling the matter immediately and complicated the situation beyond the possibility of pacific diplomatic adjustment.

The Orlando-Sonnino Ministry, which had contributed so much to bring the war to a triumphant close, was overthrown in the general commotion. A new Ministry under the able leadership of Signor Nitti took its place, only to follow its predecessor after an earnest and patriotic attempt to steer the Country through the tempestuous seas that threatened to overwhelm it. And in its room has now been formed a Ministry under the veteran Giolitti, whose experience, sagacity, and ability are being put to the severest test that able leader has ever known in his long career.

Italy's course subsequent to the War and her present situation, as complicated as it is, are not, however, properly the subject of this volume.

Italy claims officially that she lost in the war a half-million men killed; that she had, besides, nearly a million and a half more wounded, of whom some two hundred thousand are permanently disabled; and that she spent more of her wealth in proportion to her property Values than any

¹ It is to be noted that in all this period of excitement no act of rudeness was reported as having been offered to any American in Italy.

other of the Allies. That after efforts so heroic, losses so great, and sacrifices so immeasurable, she should be left with so profound a feeling of injustice to her on the part of her former allies is, indeed, a malign fortune. Yet, whatever the immediate issue of the present unhappy complications may be, those who know Italy and know what she performed during the war will rest assured that however the questions which rack her to-day may be settled she will reap in time the fruit of her sacrifices, and will arrive at last at the goal of a great and puissant Nation, established in Constitutional Liberty as a champion of Civilization to which, through the ages, she has so greatly contributed.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE WITH AUSTRIA

SIGNED BY GENERAL DIAZ ON NOVEMBER 3, TO GO INTO EFFECT
AT 8 O'CLOCK, NOVEMBER 4, 1918

TEXT OF ARMISTICE

A. MILITARY CLAUSES

One—The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, and sea, and air.

Two—Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in Clause Three, below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a maximum of twenty divisions reduced to pre-war effectives.

Half the divisional, corps, and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

Three—Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austro-Hungary since the beginning of the war.

Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the Commander in Chief of the allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Ziller. The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis, and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno, (Terglou,) and the watershed of the Cols di Podberdo, Podlaniscam, and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save River and its tributaries; from the Schneeberg it goes down toward the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia, and Volosca in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province

of Dalmatia, including in the north Lisarica and Trivania, and to the south territory limited by a line from the shore of (Semigrad) Cape Planca to the summits of the watersheds eastward, so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water courses flowing toward Sebenico, such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago, and Puntadura Islands, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Cursolä, Cassa, and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.

All territory thus evacuated will be occupied by Allied and American troops.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) belonging to or within those territories to be left *in situ* and surrendered to the Allies and America, according to special orders given by the Commander in Chief of the forces of the associated powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage, or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the associated powers.

Four—Allied armies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and water ways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation. The armies of the associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the associated powers wherever they may be.

Five—Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days, not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts, but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary before that date.

Six—The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be intrusted to the local authorities, under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

Seven—The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all allied prisoners of war and internal subjects of civil populations evacuated from their homes, on conditions to be laid down by the Commander in Chief of the forces of the allied powers on the various fronts.

Eight—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

B. NAVAL CONDITIONS

One—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Two—Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of fifteen Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under the supervision of the Allies.

Three—Surrender to the Allies and the United States with their complete armament and equipment of three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, one mine layer, six Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships, including river craft, are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America.

Four—Free navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the allied and associated powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allies and associated powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

Five—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, with the exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Six—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Seven—Evacuation of all Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

Eight—Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

Nine—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allies and associated powers to be returned.

Ten—No destruction of ships or materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

Eleven—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries duly authorized, signify their approval of above conditions:

3rd November, 1918.

Representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command

Victor Weber, Edler von Webenau
Karl Schneller
Y. von Lichtenstein
J. V. Nyékhegyi
Zwierkowaki
Victor, Freiherr von Seiller
Kamillo Ruggera

Representatives of Italian Supreme Command

Ten. Gen. Pietro Badoglio
Magg. Gen. Scipione Sciopioni
Colonn. Tullio Marchetti
Colonn. Pietro Gazzera
Colonn. Pietro Maravigna
Colonn. Alberty Pariani
Cap. Vasc. Francesco Accinni

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF THE PACT OF LONDON

SIGNED ON APRIL 26, 1915

The Marquis Imperiali, acting on the instructions of his [the Italian] Government, has the honor to communicate the following memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey; the Ambassador of France, M. Cambon, and the Ambassador of Russia, Count Benckendorff:

ARTICLE 1.—A military convention is to be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces against Italy. Russia should decide mainly to attack Germany. Similarly the said convention is to regulate the questions relating to armistices, in so far as such armistices form an essential part of the competence of the Supreme Army Command.

ARTICLE 2.—On her part Italy undertakes by all means at her disposal to conduct the campaign in union with France, Great Britain, and Russia against all the powers at war with them.

ARTICLE 3.—The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render uninterrupted and active assistance to Italy until such time as the navy of Austria has been destroyed or peace has been concluded. A naval convention is to be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain, and Italy.

ARTICLE 4.—By the future treaty of peace, Italy is to receive the district of Trentino; the entire Southern Tyrol up to its natural geographical frontier, which is the Brenner Pass; the city and district of Trieste; the County of Gorizia and Gradisca; the entire Istria up to the Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussino, as well as the smaller Islands of Plavinika, Unia, Canidole, Palazuolo, S. Pietro dei Nembi, Asinello, and Grutzo, with the neighboring islands.

Note 1.—Here follow the details of the frontier delimitations: In execution of the conditions of Article 4 the frontier line should run as follows: From the summit of the Umbrile northward as far as Stelvio, thence along the watershed of the Rhetian Alps as far as the sources of the Adige and the Eisach; after which it will cross the heights of the Reschon and the Brenner and those of the Ets and the Tiller. The frontier will then turn southward,

passing round Mount Tobloch in order to reach the real frontier of Carniola, which is near to the Alps. Passing along this frontier, the line will reach Mount Tarvis and follow the watershed of the Julian Alps beyond the crests of the Predil, the Mangart, and the Tricorne, (Triglav,) and the defiles of Podberdo, Poldanako, and Idria. Thence it will turn in a southeasterly direction toward the Schneeberg, in such a way as to exclude the basin of the Save and its tributaries from Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend toward the seacoast—Castua, Matuglia, and Volosca being considered as Italian districts.

ARTICLE 5.—Italy will likewise receive the Province of Dalmatia in its present frontiers, including Lisserica and Trebigne, (Trebanje,) in the north, and all the country in the south up to a line drawn from the coast, at the promontory of Planka, eastward along the watershed in such a way as to include in the Italian possessions all the valleys of the rivers flowing into the Sebenico—viz., Cikola, Kerka, and Buotisnica—with all their affluents. Italy will likewise obtain all the islands situated to the north and west of the coasts of Dalmatia, beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maob Pago, and Puntadura, and further north, and down to Melada in the south, with the inclusion of the Islands of St. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Cursola, Cassa, and Lagosta, with all the adjacent rocks and islets, as well as Pelagosa, but without the Islands of Zirona Grande and Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, and Brassa.

The following are to be neutralized: (1) the entire coasts from Planka, in the north, to the southern extremity of the Sabbioncello peninsula, including this last-named peninsula in its entirety; (2) the part of the littoral from a point ten versts south of the promontory of Ragusa Vecchia to the Viosa (Vojusza) River, so as to include in the neutralized zone the entire Gulf of Cattaro, with its ports of Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo; the rights of Montenegro, arising from the declarations exchanged by the two contracting parties as far back as April and May, 1909, remaining intact. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that those rights were guaranteed to Montenegro within her present frontiers, they are not to be extended to those territories and ports which may eventually be given to Montenegro. Thus, none of the ports of the littoral now belonging to Montenegro is to be neutralized at any future time. On the other hand, the disqualifications affecting Antivari, to which Montenegro herself agreed in 1909, are to remain in force; (3) lastly, all the islands which are not annexed to Italy.

Note 2.—The following territories on the Adriatic will be included by the powers of the Quadruple Entente in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro: In the north of the Adriatic, the entire coast from Volosca Bay, on the border of Istria, to the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the entire coast now belonging to Hungary, and the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume, and the small ports of Novi and Carlopago, and also the Islands of Veglia,

Pervicchio, Gregorio, Coli, and Arbe; and in the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro have interests, the entire coast from Planka up to the River Drin, with the chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and San Giovanni di Medua, with the Islands of Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, Brassa, Jakljan, and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo may be given to the independent Mohammedan State of Albania.

ARTICLE 6.—Italy will receive in absolute property Valona, the Islands of Sasseno, and as much territory as would be required to secure their military safety—approximately between the River Voyazza in the north and in the east down to the borders of the Chimara district in the south.

ARTICLE 7.—Italy, having received Trentino and Istria in accordance with Article 4, and Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands in accordance with Article 5, and the Gulf of Valona, is not, in case of the creation of a small autonomous and neutralized State in Albania, to resist the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to distribute among Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece the northern and southern parts of Albania. The latter's southern littoral from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona to Capo Stylos is to be neutralized. Italy is to have the right to conduct foreign relations with Albania; at any rate, Italy is to agree to the inclusion in Albania of a territory large enough to allow her frontiers to touch those of Greece and Serbia, west of Ochrida Lake.

ARTICLE 8.—Italy will obtain all the twelve islands (Dodecanese) now occupied by her, in full possession.

ARTICLE 9.—France, Great Britain, and Russia admit in principle the fact of Italy's interest in the maintenance of the political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean—viz., in that part of it which adjoins the Province of Adalia, in which Italy has already acquired special rights and interests defined in the Italo-British Convention. The zone which is to be made Italy's property is to be more precisely defined in due course in conformity with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Italy's interests will likewise be taken into consideration in case the powers should also maintain territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey for some future period of time, and if they should only proceed to establish among themselves spheres of influence. In case France, Great Britain, and Russia should, in the course of the present war, occupy any districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire territory adjacent to Adalia and herewith more specifically defined is to be left to Italy, who reserves her right to occupy it.

ARTICLE 10.—In Libya, Italy is to enjoy all those rights and privileges which now belong to the Sultan in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne.

ARTICLE 11.—Italy is to get a share in the war indemnity corresponding to the magnitude of her sacrifices and efforts.

ARTICLE 12.—Italy adheres to the declaration made by France, England, and Russia about leaving Arabia and the holy Moslem places in the hands of an independent Moslem power.

ARTICLE 13.—Should France and Great Britain extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, they will admit in principle Italy's right to demand certain compensation by way of an extension of her possessions in Erythraea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the colonial areas adjoining French and British colonies.

ARTICLE 14.—Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy the immediate flotation on the London market of a loan on advantageous terms to the amount of not less than £50,000,000.

ARTICLE 15.—France, Great Britain, and Russia pledge themselves to support Italy in not allowing the representatives of the Holy See to undertake any diplomatic steps having for their object the conclusion of peace or the settlement of questions connected with the present war.

ARTICLE 16.—The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italy's adhesion to the Declaration of Sept. 5, 1915, this declaration alone will be published immediately on the declaration of war by or against Italy.

Having taken into consideration the present memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, being authorized thereto, agreed with the representatives of Italy, likewise authorized thereto, as follows:

France, Great Britain, and Russia express their complete agreement with the present memorandum submitted to them by the Italian Government. In respect of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the present memorandum, regarding the co-ordination of the military and naval operations of all the four powers, Italy declares that she will actively intervene at an earliest possible date, and, at any rate, not later than one month after the signature of the present document by the contracting parties.

The undersigned have confirmed by hand and seal the present instrument in London in four copies. April 26, 1915.

(Signed)

GREY,
CAMBON,
IMPERIALI,
BENCKENDORFF.

INDEX

- Abruzzi, Duke of, 121, 219, 233
 Abyssinia, Italian Protectorate in, 87
 Adowa, battle of, 87
 Adrianople, capture of, by Bulgarians, 130; retaken by Turks, 134
 Adriatic Sea, Italy's need of, 55, 76-78; Serbia seeks outlet on, 125; Austrian interference on, 219, 220; Italianism of, 327-329; Peace Conference *re* settlement of, 399, 405
 Aegean Islands, 130, 202
 Aegean Sea, 102, 121, 219, 220
 Aehrenthal, Baron von, 99, 100; forced to repudiate charges against Serbia, 103; succeeds Goluchowski, 106; attitude toward Italian-Turkish War, 121; succeeded by Berchtold, 121, 220
 Agadir, German gunboat arrives at, 116
 Alsace, French attack on (1917), 286, 287
 Albania, Austrian-Italian agreement *re*, 73, 79, 104; Austrian designs in, 125, 126, 128, 129; taken over by Powers, 130; under William of Wied, 137, 138; at outbreak of war, 162, 163; strategic position of, 173; religious factions in, 173, 174; Italian-Austrian discussions *re*, 193, 205, *footnote*; declares war on Austria, 245; independence of, under Italian protection (1917), 300. *See* Valona
 Aleppo, 361
 Alexander, King, assassination of, 95
 Alfieri, 16
 Algeciras, conference of, 91-94, 118
 Allenby, General, enters Jerusalem, 302, 303; occupies Damascus, 360, 361
 Alliance, between Croat and Serb parties, 96. *See* Dual Alliance and Triple Alliance
 Allies, anxiety of *re* Italy, 201, 202, 248; *re* Greece, 237, 238, 269, 270; military command of (1916), 285, 286; Commissions to U. S., 293, 294; confer after Caporetto, 317, 318; unite under Foch, 340; turn tide of battle, 361, 362
 Alpine Corps, 229
 Alsace-Lorraine, 363
 Americans, in France, 341, 342, 354-356; in Italy, 350, 357
 Ancona, the, sunk, 245
 Ancre, Battle of the, 250
 Annexation, by Austria, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 96 ff. *See* Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Annunziata, Order of the, 169
 Annunzio, Gabriel d', orator at Quarto celebration, 210; capture of Fiume by, 403
 Antivari, 102
 Aonso, Sub-Lieutenant, 379
 Aosta, Duchess d', becomes head of Italian Red Cross, 233
 Aosta, Duke d', 233; in Isonzo offensive, 265
 Arab Pasha, 68
 Argyrokastro, Greek regiment sent to, 175
 Armistice, sought by Austria, 380, 381
 Army, Italian, organization of, 264, 265, 368; position of, on the Piave, 315; calls for young boys, 353; position in last offensive, 376 ff.
 Article VII of Triple Alliance, cause of controversy, 82, 151-157, 192 ff.
 Artillery, Italian scarcity of, 227
 Asiago Plateau, attack on, 366, 367, 374-376
 Asphyxiating gas, used by Germans, 225; by Austrians, 263, 264
 Aspromonte, 44
 Athens, Allied troops land at, 285
 Austria, early history of, 18, 19, 38, 39; Balkan ambitions, 63, 64, 75, 76, 108, 109, 140, 141; annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 96; railway concession from Turkey, 101; *re* Italian-Turkish War, 121-122; War Party gains, 128, 129; results of Sarajevo, 151-153; yields to Italian demands, 197, 204, 205; Italy declares war on, 206; offensive (1916), 253 ff.; overruns Roumania, 272, 273; Caporetto, 303; offensive (1918), 347 ff.; collapses, 376; asks for Armistice, 380, 381
 Austrian Ambassador, asks for his passports, 214, 215
 Austrian embassy, guarded in Rome, 166
 Austrian fleet, bottled up in Pola, 235, 379, 380; claimed by Jugo-Slavs, 389, 390
 Austrian front, geography of, 222, 223
 Austrian preparedness, 162, 222, 223, 226-230
 Austrians, fighting quality of, 378
 Austro-German Empire, 5, 6
 Avenit, the, Socialist paper, 307
 Aseglio, d', Prime Minister, conflicts with Vatican, 37
Astec, the, sunk by German submarine, 284
 Baden, 49
 Badoglio, General, 265, 315
 Bagdad, 250, 285
 Balfour, Arthur J., 285; head of British Commission to United States, 293
 Balkan League, 123; Venizelos and, 124; Turkey and, 125
 Balkan Question, arises, 60; attitude of Powers toward, 61-65, 125, 126

- Balkan Wars, First of, breaks out (1912), 125; Treaty of London, result of, 129-132; Second War breaks out (1913), 132; progress of, 133, 134; result of, 134-137
- Balkans, brief history of, 73, 74; importance of location, 76; and Congress of Berlin, 75, 76; population of, 76; relations with Italy strengthened by marriage, 82; Status quo threatened, 119, 120; after the World War, 389-391
- "Bargaining," Italy accused of, 300, 302, 303
- Barrère, M. Camille, French Ambassador, 207, *footnote*
- Barisal, 189
- Bavaria, demands abdication of King Ludwig, 385
- Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 285
- Beirut, 361
- Belgium, 42, 47
- Belgrade, 52; evacuated, 238
- Belleau Wood, 342
- Below, General von, 343
- Benedetti, 47
- Benedetto Brin, blown up, 292
- Benedict XV, elected, 164; invites discussion of Peace (August, 1917), 301
- Berchtold, Count, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 121; visits Italy, 125; *re* Serbia, 140, 151, 152, 154, 157, 158
- Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, 115, 119
- Berlin, Congress of, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63; effect on Italian national spirit, 72
- Bervaglieri, 375
- Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 125, 158
- Bismarck, plans Prussian expansion, 46 *ff.*, 51, 59; seeks Russian good-will, 62, 64, 66; letter to Massini, 80; visited by Orsini, 86; dismissed by Emperor William, 87
- Biscolati, 189; character of, 261, 262; *re* Albania, 300; *re* Italian expansion, 394-396
- Blockade of Germany, 243; of Greece, 285; hardships caused by, 290
- Boehm, von, General, 343
- Bolo Pasha, 336, 337
- Bolshevism, in Russia, 290; spreads in Germany, 333-335; shadow of, in Italy, 392
- Bonarelli, the Marchese, on Italian Commission to the United States, 294
- Boselli, National Ministry formed under presidency of, 261; ministry defeated, Caporetto, 319, 320
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria acquires, 63, 75, 76, 96 *ff.*; annexation of, as cause of World War, 83; declare for union with greater Serbia, 383
- Bosphorus, English-Russian agreement *re*, 324; surrendered to Allies, 361
- Brasil, breaks off relations with Germany, 284
- Breslau, escapes to Turkey, 166, 270
- Brest-Litovsk, terms of treaty, 338
- Briand, M., visits Italy, 243; resigns, 291; *re* Peace proposals, 363
- British army, 3,000,000 volunteers, 244; Mesopotamian campaign, 250, 285, 286; attacks Hindenburg Line (1917), 286; losses in Battle of the Somme, 268; change in leaders, 285; halt German offensive (1918), 341; smashes Hindenburg Line, 361; on the Piave, 374
- British Commission, visits United States, 293
- British navy, in Battle of Jutland, 250, 251
- British Press, critical toward America, 280
- Brusiloff, General, 224, 289
- Bucharest, Treaty of, 134 *ff.*
- Bulgaria, in Balkan Wars, declares independence, 99, 124-127, 129-130, 132-134; enters Alliance with Turkey, 134; receives loan from Central Empires, 139; support sought by Allies and Central Empires, 156, 237, 238; enters, 163; Italy declares war on, 240; Albania declares war on, 245; surrenders unconditionally, 359, 360
- Billow, Prince von, 105, 146; estimate of Sonnino, 168, *note*; success as ambassador, 168, 169, 170; Gholitti calls on, 187; confers with Sonnino, 192; *re* Article VII and Irredentists, 194-196; asks for passports, 214, 215; treaty *re* civil rights of Germans and Italians in event of War, 216
- Burgundy, source of continual struggle, 6
- Burian, Baron, 196, 197
- Cadorna, General, 51, 172, 227, 231, 233; in Isonzo attack, 241, 253-257; opens spring offensive (1917), 296, 297; superseded by Diaz, 315
- Caillaux, M., 116
- Cairoli, 48, 58; ministry falls, 67
- Calabria, 44
- Cambray, 322
- Campo Formio, treaty of, 55
- Capello, General, 265
- Caporetto, disaster of, 303-316; Italy recovers by her own effort, 317; offensive launched on anniversary of, 373
- Caprera, 44, 48
- Caprivi, Count, 87
- "Carbonari," 23, 25
- Carcano, takes over the Treasury, 189, 213
- Carducci, 5
- Cairo, the, Italian advance on (1915), 234, 241, 242
- Casablanca, French marines land at, 114
- Casualties, German offensive (1918), 341
- Cattaro, the, 245, 247, 326
- Causes of war, always essentially economic, 1, 2; in Imperial ambitions, 3
- Cavalry, in last Italian offensive, 378 *ff.*
- Cavan, Earl of, and Piave offensive, 374
- Oaviglia, Lieutenant-General, 375
- Cavour, Count, native of Piedmont, 23, 24; statesmanship of, 30, 31, 37-39; attitude toward Garibaldi, 41-43; death of, 44
- Central Powers, "Peace Offensives" of, 362-365, 369-371
- Cetlinge, 129; captured by Austrians, 246

- Chamber, the, constituency of, 147, 148; supports Giolitti, 184; registers vote of confidence in government (Dec., 1914), 187; asks for full war power, 213, 214; lay *Green Book* before public, 217; *re* Italian reverses, 259
- Charles Albert, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 53
- Charles, Emperor, *re* discussion of Peace terms (1917), 362; takes refuge in Hungary, 382
- Charles, Grandduke, 262
- Château-Thierry, 342
- Chemin des Dames, cleared by the French (1917), 322
- Chiassi, Eugenio, 189
- Cholera, menace of, in winter of 1915, 242
- Church of Rome, influence of, 52
- Cirenaica, annexed by Italy, 120
- Clericals, the, 184, 185; after the war, 392
- Coal, scarcity of, in Italy, 230, 290, 317, 357
- Coalition cabinet, replaced, 285
- "Compensation," debatable term in Triple Alliance, 204
- Confederation, German, 21
- Confederation of Italian states, favored by Napoleon, 39
- Conference, of Allied Premiers (1917), 277, 278, 279
- Constantine, King, popularity of, 269; forced to abdicate, 298
- Constantinople, Russian-English agreement *re*, 324
- Convention, Turkish-Austrian, 101
- Corfu, seized by French, 247
- Corriere della Serra*, 189
- Corti, Count, 66
- Costanza, captured by Austrians, 273
- Crete, 123, 124; ceded to Greece, 134
- Crispi, Francisco, 41, 58, 85, 86
- Croatians, 95, 96, 389
- Crown Prince, German, in attack on Verdun (1916), 248, 249; flees to Holland, 386
- Currency, depreciation of, 331, *note*, 349, 357
- Cusola Archipelago, 205, *footnote*
- Custoza, battle of, 32, 46
- Cyprus, English-Turkish agreement *re*, 61, 62, 67
- Czecho-Slovaks, 343, 345
- Dalmatia, under Venetian Republic, 9; held by Austria, 46; littoral of, 55; President Wilson *re* control of, 400
- Damascus, occupied by Allies, 360
- Dandolo, Italian battleship, 175
- Dante, 5; essentially Italian, 15, 16; monument to, erected by Irredentist Provinces, 112
- Dardanelles, enterprise, 199, 230; Russian-English agreement *re*, 324; surrendered to Allies, 361
- Debts, incurred in Wars for Independence, 56
- Declaration of war, effect of, on Italians, 208, 215
- Defeatists, hindrance to victory of Allies, 291, 292; silenced after Caporetto, 318
- Degoutte, General, 342
- Delcassé, power in French foreign policy, 88, 89; forced to resign, 91, 92; restored to Ministry, 115
- Demitrieff, General, 224
- Democracy, championed by President Wilson, 350-352, 396
- Denmark, Bismarck plans to take Schleswig and Holstein from, 45, 59
- De Pretis, policy of, 57, 58
- Destruction, by German armies, 371
- Diaz, General, 231, 265; succeeds Cadorna, 315; in Piave battle (1918), 347, 348, 357, 358; brilliant strategy of last attack, 365-368, 372-379
- Diplomacy, era of, after Treaty of Berlin, 62
- Dobrudja, the, 272
- Dodecanese Islands, 143, 162, 194
- Doge, Venetian, 9
- Draft, in America, 284
- Dual Alliance, 64, 65
- Duma, dedes Tsar, 268
- Durasso, 125, 129, 173, 176, 236, 246
- Economic causes of war, 1, 2; problem of Italy during the war, 290, 331-332, 336-337; after the war, 387
- Egypt, occupation of, by England, 68
- Empire, struggle with Papacy, 8; Italy emancipated from, 5, 6
- Engineers, marvellous accomplishments of, in the war, 264, 265, 281
- England, first to recognize "Kingdom of Italy" (1861), 43; colonial possessions of, 60; *re* Cyprus, 61, 62, 67; *re* Egypt, 68; and Triple Entente, 81, 82; *re* Irish question, 116; attitude toward Sonnino's demands, 202; change in political leaders, 285; interferes with neutral shipping, 291; celebrates entry of United States into war. *See* British army
- Entente, between England, France and Russia, 81, 82, 98
- Enver Bey, 129
- Equipment, inferiority of Italian, 222, 223, 226-230
- Erzberger, Matthias, visits Rome, 189, 190; receives armistice terms, 385, 386
- Essad Pasha, 178, 176
- Falkenhayn, General von, 272
- "Farà da sé," 35, 58
- Fashoda, incident of, 88
- Finland, 338
- Fiume, 203, 399, 400, 401, 402
- Fleet, mobilized, 161; commanded by the Duke of Abruzzi, 233; activity during first year of war, 235, 236, *see footnote*; retains Italian commander, 337, 338; gallantry of, 379, 380
- Floods, on the Piave, 368 ff.
- Florence, 16, 45
- Flotow, von, German Ambassador at Rome preceding Von Bülow, 218
- Foch, General, appointed chief of French General Staff, 288; visits Italian front after Caporetto, 317; appointed Com-

- mander-in-Chief of armies in France, 340, and *note*; proves greatness as General, 341, 342; Italian attitude toward, 348, 349, 357
 Food, scarcity of, 290, 332, 388; shipment of, to neutrals interfered with, 291
 Foscolo, 16
 "Fourteen Points," 333; attitude of Allies toward, 334, 335, 336
 France, early history, 6, 18, 38, 40-45; Bismarck and, 50, 51, 59, 60; *re* Morocco (1907), 114-117; importance of Italy's neutrality to, 179; *re* Italian demands; celebrates entry of U. S. into war, 298; treason discovered in, 336, 337; opposes sending American troops to Italy, 357; Italian antagonism toward, 390, 391, 397
 Franchet-d'Espèrey, General, leads victorious attack on Bulgaria, 359, 360; *re* antagonism between French and Italians, 397
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 110; head of Austrian war party, 128; assassination of, at Sarajevo, 140, 141
 Francis Joseph, Emperor, declares war on Italy (1859), 38; *re* annexation of Bosnia, 54, 55; visited by King and Queen of Italy, 69; visited by Kaiser (1913), 139; letter of, to Kaiser (July, 1914), 156 ff.; called "Emperor of the Hangmen," 180
 Franco-Prussian War, 59, 60, 61
 Free Masons, 167, *see note*
 French army, attacks along Aisne (April, 1916), 286, 287; launches offensive (1917), 285-288, 321, 322; meets German offensive (May, 1918), 341; drives back Germans, 361 ff.
 Friuli plains, Italy open to attack through, 226
 Gaëta, becomes part of United Italy (1861), 43
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, born in Nice, 23; "sword of Risorgimento," 24; and "Young Italy," 23, 29; leader in Wars of Independence, 42-45; outlives other Risorgimento leaders, 56, 57; founder of Irridentism, 111; Garibaldi brothers in World War, 173; unveiling of statue, 209
 Gentio, the. *See* Engineers
 Gentiloni Agreement, 184, 185
 Gerlach, M., a traitor in Italy, 292
 German Empire, attainment of, 49, 59, 60; end of, 370, 384
 German financial control in Italy, 82-84, 145, 146, 165, 182-184
 German navy, in battle of Jutland, 250, 251; mutiny in, 384, 385
 German propaganda *re* Russian Revolution, 288, 289
 Germany, interference in Africa, 90-94, 114-117; seeks friendship of Turkey, 91, 92; disclaims knowledge of Austrian note to Serbia, 155; communications with Austria at outbreak of war, 155-159; *re* Italian protest to Austria, 191, 192; intrigue in Italy, 229; Italy de-
 clares war on, 271; forces Brest-Litovsk, 321; *re* Fourteen Points, 335, 336
 Giardino, General, 265, 305, 315, 373, 374
 Giolitti, character and power of, 149-181; endorsed by Italian chamber, 184; protagonist of policy of neutrality, 185-189, 207; life threatened, 211, 212; returns after war to lead ministry, 402
Giornale d'Italia, attacks Giolitti, 188
 Gladstone, W. E., 22, 23
 Goeben, escapes to Turkey, 166, 240
 Goito, Italian revolutionary victory at, 81
 Goldoni, 16
 Goluchowski, Austrian Premier, 105, 106
 Gorizia, 204, *footnote*, 247; goal of Isouzo attack, 241, 242, 251; captured by Italians, 266, 267
 Gouraud, General, 361
 Govone, General, 45
 Gradisca, 204, *footnote*
 Grappa, fighting in region of, 368, 374, 375 ff.
 Gray, Sir Edward, 325, *note*
 Graziani, French general, 374
 Grassiani, General, leader of Czechoslovak legion, 345
 Greece, revolts (1820), 22; King of, visited by Humbert, 107; in Balkan Wars, 127, 130-134; *re* Dodecanese, 143; at outbreak of World War, 162, 163; influenced by Central Powers, 237, 238; source of anxiety to Allies, 269, 270, 279; Venizelos returns to power, 285; declares war on Central Powers, July 16 (1917), 298, 299
 Green Book, made public, 217
 Gregory XVI, 31
 Guatemala, breaks off relations with Germany, 284
 Gueffs, 4, 16, 23
 Guicciardini, Count, 92
 Guns, shipment of, sunk by Austrians, 246; assembled by Austrians for offensive (1916), 252, 253
 Haig, Sir Douglas, 361
 Hannover, 46
 Hapsburg, House of, founded by Rudolph, 4; Maximilian I and, 5, 6; regains power in Italy, 8; ruthless control continued, 30
 Harden, Maximilien, 127, 128
 Hegemony, German ideal of, 127, 383
 Helena, Princess of Montenegro, marriage of, to Victor Emmanuel III, 78, 82
 Henry, Prince, Commander German fleet, 385
 Hertling, Count von, 363, 364, 369
 Herzegovina, 55; annexation by Austria, 95, 96, 97. *See* Bosnia
 Highways of traffic, cause of war, 1
 "Hill 625," 296
 Hindenburg Line, British attacks on, 286, 322; smashed, 361, 362
 History, continuity of, 1-5
 Hoetsendorf, General Conrad von, 128, 129, 252, 253, 348
 "Holy Alliance," 20

- Holy Roman Empire, 3, 5; perishes, 7; as bulwark against Turkey, 10; traces in Italy of, to-day, 18; Napoleon and, 19
 Holy See. *See* Vatican
 Honduras, breaks off relations with Germany, 284
 Hoover, Herbert, Food Commissioner, 332, *note*
 Hostility, traditional attitude of Italy toward Austria, 179-184, 199, 200
 Humbert, General, 361
 Humbert, King, visit to Vienna, 69; visit to Kaiser, 87; visit to King of Greece, 107
 Humboldt, Baron von, 8
 Hungary, emancipation of Subject Peoples of, 343, 344. *See* Austria
 Hutler, General von, 343
 Illyria, 20
 Imperialism, strengthened by Bismarck's strategy, 51, 52; dominating spirit in Austria, 109, 110; driven out in Central Empires, 380-381, 385-386
 Independence, Italian Wars for, first campaign of, 25-48. *See* National spirit
 Industry, adapted for manufacture war materials, 181, 281
 Interventionists, denounce Italy's neutrality, 188, 189
 Ireland, 42, 116
 Irredentism, spirit of, in ascendancy, 110-118
 Irredentist provinces, strife over, 144, 193-195; Italians never resigned to loss of, 203; return to Italy
 Irredentists, 104, 105, 109; conflict with Jugo-Slavs, 111, 112
 Isonzo, fighting on the, 227-229, 234; believed impregnable, 240, 241, 251; Italian offensive (1916), 265, 266
 Istria, under Venetian Republic, 9; Austria holds, 46; appeals to Italy for protection, 111; Wilson and question of, 400
 Italian Commission to the United States, 294
 Italian Declarations of war, on Austria (May 23, 1915), 206; on Turkey (August 20, 1915), 240; on Bulgaria (October 10, 1915), 240; on Germany (August 27, 1916), 271
 Italian demands upon Austria, listed, 204, 205, *footnotes*
 Italian Foreign Policy, *re* Tunis, 77, 78, 80-83; *re* Bosnia and Herzegovina, 108; *re* Turkey, 117, 118; *re* Tripoli, 120; *re* Albania, 174, 175. *See* Triple Alliance
 Italian front, length of, 222, 223, 252
 Italian history, continuity of, 1, 2, 148, 149
 Italian Labor Corps, in France, 365
 Italian legion, in France, 173
 Italian people, favor Allies, 177, 178; enter war voluntarily, 206, 207; celebrate impending declaration, 209-214; news of Declaration, 208, 215; rally after Caporetto, 318-320
 Italian representatives, at Peace Conference, 272-279
 Italian troops, in France, 346, 365
 Italian-Turkish War, causes, 117, 118; declared, 119, 120; Austria's attitude toward, 121, 122; end, 125; result, 143
 Italian workman, character of, 147
 "Italianità," definition of, 5, 33
 Italy, geography of, 55; at outbreak of World War, 142-147; sounded by Austria *re* Serbia, 151-153; declares neutrality, 160; mobilizes fleet, 161; resents interference with shipping, 166, 169-171; sentiment favors Allies, 166, 188-190; protest to Austria, 191; states position *re* Austria, 194-197; enters war, 206-214; advance during first winter, 233-235; Austrian offensive (1916), 253 *ff.*; Italian counter-offensive, 257 *ff.*; Italian offensive (1917), 296 *ff.*; Caporetto, 303 *ff.*; crushes Austrian army (1918), 372 *ff.*; difficulties after victory, 387 *ff.*
 Ivanof, General, 224
 Jagow, von, 152
 Janina, 129
 Japan, at war with Russia, 89
 Jassy, Roumanian Government retires to, 272
 Jellico, Admiral, 285
 Jerusalem, surrendered to General Allenby, 322, 323
 Joffre, Marshal, on French Commission to United States, 293
 Jugo-Slavs, 111, 112, 155, 343, 345; ambitions of, 389-390, 392-393
 Jutland, Battle of, 250, 251
 Kaiser. *See* William II
 Kellersburg, Baron von, Austrian Commissioner, 38
 Kemal Pasha, 125
 Kerensky, 289, 290
 Kiel, mutiny at, 384, 385
 Kitchener, Lord, 225
 Korniloff, General, 289, 290
 Kuhlmann, von, *re* Peace proposals, 364
 La Marmora, 45, 46, 48
 Lanza, Prime Minister, 51
 League of Nations, 396, 397, 398
 Lemberg, 224
 Lenin, 290
 Lion Gambetta, sunk in Adriatic, 224
 Leonardo da Vinci, blown up, 292
 Leopold, Prince, 50
 Liberalism, progress of, in Italy, 36, 37
 Liberty, wars for, in Italy, 28 *ff.* *See* Wars for Independence
 Libya, 119, 149, 150. *See* Italian-Turkish War
 Lima, 47, 205, *footnote*
 Limerica, 326
 Lloyd George, David, 116; *re* enemy peace proposals, 333; seconds nomination of Poch, 340, *note*
 Loan, Italian, 181; U. S. to Allies, 284; Britain to Italy, Treaty of London, 328
 Lombard League, 4
 Lombardy, 13, 30, 34, 41, 53, 54

129, 130, 131
 London, Treaty of (1915), 201, 202;
 terms, 325-328; and Peace Conference,
 400
 Ludendorff, General von, 309, 369
 Lusitania disaster, effect of, upon Italians,
 211, 213
 Luxemburg, 47, 49

 Macchiavellianism, 180
 Macchio, Austrian Ambassador (1914),
 168, 169
 Macedonia, Italian relations with, accord-
 ing to Titooni
 Macedonian Reform, steps toward inter-
 nationalization of, 97, 98
 Mackensen, General von, Russian drive
 of, 224; Serbian drive of, 238; over-
 comes Roumania, 272
 Magenta, battle of, 38, 39
 Malesoria, 173, *note*
 Mangin, General, 342, 361
 Manin, Daniel, 32
 Manzoni, 16
 Marcora, President of the Chamber, 213
 Margherita, Queen of Italy, leads women
 in war work, 232, 233
 Marmora, Sea of, Russian-English agree-
 ment *re*, 324
 Marne, battle of the, 342, 355
 Maude, General, 250
 Max of Baden, Prince, 369
 Maximilian I, 5, 6
 Mazzini, 5; birthplace, Genoa, 23, 24;
 comes into leadership, 28, 41, 42; and
 Bismarck, 50, 51, 80
 Meda, clerical Representative, 263
 Mediterranean, 89, 90; cleared of Bar-
 bary pirates, 93, 94
 Merchant vessels, arming of, 283-284
 Mesopotamia, Allied expedition in, 250,
 285, 286
 Messina, 41
 Metternich, Prince, 15, 20, 21, 22
 Michael, Grandduke, 288
 Milan (1848), 30, 31; anti-German riots
 at, 210
 Military position, difficulties of Italy's,
 222, 223, 226-230
 Mobilization, officially ordered, May 23
 (1915), 230, 231; second order of, 255
 Modena, 16, 21; unites with Piedmont,
 38, 39
 Mohammedans, in Balkans, 128
 Monastir, 130
 Monis, M., 116
 Monte Kuk, 266; Italians assault (1917),
 296
 Monte Nero, 226, 234
 Monte Sabotino, strategic importance of,
 240, 241, 242
 Montenegro, allied to Italy by marriage,
 78; Kingdom of, proclaimed, 101, 102;
 in Balkan Wars, 124-127; *re* Scutari,
 131, 137, 138; at outbreak of war, 162,
 163; effect of Serbia collapse in; Austria
 overwhelms, 246, 247

88; Germany stirs up trouble in, 90, 91,
 114, 115, 116
 Naples, 19, 22, 25; Garibaldi assumes title
 of Dictator of, 42
 Napoleon, ambitions of, *re* Italy, 7, 8, 13;
 prophesies achievement of Italian
 unity, 14; campaign in Italy (1805), 18,
 19, 21; gives Venice and Dalmatia to
 Austria, 55, 56
 Napoleon III, part of, in Italian wars for
 Independence, 38, 39, 44-47, 50, 51
 National spirit, origin of, 5; voiced by
 Dante, 16; survives Austrian rule, 21;
 discouraged by Treaty of Berlin, 72;
 intensified by World War, 393
 Nasim Pasha, assassinated, 129
 Neutral shipping, interfered with, 169,
 170, 291
 Neutrality, importance of Italy's declara-
 tion to Allies, 177, 179, 180
 Nicaragua, breaks off relations with Ger-
 many, 284
 Nice, taken from Piedmont by Napoleon,
 19; plebiscite in, 40; Italians resigned
 to loss of, 179
 Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 102, 247
 Nitti, resigns from Giolitti's Ministry,
 151, *note*; on Italian Commission to
 United States, 294; Ministry under, 403
 Nivelle, General, 287, 288
 Novara, 36
 Novi Bazar, railroad concession, 98, 99,
 101, 128

 Oberdan, 71, 212
 Odessa, seized by Germans, 338
 Oppressed Peoples, Conference of, 343,
 344, 345
 Orlando, in the Cabinet, 263; receives
 members of Conference of Oppressed
 Peoples, 344, 345; Ministry over-
 thrown, 402; called upon to form new
 Government after Caporetto, 320
 Ottoman Empire, height of power, 10;
 menace of, 20; field for exploitation, 62,
 63, 75, 76. *See* Turkey
 Ouchy, Peace Treaty signed at, between
 Italy and Turkey (1912), 125

 Palermo, 41
 Palestro, battle of, 38
 Pan-Serbidea, 155; Confederation formed,
 135, 137
 Pan-Slav movement, 79
 Panther, the, German gunboat, 116, 117
 Papacy, historic rivalry with Empire, 3,
 4, 36; influence upon Italian history,
 16, 17; wide-spread power of, 51-53;
 France and, according to Crispi, 76, 87.
See "Roman Question"
 Papadopol area, fighting in, 374 ff.
 Papal states, rule in, 27, 28; invaded by
 revolutionists, 42
 "Parecchio," the, of Giolitti, 188
 Paris, Treaty of, 18, 19
 Parliament, first Italian, 43
 Parma, 16, 21; Duke of, 25
 Passenger ships, sinking of, 371

- Pavia, 6, 7
 Peace Conference, 396; League of Nations, 397, 398; Italy's diplomatic errors at, 399, 400; Italian Commissioners leave Paris, 401; return, 402
 Peace, proposals by Central Empires (December, 1916), 274; Wilson's note to belligerents (1916), 274, 275; Pope expresses hope of, 275; Allies reply to German proposal, 277; to President's note, 279; Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech, 281, 282; Pope invites discussion (August, 1917), 301; Emperor Charles *re* (1917), 362; Wilson's "Force to the Uttermost," 364
 Pellegrini, Lieutenant-Commander, 379
 Pellico, Silvio, 24
 Pershing, General, nominates Foch as Commander-in-Chief, 340, *note*; proposes separate sector for American army, 355, 356
 Persia, Russian-English agreement *re*, 324
 Persia, the, sunk, 245
 Perugia, 16, 43
 Pétain, General, 249, 287, 288, 361
 Petrarch, 5, 16
 Piacenza, revolts against Austria, 39
 Plave, Italians halt Austrian offensive at, 315, 317, 318, 330, 338; Italian offensive opens on, 348, 368, 369, 374 *ff.*
 Piedmont, forms league with Austria (1792), 18; Napoleon and, 19, 23; leader in Italian wars for independence, 26, 30, 31; votes to join United Italy, 39, 41, 43
 Pilo, Count Rosalino, 41
 Pius IX, 31, 32; refuses to recognize Kingdom of Italy, 43; declaration of infallibility, 51, 52
 Planka, 326
 Plebiscite, in Nice, 40, 41; in Sicily, 43
 Podgora, 240-242; wasted in Isonzo drive, 266
 Poincaré, President, 269
 Pola, Austrian Fleet at, 379, 380
 Poland, revolution in ancient kingdom of, 29; 338, 393
 Pope. *See* Pius IX, Benedict XV, Gregory
 Porta Pla, 51, 52, 178
 Porte, the, secret treaty with England, 60, 61, 96. *See* Turkey
 Prague, Treaty of, 111
 Preparations, by Italy, for war, 171, 181, 182, 223
 Press, Allied, criticises Italy, 248; *re* Wilson's peace notes, 275, 280-283
 Press, Italy's attitude toward neutral war-correspondents, 171, 172; attacks Gholitti, 188; propaganda of German-owned newspapers, 229
 Prisoners, Austrian, in Carso offensive, 297
 Propaganda, German, *re* shipping of foodstuffs, 291; in Italy, 217; success of, in Russia, 289
 Provence, 6
 Prussia, growth of power, 21
 Przemysl, 224
 Public opinion, begins to favor Italy's entry into war, 198, 199
 Publication of Secret Treaties (1917), 324
 Punic wars, similarity of, to the World War, 2
 Quarto, celebration at, 209
 Queen mother, prominent in war work, 233
 Quirinal, opposed to Vatican, 185
 Quirinal Palace, transformed into hospital, 232
 Radetsky, 30, 34, 42
 Railways, German control of, in Italy, 182
 Rattazzi, Ministry of, falls, 40
 Ravenna, 16
 Red Cross, Italian, after Caporetto, 318, 319; American, 388
 "Red Shirts," 13
 Reformation, origin of, 3, 4
 Reggio, votes to unite with Piedmont, 39
 Religion, cause of wars, 3, 9; source of trouble in Tripoli, 119
 Revolution, 18; in Piedmont, 26, 27; Garibaldi leader of, 41-44
 Revolution, French, 18
 Revolution, of Young Turks, 129
 Revolutions, in attainment of Italian unity, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33, 36
 Rhine, French intentions on, 325
 Ribot, M., *re* discussion of Peace terms, 362, 363
 Ricasoli, 43
 Risorgimento, II, 30
 Risorgimento, origin of, 8; continuity of, 9; influence of, 13; great figures of, 24
 Rizzo, Commander, 379
 Robertson, General, visits Italy after Caporetto disaster, 316, 317
 Robland, General *di*, 265, 314
 Rodd, Sir Rennell, British Ambassador, 207, *footnote*
 Romagna, 39, 145
 Roman Church, conservatism of, 31, *note*
 Roman Question, 68, 69; explained, 185
 Rome, power of, influences Italian history, 16; changed to Republic by Napoleon, 19; declared capital of Italy, 36; outside of United Italy, 43; Garibaldi's war cry, "Rome or death," 44
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 94
 Rossi, Count, 33
 Rouher, 49
 Roumania, in Second Balkan War, 132-135; geography and people of, 133; Austria's ambition *re*, 156, 159; attitude toward World War, 224, 237, 238; Allies urge entry of war by, 268, 269; declares war on Austria, August 27 (1916), 271; overwhelmed by Austrians, 272, 273; forced to make peace, 338
 Russia, early history, 10, 11; benevolent neutrality toward Prussia in Franco-Prussian War, 61; enters Triple Entente (1907), 88; attitude toward Algeciras, 93; *re* Austria's annexation of Bosnia, 99; Tsar visits German emperor, 115; attitude toward Balkan

- League, 126, 127; yields to Roumanian demands, 268, 269; revolution in, 288-290; Brest-Litovsk treaty signed, 321
 Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty (1916), 325
- Sabotino, Monte, strategic importance of, 241, 242; carried by Italians (1916), 242
- "Sacro Egoismo," phrase misinterpreted, 182, 183
- Sadowa, battle of, 46, 49
- Salandra, in power at outbreak of war, 149, 150; *re* death of San Giuliano, 167; advocates policy of "Sacro Egoismo," 182, 183, 186; resigns and is recalled by King, 212, 213; meets charge of Italy's breach of faith in entering war (1915), 217-220; resigns, 260
- Salisbury, Lord, 67
- Salonica, Austrian desire for, 97
- Salzburg, 90
- San Giuliano, Marquis di, *re* Triple Alliance, 92; character of, 151; informed of Austria's intention to declare war on Serbia, 153-155; *re* Italy's occupation of Saseno, 175; death of, 167, 182
- San Martino, battle of, 39
- San Mihail, 355
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 11, 61
- Sarajevo, assassination at, 140, 152; Count Tisza *re*, 157, 158
- Sardinia, early history of, 17, 23, 26, 30, 37; in Italian Wars for Independence, 38 *ff.*; joins United Italy, 43
- Sarrail, General, 239, 246, 247
- Saseno, island of, 174, 175
- Savoy, goes to France, 19, 179
- Savoy, House of, growth of power, 17, 18, 26; Victor Emmanuel III a descendant of, 23; activities of, in World War, 232, 233
- Saxony, 46
- Schleswig and Holstein, Bismarck takes from Denmark, 45
- Schools, Austrian policy in, 109, 112, 113
- Scialoja, 263
- Scutari, 129, 246
- Sea, Italy's power on, 77; "Freedom of the Sea," 333, 334
- Secrecy of Italian policy, 171, 172, 181, 182
- Sedan, battle of, 51
- Serbia, gains independence, 62, 74-76; tariff war with Austria, 95, 96; *re* Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99-103; in Balkan Wars, 124-127, 131 *ff.*; agreement with Bulgaria *re* Macedonia, 126, 127, 131; ambitions of Pan-Serb Confederation, 135, 137; Austrian communications after Sarajevo, 140, 141, 151 *ff.*; Austria declares war on, 154-156; disaster of, 236-240; helps defeat Bulgars, 359, 360
- Sicily, early history, 13, 33, 36; liberated by Garibaldi, 41, 43
- Siena, 16
- Sixtus, Prince, Emperor Charles writes to, *re* discussion of Peace, 362
- Slavic race, 9, 10
- Smyrna, Italian right to occupy, 395
- Socialists, power of, in the Chamber, 184; war-socialists, 214; peace socialists, 217; 392
- Solferino, battle of, 38, 39, 54
- Somme, Battle of the, 250, 268
- Sonnino, Baron, Premier, 92; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 167, 168; confers with Von Bülow (1914), 192; states Italy's position *re* Austria, 194-197; diplomacy of, 202-204; *re* Italian retreat (1916), 259; and Bissolati, 263; *re* Albania, 299, 300; favors Expansionist policy after war, 394; Ministry of, collapses, 402
- South America, and the War, 280, 284
- Soviet Government, in Russia, 289
- Spa, German headquarters at, 334
- Spain, 18, 22, 26, 42, 43, 50, 142
- Spanish-American War, effect of, in Europe, 85
- Sphere of influence, granted to England in Persia, 324
- Spirit, of Italian soldiers, 223, 242, 243
- Status quo, in Balkans, violated by Austria, 99, 100
- Stefanik, Colonel, Czech-Slovak leader, 345
- Subject Peoples, emancipation of, 343, 344
- Submarine policy, of Germany, 283, 284, 290, 291
- Subsidiy, Italian, 331, 332
- Suez Canal, seized by England, 68
- Sultan Aziz, 90, 91
- Sultan, of Morocco, 117
- Sultan, of Turkey, 117
- Swift, Major-General, in command of American troops in Italy, 357, *see note*
- Switzerland, gains independence, 6, 17; and the World War, 225
- Szögeny, Count, 158
- Tagliamento, the, 313, 314
- Talleyrand, 8
- Taxation, in newly formed kingdom, 57, 58
- Temporal power. *See* Papacy
- Territory, promised to Italy in Pact of London, 326-328
- Thomas, Duke of Genoa, Regent during King's absence, 231
- "Thousand, The," 13, 41
- Three Emperors' League, 60, 61; renewed, 67; amounts to nothing, 104
- Tirpitz, Admiral von, 140
- Tisza, Count, Hungarian Premier, 141; *re* attack on Serbia, 157, 158; assassinated, 333
- Tittoni, Tommaso, inclined to favor Austria, 104, 105, 106, 107; reaffirms support of Triple Alliance, 113
- Tolmino, fortress of, 226
- Toulon, 43
- Townshend, General, 250
- Trades-Unions, Lloyd George addresses, 334
- Transportation, of Italian troops, 236, *see footnote*
- Treachery, stamped out in Italy, 292; in France, 116

- Treat, Brigadier-General, in charge of American troops in Italy, 357, *see note*
- Treaties, Secret, published by Bolsheviks, 201, 202, 324, 325. *See Treaty of London*
- Treaties, Secret, *re* Cyprus, 61, 62; *re* French and Italian African colonies, 88, 92; *re* Persia and Dardanelles, 301, 302
- Trebigne, 326
- Trent, 46, 47, 379
- Trent, captured by Italians, 379
- Trentino, the, Italian province in Austria's control, 46, 47, 55; essentially Italian, 110, 144, 179; offered as bribe by Austria, 197; promised to Italy in Pact of London, 326; Italians advance in (1916), 266, 271; forced to withdraw after Caporetto, 314; final capture by Italy, 378 ff.
- Trieste, integral part of Italy, 47, 110, 111, 144, 179; occupied by Italians, 378, 379
- Triple Alliance, founded by Bismarck, 67, 68; terms of, 70; hostility toward, in Italy, 71, 144, 160; renewals of, 77, 78, 125; purpose defensive, 83; weakened by Algeiras Conference, 92, 93; supported by Tittoni, 104-107; and Italian-Turkish War, 119, 121; and Saseno, 174-176; interpretation of terms, 176-178; renounced by Italy (May 3, 1915), 206. *See Article VII*
- Triple Entente, 88; strengthened by Algeiras Conference, 92
- Tripoli, Italian-French agreement *re*, 88; Germany and, 117, 118, 119; Italian-Turkish War concerning, 119 ff.
- Trotsky, 290
- Tunis, French occupation of, 66-68; Italian attitude toward French occupation of, 85-88
- Tunnels, great number of, to be guarded, 230
- Turin, in early history of Italy, 13, 17, 39; anti-German riots at, 210; strike in, *re* Caporetto, 303, 307
- Turkey, ancient enemy of Italy, 9, 10; friendly overtures of Central Powers, 90-94, 220; railway concession to Austria, 98; *re* Bosnian annexation, 100, 101; Italy declares war on (1911), 119, 120; defeated by Balkan League, 124, 125; European power curbed, 129, 130; 328; declares war on side of Central Empires, 163; hostility to Italy, 239, 240; seeks armistice, 360, 361
- Tuscany, early history of, 21, 38, 39
- Tyrol, acquired by Austria, 20
- Tyrolean, plied by Austria against Irredentists, 111, 112
- Tsar, forced to abdicate, 283, 289
- Udine, Prince of, on Italian Commission to United States, 294
- Udine, recaptured by Italians, 331
- Ukraine, occupied by Germans, 338
- Umana, the, 23
- "United Italy," early conception of, 5; Napoleon prophesies, 14; intensity of feeling for, 16, 22, 25-28; Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, and Modena vote for, 32, 33; two Sicilies vote for, 43; Rome secured as capital, 53; debts of new government, 56
- United States, war with Spain, effect of, in Europe, 85; takes part at Algeiras, 93, 94; Italian knowledge of, 142, 143; neutral shipping interfered with, 170; war-correspondents barred from Italian front, 171, 172; declares war on Germany (April 14, 1917), 283, 284; entry of war celebrated in Europe, 293; visited by Allied Commission, 294; divided on League of Nations, 397, 398
- Unpreparedness of Italy for war, 178, 180, 181, 223, 227
- Uskub, evacuated by Serbs, 238
- Valona, key to Adriatic, 79; Austrian proposal *re*, 125, 126; Italian occupation of, 169, 174-177, 194; Italian demand for sovereignty, 206, *note*; troops transported to, 236
- Vatican, in early Italian history, 52, 142; "non expedit" of, 184, 185; attitude toward World War, 164-167; peace proposals of, 275, 301; renews terms of London Pact, 323, 330. *See Papacy*
- Venice, Austrian control of, 7; Republic of, 9, 10; Napoleon and, 18, 19; shifted between Italy and Austria, 15, 34, 42-44, 53; bombed, 346
- Venizelos, statesmanship of, 123, 124; sends Greek regiment to Argyrokastro, 175; driven out of power, 238; returns to power, 298
- Venosta, Visconti, 51, 93
- Verdun, struggle for, 248, 249, 250
- Veribus Unis, Austrian flagship, destroyed, 330
- Verona, bombed, 346
- Victor Emmanuel II, in wars for Italian Independence, 23, 24, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40-43, 48, 51, 52; proclaimed King of United Italy, 43
- Victor Emmanuel III, descendant of House of Savoy, 23; marriage of, 78, 82; message of, to Quarto celebration, 209, 210; summons Crown Council, 212; recalls Salandra, 213; at the front, 231, 232; appeals to People after Caporetto, 316
- Victor Hugo, 71
- Vienna, Congress of, 8, 19, 30
- Vittorio-Veneto, Battle of, 373
- Viviani, on French Commission to United States, 293
- Waddington, M., 67
- Wallachia, captured by Austrians, 272, 273
- Warsaw, 224
- Westphalia, Treaty of (1648), 6
- White, Henry, at Algeiras Conference, 94
- Wied, Prince William of, 137, 138, 139, 173
- William II, Emperor, visits Italy, 86, 87; attitude toward Italian-English friend-

- ship, 89; visits Tangier, 90, 91; and Roosevelt, 94; visited by Tzar (1910), 115; visits Francis Joseph, 139; *re* Austrian attack on Serbia, 156-159; driven from throne, 370, 384; failure of, to save honor by entering battle, 386
- Wilson, Woodrow, re-elected, 274; note of, to belligerents (Dec., 1916), 274, 275; reply of Allies, 279, 280; "Peace without Victory" speech, 281, 282; calls special session of Congress, 284; "Fourteen Points" of, 332-335; attitude of Italian people toward, 350-352; "Force to the Uttermost" speech, 364 *ff.*; at the Peace Conference, 396-398; visits Italy, 400
- Workmen, revolt of, in Turin, 303, 307
- World, the New York, attacks Italy's motives in war, 280, 281
- World War, threatened (1909), 103; (1911), 116; political situation in Europe at outbreak of, 162 *ff.*
- Wurtemberg, 49
- "Young Italy," 28 *ff.*
- "Young Turks," revolution of, 96, 97, 129; and Tripoli, 118, 119; turned out, 125
- Ypres, battles of, 184, 225, 286, 321
- Zupelli, General, War Ministry intrusted to, 189; efficiency of, 233
- Zürich, Peace of, 39

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Aug 20 1940

